A Venezuela discussion (GELI): The Machado-opposition’s long-flawed transition model. / On oil, US strategy in Venezuela, Guyana, Argentina et al is sharply focused vs. China, Russia & Iran.

I did an in depth, ca. 30 minute, talk with the Guyana Energy Leadership Institute (GELI) on the issues underlying a democratic transformation and an economic and oil recovery of Venezuela after Maduro’s removal by the Trump administration. This was a “decapitation” of the regime in collusion with Maduro’s VP, today’s chavista president, Delcy Rodriguez. (This was recorded​ on about 09 Octobre, before Maria Corinna returned to Venezuela.)

IWe went into detail on both the issue of Venezuela’s social-political governance incapacities and oil-sector recovery issues. Thir trajectories are deeply interconnected.

In particular, I offered my long standing, sharp critique of not only of the kleptocratic and autocratic chavista rule, but also of the consistent failings and incompetence of the mainstream opposition to chavismo, now led by Maria Corina Machado​. She’s the last opposition leader left standing. ​However, the​ official Venezuelan ​opposition-in-general’s ​narrow conception of how to restore democracy, and especially its ​”parliamentary cretinism” (to borrow a phrase from the 18th and early 20th-Century European left), and ​it’s longstanding petitions to Washington to “decapitate” the chavista regime and install it in power as their conception of a “return to democracy” and their narrowminded notion of what needs to be done to prepare for a successful transition ​… has everything to do ​with why the USA repeatedly blocked Machado from returning to Venezuela. ​Washington knows Machado holds essentially no sway over the organs of coercion of the chavista state she would have tame. Neither she nor her opposition predecessors – Leopoldo Lopez and Henry Caprilles in particular – have ever agreed to engage in seriously preparing for a seizure of power from below.

Rubio et al apparently realize that she and the opposition movement generally, after 27 years, have cultivated essentially zero capacity to resist and subdue the chavistas’ coercive state and state-backed forces. The entire “program” of Machado and the opposition-in-general, as I know from personal experience, has always been to “win the election” in what they describe as a dictatorship where elections cannot be won due to manipulation, and simultaneously appeal to the Americans obsequiously – regardless if a Democrat of Republican is in the White House – to “decapitate the regime for us” as I was often told.

Continue reading →

Russia in Global Politics [2/2]: “What is Trump’s Russia strategy for Ukraine and US Energy Dominance?” My Sofia IGA Highlight talk.

This is Part 2 of my Highlight lecture at the IGA Conference (Institute for Global Analytics) in Sofia, Bulgaria, co-sponsored by the Polish Embassy on 27 October. Part 1 was: “How post-’91 reconstruction failed.” I will post the Q&A separately, as a third element of the talk that addressed Russia’s W. Siberian fields’ vulnerability to destruction, Russia’s likely response vs. Europe, also China’s energy strategy, and Trump’s now-familiar strategy for negotiations with Putin, etc.

The Part 2 video above is on: “What is USA Russia strategy under Trump?” including: (a) the US/Trump Ukraine war policy, and (b) the Trump administration policy to Russian oil within its “US Energy Dominance” strategy.

“USA Energy Dominance” is focused against both Iran and Russia. However, as I explained, in my assessment, together with US oil policy to the W. Hemisphere and Venezuela, to OPEC, to the Caspian and Central Asia states and beyond, this is all ultimately aimed at constraining China on energy in the same way Xi’s China has attempted to constrain the world on critical minerals.

Continue reading →

Russia in Global Politics [part 1/2]: “How post-’91 reconstruction failed.” My Sofia IGA highlight talk

It was honored to give the Highlight lecture at the IGA Conference (Institute for Global Analytics) in Sofia, Bulgaria, invited by IGA and the Polish Embassy. on 27 October. My special thanks to Dr. Rumena Filoipva, founder and director of IGA.

I divided the topic into two key aspects:

  1. How did Russia end up at war with Ukraine & West?
    That is, how did 20 years of Russian reform & reconstruction fail after the USSR collapsed in 1991.
    I focused on two aspects of that once-hopeful history:
    i) the geopolitical and ii) the economic histories.
    The second aspect (this will be in a following YouTube and GlobalBarrel.com post):
  2. What is today the USA’s (i.e., the Trump administration’s) Russia strategy? This focused on two aspects:
    i) the Ukraine war, and ii) the USA’s present energy geostrategy under the Trump administration. That is, “USA Energy Dominance,” which is presently focused on both Iran and quite strongly on Russia, but ultimately all this, including its policy to Venezuela and to W. Hemisphere oil, to OPEC, etc, is all is vs China.
Continue reading →

Invitation: “Russia in Global Politics”- My Highlight Talk, IGA Conference, Sofia. 27 October

Dear GlobalBarrel.com readers -and others- in Bulgaria, you are cordially invited. – I’m honored to give the highlight talk at the IGA Conference in Sofia, co-sponsored by the Polish Embassy. The program (Page 2 below, in red) lists my talk: “Russia in Global Politics, Regime Dynamics, Foreign Policy Outlooks and Interactions with other Powers,” Best, Tom O’D. (I’ll post a video after the conference.)

Central and South Eastern Europe After Four Years of War:
New Trends and Old Patterns in Foreign Influence, Resilience-Building
and Regional Cooper ation

International Conference
Grand Hotel Sofia, Triaditza 2 Hall
10 am – 5 pm, 27 October 2026

Analysis: Trump & Congress agreed to end Russian oil exports. But first, he tries one more “reverse Nixon” – My Polish press [PL/EN]

Dr. Tom O’Donnell (credit: Atlantic Council of Montenegro)

How to understand Trump? Below is one of the interviews I gave the Polish press a while back on European attempts at peace talks with Russia. It also examines renewed interest of some German political parties to repair North Stream and bring Russian gas back to Germany.

However, they should understand that, for Washington, this would only happen if Putin agrees to a peace deal. Reopening Nord Stream is but one of many enticements Trump is again offering Putin, along with his diesel deal, he’s also offered a return of Russian frozen assets, “trillions” in USA investments into the Russian economy, and many other “carrots” to entice Putin to make a deal ending Russia’s Ukraine war.

This sudden return to the enticements Trump offered Putin during his first three-or-four months in office, is seen by many observers as simply “treason”, a fawning after Putin. However, the press and most every commentator are missing the other side, the “big stick” Trump is also carrying as he makes these offers.

I am, of course, drawing an analogy to President Theodore Roosevelt’s adage, for dealing with foreign adversaries, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Well, Trump is not so adept at speaking “softly” but his elaborate economic and other enticements are essentially “speaking softly” to Putin. What I am saying is that these seemingly obsequious offers are only half the story. Often, in diplomacy, as any negotiation, there are important levers one or the other side can wield, whose obvious presence, as a sort of “sword of Damocles” hovering over the proceedings goes unspoken, at least publicly. These are things any objective analysis needs to bring to light. In this case, there are, objectively, two aspects, not one, to the Trump-administrations present approach to Russia:

Continue reading →

At Warsaw Security Forum: What’s Trump doing? Lavrov refuses energy ceasefire-for-diesel deal [TRT London]

I’m at the Warsaw Security Conference, an annual high-level gathering of European and US experts and officials, 12-13 Oct.

Everyone is trying to figure what in the world Trump thinks he’s doing by buying diesel from Putin and claiming Putin agreed to an energy ceasefire. Meanwhile, Russia foreign minister Sergey Lavrov rudely rejected any energy ceasefire, contradicting Trump, saying that Ukraine “does not deserve” a ceasefire.

All indications are that this deal is dead on arrival. I answered several questions and theorized what Trump hopes to accomplish.

It is clear from both European and American security experts and officials here in Warsaw, that no one thinks this “deal” will fly, or that it can really lower diesel prices. Instead, there is deep indignation that the President of the USA would so blatantly undermine the struggle against the Russian petrostate for its aggression in Ukraine. And, there are also market implications beyond the direct undermining Ukraine’s defensive war and allies’ Russian energy sanctions.

Continue reading →

My Al Jazeera. Diesel deal: Trump’s chasing votes, but he’s also, again, offering Putin many other bribes to end the war. (see text below video).

[Correction: I misspoke. Russia formerly exported about 800,000, not 800 “million” barrels of diesel per day to Europe, before sanctions cut that off. I also added the NYT quote below before widely sending this post out.] As I post this, I am thinking this is not ONLY about US elections. Why? Trump et al have been claiming for a couple weeks that Russia wants to talk – though there is no public evidence. And Trump’s team are engaged in other, similar maneuvers:

  1. Offering Moscow to reopen the Nord Stream pipelines under ownership of a US firm. This is an old idea Trump et al had dropped by ca. April 2025, when it became obvious that enticing Putin with big deals and investments was not going to sway him to end his war in Ukraine. (This move has the German AfD excited, but they’re not significant players here.)
  2. Trump’s negotiators have also offered Moscow a that some western firm(s) could purchase Russia’s sanctioned Lukoil oil-and-gas infrastructure located mainly in Europe, which can no longer be used by Lukoil due to US sanctions,
  3. Plus, there is this unrealistic diesel deal, which Trump clearly hopes will make US voters think he is getting fuel prices down before November elections. I say “unrealistic” because, if Russia actually had significant extra diesel to sell, it would not have banned exports of diesel for many months while its refineries burn due to Ukrainian drone hits.
  4. And now (10Oct26 addition), there were earlier attempts, in September, also to bribe Putin to end the war. Here is the NY Times on what happened in NYC on the sidelines of the General Assembly opening:

“…, when the Trump administration opened the latest diplomatic track on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in late September, Ukrainian officials were startled by how far Mr. Kushner and Mr. Witkoff went in their offerings to Russia.
According to officials familiar with the discussions, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss confidential diplomatic talks, the Americans put three lucrative economic incentives on the table to coax Moscow into a limited cease-fire, either on energy infrastructure or at sea.

“Washington floated releasing billions of Russian sovereign assets immobilized in the West. The money, the officials said, was viewed as an upfront incentive for partial truces, not a reward for their enactment. This revived a proposal from last year to release funds to Russia. Then, the suggestion was to release up to $100 billion.

“The Americans also revisited a plan to sell off parts of the Russian oil giant Lukoil in a multibillion-dollar deal that would go to a group of Middle Eastern investors, including some with business ties to U.S. negotiators.

Continue reading →

Trump lost his nerve? Takes Putin’s diesel for votes. – My Kanal24-Kyiv detailed the Hormuz & Ukraine gains this will complicate.

[Note: I edited the title, to reflect the element of deception usually present in Trump moves. Hence the new “?”. 16:30 CET 10.10.26. T.O’D. All else is as early today.] Trump has lost his nerve and betrayed what the US and Ukraine had accomplished vs Russia and Iran. He made a deal with Putin to import millions of barrels of Russian diesel. Out of his desire to win US elections, he has undermined what the USA, Ukraine and allies have worked for, and he had himself worked to accomplish.

Importing Russian diesel fuel undermines sanctions the US and allies in Europe and Asia – and Trump himself – imposed.

The US Congress, with bipartisan resolve , and allies, must rebuke him.

Continue reading →

My Al Jazeera: EU’s release of 100M bbl of diesel stocks will help to lower prices as Hormuz flow rises & to offset Russian & Chinese export stops

This is a brief live-on-air commentary just after the G7 announced that it would release 100M barrels of diesel fuel to supply markets that are tight due to the Hormuz crisis. This will go a long way to keep inflation in the US, Europe and Asian allies down, protecting consumers and economies.

While Hormuz is already, as I said, transiting as much CRUDE OIL as before the Iranian regime closed it – i.e., Tehran has lost control of the Straight to the US military, which is successfully escorting ships out even in daylight now.

Meanwhile, the amount of REFINED OIL products flowing out has not yet gotten up to pre-war levels, and so we see the present refined-fuel-market shortages and high prices.

Continue reading →

1.0 | Iran has already lost Hormuz. 13M barrels of oil leaving daily. USA “6th Generation” tech avoided ground war.

This is part 1.0 of a series on the US-Iran war and the present US global energy offensive. Hormuz developments are altering some elements of the one, “Global Barrel” market-centered collective energy-security model that dates to 1973, and which I named this blog after 15 years ago (after I had apparently coined that name).

I will have No. 2.0 of this Iran series soon. Here is 1.0, my brief BBC interview of last night, with some comments below here.

This was my fourth interview with BBC Persian Service, London in recent months. It feels important to get things clear when I have the opportunity to speak directly to Iranians or to Ukrainians.

Comments:

The larger USA global oil-sector offensive involves Russia, Iran, Venezuela, India, and other countries. I’ve seen these each as USA “shaping operations” aimed at preparing the energy landscape favorably to the US and its allies before any future armed conflict with China might begin – or to prevent one.

As I explained earlier (e.g., Jerusalem Post interview), a problem for the Islamic Republic of Iran, in deciding to take control of Hormuz, is that its control can only degrade over time under US pressure.

In the past few weeks, as it’s grip was loosened by the US military, it needed to find a further lever. In the past few weeks Tehran tried two things to reverse its weakening Hormuz position:

Continue reading →

Our TRT-London: Europe is playing dice with gas storage ] Renewable over-installation is wrecking EU energy security

First video is the entire show. Second video has only my comments.

I just watched our show from about two weeks ago and, I must say, it is quite informative, both in the near term European gas sector risk analysis, and in our discussion of the long term persistent failures of European energy policy to change course. We discussed the still-increasing, renewable installations despite the high prices, weather dependent unreliability and high complexity that over dependence on renewables continues to cause.

This “green” and “clean” policy has not only failed on national and energy security, but also has done far too little to address long term carbon dioxide emissions in comparison to what a nuclear-centric energy policy can do, as France has amply demonstrated over the past 50 years.

And, note bene: nuclear requires no complex grid rebuilding and extension, no still-not-available carbon capture and storage tech (CCS) nor still not developed-at-scale “universal long-term grid scale storage” tech (ULTGSST).

My fellow experts and our Roundtable TRT World London host were:

  • Malcolm Grimston, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Center for Energy Policy and Technology, Imperial College, who was in London.
  • Chris Wefer, Founding-Partner, Macro Advisory, Eurasia Strategic Consultancy, who was in Moscow
  • myself: Dr. Thomas W. O’Donnell, Energy and Geopolitical Strategist, Founder GlobalBarrel.com, who was in Berlin
  • And Edna Brady, TRT-London host

I told Sky: AfD economics, like other German parties’, is about nostalgia, not modernization & reindustrialization

The far-right AfD (Alternativ für Deutschland) won a sweeping election victory in the German state of Saxony-Anhalt last Sunday. I addressed the implications of and motivations for the AfD’s economic program.

In the interview, we spoke mostly about macroeconomic policies of the AfD, and its anti-immigrant social policies. However, the AfD seems to not have a fundamentally different economic orientation from other German parties over the past couple decades. It too is backward looking, full of nostalgia for “what worked” previously in the post-War German economic model. However, it also prioritizes going back to when there were fewer immigrants in Germany.

My work on the German economic model, however, especially my teaching and talks, has focused on the failure of Germany to embrace the tech, social-cultural organization, and research imperatives of the Third Industrial Revolution, the Information Age.

Germany, and the EU as well, have long failed to catch up with the USA, or for that matter Asian allies Japan and South Korea, in information technologies and the modernization of work organization-and-culture within the spheres of production, communication, commerce, research, education and business. This would have required reforms fostering a risk-tolerant culture of innovation, personal initiative, flexibility and entrepreneurialism,  sweeping transformations away from the old, mid-20th-Century Fordist model “with German characteristics,” so to speak.

This strategy was both a theoretical and practical mistake – not because it addressed global warming, which indeed is a significant problem though, in my view, not the predominant global problem it is made to be in the last 15 years of German policy, but because it was offered as an alternative model of economic development to Europe embracing the “American” Information Revolution.

In reality, Europe had no option but to wholly embrace what it terms “digital technologies” and catch up to tje USA.

In addition to embracing its peculiar “green”, “clean” energy path to reindustrialization, the other German strategy, in parallel, was to double down on improving its renowned 1960-1980’s electro-mechanical technologies, which are typical of the previous Second Industrial Revolution, and massively export these into the Chinese market.

Nevertheless, Gerany did have a plan to move, at some point, beyond this hold-over tech. The strategy was to bank on development of “green” or, more recently, “clean” technologies.

It was widely claimed, for about 20 years (influenced by futurist green-energy theorists like US physicist Amory Lovens, that Europe could “spark a Fourth Industrial Revolution” by carrying out a “green energy transition” based on developing and deploying a “totally new” energy system” using only renewable sources such as windmills and solar panels along with all their required grid-expansion, -connection and energy storage technologies.

Continue reading →

My Al Jazeera: Trump’s big Venezuelan oil deal aims to reassure US investors amid political and legal uncertainties. — If successful, it would slash Russia, Iran, OPEC oil leverage, constrain China.

I spoke with Al Jazeera on what we know about this new deal between the US and Venezuela.

Trump’s talk of “ownership” is hype aimed at voters. In reality, he is creating reassuring conditions for US firms hesitant to make the big investments required to recover and grow Venezuela’s enormous extra-heavy oil reserves in the Faja del Orinoco region.

In general, the deal seems to follow the outlines of the new hydrocarbon law passed in January by the chavista controlled (and illegitimate) National Assembly. It seems essentially aimed to assure US and other firms that if they invest to develop Venezuelan oil that the US will protect their investments.

US courts will decide contract disagreements, the US Treasury will handle payments, and the US is encouraging repairs and expansion of the dilapidated national infrastructure the oil sector requires as do the people of the country.

On all this, I highly recommend reading the latest article by my old friend, longtime Venezuelan oil-sector journalist and publisher Elio Ohep. Here is the link: https://energiesnet.com/still-unknown-whats-really-behind-trumps-biggest-oil-deal-in-world-history/

– – Tom O’D.

PS I spent two years in Venezuela researching “The political economy of Venezuelan oil under Chavismo” as a US Fulbright scholar and visiting professor at CENDES (Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo) at UCV (University Central de Venezuela), and returned a number of times.

I am available for keynotes, seminars, consults, commissioned analysis, and on-air expert commentary.

Continue reading →

My Jerusalem Post interview: “Iran’s Strait of Hormuz trump card is losing strategic value, expert tells ‘Post'”

Yesterday, I had a long talk with ‘Post’ Mideast reporter Danielle Greyman-Kennard. My thanks to her. – Tom O’D.

Although 14 to 15 million barrels of oil passed through Hormuz per day before the war, an expert told the Post that it was entirely possible to manage without much of that supply.

27 Aug. 2026, updated 28 Aug. – Though the Islamic Republic of Iran has established a “sophisticated panoply” to protect itself against the possibility of regime change, its trump card, the Strait of Hormuz, is losing its strategic value and will continue to do so, former Wilson Center global fellow Thomas O’Donnell told The Jerusalem Post on Thursday. (Continue reading at GlobalBarrel.com or at Jerusalem Post here)

Lightning occurs when META 4, an Oil Products Tanker, sails into Muscat Anchorage on March 21, 2026 at Sultan Qaboos Port in Muscat, Oman.President Donald Trump had threatened to attack Iran’s energy infrastructure if it did not end its de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by March 23.(photo credit: Elke Scholiers/Getty Images)

With many of the regime’s regional proxies degraded over years of war with Israel and its nuclear ambitions delayed after the 12 Day War in June last year, Tehran only has its rockets, drones, and ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz left as an insurance policy against attempts to topple the regime, he noted.

These remaining elements will be used to dissuade action while it restores the others, but they are losing the weight they once carried, O’Donnell added.

Though 14 to 15 million barrels of oil traveled through Hormuz per day before the war, he argued that it was very possible to manage without much of that supply.

Saudi Arabia’s East-West Crude Oil Pipeline moves around five million barrels per day for non-domestic use, while the United Arab Emirates moves an average of 1.5 to 1.8m. bpd through its own pipeline, he calculated.

Some 400m. barrels of oil and refined petroleum products were unanimously approved for release by the 32 member nations of the International Energy Agency (IEA), while the US government committed 172 million barrels from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

Oil tanker HELGA is moored at one of Iraq’s southern offshore oil terminals near Basra as it prepares to load crude oil, becoming the second vessel to arrive since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, April 24, 2026. (credit: REUTERS/Mohammed Aty/File Photo)

None of this even touches on the oil supplied by the Western Hemisphere, where roughly 32% to 40% of the world’s total oil originates.

“There’s more production in other places, but [the disruption of] oil has not been anything like it would have been 20 years ago if they closed the strait,” he said, explaining how the US’s own oil and fracking industries have helped mitigate much of the damage.

Could Iran’s weakening control of Hormuz force a deal with the US?

“The oil price, it’ll go up and down. The fact that it went over $100 [a barrel], and the next day it was $80, that means that’s geostrategic variability. That’s not fundamental.”

Continue reading →

I told Sky: Besides Trump’s economic war, the US Navy is eroding Iran’s Hormuz blockade. Oil flows rebound. Allies scramble to buy ships [EN,AR]

ENGLISH version. Sky News (UAE), 20 August 2026, Dr. Tom O’Donnell (in Berlin).

I told Sky (UAE), Hormuz is now “a game of chicken” – who can wait the longest and bear the most pain. I tried to look objectively at the two sides.

a) On the Iran side, oil exports are reportedly zero since about 15 July. None of Iran’s oil ships seem to have left Hormuz. A massive accumulation of Iranian oil cargo sits on ships near Malaysia and Singapore, while perhaps 53 loaded ships are stuck in the Gulf due to the US Navy blockade. For a petrostate, this is devastating.

In addition, all Iranian ports are blocked form exporting or importing anything.

What oil can perhaps leave by train to China, say 70,000 barrels per train taking two weeks, is painfully small and costly.

Trump has now declared a push to block any payments or financial transfers to and from Iran. But, if no one is selling anything in either direction, there will be less and less financial flows to block.

For the regime, this is dire. It does not mean Iran will surrender, or even talk, but it is clearly devastating.

Continue reading →