ENGLISH version. Sky News (UAE), 20 August 2026, Dr. Tom O’Donnell (in Berlin).
I told Sky (UAE), Hormuz is now “a game of chicken” – who can wait the longest and bear the most pain. I tried to look objectively at the two sides.
a) On the Iran side, oil exports are reportedly zero since about 15 July. None of Iran’s oil ships seem to have left Hormuz. A massive accumulation of Iranian oil cargo sits on ships near Malaysia and Singapore, while perhaps 53 loaded ships are stuck in the Gulf due to the US Navy blockade. For a petrostate, this is devastating.
In addition, all Iranian ports are blocked form exporting or importing anything.
What oil can perhaps leave by train to China, say 70,000 barrels per train taking two weeks, is painfully small and costly.
Trump has now declared a push to block any payments or financial transfers to and from Iran. But, if no one is selling anything in either direction, there will be less and less financial flows to block.
For the regime, this is dire. It does not mean Iran will surrender, or even talk, but it is clearly devastating.
Pakistan TV, 9 Aug. We discussed the Trump administration’s two retreats from forcefully reopening Hormuz. This is not so simple as who is winning and who is losing.
The first of two key factors to note: It was GCC allies who sharply blocked Trump from executing planned big assaults on Iran to facilitate reopening Hormuz, on fear of Iranian missile punishment which would continue until the US military finished silencing most of Iran’s missile capacities. The Saudis and Qataris were most sharply opposed to accepting this punishment. What are the implications?
a) On the one hand, their refusal to allow Trump to use force to resolve the Hormuz crisis is a de facto success for the Iranian strategy of attacking all GCC states expecting them to then oppose USA military action against Iran.
b) On the other hand, I suspect the Trump-Vance response to GCC allies caving in to Iranian missiles was similar to the attitude the administration took to Europe and NATO in early 2025, for being seen as unwilling to really fight for either Ukraine or their own nations’ security, assuming the bulk of the task would be performed by the USA. Trump’s comments that Gulf allies should “pay the United States” for protecting them once the Straight is reopened, seems a reflection of this mindset.
Interestingly, we then see the rapid emergence of a new “Islamic NATO” mutual defense alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and perhaps soon Egypt. And simultaneously the Saudi-led new 19-country Red Sea defense league.
These are a striking departure from past Gulf practice. They should be seen, among other things, as an urgent Saudi recognition that the USA either refuses and/or is incapable of continuing to bear the burden of their defense, especially via American “boots on the ground.” I recall when the Obama administration told the Saudis the same, and indeed the Saudis made some military adjustments, including in Yemen, but obviously nothing anywhere like these alliances.
Now, with its new military alliances, the Saudis and their Gulf allies will increasingly be capable of fighting and be expected to actually join in any fight against Iran’s push for hegemony in Hormuz, in the Gulf Region and MENA generally.
The second large factor to note: I also explained how the Iranian leadership’s key lever, their ability to disrupt and partially close Hormuz, is seen by the US administration as a diminishing lever. There are two main indications of this:
First, the absence of what had been widely predicted to be astronomical oil price spikes after Hormuz was closed and,
Second, agreements are now in place in several Gulf states that four or five new oil pipelines to be built in the next couple years to bypass the Straight.
In fact, Sec. Bessent said exactly this shortly after my interview where I had anticipated this USA attitude. He (characteristically over-) confidently declared these pipelines mean the Straight will become “irrelevant”. And, shortly thereafter, Sec. of Energy Chris Wright was insistent that USA forces are now escorting eight or nine million barrels per day (mbd) of oil out of the Straight, implying a decreasing capacity of Iran to interrupt shipping.
As I have said before here, this tells the administration that it objectively has much more leeway, timewise, for resolving this crisis than any other administration would have before. This is part of their calculation that they can now, in effect pause any significant offensive military operations and focus on a new (really a second) “economic war” against Iran, to undermine it. However, IMHO, this in-itself cannot, with this particular IRGC-led regime, be sufficient to resolve the Hormuz crisis. In the end, this will require with the use of substantial USA force to accomplish physical occupation, with troops and electronically, of the shore-region of the Straight, and significant further erosion of Iranian missile and drone stocks and capacities to import and/or produce these. Alternatively, a USA back-down, a partial “surrender” is required, which would be almost impossible for any president to accept considering Iranian demands at present, which are hardly conciliatory.
TRT-London asked me tonight about oil-market impacts of the deal between Iran and Oman. The title says most of it.
Of course there has been hardship globally with higher energy prices and volatility. However, compared to what would have happened 10 or 20 years ago, this is very significantly smaller.
Oil on average has been up only 25%, and refined products 36% since 28 Feb. (“Why Oil Prices Could Hit a Breaking Point by Year End,” WSJ, Video, 3aug26). Why?
The huge surplus in oil production that was building globally for at least three or four years, plus the constantly falling energy intensity of the economy, plus the high degree of interconnectedness of the one-global-barrel market (the name of this blog for the past 15 years) explains this relatively mild impact thus far. I explained this, and the geopolitical advantage, the long time line, it has given Trump and Washington to go slow and talk a lot as compared to the urgency they would have had earlier.
This is both a case of:
a) More oil being produced globally due to huge advances in petroleum and gas exploration and production (E&P) technologies, Especially in the USA, where a new “Fracking 4.0” stage of the Shale Revolution seems to be underway, one that could boost extraction rates of previously drilled wells by factors of 50-300%, according to various industry tech reports. This is all about US high tech and perfecting of methodologies. (See, Javier Blas, “Shale Oil’s Next Revolution Should Worry OPEC” Bloomberg, 30Nov25).
In addition, there have also been significant tech improvements in deeper offshore production, and in exploration generally, leading to a lot of new, large-sized proven reserves to exploit And,
Both Christof Rühl (bio) and Jack Kemp (bio) had great, data-driven media this past week. I too addressed these issues (spoiler: I assess Trump is not bluffing on Iran talks, and oil supply remains adequate.) My conflict-trajectory take differs a bit from Chrisof, perhaps closer to Jack K here.. My Al Jazeera was just after Trump announced talks.
Mar 12, 2026. Is the Iran war about the US containing China? For my part, I explained how control of Hormuz would give the US two key levers:
The USA will control half of China’s oil imports, 5.4 million barrels per day (mbd), which flow through Hormuz.
The USA will insure that during any Pacific war China might start that Iran, acting in solidarity with China, could not block oil flows to US Asian allies such as Japan, S. Korea, Australia, Philippines, or flows to others whose supplies it would also want to guarantee, such as Viet Nam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, etc..
I was a bit insistent that the spike during the day today, to over $100 at some point, was overblown.
As I mentioned, Fatih Birol at IEA (I forgot to mention also Chris Wright, USA Secretary of Energy),who had said the same thing, insisting last Friday that there is plenty of oil in the market. (See Wright and Bloomberg’s Steven Stapczynski elaborate here). That is NOT a problem now.
And, in the interview, I detailed some facts about this (e.g., before the war started nine days ago, there were about 1.4 billion(!) barrels floating on the water, an unprecedented amount, and the Russians had nowhere to put their unsellable oil).
So, It turns out that late Monday evening news (EST USA time), the news coming from the USA vindicates my suspicions. For now, there is no plan by the administration to release SPR reserves into the market.
Notice what I explained about this likely being a short-lived boost for Russian oil That is, after the Venezuelan campaign, if the Trump admin. Iran campaign works, both China and Russia will be in a very restricted position in the now-USA tightly controlled international oil market supply chain.
Here is the WSJ saying the prices of oil dropped quite a bit, and the stock market rebounded as well by the end of the day. Following that is a Bloomberg take too.
Last night on TRT World Global News (London), I emphasized that despite the modest spike in oil prices from about $70 to $78 per barrel as of yesterday, Trump has an historically unprecedented advantage for exercising “US Energy Dominance.”
Fig. 1. IEA projects global oil glut throughout 202
The campaigns against Venezuela and Iran, plus the turning of the Indian oil-consuming behemoth towards USA and Western interests vs Russian oil, are examples of the geopolitical leverage the USA’s now-dominant role in global oil affairs has afforded the Trump administration.
This oil-market advantage comes mainly from of two things:
A new USA-Ukrainian strategy has replaced the failed Russian oil-price cap. Oil is the material basis of Moscow’s capacity not only to fight Ukraine, but for its subversion in former USSR states, in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. In the US, one finds strong bipartisan sentiment that “Russia is a gas station, masquerading as a state,” as former-Senator John McCain famously remarked, and that Moscow must be deprived of its easy petrosate riches.
My study for European Initiative for Energy Security (EIES,based in Brussels, is associated with SAFE in Washington, DC, though policy-independent), traces the new USA-Ukrainian joint war on Russian oil, which includes sanctions, tariffs; drone strikes on Russian refineries, ports and oil tankers, and seizures of shadow fleet ships at sea. All these are part of a coherent campaign begun in Spring 2025, as the Trump administration realized that its focus on offering Putin economic enticements to end the war was proving ineffective. It became clear that the application of “pain”, as Trump put it, would be necessary.
The present study shows, in some technical detail, how it is possible to, first, physically stop the majority of Russian seaborn oil exports, secondly, that this can force the shutdown of old, delicate W. Siberian oil fields in winter resulting in the permanent or semi-permanent ruin of these fields, the material basis of the Russian petrostate economy.
This, in fact, is the real threat, the “pain”, which Putin has begun to fear, inducing him to engage for the first time a bit more seriously in negotiations.
The Report also draws attention to and analyses the unfortunate incapacity of many European expert observers and think tanks to see the outlines of this coherent oil war strategy, distracted by the considerable bluster and threats employed by President Trump.
Third, in parallel, the study explains presently favorable oil market conditions consisting of a persistent supply glut, making any major cutoff of Russian seaborne oil exports feasible without sparking a lasting spike in world prices. I show how the OPEC-Gulf states, especially the Saudis and UAE, have facilitated this glut in coordination with President Trump et al, with the prospect of regaining much of the Indian and Chinese market discounted Russian oil has taken since 2022.
For the longer term, however, in the conclusion to this report, it is shown how the return of Venezuelan barrels to the market (and perhaps Iranian barrels as well) are part of a comprehensive USA energy strategy to create market conditions enabling both persistent low prices and, if necessary, the permanent “Liquidation of the Russian Petrostate,” to end the Ukraine war and Moscow’s international significance-in-general.
This is all seen to be part-and-parcel of the Trump administrations detailed commitment – with significant bipartisan support – to exercise “USA Energy Dominance” as a pillar of USA geo-economic power and geostrategy.
I am available for interviews and speaking on this Report’s topic. Contact EIES or me directly.
-1- How US and other foreign oil firms can start immediately to stepwise developing three different types of oil fields. Yes, Venezuela can become a “powerhouse” oil producer. This could be a huge change in the global oil system.
-2- What is meant when Trump and oil firms talk about USA “security guarantees” for work in Venezuela. The USA government is unlikely to subsidize oil majors going into Venezuela. Instead, they are talking about somehow Washington managing a “regime change.” The KEY element of this is that the present pro-Chavista armed actors, both the state and non-state armed actors and the Chavista-state intelligence services, all of which are widespread in the country, are still intact and are still active, either agree to disband stepwise or to stepdown and not oppose the formation, eventually, of a new government elected freely. The instruments of state armed coercion that will remain, including elements of the police, intelligence services, national guard, army, must agree to serve whomsoever is democratically elected in future elections. However, as Trump himself points out, the foreign oil majors “are tough guys” and they have abundant experience and methods to work in countries having fairly dangerous situations.
Image from 2002 shows an oil refinery in Maracaibo, Vzla. Photo ANDREW ALVAREZ
Published Jan 10, 2026 – By, Brendan Cole, Senior News Reporter
Developing Venezuela’s oil industry following the removal of its leader, Nicolas Maduro, would require major legal and commercial changes, Exxon CEO Darren Woods has told President Donald Trump.
Energy industry analyst, Thomas O’Donnell, told Newsweek on Saturday that one approach would be for companies to work on small projects to kickstart production before targeting the oil fields that require heavy investment.
Image from 2002 shows an oil refinery in Maracaibo, Vzla. Photo ANDREW ALVAREZ
Published Jan 10, 2026 – By, Brendan Cole, Senior News Reporter
Developing Venezuela’s oil industry following the removal of its leader, Nicolas Maduro, would require major legal and commercial changes, Exxon CEO Darren Woods has told President Donald Trump.
Energy industry analyst, Thomas O’Donnell, told Newsweek on Saturday that one approach would be for companies to work on small projects to kickstart production before targeting the oil fields that require heavy investment.
7 January 2026, Al Jazeera English. On Venezuelan oil, and Trump’s new leverage over China’s oil-loans..
See especially (i) my second response re. China’s big risk regarding repayment of its $100b loans, collateralized with a promised flow of Venezuelan oil, and equally (ii) Janiv Shah’s first comment, on the more immediate China impact. It was a pleasure to be on with the well known oil expert Janiv Shah, VP RystadEnergy.
I was interviewed by David Karalvanov at bTV (Bulgaria) on the US-Venezuela confrontation under Trump and Maduro (01Dec). David used excerpts for a documentary and kindly gave me the full video here. An outline of the five questions and answers is below here.
Three Asides:
I recall vividly how Trump and co., in his first term, easily misled a naively dependent Venezuelan opposition into believing that the USA was planning to forcibly remove Maduro. In turn, the opposition convinced the country’s population that the USA was preparing to forcibly liberate them. This belief was deeply corrosive to advancing any self-reliant domestic anti-Maduro pro-democracy movement. In the end, the Trump administration tried a poorly prepared putsch. John Bolton, Trump’s then-National Security Advisor, the organizer, was embarrassingly gamed by the Venezuelan regime’s intelligence police. Meanwhile, the present Venezuelan opposition has long been unwilling to organize or endorse any popular movement to forcibly restore democracy from below.
In a recent CNN interview I spoke about Trump rationales for the present confrontation. See: “Why Trump wants a Venezuelan oil boom …“) and dangers of not preparing for the day-after possibilities of chaotic events, terrorism or resistance by armed pro-Chavista military or collectivo groups, and/or x-Colombian guerilla groups long active in the country.
I’ve written for 20 years on Venezuela, Chavismo and oil, including two years as visiting professor, Universidad Central de Venezuela’s UCV/CENDES, Caracas.–I’m happy to speak or consult on Ven.-US-China-Russia-Iran-Colombian-EU-… and/or Ven. domestic matters in English or Spanish.- Tom O’D
My thanks to Tor Klaveness at Kapital, Norway’s oldest and leading, business magazine. Below is an English translation, then the Norwegian original. – Tom O’D.
“Bone-crushing” and “draconian”: The law that could choke Putin’s oil revenues
If peace talks between Ukraine and Russia break down, the US Senate is ready to pass a sanctions package that could strangle Russia’s oil exports. In that case, it could significantly strengthen the oil market.
Energy Published 29 Nov. | Paywall removed, Updated 9 Dec.
“President Trump said this weekend, ‘Send me the bill.’ So we have to send him the bill to help end this war.”
Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, energy and geopolitical strategist
This was stated by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham in a panel debate on November 19 with Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal. The debate was moderated by Clayton Seigle, a senior fellow at the think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which also organized the debate.
The bill Graham referred to is the Sanctioning Russia Act , which he is co-sponsoring with Blumenthal. The bill already has the support of 85 of the 100 US senators and would give US authorities the right to impose punitive tariffs of no less than 500 percent on countries importing Russian energy.
PHOTO: Alexander Kazakov, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP/NTB
With a stick and a carrot
Dr. Thomas O’Donnell is an energy and geopolitical strategist, founder of GlobalBarrel.com and former global fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. He believes Congress is now poised to give President Trump an extremely potent weapon.
The proposal is being described as “bone-crushing” and “draconian,” and is set to be voted through almost unanimously in the Senate.
Here is the video of our 10 Nov. event, organized by EIES (European Institute for Energy Security). Our topic was the turn in US Trump administration policy on ending Russia’s war against Ukraine and the Russian oil sector.
My sincere thanks to EIES, and especially Executive Director Albéric Mongrenier, for inviting me along with distinguished energy and geopolitics experts. (Note: EIES is affiliated with, but policy-independent of, SAFE in Washington).
Our distinguished expert panel included:
Dr. Jaak Aviksoo, Former Minister of Defence of Estonia, EIES Energy Security Leadership Council
Christof Rühl, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, former BP Chief Economist
Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, Energy and Geopolitical Strategist and Founder of GlobalBarrel.com
Moderated by Rosemary Griffin, OPEC+ Lead Reporter, S&P Global Commodity Insights
Opened by Peter Flory, Senior Fellow, EIES, Former NATO Assistant Secretary General
A central question we addressed was the turn in the Trump administration policy to apply significant coercive measures against the Russian oil sector to undermine the ability of the Putin government to continue its was in Ukraine. We discussed how effective the new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil might be and what is the synergistic effect of the Ukrainian drone and missile campaign against Russian domestic refineries and oil export terminal ports.
For an update on expanded attacks on Russian Black Sea oil ports and their meaning, see the written comments accompanying my Kanal24 video interview, posted on Monday, 17 Nov. “The US & Ukraine pound Russian oil | my Kanal24, Kyiv“).
This Friday, Trump and Putin will talk in Alaska about the future of Ukraine. Why has Putin asked for this meeting?
The two have spoken repeatedly on the phone …. but, something changed. As I indicated in my previous post (here), Trump has turned from his preferred plan to end the war, to one of confrontation and coercion of Putin (what I have called “Plan B”), aiming to force him into halting his war of aggression and seriously discuss peace proposals.
It was an honor to speak with Natalia Lutsenko of Channel 24 TV in Kyiv, and the Ukrainian national audience on these heavy issues of war and peace. The video interview – about 34 minutes long – goes into some detail of my analysis of the balance of forces.
The Global Barrel 