Category Archives: Venezuela oil

My LRT: Ukraine chokes Russian petrostate, as US presses Russia-Iran-Venezuela energy “shaping operations.” [EN, LT]

Two key themes here: Ukraine’s advances against Russia’s domestic oil infrastructure, and the Trump Administration’s global energy offensive, as shaping operations for a future conflict with China – or with the China-Russia-Iran axis.
(Watch in Lithuanian) I told Aleksandra Ketlerienė, at Lithuanian national TV, that Ukraine is perhaps half way along in its kinetic capacities to forcing a collapse of a large part of domestic Russian refining capacities. (Interview in Lithuanian 14jul26).

I stressed that Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia must be taken as one side of a two-sided offensive vs. the Russian petrostate, with the other side being Washington’s targeting, logistics and other assistance to Ukraine’s air campaign, its harsh sanctions vs Rosneft and Lukoil, plus the announcement of a deal with Trump to impose the late-Senator Lindsey Graham (Rep., S. C.) and Sen. Richard Blumenthal’s (Dem. Conn.) self-described “draconian” secondary Russian sanctions, backed by about 93% of US senators, plus the US offensives vs. Iran and Venezuela focused on the oil-and-energy sector, and its continued work to pull India away from Russian oil — not as separate or chaotic events, but as part of a conscious, global energy offensive by the USA jointly with Ukraine and other allies, one which should be assessed as such, and not merely as individual, disjoint, haphazard “crises”. (On Ukrainian strategy, I cited its energy and intelligence expert, Mykhailo Gonchar, “From burning refineries to maritime blockade: a new strategy of pressure on Russia.” a valued colleague. 01jul26)

My assessment, since early 2026, has been that these should be understood as energy-sector “shaping operations.”
That is, these are energy conflicts-of-choice aimed at optimizing the strategic post”ure of the USA and its allies to: destroy the petrostate basis of Russian power (see my EIES analytic paper, “Liquidating the Russian Petrostate, jan26), to secure allied access to Venezuelan (and Western Hemisphere-in-general) oil flows, and to Persian Gulf (Hormuz) oil flows in preparation for a kinetic conflict of whatever magnitude with China in the Indo-Pacific region. I should add that these energy “shaping operations” are intrinsic to the larger Trump administration strategy of “USA Energy Dominance” strategy, which I have discussed at GlobalBarrel.com.

NOTE – I believe it is important not to allow various sharp difficulties, setbacks or even failures that surely will occur on any of these fronts – vs. Russia, Iran and Hormuz, in Venezuela, with India, or directly with China – on the energy, and especially the oil front, to cause a loss of perspective that there is a global energy offensive or even a global energy war taking place, as a central part o the USA and de facto as part of the entire allied preparations (viz., as “shaping operations”) for a looming kinetic conflict with China and its allies – or, perhaps, is sufficiently successful, to dissuade China from aggression.

Also, recognizing the connected strategy is one thing, analyzing and critiquing the individual parts and overall rationale is another.
For more, go to my blog at https://GlobalBarrel.com

Dr. Tom O’Donnell (for a keynote, consult or commissioned analysis for your organization, write twod(at)umich.edu )

Answer to Ahmadinejad’s question over dinner: “To block your control of oil, like with Saddam.”

Pictures taken by the author (T.W.O’D) during a dinner and Q&A with President Ahmadinejad, in NYC during 2010 UN General Assembly opening. Note quote from Ahmadinejad.

Some years ago, I was invited to dinner with President Ahmadinejad in NYC during the annual opening of the General Assembly.

The American think-tanks, consultancies, and x-diplomats present went on and on asking detailed questions about this or that scenario where US experts might work with Iranian experts to observe or limit the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. (I mentioned this 2010 dinner in a later post: “China’s Iran-Oil Import Angst. Part I” Feb 13, 2012.)

It became rather tiresome. Ahmadinejad clearly was growing tired of it. He then asked us,

“If this is all about our nuclear program, then I would like someone please to address here why did the United States side with Saddam Hussein and attack us before there was any issue of a nuclear program?” (Iranian President M. Ahmadinejad, 22 Sept 10, NYC, my notes, T.O’D.)

Everyone ignored his question, and simply kept up with their obviously pre-prepared technical questions. But, what had he meant?

To me, clearly he was referring to the Iran-Iraq war (Sept.1980-Aug.1988), when the USA, at a certain point, decided to take Iraq’s side and, among other things, sunk the entire Iranian Navy in a day, took over air traffic control for the Iraqi air force, started directly advising Iraq on strategy, and etc.

In the end, Iran had to accept an Iraqi peace deal after a crushing defeat facilitated by the USA. I recall now all these details vividly. And, all this was indeed well before any nuclear program.

Aside: I find it disturbing that so many “experts” refer to the supposed “Iraqi defeat” in that war. This was all understood at the time. For example, I quote here from the NYT, (Sec. A, Page 1, of July 21, 1988): Ayatollah Khomeini had personally endorsed the cease-fire demanded by United Nations Security Council Resolution 598. Iran’s supreme religious leader confirmed, for the first time, that he had approved the resolution and added, with his characteristic rhetorical flair: ”Taking this decision was more deadly than taking poison. I submitted myself to God’s will and drank this drink for his satisfaction.” (Emphasis added to the most famous part of Khomeni’s statement. T.O’D.) Further research will quickly show he had to sign as Iran was being soundly defeated at the time, hence the “poison” he had to swallow. 

By the way, it is also known, at least in academic circles, from later extensive archival research, that the war with Iraq was planned and instigated by Iran, and that Iraq had attacked in response to Iranian provocations and signs of Tehran’s preparations, after warnings. I am happy to send references to those interested.

What I myself had been arguing, back then, during the Iran-Iraq War Ahmadinejad was referring to, was that the US-Iran confrontation was actually about the US opposition to any country, either from inside the Gulf Region or outside the Region, gaining hegemony over the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. This had to do with guaranteeing the free flow of oil, and that the global oil market would be a “real” market that no one state could unduly control. I had even coined a term, “The Global Barrel,” for this market-centered, post-OPEC-nationalizations collective oil-security system, a system initiated by Henry Kissinger in 1973.

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USA sees Gulf energy flow as core interest. If no deal soon, Marines will take Hormuz. | My Asharq TV

Guaranteeing Gulf energy flows to allies has always been a core US interest, while today’s Great Power Competition means China’s access will be rendered conditional.

This is not the Iraq war. If after operations to secure the coasts and islands and to clear mines, the Iranian regime resists, the USA plan is that Iran’s oil sector and economy would be destroyed by aerial bombardment. Washington neither desires nor needs to occupy Iran proper nor to change the regime. The US strategic imperative here is to secure, long term energy flows from the Region and, accordingly, to end the regime’s capacities to project regional power.

After almost 30 years of analysis and my university seminars, there is very little I see new here, save a new USA urgency.

In my view, this urgency flows from USA concerns over Great Power Competition, especially with China. This is exacerbated by the possibility that Iran could close the Strait in solidarity with China (or perhaps Russia) during any Great Power conflict elsewhere. The threat of Iran’s developing capacities in this regard, especially its missiles and drones, but also its nuclear weapons ambitions and intentions to rebuild its regional proxy allies, all act to undermine the prerogatives of the USA and its Gulf regional allies to secure the region and its energy flows.

In any case, the idea that Washington and Trump “have no strategy” is demonstratively wrong, and self-disarming. (See, for example, my EIES study of Trump administration energy policy since ca. April 2025 v. Russian oil.) One might not fully understand the strategy, or might disagree with it, but there is clearly a multifaceted strategy here under the general slogan of “USA Energy Dominance” (e.g., see posts here and here). Besides Iran, it especially includes Russia, Venezuela, India, and of course China, as well as US domestic oil, gas, nuclear and renewables policies.

Author’s screen shot from NTD News. The statement was posted on Tuesday.

Note, a third Amphibious Assault Group, an aircraft carrier with an additional Marine Expeditionary Unit of 2000-2500 troops, has just arrived to join two other already in the Region. This further shows that Trump is increasing preparations to seize Hormuz, not backing down.

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With Iran & Hormuz, the US would act as arbiter of China’s Gulf oil & LNG access, while ensuring access for Indo-Asian allies. Venezuelan oil growth will enable Trump to impose phased cuts of Russian exports, after the Iran war. [Kanal24, Kyiv]

This is a longish, ca. 30 minute video. Host Nataly Lutsenko kindly told me she wanted to make a long interview.

(During time of crisis like this, I have so many TV and press interviews that I don’t have time to put most of them online. So, I will refrain from writing long posts to accompany videos to get more online, if I think they are useful interviews. – Tom O’D)

My EIES Study: ‘Liquidating the Russian Petrostate.’ New USA-Ukrainian oil-war effective. Siberian fields threatened.

A new USA-Ukrainian strategy has replaced the failed Russian oil-price cap. Oil is the material basis of Moscow’s capacity not only to fight Ukraine, but for its subversion in former USSR states, in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. In the US, one finds strong bipartisan sentiment that “Russia is a gas station, masquerading as a state,” as former-Senator John McCain famously remarked, and that Moscow must be deprived of its easy petrosate riches.

My study for European Initiative for Energy Security (EIES, based in Brussels, is associated with SAFE in Washington, DC, though policy-independent), traces the new USA-Ukrainian joint war on Russian oil, which includes sanctions, tariffs; drone strikes on Russian refineries, ports and oil tankers, and seizures of shadow fleet ships at sea. All these are part of a coherent campaign begun in Spring 2025, as the Trump administration realized that its focus on offering Putin economic enticements to end the war was proving ineffective. It became clear that the application of “pain”, as Trump put it, would be necessary.

The present study shows, in some technical detail, how it is possible to, first, physically stop the majority of Russian seaborn oil exports, secondly, that this can force the shutdown of old, delicate W. Siberian oil fields in winter resulting in the permanent or semi-permanent ruin of these fields, the material basis of the Russian petrostate economy.

This, in fact, is the real threat, the “pain”, which Putin has begun to fear, inducing him to engage for the first time a bit more seriously in negotiations.

The Report also draws attention to and analyses the unfortunate incapacity of many European expert observers and think tanks to see the outlines of this coherent oil war strategy, distracted by the considerable bluster and threats employed by President Trump.

Third, in parallel, the study explains presently favorable oil market conditions consisting of a persistent supply glut, making any major cutoff of Russian seaborne oil exports feasible without sparking a lasting spike in world prices. I show how the OPEC-Gulf states, especially the Saudis and UAE, have facilitated this glut in coordination with President Trump et al, with the prospect of regaining much of the Indian and Chinese market discounted Russian oil has taken since 2022.

For the longer term, however, in the conclusion to this report, it is shown how the return of Venezuelan barrels to the market (and perhaps Iranian barrels as well) are part of a comprehensive USA energy strategy to create market conditions enabling both persistent low prices and, if necessary, the permanent “Liquidation of the Russian Petrostate,” to end the Ukraine war and Moscow’s international significance-in-general.

This is all seen to be part-and-parcel of the Trump administrations detailed commitment – with significant bipartisan support – to exercise “USA Energy Dominance” as a pillar of USA geo-economic power and geostrategy.

I am available for interviews and speaking on this Report’s topic. Contact EIES or me directly.

My Al Jazeera| In Venezuela, an oil “security guarantee” means Trump-Rubio get armed Chavismo to disband or stand down.

My Al Jazeera (EN) interview, Interview recorded

I spoke about three issues

-1- How US and other foreign oil firms can start immediately to stepwise developing three different types of oil fields. Yes, Venezuela can become a “powerhouse” oil producer. This could be a huge change in the global oil system.

-2- What is meant when Trump and oil firms talk about USA “security guarantees” for work in Venezuela. The USA government is unlikely to subsidize oil majors going into Venezuela. Instead, they are talking about somehow Washington managing a “regime change.” The KEY element of this is that the present pro-Chavista armed actors, both the state and non-state armed actors and the Chavista-state intelligence services, all of which are widespread in the country, are still intact and are still active, either agree to disband stepwise or to stepdown and not oppose the formation, eventually, of a new government elected freely. The instruments of state armed coercion that will remain, including elements of the police, intelligence services, national guard, army, must agree to serve whomsoever is democratically elected in future elections. However, as Trump himself points out, the foreign oil majors “are tough guys” and they have abundant experience and methods to work in countries having fairly dangerous situations.

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Kyiv TV| Venezuela can replace Russian oil.

My Kanal24 interview with Nataly Lutsenko, who was in Kyiv, Ukraine on11Jan25, posted here 18Jan.. I explained:

— The stepwise manner in which different Venezuelan oil basins can start being brought to market rapidly while recovery and new production can proceed to more complex and higher-investment projects over time.

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My Newsweek| I counter Exxon CEO Darren Wood’s WH drama that “Venezuela is uninvestable.” And more commentary.

Oil Bosses Hit Trump With Venezuela Setback: ‘Uninvestable’

Image from 2002 shows an oil refinery in Maracaibo, Vzla. Photo ANDREW ALVAREZ

Published Jan 10, 2026 – By, Brendan Cole, Senior News Reporter

Developing Venezuela’s oil industry  following the removal of its leader, Nicolas Maduro,  would require major legal and commercial changes, Exxon CEO Darren Woods has told President Donald Trump

Woods gave a downbeat assessment of the viability of restoring oil production in the South American country believed to hold the world’s largest reserves, telling Trump that at the moment, the country’s industry was “uninvestable.”

Energy industry analyst, Thomas O’Donnell, told Newsweek on Saturday that one approach would be for companies to work on small projects to kickstart production before targeting the oil fields that require heavy investment.   

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Oil Bosses Hit Trump With Venezuela Setback: ‘Uninvestable’

Image from 2002 shows an oil refinery in Maracaibo, Vzla. Photo ANDREW ALVAREZ

Published Jan 10, 2026 – By, Brendan Cole, Senior News Reporter

Developing Venezuela’s oil industry  following the removal of its leader, Nicolas Maduro,  would require major legal and commercial changes, Exxon CEO Darren Woods has told President Donald Trump

Woods gave a downbeat assessment of the viability of restoring oil production in the South American country believed to hold the world’s largest reserves, telling Trump that at the moment, the country’s industry was “uninvestable.”

Energy industry analyst, Thomas O’Donnell, told Newsweek on Saturday that one approach would be for companies to work on small projects to kickstart production before targeting the oil fields that require heavy investment.   

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My Al Jazeera| Venezuela: China’s $100b oil-debt conundrum & Trump| With Janiv Shah, VP Rystad

7 January 2026, Al Jazeera English. On Venezuelan oil, and Trump’s new leverage over China’s oil-loans..

See especially (i) my second response re. China’s big risk regarding repayment of its $100b loans, collateralized with a promised flow of Venezuelan oil, and equally (ii) Janiv Shah’s first comment, on the more immediate China impact. It was a pleasure to be on with the well known oil expert Janiv Shah, VP RystadEnergy.

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My bTV| On the Trump administration’s Venezuela logic: drugs, migration & oil (partly vs Russia). Both Maduro’s regime & Machado’s opposition sit & wait.

I was interviewed by David Karalvanov at bTV (Bulgaria) on the US-Venezuela confrontation under Trump and Maduro (01Dec). David used excerpts for a documentary and kindly gave me the full video here. An outline of the five questions and answers is below here.

Three Asides:

  1. I recall vividly how Trump and co., in his first term, easily misled a naively dependent Venezuelan opposition into believing that the USA was planning to forcibly remove Maduro. In turn, the opposition convinced the country’s population that the USA was preparing to forcibly liberate them. This belief was deeply corrosive to advancing any self-reliant domestic anti-Maduro pro-democracy movement. In the end, the Trump administration tried a poorly prepared putsch. John Bolton, Trump’s then-National Security Advisor, the organizer, was embarrassingly gamed by the Venezuelan regime’s intelligence police. Meanwhile, the present Venezuelan opposition has long been unwilling to organize or endorse any popular movement to forcibly restore democracy from below.
  2. In a recent CNN interview I spoke about Trump rationales for the present confrontation. See: “Why Trump wants a Venezuelan oil boom …“) and dangers of not preparing for the day-after possibilities of chaotic events, terrorism or resistance by armed pro-Chavista military or collectivo groups, and/or x-Colombian guerilla groups long active in the country.
  3. I’ve written for 20 years on Venezuela, Chavismo and oil, including two years as visiting professor, Universidad Central de Venezuela’s UCV/CENDES, Caracas.–I’m happy to speak or consult on Ven.-US-China-Russia-Iran-Colombian-EU-… and/or Ven. domestic matters in English or Spanish.- Tom O’D

David’s five questions and some of my answers:

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My CNN live: Why Trump wants a Venezuelan oil boom | Venezuelans, living in misery, just want Maduro gone; eight million have fled.

I was interviewed on CNN International’s “Newsroom” with host Kim Brunhuber – live, Friday, 12 Dec. 2025. The transcript is below. Kim asked about Venezuela’s oil industry, the impact of sanctions, what stricter enforcement could do to the Venezuelan economy, and what the US stands to gain if it ultimately gains greater access to the country’s oil reserves? He also wanted to know what Venezuelans are saying. / CNN says: “The show is broadcast around the world on CNN International, and in the US on our new platform All Access.”

Transcript:

0:01 I want to bring in Thomas O’Donnell, an

0:03 energy and geopolitics strategist at

0:05 GlobalBarrel.com. He’s also a former

0:07 visiting professor at the Central

0:09 University of Venezuela and he joins us

0:11 from Berlin. Thank you so much for being

0:13 here with us. Uh so this seizure, a

0:16 clear escalation here. Uh the White

0:19 House says more tanker seizures could be

0:22 coming. If that happens, I mean, what

0:23 would that do to the Venezuelan economy?

0:28 Well, there’s there’s two aspects here.

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China & Russia stick with Venezuela’s Maduro for the same reason the USA stuck with S. Viet Nam [My Energy Analytics Institute Q&A]

Venezuelan protest, 31 January 2019. Photo credit Deutsche Welle, German public broadcaster.

I was very happy to be interviewed for the Latin American “Energy Analytics Institute” (EAI), a Houston-based consultancy and news service. I’ve followed its work for years.

With Biden in and Trump out, everyone is debating how to deal with Maduro and his chavista regime that’s brought such misery and ruin in Venezuela. It’s not only the USA’s new LatAm team of Biden, Blinken and Nichols, but the EU, Norway, the OAS, the Lima Group, who are all looking for a new strategy. And so has the Venezuelan opposition, plus an increasingly important actor: the growing and doggedly persistent civil society organizations. Increasingly suffering forced-isolation from abroad, this array of social, cultural, media, medical, educational, nutrition, economic and political resistance groups do largely self-sufficient work to replace basic necessities and social-services, which the chavista government and ruined private sector can no longer provide.

However, in this brief Q&A what was addressed was not strategy per se; but a key underlying issue to understand in framing a strategy: the interests of both Moscow and Beijing as key obstacles to removal of the chavista regime. Read at EAI site (free) or Read below – Tom O’D.

China, Russia, Venezuela: Q&A With Thomas O’Donnell

(Energy Analytics Institute, 13.Feb.2021) — China and Russia continue to push around their might in Venezuela. Thomas O’Donnell with the Hertie School of Governance & Freie Universität-Berlin weighs in briefly here.

Energy Analytics Institute: What might China and Russia be willing to do this year to assist Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro?

Thomas O’Donnell, PhD: Beijing’s original (and perhaps still) plan for Venezuela was deep vertical integration mirroring PDVSA-Citgo Petroleum: new Faja upgraders, a pipeline to Colombia’s Pacific coast, dedicated ships, dedicated domestic Chinese refineries, etc. All very rational and lucrative for both sides. China became alarmed with Hugo Chavez’ unreliability and incompetence within a few years and with Maduro’s incapacity to reform within a year or so. The entire “oil-for-loans” history was a fallback strategy for Beijing – at least secure an oil stream with minimized risk. I have no doubt the Chinese Communist Party wants a new Caracas regime it can work with.

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Decoding the Oil Price War 1: Moscow seized COVID crisis to hit US shale, force sanctions relief

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The “Oil Price War of 2020” was launched at the worst possible time.  The COVID-19 pandemic was spreading to the world beyond China, promising to kill tens-of-thousands, and bring a global economic collapse.

However, this war was not preordained. Things could have gone otherwise from the start.  It was a decision, a sort of Pearl-Harbor-esque surprise attack, announced by Russian minister of energy, Alexander Novak, upon his arriving late to the OPEC-plus summit hall in Vienna on March 6.

If Moscow now abandons its all-out war on US shale, it will be because Putin has miscalculated.  He was willing to increase the pain for everyone else by exploiting the COVID-19 energy crisis in a half-baked attempt to get out from under the US sanctions.  However, the unanticipated repercussions might get too hot for Moscow.

The facts about why Putin decided to launch this oil price war are important to decode.  A key aspect to understand is that Moscow’s game plan was to blame the Saudis; and it soon began a disinformation campaign saying the Saudis launched the war.

We shall see, below and in future posts, how this blame-shifting is a stratagem designed to manipulate a section of US politicians and especially independent US oil producers, who traditionally hold strong, anti-Saudi sentiments (to be clear: they have good reasons to hold these anti-Saudi views), to preferentially sympathize with Russia against the Saudis and to lobby Trump and Congress to give Moscow relief from US sanctions.

Whether this Oil War strategy of Moscow can, at least in part, succeed in freeing Russia from US sanctions is not clear.  But, Moscow’s is highly motivated to succeed due to the significant constraints these sanctions are imposing on Russia.  They include sanctions in retaliation for its war against Ukraine, since 2014, which have undermined expansion of Russia’s domestic oil and gas sector; sanctions which have stalled Russian-German plans to finish the Nord Stream 2 pipeline; and sanctions on Rosneft’s efforts to sustain the Maduro dictatorship in Venezuela.

Today, as explained below, I would say the odds are against Moscow’s success, with the plan bordering on adventurism.  The Saudi’s initial response, in so far as it specifically targets Russia’s oil business, is rational; however, by de facto joining the Russian oil price war on US shale,  the Saudis will also provoke a backlash from powerful US oil-business and political interests, which is likely precisely what Putin and Igor Sechin hoped to bait the Saudis’ Prince MbS into doing.

Considering the pain the world is already suffering, Putin and Sechin’s callous game to exploit the COVID-19 oil-market crisis must be seen for what it is.  Most especially, one should not acquiesce to Moscow’s disinformation campaign to shift the blame elsewhere.

In Vienna: Who started the price war?

For weeks, Riyadh had aggressively lobbied the 10 OPEC and 11 non-OPEC members of the OPEC-plus alliance to agree to a major production cut.  This alliance had been born in 2016, of a newfound, market-dictated, yet grudging, Russian-Saudi mutual recognition of the reality that only such a large-scale collective effort could begin to get control of a market in long-term oversupply.  By December 2019, their OPEC-plus group had Continue reading

Venezuelan transition? My analysis on Germany’s DW TV | Videos: español & English

venezuela_protest_dw.de_31jan19

Here are two videos from the Quadriga show on Germany’s international network DW.de —  Aquí hay dos vídeos del programa Cuadriga de la red internacional alemana DW.de

Espanol, 28 febrero 2019:  https://p.dw.com/p/3EHYo  (… luego desplácese hasta el video)

English 31 January 2019 : https://p.dw.com/p/3CVxR (… then scroll down to the video)

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Putin’s OPEC tactics: Iran sanctions and the Saudis [IBD cites me]

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June 2018 OPEC meeting’s key players (AP)

Last week, Gillian Rich at Investor’s Business Daily (Washington), asked me (Berlin) and others about the OPEC’s 20-21 June meeting. Below here, I give my views in more detail, including the tie-in to the Trump project to isolate Iran and my comment about Putin likely betraying the Iranians again.  The IBD piece is here: Trump Could Make OPEC’s Next Meeting As Dysfunctional As G-7 Summit. 15 June ’18.

We spoke about market and geopolitical aspects. On the latter, I emphasized both the Trump Administration’s evolving plan to sanction and isolate Iran, and Russia’s new role as a central player with OPEC ever since the 2016 joint Russian-OPEC decision to raise production.

That’s when Putin played a new role for any Russian leader. Not only did he coordinate Russian oil policy with OPEC’s, he got personally involved in heated discussions, getting on the phone late in the last night with Iranian and Saudi leaders to get the deal sealed. Continue reading