Tag Archives: drones

I told Kyiv Kanal24 – Heavier missiles needed to kill Russian oil sector. – Putin fights on like LBJ & Nixon did in Vietnam, & for the same reason

Maxym Krapivnyy, host at Ukraine’s Kanal24 in Kyiv, spoke with me recently while I was in the USA about: Ukraine’s drone war vs. Russian energy, Russia’s economy, and the USA’s expanding energy war targeting Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and India’s Russian oil imports. I explained that soon, the late-Lindsey Graham’s (R, S.C.) and Richard Blumenthal’s (D., Conn.) “draconian” secondary sanctions bill is expected to be signed by Trump, blocking most Russian oil exports. (Note: the Senate yesterday voted 86-12, to advance the bill. See Blumenthal, here.)

However, Maxym also then asked my view on the likeliness of Putin soon agreeing to serious peace talks. I said I expected Russia would be unwilling to soon end the war even if its forces were pushed back to the Russian border. Why? To admit defeat would devastate Russian credibility as a Great Power in Eurasia and beyond. (See below for a comparison to the USA in Vietnam.)

On the energy war, I stressed that Russia is well known to be a petrostate. Russia’s wealth and capacity to finance aggression abroad overwhelmingly depends on its oil export revenues. Russia’s continued existence as a-petrostate is what the ongoing Ukrainian and USA energy offensives are targeting, on two main fronts.

There are two sides to this energy war. One is the Ukrainian’s kinetic war against Russia’s domestic refineries, the other is the USA and allies’ global sanctions offensive. Both aspects are evolving in breath and complexity:

  • First, there is the Ukrainian drone and missile campaign, including deep strikes against domestic Russian oil refineries and infrastructure. This has been gaining in success. I pointed out that these attacks have to, however, increase still more, requiting heavier missiles to close refineries and oil export terminal ports for sufficient time to render repairs unprofitable. However, Ukraine is now testing and has begun to produce such heavier weapons, which should be available in the short-to-medium term. We discussed Russia’s refined product supply problems, and what Ukraine must yet accomplish.
  • Second, oil which increasingly cannot be refined is pouring into Russian export terminals, its big Baltic and Black Sea oil ports. This was already the situation before the Iran war began on February 28. At that time, oil that could not be refined due to drone attacks was being loaded on ships for export. However, with USA sanctions having been intensified, many of these ships had no customers, it had nowhere to go. During the initial phase of the Iran war, the USA allowed India and other allies to purchase this oil (i.e., it unsanctioned oil already loaded on ships without any clear destination) to avert it going to China. This accumulation is apparently again building up, for the same reasons.

the USA now maintains sanctions against Russian oil firms Rosneft and Lukoil, and is working to supply India with non-Russian oil to end its Russian oil purchases, making it harder for Russia to find export markets besides China. However, the reclosing of Hormuz will of course make this somewhat easier for Russia to find buyers.

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My LRT: Ukraine chokes Russian petrostate, as US presses Russia-Iran-Venezuela energy “shaping operations.” [EN, LT]

Two key themes here: Ukraine’s advances against Russia’s domestic oil infrastructure, and the Trump Administration’s global energy offensive, as shaping operations for a future conflict with China – or with the China-Russia-Iran axis.
(Watch in Lithuanian) I told Aleksandra Ketlerienė, at Lithuanian national TV, that Ukraine is perhaps half way along in its kinetic capacities to forcing a collapse of a large part of domestic Russian refining capacities. (Interview in Lithuanian 14jul26).

I stressed that Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia must be taken as one side of a two-sided offensive vs. the Russian petrostate, with the other side being Washington’s targeting, logistics and other assistance to Ukraine’s air campaign, its harsh sanctions vs Rosneft and Lukoil, plus the announcement of a deal with Trump to impose the late-Senator Lindsey Graham (Rep., S. C.) and Sen. Richard Blumenthal’s (Dem. Conn.) self-described “draconian” secondary Russian sanctions, backed by about 93% of US senators, plus the US offensives vs. Iran and Venezuela focused on the oil-and-energy sector, and its continued work to pull India away from Russian oil — not as separate or chaotic events, but as part of a conscious, global energy offensive by the USA jointly with Ukraine and other allies, one which should be assessed as such, and not merely as individual, disjoint, haphazard “crises”. (On Ukrainian strategy, I cited its energy and intelligence expert, Mykhailo Gonchar, “From burning refineries to maritime blockade: a new strategy of pressure on Russia.” a valued colleague. 01jul26)

My assessment, since early 2026, has been that these should be understood as energy-sector “shaping operations.”
That is, these are energy conflicts-of-choice aimed at optimizing the strategic post”ure of the USA and its allies to: destroy the petrostate basis of Russian power (see my EIES analytic paper, “Liquidating the Russian Petrostate, jan26), to secure allied access to Venezuelan (and Western Hemisphere-in-general) oil flows, and to Persian Gulf (Hormuz) oil flows in preparation for a kinetic conflict of whatever magnitude with China in the Indo-Pacific region. I should add that these energy “shaping operations” are intrinsic to the larger Trump administration strategy of “USA Energy Dominance” strategy, which I have discussed at GlobalBarrel.com.

NOTE – I believe it is important not to allow various sharp difficulties, setbacks or even failures that surely will occur on any of these fronts – vs. Russia, Iran and Hormuz, in Venezuela, with India, or directly with China – on the energy, and especially the oil front, to cause a loss of perspective that there is a global energy offensive or even a global energy war taking place, as a central part o the USA and de facto as part of the entire allied preparations (viz., as “shaping operations”) for a looming kinetic conflict with China and its allies – or, perhaps, is sufficiently successful, to dissuade China from aggression.

Also, recognizing the connected strategy is one thing, analyzing and critiquing the individual parts and overall rationale is another.
For more, go to my blog at https://GlobalBarrel.com

Dr. Tom O’Donnell (for a keynote, consult or commissioned analysis for your organization, write twod(at)umich.edu )

My Kanal24 Kyiv: 1) Ukraine’s deep-strike drones. 2) G7’s push v. Russian oil. 3) USA-Iran: Who won? (& a written comment)

I spoke with Kyiv Kanal24’s Nataly Lutsenko on three issues. Jump to a topic here: 1) Ukrainian drones in Russia 00:00:19   2) G7 push v Russian oil. 00:05:25   3) Who won the US-Iran war? 00:10:27   Recorded 18 June 2026.

Note on number 3: I said it is not yet clear who won the US-Iran war. This has to do with military capacities which the USA (and its allies) could bring to bear but are now deeply reluctant or unwilling to bring to bear.

If Iran is unwilling to compromise or, worse, plays games, as it has already in the past few days with its “Persian Gulf Strait Authority,” the USA might decide it is constrained to employ whatever means necessary (Carter Doctrine) to end the Islamic Republic’s capacity to restrict the free flow of energy from the Gulf.

Trump and USA officials understand that a full-on military option is not an optimal resolution. This led them to accept an MoU that is quite conciliatory to Tehran in order to get the Straight reopened, and also apparently in response to many of its Gulf allies unwillingness to absorb the punishment Iranian missiles and drones would inflict before the Straight is forcibly reopened and Iran’s missile capacities are eventually suppressed. The administration knows that a massive bombing campaign of the entire country’s military-industrial and civilian infrastructure, plus an occupation of the Iranian coast along the Straight could likely achieved their aims of removing the Straight from Iranian hegemony. However, this in turn, is likely to require a protracted force commitment to contain whatever regime forces remain active. No matter how minor, remaining missiles and drones, proxy forces and terrorist capacities could require a long time to resolve.

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My EIES Study: ‘Liquidating the Russian Petrostate.’ New USA-Ukrainian oil-war effective. Siberian fields threatened.

A new USA-Ukrainian strategy has replaced the failed Russian oil-price cap. Oil is the material basis of Moscow’s capacity not only to fight Ukraine, but for its subversion in former USSR states, in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. In the US, one finds strong bipartisan sentiment that “Russia is a gas station, masquerading as a state,” as former-Senator John McCain famously remarked, and that Moscow must be deprived of its easy petrosate riches.

My study for European Initiative for Energy Security (EIES, based in Brussels, is associated with SAFE in Washington, DC, though policy-independent), traces the new USA-Ukrainian joint war on Russian oil, which includes sanctions, tariffs; drone strikes on Russian refineries, ports and oil tankers, and seizures of shadow fleet ships at sea. All these are part of a coherent campaign begun in Spring 2025, as the Trump administration realized that its focus on offering Putin economic enticements to end the war was proving ineffective. It became clear that the application of “pain”, as Trump put it, would be necessary.

The present study shows, in some technical detail, how it is possible to, first, physically stop the majority of Russian seaborn oil exports, secondly, that this can force the shutdown of old, delicate W. Siberian oil fields in winter resulting in the permanent or semi-permanent ruin of these fields, the material basis of the Russian petrostate economy.

This, in fact, is the real threat, the “pain”, which Putin has begun to fear, inducing him to engage for the first time a bit more seriously in negotiations.

The Report also draws attention to and analyses the unfortunate incapacity of many European expert observers and think tanks to see the outlines of this coherent oil war strategy, distracted by the considerable bluster and threats employed by President Trump.

Third, in parallel, the study explains presently favorable oil market conditions consisting of a persistent supply glut, making any major cutoff of Russian seaborne oil exports feasible without sparking a lasting spike in world prices. I show how the OPEC-Gulf states, especially the Saudis and UAE, have facilitated this glut in coordination with President Trump et al, with the prospect of regaining much of the Indian and Chinese market discounted Russian oil has taken since 2022.

For the longer term, however, in the conclusion to this report, it is shown how the return of Venezuelan barrels to the market (and perhaps Iranian barrels as well) are part of a comprehensive USA energy strategy to create market conditions enabling both persistent low prices and, if necessary, the permanent “Liquidation of the Russian Petrostate,” to end the Ukraine war and Moscow’s international significance-in-general.

This is all seen to be part-and-parcel of the Trump administrations detailed commitment – with significant bipartisan support – to exercise “USA Energy Dominance” as a pillar of USA geo-economic power and geostrategy.

I am available for interviews and speaking on this Report’s topic. Contact EIES or me directly.

Why USA alarm? [PL/EN] Analityk: Ukraina pokazała, że może zakłócić eksport rosyjskiej ropy przez porty /Analyst: Ukraine has shown it could disrupt Russian ports exporting oil

Money.pl Getty …

In an Easter Sunday interview in 20+ Polish papers [POLISH & ENGLISH below], I said White House reasons for Ukraine not to hit Russian refineries don’t make sense. The “elephant in the room” alarming DC is that Ukraine can now disrupt Primorsk, UST-Luga and Novorossiskya oil ports, needed for 60% of Russian exports.

This would not only deny Moscow vital oil revenues needed to wage war, it would also spark a spectacular global oil market shock. I explain that the USA and allies can urgently prepare for this, while the Ukrainians are still maintaining strategic patience.

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My Newsweek: 1) Ukraine could hit Russian oil exports-but hasn’t. 2) Gen. Hodges is right–USA stand regrettable.

Credit: Kyiv Post 13mar24

“O’Donnell told Newsweek that that if Ukrainians really wanted to hit oil exports, they would go after Novorossiysk Fuel Oil Terminal in the [eastern] Black Sea and Primorsk Oil Terminal at the end of the Baltic Pipeline System.

“‘These are the two major exports sites for Russian oil and they are demonstrated to be within range of aerial drones and perhaps, in the case the Black Sea, their seaborne drones,’ he said. ‘If they really want to cut Russia’s oil income, they would go after those ports and they haven’t—that might be in deference to Americans concerns.’ (Russia Faces Major Gas Headache After Ukraine Strikes, Newsweek, article by Brendan Cole, Mar 25, 2024.)

Last week, Newsweek (USA) twice cited my analysis of Ukrainian drone strikes. In one instance, I had the honor of following an interview with General Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army, Europe, with whom I concur in regretting the USA opposition.

(Aside: I hope to have an Op-Ed, perhaps tomorrow, in Europe, assessing that (i) the USA’s stated reasons versus Ukraine’s drone strikes to date do not make sense, and (ii) the “elephant in the room,” which must really have alarmed the White House, is that Ukraine’s strikes on refineries ipso facto demonstrate they COULD, if they so chose, disrupt anywhere up to 60% of Russian oil exports. Lastly,(iii) if the USA, EU and allies do not rapidly prepare non-Russian oil-sector producers for this eventuality, a global oil price shock could result.)

Here are the links to last week’s two new interviews/citations by Newsweek:

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My DW, VoA & Newsweek interviews: “Ukrainian drones cripple Russian refineries.” Thoughts on strategy, impacts and history

Interview 1/3: Kate Lycock of DW Radio’s Inside Europe interviewed me yesterday, on the historical role of fuel-denial in war, and the impacts of Ukraine’s drone strategy on Russia (first story, on 21 March)

Aside from some WW2 history, I identified two separate impacts we can see in the present Ukrainian campaign: a) The impact on Russian fuel deliveries to the war zones themselves and to the domestic Russian war economy, and b) their possible impact as a “force multiplier” for the oil-price cap sanctions on Russian oil exports, designed to deny Moscow its all-important oil revenues that are financing its aggression. I also speculated a bit as to how these strikes, together with Black Sea sea-drone operations, might be shaping coming Ukrainian offensive(s). (This show is also syndicated in the USA as I recall.)

2/3: on 20 March, I was also interviewed on the drone strikes by Voice of America’s Harry Ridgwell, while I was at the Berlin Energy Transition Dialogue, held at the German Federal Foreign Office. (See Video in LHS column.)

3/3: Lastly, I was quoted a couple times by Brendan Cole of the USA national magazine, Newsweek, on 18 March:

Read more: My DW, VoA & Newsweek interviews: “Ukrainian drones cripple Russian refineries.” Thoughts on strategy, impacts and history

Russia Faces ‘Serious’ Threat as Ukraine Attacks Refineries

Mar 18, 2024. By Brendan Cole, Senior News Reporter. You can read it HERE.

Note, there are new developments since yesterday, including Russia’s revenge strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure (reports are that 1 million Ukrainians have no electricity today) and on its Special Operations Headquarters. However, of the 30 Russian drones that swarmed to target this Kyiv building, every one was shot down.

Also, there are reports (Financial Times) that the USA is warning Ukraine that the strikes will draw retaliation and raise the price of oil.

Who cares! This has gone on for simply too long. There are vastly sufficient oil reserves in the world that can be tapped to fully replace Russian oil even if it were totally taken offline. After over two years of war, Washington and the EU Members should have by now begun a concerted effort to get sufficient new oil on line to enable blocking a high percentage of Russian exports from being exported to the world market

I talk about one possible approach to this in my DW interview, involving Denmark and Sweden inspecting and banning passage of sketchy Russian tankers through their economic zones in the Baltic Sea.

After two-plus years of war, there is no excuse to still be playing around with the oil price cap without either significantly lowing it — say, to $30/barrel as the Ukrainians suggest, in any case begin stepwise lowering it below the present $60, which would be a signal to producers to start developing new fields — and/or finding ways to block shipments more directly.

This is not to diminish the clever and difficult work people at especially OFAC and the USA Justice Department in Washington and their colleagues in London and Brussels have carried out to tighten and make more effective the oil price cap. However, as it stands, the cap is too high and a weak instrument.

The entire political preoccupation with keeping Russian oil on the market is fundamentally flawed, Signals must be given to the market that it will be step-wise taken off the market, which will instill/stimulate IOCs, NOCs and smaller firms to rapidly bring undeveloped oil reserves online to permanently replace Russian exports.

LAST: Here are some references for further reading that I found useful in my research.

My Kyiv Post Interview: “Russia Lost 12% of Its Oil Refinery Capacity in a Day: What’s the Impact?”

According to energy and geopolitics expert Tom O’Donnell, Ukrainian allies’ oil price cap, in conjunction with Ukrainian drones’ physical damage could be a significant hit to Russian revenues.

by Jason Jay Smart | March 15, 2024, 2:16 pm | Please read at Kyiv Post if possible

Tom O’Donnell, PhD, an expert on energy and geopolitics, sat down with Kyiv Post to explain what Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s energy sector will mean for the larger Russian energy sector.

It sounds like a huge number. But how much do you think losing 12 percent of production, in a day, will affect Russia?

First off, although these refineries hit by Ukrainian drones yesterday represent about 12 percent of Russian production, experience shows that they might not each be totally impaired from production. Nevertheless, there are two particularly significant implications for Russia.

First, whatever percentage of Russian refined oil products this impairs, the damage will both deprive the war economy of needed export revenues and/or of much-needed fuels to keep the domestic war economy running.

Already, Russia had announced it will ban the export of gasoline from March 1 in order to tame prices for consumers in the runup to the presidential elections mid-month. In 2023 about 17 percent of Russian gasoline was exported.

What is the origin of the current price pressure?

The present price pressure is both a result of the demands of the war economy as well as previously successful Ukrainian hits on other refineries that began in January.

Read more: My Kyiv Post Interview: “Russia Lost 12% of Its Oil Refinery Capacity in a Day: What’s the Impact?”

This gets to my second point – the successful refinery strikes of yesterday, involving a reported launch of 58 drones, as well as recent hits on a Russian domestic gas transmission pipeline, all demonstrate that the January successes were not one-off special operations, but rather the beginning of what will be a sustained Ukraine armed forces campaign capable of, over time, significantly disrupting Russia’s all-important oil and gas import revenues and internal refined-product supplies.

Kyiv has launched some of its largest air attacks on Russia this week ahead of the vote, which is set to hand President Vladimir Putin another six-year term in the Kremlin.

If Russia continues to lose refineries, which appears likely, what new complications will it create for Russia?

First, from a strategic point of view, it is important to see these physical strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in conjunction with the sanctions efforts of the USA, EU and other allies aimed at reducing Russian oil profits. These drone strikes should be seen as a “force multiplier” to allied oil sanctions.

How so?

Consider that, with Russia no longer having the Druzba oil pipeline flowing into Central Europe due to EU sanctions, this has forced it to shift its Urals-region oil exports to seaports on the Baltic coast of Russia and to a new western-Arctic port.  Hence, hitting any refining or export facilities inside Russia along this general Urals-oil export corridor has a significant effect on Russia sustaining export revenues. This oil mainly flows to Turkey, India and China, with Russian oil tankers representing the main users of the Suez and then the Red Sea.  Due to sanctions, most of these ships are now either directly or indirectly Russian-controlled, to avoid the sanctions oil-price cap.

There has been a discussion in US-EU security-and-sanctions circles that these ships could be stopped for inspection by Sweden and/or Denmark in the Baltic, in the straights between their countries, and many might be refused passage due to having sketchy insurance and/or being unsafe, old vessels. 

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What do you think of the oil price cap? Is it a good idea?

From the point of view of strategic impact, the allies’ choice of an oil-price cap has been, in my view, a weak and overly complex-to-enforce instrument.  However, in conjunction with Ukrainian drones’ physical damage, the overall hit to Russian revenues might become significant.

Secondly, Ukraine has also hit refineries in Russia just east of its own territory, which will mainly undermine the region’s war economy and complicate supplying the massive demand from Russia’s invasion forces.  This region already has chronic fuel-supply problems, with farmers last year protesting against a lack of diesel for harvests, causing Russia to ban diesel exports during that season.

Dr. Tom O’Donnell is Berlin-based and is a Global Fellow of the Wilson Center.

Jason Jay Smart

Jason Jay Smart

Jason Jay Smart, Ph.D., is a political adviser who has lived and worked in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Latin America. Due to his work with the democratic opposition to Pres. Vladimir Putin, Smart was persona non grata, for life, by Russia in 2010. His websites can be found at http://www.JasonJaySmart.com / http://www.AmericanPoliticalServices.com / fb.com/jasonjaysmart / Twitter: @OfficeJJSmart

Related references for assertions I made in my interview – Tom O’D.