This is a brief live-on-air commentary just after the G7 announced that it would release 100M barrels of diesel fuel to supply markets that are tight due to the Hormuz crisis. This will go a long way to keep inflation in the US, Europe and Asian allies down, protecting consumers and economies.
While Hormuz is already, as I said, transiting as much CRUDE OIL as before the Iranian regime closed it – i.e., Tehran has lost control of the Straight to the US military, which is successfully escorting ships out even in daylight now.
Meanwhile, the amount of REFINED OIL products flowing out has not yet gotten up to pre-war levels, and so we see the present refined-fuel-market shortages and high prices.
This is part 1.0 of a series on the US-Iran war and the present US global energy offensive. Hormuz developments are altering some elements of the one, “Global Barrel” market-centered collective energy-security model that dates to 1973, and which I named this blog after 15 years ago (after I had apparently coined that name).
I will have No. 2.0 of this Iran series soon. Here is 1.0, my brief BBC interview of last night, with some comments below here.
This was my fourth interview with BBC Persian Service, London in recent months. It feels important to get things clear when I have the opportunity to speak directly to Iranians or to Ukrainians.
Comments:
The larger USA global oil-sector offensive involves Russia, Iran, Venezuela, India, and other countries. I’ve seen these each as USA “shaping operations” aimed at preparing the energy landscape favorably to the US and its allies before any future armed conflict with China might begin – or to prevent one.
As I explained earlier (e.g., Jerusalem Post interview), a problem for the Islamic Republic of Iran, in deciding to take control of Hormuz, is that its control can only degrade over time under US pressure.
In the past few weeks, as it’s grip was loosened by the US military, it needed to find a further lever. In the past few weeks Tehran tried two things to reverse its weakening Hormuz position:
ENGLISH version. Sky News (UAE), 20 August 2026, Dr. Tom O’Donnell (in Berlin).
I told Sky (UAE), Hormuz is now “a game of chicken” – who can wait the longest and bear the most pain. I tried to look objectively at the two sides.
a) On the Iran side, oil exports are reportedly zero since about 15 July. None of Iran’s oil ships seem to have left Hormuz. A massive accumulation of Iranian oil cargo sits on ships near Malaysia and Singapore, while perhaps 53 loaded ships are stuck in the Gulf due to the US Navy blockade. For a petrostate, this is devastating.
In addition, all Iranian ports are blocked form exporting or importing anything.
What oil can perhaps leave by train to China, say 70,000 barrels per train taking two weeks, is painfully small and costly.
Trump has now declared a push to block any payments or financial transfers to and from Iran. But, if no one is selling anything in either direction, there will be less and less financial flows to block.
For the regime, this is dire. It does not mean Iran will surrender, or even talk, but it is clearly devastating.
I spoke with Kyiv Kanal24’s Nataly Lutsenko on three issues. Jump to a topic here: 1) Ukrainian drones in Russia 00:00:192) G7 push v Russian oil. 00:05:253) Who won the US-Iran war? 00:10:27 Recorded 18 June 2026.
Note on number 3: I said it is not yet clear who won the US-Iran war. This has to do with military capacities which the USA (and its allies) could bring to bear but are now deeply reluctant or unwilling to bring to bear.
If Iran is unwilling to compromise or, worse, plays games, as it has already in the past few days with its “Persian Gulf Strait Authority,” the USA might decide it is constrained to employ whatever means necessary (Carter Doctrine) to end the Islamic Republic’s capacity to restrict the free flow of energy from the Gulf.
Trump and USA officials understand that a full-on military option is not an optimal resolution. This led them to accept an MoU that is quite conciliatory to Tehran in order to get the Straight reopened, and also apparently in response to many of its Gulf allies unwillingness to absorb the punishment Iranian missiles and drones would inflict before the Straight is forcibly reopened and Iran’s missile capacities are eventually suppressed. The administration knows that a massive bombing campaign of the entire country’s military-industrial and civilian infrastructure, plus an occupation of the Iranian coast along the Straight could likely achieved their aims of removing the Straight from Iranian hegemony. However, this in turn, is likely to require a protracted force commitment to contain whatever regime forces remain active. No matter how minor, remaining missiles and drones, proxy forces and terrorist capacities could require a long time to resolve.
Pictures taken by the author (T.W.O’D) during a dinner and Q&A with President Ahmadinejad, in NYC during 2010 UN General Assembly opening. Note quote from Ahmadinejad.
Some years ago, I was invited to dinner with President Ahmadinejad in NYC during the annual opening of the General Assembly.
The American think-tanks, consultancies, and x-diplomats present went on and on asking detailed questions about this or that scenario where US experts might work with Iranian experts to observe or limit the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. (I mentioned this 2010 dinner in a later post: “China’s Iran-Oil Import Angst. Part I” Feb 13, 2012.)
It became rather tiresome. Ahmadinejad clearly was growing tired of it. He then asked us,
“If this is all about our nuclear program, then I would like someone please to address here why did the United States side with Saddam Hussein and attack us before there was any issue of a nuclear program?” (Iranian President M. Ahmadinejad, 22 Sept 10, NYC, my notes, T.O’D.)
Everyone ignored his question, and simply kept up with their obviously pre-prepared technical questions. But, what had he meant?
To me, clearly he was referring to the Iran-Iraq war (Sept.1980-Aug.1988), when the USA, at a certain point, decided to take Iraq’s side and, among other things, sunk the entire Iranian Navy in a day, took over air traffic control for the Iraqi air force, started directly advising Iraq on strategy, and etc.
In the end, Iran had to accept an Iraqi peace deal after a crushing defeat facilitated by the USA. I recall now all these details vividly. And, all this was indeed well before any nuclear program.
Aside: I find it disturbing that so many “experts” refer to the supposed “Iraqi defeat” in that war. This was all understood at the time. For example, I quote here from the NYT, (Sec. A, Page 1, of July 21, 1988): Ayatollah Khomeini had personally endorsed the cease-fire demanded by United Nations Security Council Resolution 598. Iran’s supreme religious leader confirmed, for the first time, that he had approved the resolution and added, with his characteristic rhetorical flair: ”Taking this decision was more deadly than taking poison. I submitted myself to God’s will and drank this drink for his satisfaction.” (Emphasis added to the most famous part of Khomeni’s statement. T.O’D.) Further research will quickly show he had to sign as Iran was being soundly defeated at the time, hence the “poison” he had to swallow.
By the way, it is also known, at least in academic circles, from later extensive archival research, that the war with Iraq was planned and instigated by Iran, and that Iraq had attacked in response to Iranian provocations and signs of Tehran’s preparations, after warnings. I am happy to send references to those interested.
What I myself had been arguing, back then, during the Iran-Iraq War Ahmadinejad was referring to, was that the US-Iran confrontation was actually about the US opposition to any country, either from inside the Gulf Region or outside the Region, gaining hegemony over the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. This had to do with guaranteeing the free flow of oil, and that the global oil market would be a “real” market that no one state could unduly control. I had even coined a term, “The Global Barrel,” for this market-centered, post-OPEC-nationalizations collective oil-security system, a system initiated by Henry Kissinger in 1973.
Guaranteeing Gulf energy flows to allies has always been a core US interest, while today’s Great Power Competition means China’s access will be rendered conditional.
This is not the Iraq war. If after operations to secure the coasts and islands and to clear mines, the Iranian regime resists, the USA plan is that Iran’s oil sector and economy would be destroyed by aerial bombardment. Washington neither desires nor needs to occupy Iran proper nor to change the regime. The US strategic imperative here is to secure, long term energy flows from the Region and, accordingly, to end the regime’s capacities to project regional power.
After almost 30 years of analysis and my university seminars, there is very little I see new here, save a new USA urgency.
In my view, this urgency flows from USA concerns over Great Power Competition, especially with China. This is exacerbated by the possibility that Iran could close the Strait in solidarity with China (or perhaps Russia) during any Great Power conflict elsewhere. The threat of Iran’s developing capacities in this regard, especially its missiles and drones, but also its nuclear weapons ambitions and intentions to rebuild its regional proxy allies, all act to undermine the prerogatives of the USA and its Gulf regional allies to secure the region and its energy flows.
In any case, the idea that Washington and Trump “have no strategy” is demonstratively wrong, and self-disarming. (See, for example, my EIES study of Trump administration energy policy since ca. April 2025 v. Russian oil.) One might not fully understand the strategy, or might disagree with it, but there is clearly a multifaceted strategy here under the general slogan of “USA Energy Dominance” (e.g., see posts here and here). Besides Iran, it especially includes Russia, Venezuela, India, and of course China, as well as US domestic oil, gas, nuclear and renewables policies.
Author’s screen shot from NTD News. The statement was posted on Tuesday.
Note, a third Amphibious Assault Group, an aircraft carrier with an additional Marine Expeditionary Unit of 2000-2500 troops, has just arrived to join two other already in the Region. This further shows that Trump is increasing preparations to seize Hormuz, not backing down.
Investitionswillige Unternehmen stehen in Venezuela vor großen Hürden: Sicherheitsrisiken, eine verfallene Infrastruktur, ungeklärte Rechtsfragen zum US-Einsatz und die Gefahr langfristiger politischer Unruhen. (Foto: IMAGO/IlluPics)
Trumps Plan klingt ambitioniert: US-Ölkonzerne sollen nach Venezuela zurückkehren und Milliarden in die stark beschädigte Infrastruktur investieren. Im Interview erklärt Energiestratege Thomas O’Donnell, wie schnell das Land nach Jahren politischer und wirtschaftlicher Krise wieder zu alter Stärke finden kann.
ntv.de: Trumps Versprechen klingt vollmundig: US-Ölkonzerne sollen nach dem Angriff auf Venezuela ins Land zurückkehren und Milliarden von Dollar investieren, die stark beschädigte Ölinfrastruktur reparieren und damit beginnen, Geld zu verdienen. Wird dieser Plan aufgehen?
I was interviewed 05 Jan. by Juliane Kipper, Business Editor at Germany’s ntv.de, for this print article. Lies es Auf Deutsch— Read In English (from Google Translate). Or, read at ntv.de.
Investitionswillige Unternehmen stehen in Venezuela vor großen Hürden: Sicherheitsrisiken, eine verfallene Infrastruktur, ungeklärte Rechtsfragen zum US-Einsatz und die Gefahr langfristiger politischer Unruhen. (Foto: IMAGO/IlluPics)
Trumps Plan klingt ambitioniert: US-Ölkonzerne sollen nach Venezuela zurückkehren und Milliarden in die stark beschädigte Infrastruktur investieren. Im Interview erklärt Energiestratege Thomas O’Donnell, wie schnell das Land nach Jahren politischer und wirtschaftlicher Krise wieder zu alter Stärke finden kann.
ntv.de: Trumps Versprechen klingt vollmundig: US-Ölkonzerne sollen nach dem Angriff auf Venezuela ins Land zurückkehren und Milliarden von Dollar investieren, die stark beschädigte Ölinfrastruktur reparieren und damit beginnen, Geld zu verdienen. Wird dieser Plan aufgehen?
My thanks to Tor Klaveness at Kapital, Norway’s oldest and leading, business magazine. Below is an English translation, then the Norwegian original. – Tom O’D.
“Bone-crushing” and “draconian”: The law that could choke Putin’s oil revenues
If peace talks between Ukraine and Russia break down, the US Senate is ready to pass a sanctions package that could strangle Russia’s oil exports. In that case, it could significantly strengthen the oil market.
Energy Published 29 Nov. | Paywall removed, Updated 9 Dec.
“President Trump said this weekend, ‘Send me the bill.’ So we have to send him the bill to help end this war.”
Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, energy and geopolitical strategist
This was stated by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham in a panel debate on November 19 with Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal. The debate was moderated by Clayton Seigle, a senior fellow at the think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which also organized the debate.
The bill Graham referred to is the Sanctioning Russia Act , which he is co-sponsoring with Blumenthal. The bill already has the support of 85 of the 100 US senators and would give US authorities the right to impose punitive tariffs of no less than 500 percent on countries importing Russian energy.
PHOTO: Alexander Kazakov, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP/NTB
With a stick and a carrot
Dr. Thomas O’Donnell is an energy and geopolitical strategist, founder of GlobalBarrel.com and former global fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. He believes Congress is now poised to give President Trump an extremely potent weapon.
The proposal is being described as “bone-crushing” and “draconian,” and is set to be voted through almost unanimously in the Senate.
On 5 November, I told Kanal24, Kyiv that a US-Ukraine campaign to disable the Russian petrostate’s oil sector is underway. I stressed that this is a multi-spectral campaign combining (i) severe USA sanctions and secondary tariffs on Russian oil exports in parallel with (ii) Ukrainian military action on oil refineries and export-terminal ports. These attacks are known to be conducted and planned in close cooperation with USA military intelligence (FT,12 Oct.).
This means that an assessment of either aspect of this campaign on its own is inadequate. The synergy of sanctions plus military hits is the issue.
Secondary Sanctions. It has been widely recognized that the USA would need to, as promised, vigorously impose secondary tariffs on any entities that violated its recent tariff announcement. Indeed, on Sunday, President Trump lent support to a bill being drafted in Congress to hit any entity “doing business with Russia.”, not only buying its oil (i.e., “Trump says Republicans drafting bill to sanction countries that trade with Russia, Reuters. November 17). This sounds similar to the Senators Lindsey Graham (R, SC) and Richard Blumenthal’s (D Conn) so-called “bone-crushing sanctions” bill (Politico, 7 June) endorsed by 83 senators on 3 June.
The apparent aim of the port drone and missile attacks is to slash oil exports from Russia’s three or four biggest westward facing terminals. The focus thus far is on Black Sea terminals:
Above: Audio of my comments to (various) press on 22 April 25, on the impact of falling oil prices on Russia’s capacity to war on Ukraine. Also, a scenario I have discussed for over a year, first privately and then publicly, of how the USA could shut down the great majority of Russia’s seaborne oil exports, to devastating consequences for its oil sector and capacity to continue the war. In the present market situation of oversupply and anticipated continued weak demand, this could be done in a way that does not spike global oil prices.
This will only be done if Trump decides he needs to use harsh coercion to force Putin into an acceptable peace deal with Ukraine, AND if Trump were willing to impose lasting harm on the older Russian oil fields.
This is in English, after Eugene Romer of Układ Sił media introduces me in Polish. This was at the “3 Seas -1 Opportunity Forum” in Gdansk, last June 4-5, 2024. I have been wanting to post it ever since, as the questions remain relevant. My thanks to Eugene and his team, and to his Opportunity Think Tank colleagues.
My panel at the forum was on problems of relying on energy security that arrives via the sea. So, think Poland and Lithuania’s LNG terminals, of the many sub-sea pipelines, power and communications cables between Baltic and Nordic states. And, since June, all the incidents where ships leaving Russian ports “accidentally” dragged their anchors, cutting such vital links. So, this conference was rather prescient. My sincere thanks to our hosts The Opportunity Institute for Foreign Affairs.
ENGLISH Interview | Al Watan, Cairo. Thurs 10Oct24. 15 minutes
ARABIC Interview
At first, we focused on IEA warnings of a possible EU winder gas shortage due to supply-and-demand mismatches. I agree and expand on the IEA points.
Second, I explained that if Israel retaliates against Iran so strongly that it threatens the regimes survival, or is seen as intending to provoke regime change, then the Iranian leadership will have “nothing to lose” by in-turn escalating to the maximum. Aside from unleashing the maximum response of its proxies surrounding Israel, Tehran’s most potent weapon would be to spark a global oil and gas crisis.
Consider oil: Iran can either shut down the Straights of Hormuz (or simply make them unsafe for tankers) and/or, it can use missiles and drones to destroy significant parts of Saudi, UAE and other Gulf oil facilities, including perhaps even Azerbaijan’s as some Iranian propagandists have threatened.
Consider natural gas: Shutting the Straights or directly hitting Qatar’s massive LNG exports infrastructure would immediately stop Qatari LNG exports. As the world’s second largest LNG exporter, this would immediately cause a separate global natural gas crisis.
Again, oil security is determined by both global-market balances and geostrategic realities – at present the Mideast war and Russia’s War on Ukraine. My analyses this weekend were featured in: (a)an AlHurra video (LHS English, RHS Arabic), and below these (b)a detailed BBC-Cairo print interview (LHS English Google Translate, RHS Arabic original). where I make similar points as my Friday video in Warsaw.
Alhurra ENGLISH. My comments at 2:45 & 8:20. Date: 5 Oct 2024, with co-guest GPI President Paolo von Schirach, Washington.
Alhurra ARABIC, 5 October 2024
My BBC (CAIRO) print interview in Arabic and English (Google Translate):
Recorded Thurs AM, 03Oct24. Warsaw Old Town, Castle Square.
Will Israel hit Iranian oil infrastructure? And, what part of it? To what effect on markets, and geopolitics, (i.e., Mideast, OPEC, Russia and Ukraine war)? A video report.
MAIN POINTS (see transcript):
1. What if Israel hits Iran oil infrastructure in retaliation for missile strikes on Tel Aviv on Tuesday night? 1.a. The difference effects of hitting Iranian refineries vs oil export terminals In itself, neither target would make big difference in the market. The market would immediately jump, of course, but in principle the effect would be small. 1b OPEC+ and Western Hemisphere have plenty of spare capacity.
2. Consider Saudi market tactics … reportedly they want to now go for share over price support, as price support is failing after well over a year of output cuts (about 6 mb/d). Note: Shortly after this recording the Saudis repudiated the WSJ that reported the switch in tactics to defending share. Likely they’ll now want to wait and see what happens to Iranian exports, or if this Israel-Iran tit-for-tat gets out of hand.
Interview 1/3: Kate Lycock of DW Radio’s Inside Europe interviewed me yesterday, on the historical role of fuel-denial in war, and the impacts of Ukraine’s drone strategy on Russia (first story, on 21 March)
Aside from some WW2 history, I identified two separate impacts we can see in the present Ukrainian campaign: a) The impact on Russian fuel deliveries to the war zones themselves and to the domestic Russian war economy, and b) their possible impact as a “force multiplier” for the oil-price cap sanctions on Russian oil exports, designed to deny Moscow its all-important oil revenues that are financing its aggression. I also speculated a bit as to how these strikes, together with Black Sea sea-drone operations, might be shaping coming Ukrainian offensive(s). (This show is also syndicated in the USA as I recall.)
2/3: on 20 March, I was also interviewed on the drone strikes by Voice of America’s Harry Ridgwell, while I was at the Berlin Energy Transition Dialogue, held at the German Federal Foreign Office. (See Video in LHS column.)
3/3: Lastly, I was quoted a couple times by Brendan Cole of the USA national magazine, Newsweek, on 18 March:
Note, there are new developments since yesterday, including Russia’s revenge strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure (reports are that 1 million Ukrainians have no electricity today) and on its Special Operations Headquarters. However, of the 30 Russian drones that swarmed to target this Kyiv building, every one was shot down.
Also, there are reports (Financial Times) that the USA is warning Ukraine that the strikes will draw retaliation and raise the price of oil.
Who cares! This has gone on for simply too long. There are vastly sufficient oil reserves in the world that can be tapped to fully replace Russian oil even if it were totally taken offline. After over two years of war, Washington and the EU Members should have by now begun a concerted effort to get sufficient new oil on line to enable blocking a high percentage of Russian exports from being exported to the world market
I talk about one possible approach to this in my DW interview, involving Denmark and Sweden inspecting and banning passage of sketchy Russian tankers through their economic zones in the Baltic Sea.
After two-plus years of war, there is no excuse to still be playing around with the oil price cap without either significantly lowing it — say, to $30/barrel as the Ukrainians suggest, in any case begin stepwise lowering it below the present $60, which would be a signal to producers to start developing new fields — and/or finding ways to block shipments more directly.
This is not to diminish the clever and difficult work people at especially OFAC and the USA Justice Department in Washington and their colleagues in London and Brussels have carried out to tighten and make more effective the oil price cap. However, as it stands, the cap is too high and a weak instrument.
The entire political preoccupation with keeping Russian oil on the market is fundamentally flawed, Signals must be given to the market that it will be step-wise taken off the market, which will instill/stimulate IOCs, NOCs and smaller firms to rapidly bring undeveloped oil reserves online to permanently replace Russian exports.
LAST: Here are some references for further reading that I found useful in my research.
Highly recommended, by my friend, the intrepid Михайло Гончар – Україна уразила вже третину найбільших російських НПЗ – Главредhttps://glavred.net/article/v-rossii-krasivo-gorit-ukraina-porazila-uzhe-tret-krupneyshih-rossiyskih-npz-gonchar-10550015.html (Translation: Russia is on fire: Ukraine has already hit a third of the largest Russian refineries – Interview with Michael Gonchar, March 14, 2024, 4:02 p.m, Ukrainian drones are reducing oil refining in Russia and creating a fuel shortage there, Mykhailo Gonchar believes.)
Ukraine Drone Strike Hits Refining Complex Deep in Russia || Peter Zeihan – YouTube (NOTE: added a gap to URL before ‘.com’ to prevent it displaying here) https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=86YrV2D-nB4
