My assessment of how threats posed to the 3-Seas-Region Member States executing a pragmatic energy transition incorporating nuclear energy emanate both from the role of Russia’s Rosneft, and equally from the activities of seven anti-nuclear Member States led by Germany, and
Detailed research on Russia’s nuclear energy dangers contributed by colleagues in Poland and Ukraine. Their research includes:
Appendix A: Some facts and policy recommendations on Rosatom activities, based on research by Warsaw colleagues at The Polish Economic Institute (PEI), Dr. Adam Juszczak, and Mr. Kamil Lipiński (p. 6);
Appendix B. Rosatom may be assisting in circumventing sanctions., from research by colleagues at DiXiE Group, Kyiv, Ukraine, especially Mr. Roman Nitsovych, and Ms. Olena Pavlenko (p. 7);
Appendix C. Why sanction Rosatom: Link between “peaceful” Rosatom energy & Russian nuclear weapons, based on research by CGS Strategy XXI , Kyiv, Ukraine, in particular Mykhailo M. Gonchar, Founder and President, and Chief Editor of the Black Sea Security Journal (p. 11.)
I highly recommend their three Appendices.
I should note that what I wrote in the main body was likely unexpected. I wrote that, for accomplishing a pragmatic, nuclear-power-inclusive energy transition in the 3-Seas Region (i.e., the EU’s Central and Eastern Europe, Baltic, and Balkan Member States), the continued dependencies on Russia’s Rosatom are not the only threats. The threat from the Group of Seven anti-nuclear states, led by Germany, is clearly equally or more disruptive to the Region accomplishing a pragmatic energy security-and-transition policy. I’ll quote a bit of the report on this point:
This version has my voice in English. Translations of interview question are in the blog pos
[Right: Video in English. Below: Arabic version]
The US administration asserts that Kyiv’s drone strikes on Russian refineries threaten to cause higher oil prices. However, as I have argued since early-mid-March (Kyiv Post, USA press, USA press, Polish press), this is not logical (to first order). What undoubtedly alarms DC is that Kyiv has demonstrated that – if it chose to – it could also disrupt the three big Russian westward-facing oil-ports that handle 60% of Russian exports to the global oil market, undoubtedly causing a global oil-price shock. But, fear of such a shock might be overblown. [1]
According to energy and geopolitics expert Tom O’Donnell, Ukrainian allies’ oil price cap, in conjunction with Ukrainian drones’ physical damage could be a significant hit to Russian revenues.
Tom O’Donnell, PhD, an expert on energy and geopolitics, sat down with Kyiv Post to explain what Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s energy sector will mean for the larger Russian energy sector.
It sounds like a huge number. But how much do you think losing 12 percent of production, in a day, will affect Russia?
First off, although these refineries hit by Ukrainian drones yesterday represent about 12 percent of Russian production, experience shows that they might not each be totally impaired from production. Nevertheless, there are two particularly significant implications for Russia.
First, whatever percentage of Russian refined oil products this impairs, the damage will both deprive the war economy of needed export revenues and/or of much-needed fuels to keep the domestic war economy running.
Already, Russia had announced it will ban the export of gasoline from March 1 in order to tame prices for consumers in the runup to the presidential elections mid-month. In 2023 about 17 percent of Russian gasoline was exported.
What is the origin of the current price pressure?
The present price pressure is both a result of the demands of the war economy as well as previously successful Ukrainian hits on other refineries that began in January.
This gets to my second point – the successful refinery strikes of yesterday, involving a reported launch of 58 drones, as well as recent hits on a Russian domestic gas transmission pipeline, all demonstrate that the January successes were not one-off special operations, but rather the beginning of what will be a sustained Ukraine armed forces campaign capable of, over time, significantly disrupting Russia’s all-important oil and gas import revenues and internal refined-product supplies.
Kyiv has launched some of its largest air attacks on Russia this week ahead of the vote, which is set to hand President Vladimir Putin another six-year term in the Kremlin.
If Russia continues to lose refineries, which appears likely, what new complications will it create for Russia?
First, from a strategic point of view, it is important to see these physical strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in conjunction with the sanctions efforts of the USA, EU and other allies aimed at reducing Russian oil profits. These drone strikes should be seen as a “force multiplier” to allied oil sanctions.
How so?
Consider that, with Russia no longer having the Druzba oil pipeline flowing into Central Europe due to EU sanctions, this has forced it to shift its Urals-region oil exports to seaports on the Baltic coast of Russia and to a new western-Arctic port. Hence, hitting any refining or export facilities inside Russia along this general Urals-oil export corridor has a significant effect on Russia sustaining export revenues. This oil mainly flows to Turkey, India and China, with Russian oil tankers representing the main users of the Suez and then the Red Sea. Due to sanctions, most of these ships are now either directly or indirectly Russian-controlled, to avoid the sanctions oil-price cap.
There has been a discussion in US-EU security-and-sanctions circles that these ships could be stopped for inspection by Sweden and/or Denmark in the Baltic, in the straights between their countries, and many might be refused passage due to having sketchy insurance and/or being unsafe, old vessels.
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What do you think of the oil price cap? Is it a good idea?
From the point of view of strategic impact, the allies’ choice of an oil-price cap has been, in my view, a weak and overly complex-to-enforce instrument. However, in conjunction with Ukrainian drones’ physical damage, the overall hit to Russian revenues might become significant.
Secondly, Ukraine has also hit refineries in Russia just east of its own territory, which will mainly undermine the region’s war economy and complicate supplying the massive demand from Russia’s invasion forces. This region already has chronic fuel-supply problems, with farmers last year protesting against a lack of diesel for harvests, causing Russia to ban diesel exports during that season.
Dr. Tom O’Donnell is Berlin-based and is a Global Fellow of the Wilson Center.
Jason Jay Smart, Ph.D., is a political adviser who has lived and worked in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Latin America. Due to his work with the democratic opposition to Pres. Vladimir Putin, Smart was persona non grata, for life, by Russia in 2010. His websites can be found at http://www.JasonJaySmart.com / http://www.AmericanPoliticalServices.com / fb.com/jasonjaysmart / Twitter: @OfficeJJSmart
Related references for assertions I made in my interview – Tom O’D.
Berlin Energy Roudtable. L to R: Ben Aris, Tom O’Donnell, Morten Frisch & Andriy Kobolyev (video link from Kyiv) 24 October 2023, Haus der Bunderpresskonferenz – PHOTO GALLERY BELOW(Divan staff)
On 24 October, I was honored to moderate a great roundtable in Berlin with three European energy experts, sponsored by Der Divan Kulturehaus. SUGGESTION: While listening, open up that speaker’s file below. You’ll find Ben Aris’ data-slides on Russian price-cap failings, Andriy Kobolyev’s proposal to tax Moscow’s oil & Morten Frisch’s slides on EU renewable shortcomings & continued oil and gas needs.
[02.10.23 Note: Some typos/syntax corrected. Somehow could not edit w/ my phone yesterday.]
–1– The Saudis have no intention to spike oil price over $100/barrel, at least not for long – that’s my read.
Their customers’ economies are troubled, especially China, but Europe too – where too-high-an-oil-price could re-boost inflation, even push them into recession(s) killing oil demand.
Over the last year, the Saudi’s were newly proactive (their traditional mode was always to react after-the-fact). And their economists’ market calls were correct.
For several months, OPEC+ cumulative production cuts barely held prices stable. Only in recent months, along with new (though tepid) demand, did prices climb, form high-$80s to now mid $90s.
The Saudi minister professes to be unsure whether demand will rise in Q4. The IEA and the futures market (in backwardian now) see tightness. The Saudi minister answers that, if that happens, he has plenty of oil ready to put back into markets.
But – Nota Bene – despite present drawdowns in USA oil stocks and apparent tightness elsewhere, suddenly many oil analysts are saying that the present price rally could be short lived, and that OPEC-plus may have to keep or even deepen its cuts to maintain prices as they are.
Here are three very useful reports to this effect:
Al Jazeera asked for an online commentary within an hour of Putin’s announcement. These were my initial thoughts.
I also spoke to AJ Arabic, and a couple hours later, on Germany’s Deutsche Welle’s English language service elaborated on these points (see video, next blog post).
The question is where will the EU-USA-g7 western alliance go from here. If they stepwise lower the cap, and also work hard to get new oil online (from OPEC and the USA), they can gradually keep lowering Russia’s market share. However, as I indicated, the coming recession – esp. in Europe – and the uncertainties of Chinese demand as it exits COVID shutdowns in early 2023, complicate calculations of whether the globala oil market will be short or long on supplies and if the price will spike or not. I said this will be “a chess game.”
This interview with Artur Ciechanowich (Polish Associated Press-PAP, Brussels) appeared on Sunday, 25 November 2022 in several Polish press, TV and radio outlets (links below this post). Polish & English (via Google Translate) versions follow:
ENGLISH – via Google Translate
Europe without gas and oil from Russia? An expert gives a possible date
If the European Union does not bow to the Russian energy attack, it may completely replace gas and oil imports from this country with raw materials from other sources within four to six years, said Thomas O’Donnell, an energy market analyst and lecturer at a university in Berlin …..
Russia is waging an energy war against Europe, which is part of a larger war between Russia and Ukraine. We see that the war on the battlefield is not going Russia’s way, so the Kremlin is counting on its energy policy to cause enough economic problems for Europeans to divide the EU and withdraw from solidarity with Ukraine, says O’Donnell.
The question of replacing gas and oil imports from Russia
Vladimir Putin has a much greater influence on Europe through the supply of gas than oil. This is because gas is mainly supplied by pipelines. Around 2027, Europe, the United States, Qatar and others will increase the export capacity of liquefied natural gas enough to replace the EU’s dependence on Russian gas and allow gas prices in the EU to fall to levels close to the low prices in the US, the analyst predicts.
However, he does not hide that before this happens, citizens of EU countries will have to go through a more difficult period. “This is an energy war, and in a war both sides suffer – consumers and businesses in the EU will suffer. It will take at least four years to implement huge new LNG export projects from the US and Qatar, he cautions, adding that the EU will also need to receive as much gas as possible from Algeria, Egypt and Norway.
This year Europe filled up its gas storages. It will be harder next year. It should be understood that the storage facilities – under normal conditions – have never been used to provide normal gas supplies to consumers. They’re just too small for that. They were created with the idea of storing the raw material saved in the summer and using it in the winter, when the Russian and Norwegian pipelines could not keep up with the demand, explains Thomas O’Donnell.
He points out that, therefore, Germany has repealed the regulations requiring the maintenance of a minimum temperature in homes, and in some EU countries there are debates about power cuts for citizens. – Europe has become dependent not only on Russian gas, but also on completely unpredictable wind energy. If the wind is weak – as in the 2020-21 season – combined with the lack of appropriate transmission networks and the lack of technical capacity to store electricity on a large scale, it can mean a disaster. These are the facts. In times of war, citizens must know the whole truth, the expert argues.
PAP He emphasizes that Russia is waging an energy war against Europe in order to break its solidarity towards Ukraine. – In the US and Qatar, but also in Norway, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Israel, Egypt and so on, there are plenty of new gas reserves, financing opportunities, technologies and functioning markets. In four to six years, Europe’s dependence on Russia will be completely replaced by imports from other directions. This also applies to crude oil. Russia, meanwhile, will be reduced from an energy superpower to an OPEC second or third tier country, concludes O’Donnell.
TVN24 live – watch on TVN24 GO The material is part of the TVN24 GO website Author:kris/ToL
Source: PAP
Main photo source: Marcin Bielecki/PAP
POLISH – as from PAP
Europa bez gazu i ropy z Rosji? Ekspert podaje możliwy termin
Jeżeli Unia Europejska nie ugnie się przed rosyjskim atakiem energetycznym, to w czasie od 4 do 6 lat może całkowicie zastąpić import gazu i ropy naftowej z tego kraju surowcami z innych kierunków – stwierdził Thomas O’Donnell, analityk rynku energetycznego i wykładowca na prywatnej berlińskiej uczelni ….
Rosja prowadzi przeciwko Europie wojnę energetyczną, która jest częścią większej wojny Rosji z Ukrainą. Widzimy, że wojna na polu bitwy nie idzie po myśli Rosji, więc Kreml liczy na to, że jej polityka energetyczna wywoła u Europejczyków wystarczające problemy ekonomiczne, by podzielić UE i odstąpić od solidarności z Ukrainą – mówi O’Donnell.
Kwestia zastąpienia importu gazu i ropy z Rosji
Władimir Putin ma znacznie większy wpływ na Europę poprzez dostawy gazu niż ropy naftowej. Dzieje się tak, ponieważ gaz dostarczany jest głównie rurociągami. Około 2027 roku Europa, Stany Zjednoczone, Katar i inne kraje zwiększą możliwości eksportowe skroplonego gazu ziemnego na tyle, aby zastąpić zależność UE od rosyjskiego gazu i pozwolić na obniżenie cen gazu w UE do poziomu zbliżonego do niskich cen w USA – przewiduje analityk.
Nie ukrywa jednak, że zanim to się stanie, to obywatele państw Unii będą musieli przejść przez trudniejszy okres. – To wojna energetyczna, a na wojnie obie strony ponoszą ofiary – ucierpią konsumenci i firmy w UE. Co najmniej cztery lata zajmie wdrożenie ogromnych nowych projektów eksportu LNG z USA i Kataru – zastrzega, dodając, że UE będzie musiała otrzymywać jak najwięcej gazu także z Algierii, Egiptu i Norwegii.
W tym roku Europa napełniła swoje magazyny gazu. W przyszłym roku będzie trudniej. Należy rozumieć, że magazyny – w normalnych warunkach – nigdy nie służyły do zapewniania normalnych dostaw gazu konsumentom. Są na to po prostu za małe. Powstawały z myślą przechowania surowca zaoszczędzonego latem i wykorzystania go zimą, kiedy rosyjskie i norweskie rurociągi nie nadążały z zaspokojeniem popytu – tłumaczy Thomas O’Donnell.
Zwraca uwagę, że w związku z tym, Niemcy uchylili przepisy nakazujące utrzymywanie w domach minimalnej temperatury, a w niektórych krajach Unii toczą się debaty na temat przerw w dostawach prądu dla obywateli. – Europa uzależniła się nie tylko od rosyjskiego gazu, ale postawiła też na całkowicie nieprzewidywalną energię wiatrową. Jeśli wiatr będzie słaby – jak w sezonie 2020-21 – to w połączeniu z brakiem odpowiednich sieci przesyłowych i brakiem technicznych możliwości magazynowania prądu na wielką skalę, może to oznaczać katastrofę. Takie są fakty. W czasie wojny obywatele muszą znać całą prawdę – przekonuje ekspert.
PAP Podkreśla, że Rosja prowadzi wojnę energetyczną przeciwko Europie, aby rozbić jej solidarność wobec Ukrainy. – W USA i Katarze, ale też w Norwegii, Algierii, Azerbejdżanie, Izraelu, Egipcie i tak dalej, istnieje mnóstwo nowych rezerw gazu, możliwości finansowania, technologii i funkcjonujących rynków. Za cztery do sześciu zależność Europy od Rosji zostanie całkowicie zastąpiona importem z innych kierunków. Dotyczy to również ropy naftowej. Rosja tymczasem zostanie zredukowana z supermocarstwa energetycznego do drugoligowego lub trzecioligowego kraju OPEC – konkluduje O’Donnell.
TVN24 na żywo – oglądaj w TVN24 GO Materiał jest częścią serwisu TVN24 GO Autor:kris/ToL
Źródło: PAP
Źródło zdjęcia głównego: Marcin Bielecki/PAP
Here are links to some of the Polish media where the PAP interview was published:
1 day ago — … 4 do 6 lat może całkowicie zastąpić import gazu i ropy naftowej z tego kraju surowcami z innych kierunków – stwierdził Thomas O’Donnell, …
21 hours ago — Rosja tymczasem zostanie zredukowana z supermocarstwa energetycznego do drugoligowego lub trzecioligowego kraju OPEC” – konkluduje O’Donnell. Z …
1 day ago — Jeśli Unia Europejska nie ugnie się przed atakiem energetycznym ze strony Rosji, to w ciągu 4-6 lat zastąpi całkowicie import gazu i ropy …
1 day ago — Jeśli Unia Europejska nie ugnie się przed atakiem energetycznym ze strony Rosji, to w ciągu 4-6 lat zastąpi całkowicie import gazu i ropy …
1 day ago — Jeśli Unia Europejska nie ugnie się przed atakiem energetycznym ze strony Rosji, to w ciągu 4-6 lat zastąpi całkowicie import gazu i ropy …
27 Sept 2022 — Czy Europa jest wystarczająco silna, aby poradzić sobie bez ropy i gazu z Rosji? … Polska, podobnie jak pozostałe państwa Unii Europejskiej, …
Ile lat potrzeba UE aby uniezależnić się od importu ropy i gazu z Rosji? Ekspert wyjaśnia. Jeśli Unia Europejska nie ugnie się przed atakiem energetycznym …
Ekspert: Polska jest dobrze przygotowana na odcięcie dostaw gazu z Rosji, … sprawę z takiego niebezpieczeństwa – mówi w rozmowie z PAP Thomas O’Donnell, …Open document settingsOpen publish panel
I will be speaking at this roundtable here in Berlin on Thursday with two eminent German oil market experts. [See PDF invite, below].
What is happening in oil markets bewteen Russia and esp. Saudi Arabia, competing for the Chiese and larger Asian market? This is a key issue in the effectiveness of EU & USA sanctions against Russia’s oil exports, aimed at limiting the Putin regime’s capacity to war agaisnt Ukraine.
You are cordially invited to this live-only event in Berlin. Our roundtable includes:
Dr. Birgit WETZEL – Wirtschaftsjournalistin mit Schwerpunkten Energie und postsowjetische Staaten
Mathias BRÜGGMANN – International Correspondent im “Handelsblatt”
Dr. Thomas W. O’DONNELL – Wissenschaftler an der Freien Universität Berlin, Experte für globale Energiesysteme, erneuerbare Energien und die Transformation fossiler Brennstoffe
Moderation: Ewald KÖNIG, Journalist
Please register ASAP at : events@ggd-berlin.org as room is limited. Sponsored by the Berlin-Gulf Dialogue for Energy Dialogue e.V.
Jun 17, 2022 Today, Gazprom announced a further cut in exports of gas via Nord Stream 1 to Germany and on into Europe. Earlier this week, they had cut 40%, now it is 60% of the 55 billion cubic meters per year (bcm) that normally flows in this pipe.
I explained that the Gazprom excuse – -that it could not re-import some compressor parts it had sent to Siemens to repair in Canada due to sanctions — appears as a convenient, manufactured excuse.
I pointed out that a one-off sanctions waiver from the USA, EU and/or Canada for the reimportation of these very specific parts could likely be easily arranged – and if the gas did not again flow fully, Gazprom’s ruse would be clearly exposed.
However, as I said, this is more accurately understood as simply another step in the weaponization of the over-dependence of the European Union (and esp. of Germany, Austria and Italy) on Russian gas imports, a game which Mr. Putin began in earnest in August of 2021.
My DW Live, 14 June 2022: Gazprom Germania baili out; What was the logic of German elites to partner with Russia on energy?
My live discussion with DW (Deutsche Welle, the German national broadcaster; in English) on 14 Jun 2022 on Gazprom Germania’s Euro 10 b loan from the German state. I stressed that German Energy policy has made the EU hostage to Russian energy, and enabled Moscow’s Ukraine war. Why did Germany do this?
From 1980-to-2022 German elites depended on their Russian oil-and-gas partnership as a means to carve out a space for German capital despite general USA predominance, while still remaining inside the USA-protected Western alliance and global trade system. Their geostrategic gamble — a “strategic balancing” of Russia for perogatives vis-a-vis USA predominance — has led to disaster..
We discussed the reasons the German government is offering up to Euro10 billion to bail out Gazprom Germania, which was a daughter of Russian state gas export monopoly, Gazprom, in St. Petersburg.
We discussed the EU’s repeated failures to impose an embargo in Russian oil. Now, (after Monday 30 May) they are considering a sea-borne-oil-only embargo.
ABOVE is English audio — BELOW is Arabic video. Recorded live; Al Jazeera, 21 May 2022.
I told Al Jazeera that Finland is well prepared, having worked since 2017 with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – the Baltic states – and with Poland to connect them all together with new pipelines, also to access LNG, storage and soon, new supplies from Norway.
Finland has also rented a regasification ship, from a US firm, to receive 5 billion cubic meters per year of LNG, whch will be plenty to supply both itself and Estonia in the wake of Putin cutting off Gazprom supplies of natural gas. Finland refuses, as did Poland too, to pay Moscow in rubles and so are being punished by Putin.
Kostaka.Media (Kyiv) independent journalists continue informing the Ukranian people on energy affairs. I was interviewed from afar by YAROSLAV MARKIN, TETIANA HUZENKO. We focused on gas issues – would Putin cut Europe’s gas? What have the Americans been organizing, now with the Europeans? How would this affect Europe, Ukraine and Putin’s income?
Below are links to the article in Kostaka’s three languages (EN, RU, UA). I pasted in the English one below, in case you have access problems. This interview had to be written, not audio/video, due to wartime difficulties. [Also, here’s my previous (in-person Kyiv) interview with Kostaka.Media.]
Biden’s Gas Air Lift and the impact on Kremlin revenue: Thomas W. O’Donnell on the russian gas embargo 28 April 2022 — Author YAROSLAV MARKIN, TETIANA HUZENKO Europe is going to cut the consumption of gas by a ⅔ in 2022, that is obviously will affect the Kremlin’s revenue. However, an embargo is highly possible as well. Both the Kremlin and the EU, in response to Russia’s new war crimes in Ukraine, could stop the gas flows. In such a case, LNG supplies are to help weather the crisis of 2022-2023 via Biden Air Lift. The last mentioned is being set up by the US and EU diplomats and is patterned on the Berlin Air Lift of 1949. Berlin Air Lift was a system of food and coal supply during the times when the USSR had been blocking land routes. This would be the end of Russian gas supplies to Europe forever, an international expert and senior energy and geopolitics analyst at GlobalBarrel.com, Dr Thomas W. O’Donnell believes. He told Kosatka.Media how quickly Europe would be able to abandon Russian gas, what alternative supply routes could be used, and whether Hungary and Austria, obsessed with Russian gas, could prevent this.
The analogue of Putin’s army in the energy sector • How much gas does Europe import from Russia per year? Who are the major consumers?
There are two different market processes whereby Russian gas is purchased by Europe. If we speak about only gas delivered by pipeline, these are: І. Via long-term contracts, agreements which are for natural gas to be delivered for several years, perhaps from five to as much as 20 years.
ІІ. Via the “spot” market. These are short-term contracts for gas to be delivered the following month. It is also possible to buy gas day-by-day, where traders agree to a price for gas delivered the next day. Here, gas traders consult the future’s market, which has set the price for gas delivered the next day, or the next month, or some number of months in the future.
Re: Urgente Pedido de Entrevista Periodística – Corresponsales Clarín y La Nación – Argentina
De Maria E… … Fri, Apr 29, 11:50 PM
Dr. O ´Donnell, … Estas son las preguntas para la entrevista del domingo:
1¿Alemania tiene otra posibilidad que no sea seguir comprando el gas ruso? ¿Cuáles serían sus otras opciones?
Repuesta: Antes que nada, muchas gracias por esta oportunidad de hablar con su audiencia argentina.
Pues, debo señalar que hay dos problemas diferentes: el suministro de petróleo ruso a Alemania y Europa y el suministro de gas ruso a Alemania y Europa. Me preguntas por el gas. El gas es mucho más difícil para Europa y para Alemania que el petróleo Hay dos casos: una reducción gradual o parcial de gas o un corte inmediato.
Un corte gradual se puede manejar bastante bien. Ahora Putin está tratando de dividir y conquistar Europa cortando el suministro de gas a Polonia y Bulgaria.
Un recorte inmediato, ya sea por parte de Putin o debido a las sanciones de la UE, crearía una gran crisis energética en Europa. Sin embargo, es importante entender que, al final, Putin está en una posición mucho más débil.
Si Putin corta todos los suministros de gas a Europa, ahora no hay suficiente gas en el mercado mundial para compensar. Pero Occidente, y especialmente EE. UU., la administración Biden, se ha estado preparando para esto al menos dos meses antes de que Putin invadiera Ucrania, incluso antes de que Europa creyera las advertencias de EE. UU. de que Putin atacaría Ucrania.
The Global Barrel 