Tag Archives: Germany

My Asharq: Will Iraq be able to supply Germany natural gas? Not likely soon: Iraq has risky 40 % reliance on Iran gas, just like Germany’s was on Russia. Also, Iraq announced the same contract to capture flared gas 3X in six years, with little progress.

ABOVE is the ENGLISH audio track with the translator. (Arabic video is below)
Asharq interview (9m 30s) with myself and expert in Baghdad. 13Jan23

The interview is self-explanatory. I think it is of utmost necessity for Iraq to capture the huge amounts of associate natural gas, a byproduct of oil extraction, which it now flares off, and instead use this gas to displace the huge amounts of Iranian gas it imports. Not only is Iran an obviously dangerous, autocratic regime, which threatens Iraqi sovereignty, it itself has gas shortages every winter.

Iraq currently has a very rational plan it has repeatedly contracted with Baker-Hughes oil-and-gas service company to carry out. If it ever actually carries out this plan (it was announced in 2018, again in 2020 and then December 2022), it should, in my view, first use this gas domestically to displace Iranian imports. Once it gets beyond this serious energy security issue, it will clearly be able to build a large-scale natural gas export business.

The plan German Chancellor Scholz and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani discussed today in Berlin, would accomplish sending Iraqi gas to the EU, and eventually Germany, it exported to |Europe via a new pipeline or pipelines into Turkey for transport via pipelines to Europe. This is all do-able and Erdogan would welcome the business.

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Roundtable, London asked us: “Is the US making a profit from the conflict in Ukraine?” — In my view, this complaint reflects Scholz & Macron’s continued longing to escape the USA’s transatlantic strategy towards Russia & China.

My comments are at (1) 4:19, (2) 16:20, and at (3) the end 23:15.

Guests:

  • Nicholas Lokker, Research Assistant at the Centre for a New American Security
  • Marie Jourdain, Visiting Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center
  • Dr. Thomas O’Donnell: Energy and Geopolitics Analyst

Host: Philip Hampsheir, sitting in for David Foster.

From the TRT YouTube page blurb:

Dec 7, 2022 – Top European Union officials are accusing the United States of profiting from the war in Ukraine through high natural gas prices and weapons sales, while Europe struggles with rampant inflation and a cost of living crisis. Amidst rising tensions, a meeting between French President Emmanuel Macron and his American counterpart in Washington saw both attempt to send a message of unity.

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My DW: Will the gas-price cap keep firms in Germany? BASF & German politicians’ years-long energy policies have collapsed.

I was interviewed (Tuesday 01nov22) on the new gas-price cap plan the German government is expected to approve tomorrow.

I was asked four questions by DW’s host Kate Ferguson:

-1- Thomas, it`s interesting to see the government attach conditions to these price caps for companies. How worried is it about a corporate exodus?

-2- German chancellor Olaf Scholz is visiting a BASF factory today – just days after the company announced major cost cutting – complaining that gas prices were up to six times higher at home than in the US. Are these caps enough to prevent OTHER companies from following suit?

– 3- Managing gas prices is one thing. But with a recession looming what ELSE does the German government need to do to keep companies afloat?

-4- The EU hasn`t been able to agree on a COMMON gas price cap. How damaging is it for countries to go it alone? I was not particularly optimistic.

The above were not especially technical energy-sector questions, so my answers combine assessments of energy-sector facts facing Germany with geopolitical and geo-economic assessments of the deep crisis facing German industry, citizens and the political establishment. Read more on my blog: http:GlobalBarrel.com . Continue reading

My Al Jazeera: Costa, Sánchez & Scholz, in Berlin, demand Midcat gas pipe via France. They’ll confront Macron at EU Council, 20-21 Oct

ENGLISH audio ABOVE || ARABIC video BELOW
Left: Dr. Tom O’Donnell, interviewed on the Berlin meeting, Right, Portuguese PM Costa and Chancellor Scholz in Berlin. Spain’s PM Sánchez also attended.

Given the wartime energy emergency in Europe, it is perhaps astonishing that President Macron of France continues to block completion of the Midcat Pipeline.

Completion of this pipeline, whose construction was interrupted well before the Ukraine War began, would enable Portugal and Spain, located on the Iberian Peninsula, to send much of the abundance of LNG and pipeline gas these countries are able to import on northward, across the Pyrenees Mountains, across France and into Germany and other northern and eastern EU Member states, which are being starved of natural gas by Russia.

I am asked for my theory as to why President Macron would block this obviously much needed pipeline from crossing his country. We discuss several other related issues as well.

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My Sky News: Are EU Measures vs the Russian Oil- & Gas-War Enough?

English audio track is above for Arabic video below.
Sky News Arabia interviews me last night on the fight vs. the Kremlin’s energy war against Europe, a second front to its war against Ukraine.

Dear GlobalBarrel.com readers,

Some upcoming events I’ll attend and post here:

1. I’m invited to speak at the “12th 2BS Forum, one of the leading politico-security conferences in Southeast Europe, organized by the Atlantic Council of Montenegro.” So I’ll be in Budva from 6-9 October. Ukrainian President Zelensky will deliver a keynote video speech from Kyiv. My Panel is 8 August 2022, 14.45 – 15.15:

The Climate-Energy Security Nexus, with speakers:

  • Thomas W. O’DONNELL, Energy & Geopolitical Expert
  • Alan RILEY, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Professor, City Law School, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council ONLINE SPEAKER TBC
  • Moderator: Jasmina KOS, Presenter and Reporter, Al Jazeera Balkans

2. I’m also invited to speak at

  • The 9th Annual Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum, for which I will be in Doha, Qatar from 21-24 October. The conference title is: “Implications of the Ukraine crisis and regional and international competition for the future of security and energy in the Gulf region.”
  • The My topic will be the transformation of the German (and EU) relationship with the GCC states in energy and security matters since the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the parallel Kremlin energy war against Europe.

I plan to post on the content of these conferences and my contributions, and to try to post more of my media interviews – when they may be of use.

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Financial Times quotes me: Germany embraced Russia’s energy for “strategic balancing” vs USA

04 Oct 22: I was asked, two weeks ago, why did Germany insist on increasing its partnership with Russia in gas even after the 2014 Ukraine invasion?  Was this “naivety”?  I said this characterization obscures a conscious German geostrategy.

Two common explanations I constantly heard in Berlin over about eight years for the Russian gas partnership was the “Neue Ostpolitik” that originated with Willy Brant’s Cold-War-era Social Democratic Party and the conservative-business version of this, “Wandel durch Handel” (change through trade), held up as an historic lesson of the late-mediaeval Hanseatic Trading League.

Indeed, these traditions certainly did motivate many elite German actors to partner with Russia on energy and on trade generally …

“But according to Thomas O’Donnell, a Germany-based energy analyst, it was also driven by a German desire for ‘strategic balancing — it was a way for Germany to break free from its dependence on the US’.

“Many in the German establishment, he said, resented US dominance in energy matters and disliked ‘this idea of a global fungible market in oil that’s traded in dollars and protected by the US navy’. That resentment, he said, was one of the reasons why Germany kept out of the US war in Iraq in 2003. And it was why it suited Germany to have direct access to Russian oil and gas.” [Guy Chazan & David Sheppard,  Germany closes long energy chapter with Russia by turning on Rosneft, Financial Times,  17 Sept 22. https://www.ft.com/content/2fbbe104-93e3-48bb-8d69-211c79069624 ]

In this short post, I can’t fully explain the near unanimity of German elites over two decades (first during the two 1998-2005 Schröder chancellorships of his SPD plus the Greens, and throughout the the five Merkel coalition governments until December 2021, of her CDU/CSU with the SPD or FDP) in support of renewing and further deepening what by 1998 was already two-to-three-decades old energy partnership with Russia.

Within this remarkable unanimigy, various parties and business interests had a variety of rationales.  [see Footnote 1, on what I see as the key German foreign policy group, the “realpolitik” group, which included Merkel and Altmaier, beyond the trade-as-geostrategy grouping mentioned above.]

However, both these sections participated/participate in a broad anti-Americanism.

I am speaking here about opposition to USA leadership of the transatlantic alliance most especially on trade matters and in the alliance’s geostrategy, especially when it may involve armed conflicts. This has various geopolitical and geo-economic aspects.

This was exacerbated during the late-Merkel years not merely by the Trump presidency’s open hostility; but by policies of administrations both before and after his administration (i.e., in “normal times”).  This has to do especially with German opposition to the bi-partisan, USA strategic posture, initiated under Obama, of “Great Power Competition,” and especially to its international trade implications of decoupling from both Russia and China.

In both the realpolitik sections of German elites, who do recognize the threat Putin-ism represents and the dangers of German reliance on his regime for energy or in any other matters, and in the Putin-Versteher sections who worship trade-as-a-geostrategic-cure-all, the one common characteristic has long been a growing resentment of the USA, aka an “anti-Americanism” as I remarked to the Financial Times. This  especially exists among party and ministry functionaries, and certain business associations, so much that this anti-Americanism has become institutionalized, a constant underlying feature of German official geopolitical and geoeconomic bureaucratic life. (Nota Bene: I am not speaking here of the German middle and working classes, where matters are generally quite different, except among various far-left and -right sections. I am speaking of elites.)

Until a few years ago (e.g., during the negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Treaty, TTIP up to ca. 2016), this official anti-Americanism phenomena was often noted and discussed by policy and academic experts on both sides of the Atlantic.  It is not clear to me why this outward recognition has diminished; but the sentiment itself certainly hasn’t, especially.

Putting aside historical and social-cultural aspects of this “resentment” of the USA, in the political realm it is no secret that, over multiple USA administrations, the German side, often along with other Western European powers, has been deeply opposed to many major USA foreign policy decisions, and indeed many of these decisions did not go well for the transatlantic alliance.

One could point back 50 years, to the VietNam War, or to US coups and interventions in Latin America, or the stationing of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in West Germany (which the Russians did also in East Germany).  All of this was clearly upsetting to broad sections of the European population; as this was often within the USA as well.

All these issues would likely have been forgotten by now; however, transatlantic-policy clashes over geostrategy have continued in the post-Cold War era.

These clashes include the two Iraqi Gulf Wars and, for many years USA Iran policy (up till the late-Geo. Bush administrationm when EU attitudes to Iran started to merge with the USA’s), the USA-led NATO intervention against Serbia to end the Balkan wars (which ushered in a renaissance for NATO within Europe that was clearly unwelcomed at the time in broad German circles), the mishandling and human-rights violations of the War on Terror post 9/11, and more recently USA policy w.r.t China and Russia – esp. the shift to a strategy of  “Great Power Competition” as it disengaged from the “War on Terror” and USA military over-involvement in the MENA regions.

More generally, the fact that, during almost any post-Cold War crisis confronting the transatlantic alliance, the USA president has been “the decider” (in the words of George Bush), became a source of palpable resentment.

Economic and trade tensions served to fortify these political and geopolitical sensibilities and has been, by far, the primary vector which drew German business circles into resentment of USA leadership of the alliance. In German political parties, this ongoing resentment has been esp. notable within the SPD; in the extreme-right AfD party and, in a less ideological, more pragmatic manner, by conservative business sections of the CDU/CSU, and as always the traditional far-left.

This gave rise to a deep urge among German business and political circles to find ways to escape dependence on and subordination to USA determination of policy within the transatlantic alliance in-general and, till now, on oil and gas in particular, linked as it has been to the Mideast Wars. This only deepened the instinctive urge to fix Germany’s connection to the Russian gas and oil supplies as a “strategic balancing” to the USA’s predominance in global energy markets and in energy geostrategy during the post-Cold War years and especially the “color revolutions” and most especially Ukraine’s struggle against Russian domination.

German elites got deeply involved in a project to guarantee continued Russian natural gas deliveries to their country and on into Europe should there ever be a conflict between Russia and Ukraine that might interrupt the flows transiting Ukraine into Germany and its EU allies’ markets.

Hence, this produced the agreements to assist Putin’s Kremlin to build the detour pipelines Nord Stream 1 and 2 (i.e., a mga-infrastructure plan to completely replace, using “more secure routes,” the Russian-to-Europe export pipeline system of the Cold War Era that mostly flowed across Ukraine, but Poland and Belarus as well, and which itself had only been built due to active West German [and French] participation).

In addition, German elites took the geostrategic and geo economic decision to constantly deepen the vertical integration of Germany (and with it, Europe) with the upstream Russian gas system … not in spite of Russian aggression against Ukraine, but precisely because of the threat and reality of such aggression.

From the CEE, Baltic, American and other opponents’ point of view, this amounted to “throwing Ukraine under the bus.”  But, this was precisely the conscious,  “realpolitik” decision (my characterization) by both groups of German geopolitical and geoeconomic policy elites.  For the “realpolitik” group, there was little in the way of “naivety” … it was a calculated geostrategic gamble.  This group benefited from the ideological traditions of Ostpolitik and Change through Trade groups, which had long infected broad sections of German elites, and would repeat the inane refrains this latter group believed in  … such as “change through trade” and “this is only a commercial project.”

Footnote 1: On German-elite broad groupings, which supported/support the German-Russian energy alliance:

Group 1: In my view (assessments based on my research), the group who had little illusions about the dangerous and volatile nature of Vladimir Putin’s regime is this “realpolitik” grouping.  Despite what was constantly said publicly about the renewal and strengthening of the German-Russian energy partnership being a “non-geopolitical” and a “purely commercial project,  this group was actually deeply concerned about escaping the risks associated with Russian gas having to transit “insecure” and “risky” Ukraine in order to arrive in Germany and into Europe generally.  Any potential interruption of this flow was widely seen as a looming existential risk to Germany and its EU allies’ energy and economic security.

In this regard, building Nord Stream 1 and 2, and deepening German energy integration with Russia via its Gazprom and other energy firms was seen as of the highest priority for guaranteeing German energy security, i.e., the continued delivery of Russian gas to Germany and on into Europe, no matter what might happen in Ukraine, whether it be war or internal destabilization that could undermine Russian gas transit across the country.

This group seriously misjudged what would happen in the event of a Russian war on Ukraine.  Rather than the EU cherishing the transit of Russian imported gas which Germany had “guaranteed” by building the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines as a “lifeline” during the war; Europe has largely been horrified at the Russian brazen rupture of the post-WW2 security system and its atrocities in Ukraine and had in fact made concerted efforts and plans to wean itself off any available Russian gas supplies.  The absolute insistence of the USA, esp. the Biden administration, that the new NS2 pipeline must forever be abandoned by Germany from the first day this war began, played a crucial role in pressing (forcing?) Germany to agree to not certify the inauguration of this pipeline.

I called this group of German elites the “realpolitik” group.

Group 2: On the other end of the geostrategic/geo-economic spectrum, there was the “Putin-Versteher” or “Putin understander” among German political and business actors.  Some of the most obsequious are pictured at this link from Die Welt, who, in contrast to the “realpolitik” grouping, have had such exaggerated confidence in Putin that some, in the more extreme cases, would be happy with still-deeper German-Russian economic and political integration, not only energy sector integration.

For example, there are actors on the fringes of various parties, nevertheless with positions in parliament or important business associations, who have had a habit of calling, in private meetings at least, for political “unity” with Russia and Austria, specifically adding “against” the Americans. This fringe has gone farther than, for example, Chancellor Schroeder’s public advocacy from the early 2010’s for a Free Trade Zone and some sort of unified polity “from Lisbon to Vladivostok,” albeit short of Russian “full membership” in the EU.

Footnote 2: A few articles I have written related to this analysis follow:

  1. “My DW live: Gazprom Germania bailout: German policy made EU hostage to Russian energy, enabled Moscow’s Ukraine war | German strategy 1980-2022 was “strategic balancing” of Russia vs USA to carve out a space for its freedom of action within sphere of USA predominance,” [posted on 14 June 2022.
  2.  Here, I don’t use the phrase explicitly; but that German attitude to relations with the USA and within the transatlantic alliance, is explained rather clearly, IMHO: “Nord Stream 2: Berlin-Washington Mutual Intransigence Shows Transatlantic Divide on Russia,” My AICGS Analysis, posted on 14 Oct 2022. This is available at my blog or the original is at AICGS institute in DC.
  3. “Neue Neue Ostpolitik” My BPJ piece on German fury at Senate NS2 sanctions,” Posted on 14.Jul.2022. Originally published at the Berlin Policy Journal here of the DGAP (German Council on Foreign Relations), and later reprinted at my blog here.

My TVP, Warsaw: Assessing Energy Supplies in the EU’s Energy Crisis vs Russia.

This video is the portion of the TVP show (Warsaw, Poland, in English) with my interview on 09sep22.

We discussedthe present energy crisis in Europe vs. Putin’s Russia – as an additional front parallel to the hot war inside Ukraine.

I gave my views on the causes for Europe’s predicament: this includes over-dependence on Russian energy – long insisted upon by especially Germany and Austria – to over-dependence on variable wind energy without having any significant amout of grid-scale storage installed.

Also, on the necessity of nuclear as a zero-carbon base load generation capaciy, and the most useful applications for larger, Generation 3+ nuclear plants as versus smaller SMRs (small modular reactors). I aso commented on the Polish national energy transistion plan, wich seems much moe flexib .

[Note: TVP is the Polish state-media corporation TV channel. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telewizja_Polska

As the Wiki indicates, TVP is criticized for being partisan pro-government. In my interview, on this topic, this was not the case. I also often go onto German state-media TV, Deutsche Welle (DW), subject to my similar observations when I’ve been on that station. ]

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Al Jazeera’s video on my view: “What does Russia’s gas cut mean for Europe?”

My thanks to Al Jazeera’s Katya Bohdan, producer, and the digital team in Doha (English) for this well done “documentary” featuring my point of view on: “What does Russia’s gaas cur mean for Europe?” I think it is self-explanatory (and its short). Watch it below or directly at the AJ link here. Tom OD.

On Al Jazeera with expert in Moscow | Putin wants a “compromise” for gas. Like what, Donbas? Odessa?- In my view, EU citizens will choose the cold … & their dignity.

English audio above. — Arabic video below

My fellow expert-guest, in Moscow, Dr. Stanislav Mitrakhovich, was notably frank.

He did not insist, as have various Russian Federation officials lately, that Nord Stream 1 gas flow has been cut for technical reasons to do with the lack of a Siemens compressor.

The compressor in question was sent to Canada for repairs, but its return has been waived from sanctions restrictions. As Chancellor Scholz rightly said, the lack of a compressor is clearly not what cutting gas to Europe is about. It is political.

Nor did the expert in Moscow claim it was due to bureaucratic German-Russian difficulties with paperwork, as Putin and others have claimed..

He instead pointed out that the EU has said it will stop by year’s end the import of Russian oil, and Germany has said it will not use Russian gas in two years, and, without this and some sort of “political compromise,” gas could undoubtedly be fully flowing again from Russian into the EU.

So, I asked – rhetorically – just what possible sort of “compromise” might Putin be angling for? The Donbas for gas? Odessa for gas?

I asserted my opinion that “Europeans have their sense of dignity” and would never agree to such a “compromise.” Put that way, they will prefer to be cold this winter and to have industries and businesses have to shut for lack of gas.

We also discussed a few details of what sort of suffering – rationing of energy, low temperature heating and closing of businesses – Germany and the EU can expect to have to endure this winter.

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My Al Jazeera: Russia cuts Latvian gas; but Baltics & Poland prepared, with LNG facilities. German leadership ridiculed them. | Putin is using energy blackmail to fight sanctions imposed on Russia for his Ukraine war.

English trac above. Arabic video below.

Al Jazeera asked me how will the cut in gas to Latvia effect that country and other Baltic states?

I said they are much better prepared than Germany, for example. The Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as well as Poland, had no illusions about Putin’s Russia eventually weaponizing the EU’s dependence on Russian gas as it is now during the Ukraine war.  

Lithuania has a gas import floating terminal and also supplies non-Russian imports to its neighbors, including Poland.  Poland also has an LNG import terminal, and is now completing a new non-RUssian-gas pipeline form Norway to Poland.

They are in a much better place, prepared much better than Germany in the event of a complete cut off of Russian imports.

Al Jazeera also asked about the cut in Nord Stream 1 supplies to (and through) Germany to only 20%.  I said this will have a heavy effect on Germany and other EU states this winter. Germany will not be able now to fill storage for winter.  

We discussed other aspects of this in the brief, 4.5 minute interview on the nightly news show.

My DW TV: Why Putin cuts EU gas bit-by-bit? Can Germany handle it? Wind’s low, so we’re buring gas! | Many EU states warned Berlin: “Don’t open our door to Putin’s Trojan horse!”

It’s always great to talk with Deutschewelle’s Rob Watson on “DW Business.” We spoke at midday 26 Jul 2022 on the new NS1 . gas pipeline cut in flows to only 20% by Putin’s regime.

The title tells most of it. I explain why I think Putin is playing with gas, not oil and the EU and German vulnerabilities.

Now, German storage will not be able to be filled to the ministry’s target level of 95% by November, according to the Federal Transmission System chief, Mr. Klaus Muller – in fact, even if NS1 were still flowing at 40%.

Not only that, although Energy Minister Habeck has agreed to bring back online all the coal power plants possible, in fact Germany has a poorly thought-out over dependence on wind and it simply is not blowing much this summer. So, in actuality, we are burning more gas now to produce electricity than last year – a complete waste of gas. Also, the Rhine is low and coal barges are having difficulty delivering coal to power plants.

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Putin cuts Nord Stream1 to 20%. Gas is Moscow’s key economic lever: Exports earn much less than oil & EU needs two-to-four years to replace it | USA-EU should hit Russian oil harder

ENGLISH Audio ABOVE }} ARABIC Video BELOS

We discuss the excuses Putin is giving for cutting Nord Stream 1 flows now from 40% to only 20%. I asserted that they are nonsense. (Various links are below, under Read More.)

This pipeline has been in service since 2011 and there has never been a cut back of flow due to a defective or poorly maintained compressor, and now Russia is claiming a second one is in disrepair. Putin, in Tehran, last week warned he would do this and also said that Ukraine refusing to transit Russian gas through territory Russia has forcibly occupied is another reason he might cut Nord Stream 1 flows. So, this is clearly political, not technical.

This will mean, according to comments recently by Klaus Mueller – head of the German Federal Gas Transit Agency, that it will be impossible to fill German storage to the 95% level the minister has ordered — Mueller had said this was the case even at the former 40% flows of NS1.

I explained the reason Putin is playing this game with gas deliveries – because natural gas brings his regime far less revenues than the all-important business of Russian oil exports, while at the same time natural gas is much harder now for Europe to replace for some years hence from other sources – as it arrives mostly via pipelines from Russia, not by sea like most oil. So, gas is Putin’s greatest lever for now in the energy front of the economic war being waged in support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

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My Euronews: Nord Stream1 back on. Putin knows EU will be free of Russian gas in couple years; he’ll weaponize it while he still can. Killing EU-Ukraine solidarity is the target.

Euronews Now host, Mariam Zaidi, interviews me Thursday AM, 21 July, about the meaning of Nord Stream 1 coming back online (albeit by a mere 40%), and why the EU has to prepare for a complet cutoff of Russian natural gas this winter.

In two or so years, the EU will be completly free of dependence on Putin’s gas; and he knows it. So, Putin has two years to use it – as a weapon – or lose it. We have to be ready. Filling storage is not sufficient. There would be gas rationing and cutoffs.

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Is a lack of oil refineries boosting global fuel prices? Al Jazeera asked us, in Houston & Berlin

From: Inside Story, 20 July 2020 – The Saudi Arabian foreign minister, in Tokyo, said the problem with high prices at the pump is a lack of global capacity to refine crude. Out panal included::

  • Bob Cavnar – Energy and oil industry analyst – Houston
  • Thomas O’Donnell – Energy and geopolitical analyst – Berlin
  • Josh Young – Chief investment officer at Bison Interests – Houston

Presenter: Nastasya Tay of Al Jazeera – Doha

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Al Jazeera: Former Russian Foreign Minster A. Fedorov & I are interviewed: A Putin Gas War vs EU? | Me: This would be another huge Putin tactical blunder. EU citizens will not be intimidated, will unite, blaming Putin.

English Audio track above | Arabic Video below

I was interviewed, 11 July, together with former-Foreign Minister of Russia, Andrey A. Fedorov, about the possibility of Moscow cutting off gas supplies to Germany and the EU via Nord Stream 1 after 21 July, when the scheduled maintaince of this large pipeline from Russia to Germany and the EU ends.

Many leaders in Brussels and in Member states have warned of this possibility in recent days.

Issues included:

– Whether and how Putin is weaponizing gas exports? – What will be the effect of a Nord Stream 1 gas cutoff?

– What are EU plans?

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