This is part 1.0 of a series on the US-Iran war and the present US global energy offensive. Hormuz developments are altering some elements of the one, “Global Barrel” market-centered collective energy-security model that dates to 1973, and which I named this blog after 15 years ago (after I had apparently coined that name).
I will have No. 2.0 of this Iran series soon. Here is 1.0, my brief BBC interview of last night, with some comments below here.
This was my fourth interview with BBC Persian Service, London in recent months. It feels important to get things clear when I have the opportunity to speak directly to Iranians or to Ukrainians.
Comments:
The larger USA global oil-sector offensive involves Russia, Iran, Venezuela, India, and other countries. I’ve seen these each as USA “shaping operations” aimed at preparing the energy landscape favorably to the US and its allies before any future armed conflict with China might begin – or to prevent one.
As I explained earlier (e.g., Jerusalem Post interview), a problem for the Islamic Republic of Iran, in deciding to take control of Hormuz, is that its control can only degrade over time under US pressure.
In the past few weeks, as it’s grip was loosened by the US military, it needed to find a further lever. In the past few weeks Tehran tried two things to reverse its weakening Hormuz position:
Pictures taken by the author (T.W.O’D) during a dinner and Q&A with President Ahmadinejad, in NYC during 2010 UN General Assembly opening. Note quote from Ahmadinejad.
Some years ago, I was invited to dinner with President Ahmadinejad in NYC during the annual opening of the General Assembly.
The American think-tanks, consultancies, and x-diplomats present went on and on asking detailed questions about this or that scenario where US experts might work with Iranian experts to observe or limit the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. (I mentioned this 2010 dinner in a later post: “China’s Iran-Oil Import Angst. Part I” Feb 13, 2012.)
It became rather tiresome. Ahmadinejad clearly was growing tired of it. He then asked us,
“If this is all about our nuclear program, then I would like someone please to address here why did the United States side with Saddam Hussein and attack us before there was any issue of a nuclear program?” (Iranian President M. Ahmadinejad, 22 Sept 10, NYC, my notes, T.O’D.)
Everyone ignored his question, and simply kept up with their obviously pre-prepared technical questions. But, what had he meant?
To me, clearly he was referring to the Iran-Iraq war (Sept.1980-Aug.1988), when the USA, at a certain point, decided to take Iraq’s side and, among other things, sunk the entire Iranian Navy in a day, took over air traffic control for the Iraqi air force, started directly advising Iraq on strategy, and etc.
In the end, Iran had to accept an Iraqi peace deal after a crushing defeat facilitated by the USA. I recall now all these details vividly. And, all this was indeed well before any nuclear program.
Aside: I find it disturbing that so many “experts” refer to the supposed “Iraqi defeat” in that war. This was all understood at the time. For example, I quote here from the NYT, (Sec. A, Page 1, of July 21, 1988): Ayatollah Khomeini had personally endorsed the cease-fire demanded by United Nations Security Council Resolution 598. Iran’s supreme religious leader confirmed, for the first time, that he had approved the resolution and added, with his characteristic rhetorical flair: ”Taking this decision was more deadly than taking poison. I submitted myself to God’s will and drank this drink for his satisfaction.” (Emphasis added to the most famous part of Khomeni’s statement. T.O’D.) Further research will quickly show he had to sign as Iran was being soundly defeated at the time, hence the “poison” he had to swallow.
By the way, it is also known, at least in academic circles, from later extensive archival research, that the war with Iraq was planned and instigated by Iran, and that Iraq had attacked in response to Iranian provocations and signs of Tehran’s preparations, after warnings. I am happy to send references to those interested.
What I myself had been arguing, back then, during the Iran-Iraq War Ahmadinejad was referring to, was that the US-Iran confrontation was actually about the US opposition to any country, either from inside the Gulf Region or outside the Region, gaining hegemony over the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. This had to do with guaranteeing the free flow of oil, and that the global oil market would be a “real” market that no one state could unduly control. I had even coined a term, “The Global Barrel,” for this market-centered, post-OPEC-nationalizations collective oil-security system, a system initiated by Henry Kissinger in 1973.
Guaranteeing Gulf energy flows to allies has always been a core US interest, while today’s Great Power Competition means China’s access will be rendered conditional.
This is not the Iraq war. If after operations to secure the coasts and islands and to clear mines, the Iranian regime resists, the USA plan is that Iran’s oil sector and economy would be destroyed by aerial bombardment. Washington neither desires nor needs to occupy Iran proper nor to change the regime. The US strategic imperative here is to secure, long term energy flows from the Region and, accordingly, to end the regime’s capacities to project regional power.
After almost 30 years of analysis and my university seminars, there is very little I see new here, save a new USA urgency.
In my view, this urgency flows from USA concerns over Great Power Competition, especially with China. This is exacerbated by the possibility that Iran could close the Strait in solidarity with China (or perhaps Russia) during any Great Power conflict elsewhere. The threat of Iran’s developing capacities in this regard, especially its missiles and drones, but also its nuclear weapons ambitions and intentions to rebuild its regional proxy allies, all act to undermine the prerogatives of the USA and its Gulf regional allies to secure the region and its energy flows.
In any case, the idea that Washington and Trump “have no strategy” is demonstratively wrong, and self-disarming. (See, for example, my EIES study of Trump administration energy policy since ca. April 2025 v. Russian oil.) One might not fully understand the strategy, or might disagree with it, but there is clearly a multifaceted strategy here under the general slogan of “USA Energy Dominance” (e.g., see posts here and here). Besides Iran, it especially includes Russia, Venezuela, India, and of course China, as well as US domestic oil, gas, nuclear and renewables policies.
Author’s screen shot from NTD News. The statement was posted on Tuesday.
Note, a third Amphibious Assault Group, an aircraft carrier with an additional Marine Expeditionary Unit of 2000-2500 troops, has just arrived to join two other already in the Region. This further shows that Trump is increasing preparations to seize Hormuz, not backing down.
Both Christof Rühl (bio) and Jack Kemp (bio) had great, data-driven media this past week. I too addressed these issues (spoiler: I assess Trump is not bluffing on Iran talks, and oil supply remains adequate.) My conflict-trajectory take differs a bit from Chrisof, perhaps closer to Jack K here.. My Al Jazeera was just after Trump announced talks.
Dear readers, This paper, which I wrote in 2008-09, analyzed the evolution of interests underlying the US-Iran crisis till then, interests which persist in the 2026 US-Iran war.
That is, Trump’s “USA Energy Dominance” strategy does not seek to fundamentally alter the structure or logic of the post-1973 global, market-centered, USA-led-and-protected oil order. However, to preserve it, the USA now feels the necessity of removing the Iranian mullahs as custodians of Iran’s oil for persistently insisting on projecting power and seeking hegemony in the energy-critical Gulf Region.
What is new from 2008, is the bipartisan urgency felt in Washington to renovate the existing oil market-and-security order, reconsolidating the USA as primary arbiter of energy flows via Hormuz to both China and US allied and friendly states of the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, to be capable of significantly blocking Russian oil exports and thereby its petrostate-fueled aggression elsewhere.
In particular, it mush achieve these aims, vis-a-vis Russia and China, without causing global oil shocks. (continued in full-column below …)
Mar 12, 2026. Is the Iran war about the US containing China? For my part, I explained how control of Hormuz would give the US two key levers:
The USA will control half of China’s oil imports, 5.4 million barrels per day (mbd), which flow through Hormuz.
The USA will insure that during any Pacific war China might start that Iran, acting in solidarity with China, could not block oil flows to US Asian allies such as Japan, S. Korea, Australia, Philippines, or flows to others whose supplies it would also want to guarantee, such as Viet Nam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, etc..
I was a bit insistent that the spike during the day today, to over $100 at some point, was overblown.
As I mentioned, Fatih Birol at IEA (I forgot to mention also Chris Wright, USA Secretary of Energy),who had said the same thing, insisting last Friday that there is plenty of oil in the market. (See Wright and Bloomberg’s Steven Stapczynski elaborate here). That is NOT a problem now.
And, in the interview, I detailed some facts about this (e.g., before the war started nine days ago, there were about 1.4 billion(!) barrels floating on the water, an unprecedented amount, and the Russians had nowhere to put their unsellable oil).
So, It turns out that late Monday evening news (EST USA time), the news coming from the USA vindicates my suspicions. For now, there is no plan by the administration to release SPR reserves into the market.
Notice what I explained about this likely being a short-lived boost for Russian oil That is, after the Venezuelan campaign, if the Trump admin. Iran campaign works, both China and Russia will be in a very restricted position in the now-USA tightly controlled international oil market supply chain.
Here is the WSJ saying the prices of oil dropped quite a bit, and the stock market rebounded as well by the end of the day. Following that is a Bloomberg take too.
This is a longish, ca. 30 minute video. Host Nataly Lutsenko kindly told me she wanted to make a long interview.
(During time of crisis like this, I have so many TV and press interviews that I don’t have time to put most of them online. So, I will refrain from writing long posts to accompany videos to get more online, if I think they are useful interviews. – Tom O’D)
Nataly Lutsenko at Kanal24 TV in Kyiv, invited me again to an interview. We discussed, in detail, what I see as “the oil war” jointly waged by Ukraine and the USA against Russia. Each has its role:
(i) Ukraine is waging an air campaign with drones and missiles against Russian refineries, oil export terminal ports, and oil tankers. This is an audacious and expanding campaign seriously impeding Russian capacity to handle export of the oil its fields produce.
It is important to note, politically, that these attacks are assisted by USA intelligence, as reported in October by the FT. Ukraine’s intelligence chief also spoke of Ukraine’s crucial dependence on US intelligence assets on 20 December, and later on the depth. Unlike the former “oil price cap” strategy of the Biden administration and the early months of the second-Trump administration, the present, much expanded air war on Russian oil is now clearly embraced by the USA.
(ii) For its part, the USA’s role in this oil-war – along with NATO, UK, EU and G7 allies – involves increasingly harsh tariffs and sanctions against Russian oil exports.
I was interviewed on CNN International’s “Newsroom” with host Kim Brunhuber – live, Friday, 12 Dec. 2025. The transcript is below. Kim asked about Venezuela’s oil industry, the impact of sanctions, what stricter enforcement could do to the Venezuelan economy, and what the US stands to gain if it ultimately gains greater access to the country’s oil reserves? He also wanted to know what Venezuelans are saying. / CNN says: “The show is broadcast around the world on CNN International, and in the US on our new platform All Access.”
Here is the video of our 10 Nov. event, organized by EIES (European Institute for Energy Security). Our topic was the turn in US Trump administration policy on ending Russia’s war against Ukraine and the Russian oil sector.
My sincere thanks to EIES, and especially Executive Director Albéric Mongrenier, for inviting me along with distinguished energy and geopolitics experts. (Note: EIES is affiliated with, but policy-independent of, SAFE in Washington).
Our distinguished expert panel included:
Dr. Jaak Aviksoo, Former Minister of Defence of Estonia, EIES Energy Security Leadership Council
Christof Rühl, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, former BP Chief Economist
Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, Energy and Geopolitical Strategist and Founder of GlobalBarrel.com
Moderated by Rosemary Griffin, OPEC+ Lead Reporter, S&P Global Commodity Insights
Opened by Peter Flory, Senior Fellow, EIES, Former NATO Assistant Secretary General
A central question we addressed was the turn in the Trump administration policy to apply significant coercive measures against the Russian oil sector to undermine the ability of the Putin government to continue its was in Ukraine. We discussed how effective the new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil might be and what is the synergistic effect of the Ukrainian drone and missile campaign against Russian domestic refineries and oil export terminal ports.
For an update on expanded attacks on Russian Black Sea oil ports and their meaning, see the written comments accompanying my Kanal24 video interview, posted on Monday, 17 Nov. “The US & Ukraine pound Russian oil | my Kanal24, Kyiv“).
You are invited to register now for Monday, 10 Nov. at 14:00 UK || 15:00 CET || 9:00 ET, an EIES Webinar. [My view: the USA, Ukraine & allies can dismantle the Russian petrostate. My posts on this are linked at the end]. I’m honored to join experts:
Dr. Jaak Aviksoo, Former Minister of Defence of Estonia, EIES Energy Security Leadership Council
Christof Rühl, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, former BP Chief Economist
Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, Energy and Geopolitical Strategist and Founder of GlobalBarrel.com
Moderated by Rosemary Griffin, OPEC+ Lead Reporter, S&P Global Commodity Insights
Opened by Peter Flory, Senior Fellow, EIES, Former NATO Assistant Secretary General
Dismantling the Petrostate: Moment of Truth for Russian Oil? – Webinar: Monday 10 Nov.
Register Now – Allies have so far failed to break Putin’s war machine. The EU recently agreed on a 19th round of sanctions and plans to further ramp down Russian energy supplies. But EU sanctions have shown their limits, political leaders have not been able to use Russia’s frozen assets to aid Ukraine, and Moscow’s hydrocarbons still flow into the Union and other major markets.
Washington’s and London’s most recent sanctions may change the game. As we enter another winter of war, can Europe and the United States build on hard-won Transatlantic convergence to strike a decisive blow to the engine of the Kremlin’s aggression: Russia’s oil exports? Can the EU agree to and successfully manage the phaseout of Russian oil and gas?
The ceasefire Trump brokered will hopefully end this “12-Day War.” I want to discuss here why this war did not trigger a global energy crisis. [Here’s what I said about this to Al Jazeera last week, in the last five paragraphs. A PDF is also embedded below. I’ll also post a TRT-London show on Iran’s nuclear strategy, recorded Tuesday, soon.]
To assess the risk to energy supplies, understanding the aims of the combatants is key. Throughout this war, it was the USA-Israel side setting the agenda, and there were two strategic aims they could pursue. One was to “only” destroy Iran’s nuclear program and its existing conventional regional power-projection capacities. The second was to go beyond this to undermine the viability of the Islamic Republic, up to forcing a regime change. Why do I say this?
Above: Audio of my comments to (various) press on 22 April 25, on the impact of falling oil prices on Russia’s capacity to war on Ukraine. Also, a scenario I have discussed for over a year, first privately and then publicly, of how the USA could shut down the great majority of Russia’s seaborne oil exports, to devastating consequences for its oil sector and capacity to continue the war. In the present market situation of oversupply and anticipated continued weak demand, this could be done in a way that does not spike global oil prices.
This will only be done if Trump decides he needs to use harsh coercion to force Putin into an acceptable peace deal with Ukraine, AND if Trump were willing to impose lasting harm on the older Russian oil fields.
My long print interview at Lithuania’s LRT [Lithuanian PDF | English PDF] with Aleksandra Ketlerienė, deputy editor-in-chief of Lithuania’s LRT.lt, published 7January. We spoke in Warsaw, 19 November. My thanks to Aleksandra for her insightful questioning and editorial care. We discussed:
The EU’s systemic energy-policy “own goals” since its initial energy-crisis win after Moscow began cutting gas exports early in 2021.
Reforming failed/ineffective Russian price-cap sanctions for real sanctions, and how the global oil market is now favorable for “maximum pressure.”
Historical perspectives on oil, gas, renewables, and nuclear sectors, essential for realistic policy formation.
An historical overview of China’s decades-long effort to overcome its energy security, learning lessons of Japan’s WW2 weaknesses.
