Dear GlobalBarrel.com readers -and others- in Bulgaria, you are cordially invited. – I’m honored to give the highlight talk at the IGA Conference in Sofia, co-sponsored by the Polish Embassy. The program (Page 2 below, in red) lists my talk: “Russia in Global Politics, Regime Dynamics, Foreign Policy Outlooks and Interactions with other Powers,” Best, Tom O’D. (I’ll post a video after the conference.)
Central and South Eastern Europe After Four Years of War: New Trends and Old Patterns in Foreign Influence, Resilience-Building and Regional Cooper ation International Conference Grand Hotel Sofia, Triaditza 2 Hall 10 am – 5 pm, 27 October 2026
Dr. Tom O’Donnell (credit: Atlantic Council of Montenegro)
How to understand Trump? Below is one of the interviews I gave the Polish press a while back on European attempts at peace talks with Russia. It also examines renewed interest of some German political parties to repair North Stream and bring Russian gas back to Germany.
However, they should understand that, for Washington, this would only happen if Putin agrees to a peace deal. Reopening Nord Stream is but one of many enticements Trump is again offering Putin, along with his diesel deal, he’s also offered a return of Russian frozen assets, “trillions” in USA investments into the Russian economy, and many other “carrots” to entice Putin to make a deal ending Russia’s Ukraine war.
This sudden return to the enticements Trump offered Putin during his first three-or-four months in office, is seen by many observers as simply “treason”, a fawning after Putin. However, the press and most every commentator are missing the other side, the “big stick” Trump is also carrying as he makes these offers.
I am, of course, drawing an analogy to President Theodore Roosevelt’s adage, for dealing with foreign adversaries, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Well, Trump is not so adept at speaking “softly” but his elaborate economic and other enticements are essentially “speaking softly” to Putin. What I am saying is that these seemingly obsequious offers are only half the story. Often, in diplomacy, as any negotiation, there are important levers one or the other side can wield, whose obvious presence, as a sort of “sword of Damocles” hovering over the proceedings goes unspoken, at least publicly. These are things any objective analysis needs to bring to light. In this case, there are, objectively, two aspects, not one, to the Trump-administrations present approach to Russia:
I’m at the Warsaw Security Conference, an annual high-level gathering of European and US experts and officials, 12-13 Oct.
Everyone is trying to figure what in the world Trump thinks he’s doing by buying diesel from Putin and claiming Putin agreed to an energy ceasefire. Meanwhile, Russia foreign minister Sergey Lavrov rudely rejected any energy ceasefire, contradicting Trump, saying that Ukraine “does not deserve” a ceasefire.
All indications are that this deal is dead on arrival. I answered several questions and theorized what Trump hopes to accomplish.
It is clear from both European and American security experts and officials here in Warsaw, that no one thinks this “deal” will fly, or that it can really lower diesel prices. Instead, there is deep indignation that the President of the USA would so blatantly undermine the struggle against the Russian petrostate for its aggression in Ukraine. And, there are also market implications beyond the direct undermining Ukraine’s defensive war and allies’ Russian energy sanctions.
[Correction: I misspoke. Russia formerly exported about 800,000, not 800 “million” barrels of diesel per day to Europe, before sanctions cut that off. I also added the NYT quote below before widely sending this post out.] As I post this, I am thinking this is not ONLY about US elections. Why? Trump et al have been claiming for a couple weeks that Russia wants to talk – though there is no public evidence. And Trump’s team are engaged in other, similar maneuvers:
Offering Moscow to reopen the Nord Stream pipelines under ownership of a US firm. This is an old idea Trump et al had dropped by ca. April 2025, when it became obvious that enticing Putin with big deals and investments was not going to sway him to end his war in Ukraine. (This move has the German AfD excited, but they’re not significant players here.)
Trump’s negotiators have also offered Moscow a that some western firm(s) could purchase Russia’s sanctioned Lukoil oil-and-gas infrastructure located mainly in Europe, which can no longer be used by Lukoil due to US sanctions,
Plus, there is this unrealistic diesel deal, which Trump clearly hopes will make US voters think he is getting fuel prices down before November elections. I say “unrealistic” because, if Russia actually had significant extra diesel to sell, it would not have banned exports of diesel for many months while its refineries burn due to Ukrainian drone hits.
And now (10Oct26 addition), there were earlier attempts, in September, also to bribe Putin to end the war. Here is the NY Times on what happened in NYC on the sidelines of the General Assembly opening:
“…, when the Trump administration opened the latest diplomatic track on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in late September, Ukrainian officials were startled by how far Mr. Kushner and Mr. Witkoff went in their offerings to Russia. According to officials familiar with the discussions, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss confidential diplomatic talks, the Americans put three lucrative economic incentives on the table to coax Moscow into a limited cease-fire, either on energy infrastructure or at sea.
“Washington floated releasing billions of Russian sovereign assets immobilized in the West. The money, the officials said, was viewed as an upfront incentive for partial truces, not a reward for their enactment. This revived a proposal from last year to release funds to Russia. Then, the suggestion was to release up to $100 billion.
“The Americans also revisited a plan to sell off parts of the Russian oil giant Lukoil in a multibillion-dollar deal that would go to a group of Middle Eastern investors, including some with business ties to U.S. negotiators.
[Note: I edited the title, to reflect the element of deception usually present in Trump moves. Hence the new “?”. 16:30 CET 10.10.26. T.O’D. All else is as early today.] Trump has lost his nerve and betrayed what the US and Ukraine had accomplished vs Russia and Iran. He made a deal with Putin to import millions of barrels of Russian diesel. Out of his desire to win US elections, he has undermined what the USA, Ukraine and allies have worked for, and he had himself worked to accomplish.
Importing Russian diesel fuel undermines sanctions the US and allies in Europe and Asia – and Trump himself – imposed.
The US Congress, with bipartisan resolve , and allies, must rebuke him.
This is a brief live-on-air commentary just after the G7 announced that it would release 100M barrels of diesel fuel to supply markets that are tight due to the Hormuz crisis. This will go a long way to keep inflation in the US, Europe and Asian allies down, protecting consumers and economies.
While Hormuz is already, as I said, transiting as much CRUDE OIL as before the Iranian regime closed it – i.e., Tehran has lost control of the Straight to the US military, which is successfully escorting ships out even in daylight now.
Meanwhile, the amount of REFINED OIL products flowing out has not yet gotten up to pre-war levels, and so we see the present refined-fuel-market shortages and high prices.
Maxym Krapivnyy, host at Ukraine’s Kanal24 in Kyiv, spoke with me recently while I was in the USA about: Ukraine’s drone war vs. Russian energy, Russia’s economy, and the USA’s expanding energy war targeting Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and India’s Russian oil imports. I explained that soon, the late-Lindsey Graham’s (R, S.C.) and Richard Blumenthal’s (D., Conn.) “draconian” secondary sanctions bill is expected to be signed by Trump, blocking most Russian oil exports. (Note: the Senate yesterday voted 86-12, to advance the bill. See Blumenthal, here.)
However, Maxym also then asked my view on the likeliness of Putin soon agreeing to serious peace talks. I said I expected Russia would be unwilling to soon end the war even if its forces were pushed back to the Russian border. Why? To admit defeat would devastate Russian credibility as a Great Power in Eurasia and beyond. (See below for a comparison to the USA in Vietnam.)
On the energy war, I stressed that Russia is well known to be a petrostate. Russia’s wealth and capacity to finance aggression abroad overwhelmingly depends on its oil export revenues. Russia’s continued existence as a-petrostate is what the ongoing Ukrainian and USA energy offensives are targeting, on two main fronts.
There are two sides to this energy war. One is the Ukrainian’s kinetic war against Russia’s domestic refineries, the other is the USA and allies’ global sanctions offensive. Both aspects are evolving in breath and complexity:
First, there is the Ukrainian drone and missile campaign, including deep strikes against domestic Russian oil refineries and infrastructure. This has been gaining in success. I pointed out that these attacks have to, however, increase still more, requiting heavier missiles to close refineries and oil export terminal ports for sufficient time to render repairs unprofitable. However, Ukraine is now testing and has begun to produce such heavier weapons, which should be available in the short-to-medium term. We discussed Russia’s refined product supply problems, and what Ukraine must yet accomplish.
Second, oil which increasingly cannot be refined is pouring into Russian export terminals, its big Baltic and Black Sea oil ports. This was already the situation before the Iran war began on February 28. At that time, oil that could not be refined due to drone attacks was being loaded on ships for export. However, with USA sanctions having been intensified, many of these ships had no customers, it had nowhere to go. During the initial phase of the Iran war, the USA allowed India and other allies to purchase this oil (i.e., it unsanctioned oil already loaded on ships without any clear destination) to avert it going to China. This accumulation is apparently again building up, for the same reasons.
the USA now maintains sanctions against Russian oil firms Rosneft and Lukoil, and is working to supply India with non-Russian oil to end its Russian oil purchases, making it harder for Russia to find export markets besides China. However, the reclosing of Hormuz will of course make this somewhat easier for Russia to find buyers.
Two key themes here: Ukraine’s advances against Russia’s domestic oil infrastructure, and the Trump Administration’s global energy offensive, as shaping operations for a future conflict with China – or with the China-Russia-Iran axis. (Watch in Lithuanian) I told Aleksandra Ketlerienė, at Lithuanian national TV, that Ukraine is perhaps half way along in its kinetic capacities to forcing a collapse of a large part of domestic Russian refining capacities. (Interview in Lithuanian 14jul26).
I stressed that Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia must be taken as one side of a two-sided offensive vs. the Russian petrostate, with the other side being Washington’s targeting, logistics and other assistance to Ukraine’s air campaign, its harsh sanctions vs Rosneft and Lukoil, plus the announcement of a deal with Trump to impose the late-Senator Lindsey Graham (Rep., S. C.) and Sen. Richard Blumenthal’s (Dem. Conn.) self-described “draconian” secondary Russian sanctions, backed by about 93% of US senators, plus the US offensives vs. Iran and Venezuela focused on the oil-and-energy sector, and its continued work to pull India away from Russian oil — not as separate or chaotic events, but as part of a conscious, global energy offensive by the USA jointly with Ukraine and other allies, one which should be assessed as such, and not merely as individual, disjoint, haphazard “crises”. (On Ukrainian strategy, I cited its energy and intelligence expert, Mykhailo Gonchar, “From burning refineries to maritime blockade: a new strategy of pressure on Russia.” a valued colleague. 01jul26)
My assessment, since early 2026, has been that these should be understood as energy-sector “shaping operations.” That is, these are energy conflicts-of-choice aimed at optimizing the strategic post”ure of the USA and its allies to: destroy the petrostate basis of Russian power (see my EIES analytic paper, “Liquidating the Russian Petrostate, jan26), to secure allied access to Venezuelan (and Western Hemisphere-in-general) oil flows, and to Persian Gulf (Hormuz) oil flows in preparation for a kinetic conflict of whatever magnitude with China in the Indo-Pacific region. I should add that these energy “shaping operations” are intrinsic to the larger Trump administration strategy of “USA Energy Dominance” strategy, which I have discussed at GlobalBarrel.com.
NOTE – I believe it is important not to allow various sharp difficulties, setbacks or even failures that surely will occur on any of these fronts – vs. Russia, Iran and Hormuz, in Venezuela, with India, or directly with China – on the energy, and especially the oil front, to cause a loss of perspective that there is a global energy offensive or even a global energy war taking place, as a central part o the USA and de facto as part of the entire allied preparations (viz., as “shaping operations”) for a looming kinetic conflict with China and its allies – or, perhaps, is sufficiently successful, to dissuade China from aggression.
Also, recognizing the connected strategy is one thing, analyzing and critiquing the individual parts and overall rationale is another. For more, go to my blog at https://GlobalBarrel.com
Dr. Tom O’Donnell (for a keynote, consult or commissioned analysis for your organization, write twod(at)umich.edu )
I spoke with Kyiv Kanal24’s Nataly Lutsenko on three issues. Jump to a topic here: 1) Ukrainian drones in Russia 00:00:192) G7 push v Russian oil. 00:05:253) Who won the US-Iran war? 00:10:27 Recorded 18 June 2026.
Note on number 3: I said it is not yet clear who won the US-Iran war. This has to do with military capacities which the USA (and its allies) could bring to bear but are now deeply reluctant or unwilling to bring to bear.
If Iran is unwilling to compromise or, worse, plays games, as it has already in the past few days with its “Persian Gulf Strait Authority,” the USA might decide it is constrained to employ whatever means necessary (Carter Doctrine) to end the Islamic Republic’s capacity to restrict the free flow of energy from the Gulf.
Trump and USA officials understand that a full-on military option is not an optimal resolution. This led them to accept an MoU that is quite conciliatory to Tehran in order to get the Straight reopened, and also apparently in response to many of its Gulf allies unwillingness to absorb the punishment Iranian missiles and drones would inflict before the Straight is forcibly reopened and Iran’s missile capacities are eventually suppressed. The administration knows that a massive bombing campaign of the entire country’s military-industrial and civilian infrastructure, plus an occupation of the Iranian coast along the Straight could likely achieved their aims of removing the Straight from Iranian hegemony. However, this in turn, is likely to require a protracted force commitment to contain whatever regime forces remain active. No matter how minor, remaining missiles and drones, proxy forces and terrorist capacities could require a long time to resolve.
I explained that the price cap was de facto abandoned, replaced, by the Americans in 2025 with a campaign aimed at actually removing Russia’s capacity to export its seaborne oil. This campaign was de facto paused, first when they went after Venezuelan oil, and then during the war against Iran and the closure of the Straight of Hormuz.
However, the G7, including Trump, decided that they would focus again on pressuring Putin to end Russia’s war on Ukraine. Their decision was to focus now on sanctioning Russia’s oil and gas exports.
I explained how, just before Trump et al went after Maduro, in January, the Russian oil system had been pushed to the brink of a breakdown. This had been accomplished by a combination of the Ukrainian drone strikes deep inside Russia, particularly on oil infrastructure, a campaign conducted with detailed intelligence and targeting information provided by the USA, and by the imposition of sweeping new US sanctions Trump imposed on Rosneft and Lukoil and also by his having gotten Modi to agree that India would end the purchase of Russian oil. [See my study for EIES, Jan. 2026, “Liquidating the Russian Petrostate” or on GlobalBarrel.com]
One problem with giving a quick take on breaking news is that one can forget something. In the interview, I forgot about the US dollar swap line that the UAE had cajoled out of the USA –Trump and Bessent – just before it decided to quit OPEC. Below is the post I immediately wrote with many, IMHO, relevant issues underlying this move. These include national economic and geostrategic differences, often rather sharp, between the UAE and Saudis. However, the swap line issue is now included as point “Zero”.
-0.a- Regarding the swap line: there are so many pieces in motion that we need a litte overview refresher first.
As readers here know, my analysis is that the Trump administration’s sharp moves in the latter part of 2025 against Russian oil exports, together with the Ukrainians’ drone campaign, was at a point where it had begun threatening to force Russian oil exports offline. This, in turn, would force Russia to shut in its old and delicate West Siberian fields. I wrote a detailed study on this. This strategy is exactly like what the USA now openly says it intends to do to Iran by blocking exports from its Kharg Island oil terminal.
The Trump administration claims that the available Iranian storage on the island is near full (Scott Bessent has said this repeatedly). This will force wells to be shut in, likely ruining their productivity for the long term. (However, I believe the Iranian fields are not generally as fragile as Russia’s.)
-0.b- You will recall that Trump constrained and/or convinced India’s Modi to halt Russian oil imports as part of this larger anti-Russian oil campaign to press Putin to end the Ukraine war.
-0.c- However, before the USA proceeded to the next step vs. Russian exports, it went to Venezuela and took control of its oil sector, beginning a comprehensive and very rapid campaign there to bring Venezuelan oil back online.(I spoke at length to Swedish public radio on this again this week,)
The USA has shut off an approximately 2 million battels per day (mbd) stream of oil Venezuela was sending to China, and diverted that oil principally to India. That stream is now part of the USA effort to take care of India during the Iran crisis, so that it does not revert to taking Russian oil.
Guaranteeing Gulf energy flows to allies has always been a core US interest, while today’s Great Power Competition means China’s access will be rendered conditional.
This is not the Iraq war. If after operations to secure the coasts and islands and to clear mines, the Iranian regime resists, the USA plan is that Iran’s oil sector and economy would be destroyed by aerial bombardment. Washington neither desires nor needs to occupy Iran proper nor to change the regime. The US strategic imperative here is to secure, long term energy flows from the Region and, accordingly, to end the regime’s capacities to project regional power.
After almost 30 years of analysis and my university seminars, there is very little I see new here, save a new USA urgency.
In my view, this urgency flows from USA concerns over Great Power Competition, especially with China. This is exacerbated by the possibility that Iran could close the Strait in solidarity with China (or perhaps Russia) during any Great Power conflict elsewhere. The threat of Iran’s developing capacities in this regard, especially its missiles and drones, but also its nuclear weapons ambitions and intentions to rebuild its regional proxy allies, all act to undermine the prerogatives of the USA and its Gulf regional allies to secure the region and its energy flows.
In any case, the idea that Washington and Trump “have no strategy” is demonstratively wrong, and self-disarming. (See, for example, my EIES study of Trump administration energy policy since ca. April 2025 v. Russian oil.) One might not fully understand the strategy, or might disagree with it, but there is clearly a multifaceted strategy here under the general slogan of “USA Energy Dominance” (e.g., see posts here and here). Besides Iran, it especially includes Russia, Venezuela, India, and of course China, as well as US domestic oil, gas, nuclear and renewables policies.
Author’s screen shot from NTD News. The statement was posted on Tuesday.
Note, a third Amphibious Assault Group, an aircraft carrier with an additional Marine Expeditionary Unit of 2000-2500 troops, has just arrived to join two other already in the Region. This further shows that Trump is increasing preparations to seize Hormuz, not backing down.
Yet, tragically, even Merz’s conservatives-in-power still profess faith in 100% renewables “eventually” & nuclear “never” … despite deindustrialization.
The title above says it all. I pointed out that Germany produced about half its electricity from renewables in 2025 such as wind and solar.
However, more renewables have only caused prices to soar, and helped to drive German deindustrialization.. Much of the rest of the EU has similar problems from over-installation of renewables (Note: I coined the term “Renewables Fundamentalism” to describe this), as a Green panacea for both climate change mitigation and supposed energy independence. Aside from the high complexity of integrating ever more renewables that are highly-distributed (spread out over large land masses) and hard to integrate (requiring complete rebuilds and extensions of grids), while the problems of their unreliability (variability, depends on wind speed and amount of sunshine), is their Achilles Heel.
As I told Al Jazeera in this brief interview, once a country has over about 25% dependence on renewables, it requires a complete and highly expensive total rebuild of their grids, and a system of alternative-to-renewable generation in periods of low wind and solar, which the Germans call Dunkelflaute.
Dear readers, This paper, which I wrote in 2008-09, analyzed the evolution of interests underlying the US-Iran crisis till then, interests which persist in the 2026 US-Iran war.
That is, Trump’s “USA Energy Dominance” strategy does not seek to fundamentally alter the structure or logic of the post-1973 global, market-centered, USA-led-and-protected oil order. However, to preserve it, the USA now feels the necessity of removing the Iranian mullahs as custodians of Iran’s oil for persistently insisting on projecting power and seeking hegemony in the energy-critical Gulf Region.
What is new from 2008, is the bipartisan urgency felt in Washington to renovate the existing oil market-and-security order, reconsolidating the USA as primary arbiter of energy flows via Hormuz to both China and US allied and friendly states of the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, to be capable of significantly blocking Russian oil exports and thereby its petrostate-fueled aggression elsewhere.
In particular, it mush achieve these aims, vis-a-vis Russia and China, without causing global oil shocks. (continued in full-column below …)
I was a bit insistent that the spike during the day today, to over $100 at some point, was overblown.
As I mentioned, Fatih Birol at IEA (I forgot to mention also Chris Wright, USA Secretary of Energy),who had said the same thing, insisting last Friday that there is plenty of oil in the market. (See Wright and Bloomberg’s Steven Stapczynski elaborate here). That is NOT a problem now.
And, in the interview, I detailed some facts about this (e.g., before the war started nine days ago, there were about 1.4 billion(!) barrels floating on the water, an unprecedented amount, and the Russians had nowhere to put their unsellable oil).
So, It turns out that late Monday evening news (EST USA time), the news coming from the USA vindicates my suspicions. For now, there is no plan by the administration to release SPR reserves into the market.
Notice what I explained about this likely being a short-lived boost for Russian oil That is, after the Venezuelan campaign, if the Trump admin. Iran campaign works, both China and Russia will be in a very restricted position in the now-USA tightly controlled international oil market supply chain.
Here is the WSJ saying the prices of oil dropped quite a bit, and the stock market rebounded as well by the end of the day. Following that is a Bloomberg take too.
