Dear GlobalBarrel.com readers -and others- in Bulgaria, you are cordially invited. – I’m honored to give the highlight talk at the IGA Conference in Sofia, co-sponsored by the Polish Embassy. The program (Page 2 below, in red) lists my talk: “Russia in Global Politics, Regime Dynamics, Foreign Policy Outlooks and Interactions with other Powers,” Best, Tom O’D. (I’ll post a video after the conference.)
Central and South Eastern Europe After Four Years of War: New Trends and Old Patterns in Foreign Influence, Resilience-Building and Regional Cooper ation International Conference Grand Hotel Sofia, Triaditza 2 Hall 10 am – 5 pm, 27 October 2026
Dr. Tom O’Donnell (credit: Atlantic Council of Montenegro)
How to understand Trump? Below is one of the interviews I gave the Polish press a while back on European attempts at peace talks with Russia. It also examines renewed interest of some German political parties to repair North Stream and bring Russian gas back to Germany.
However, they should understand that, for Washington, this would only happen if Putin agrees to a peace deal. Reopening Nord Stream is but one of many enticements Trump is again offering Putin, along with his diesel deal, he’s also offered a return of Russian frozen assets, “trillions” in USA investments into the Russian economy, and many other “carrots” to entice Putin to make a deal ending Russia’s Ukraine war.
This sudden return to the enticements Trump offered Putin during his first three-or-four months in office, is seen by many observers as simply “treason”, a fawning after Putin. However, the press and most every commentator are missing the other side, the “big stick” Trump is also carrying as he makes these offers.
I am, of course, drawing an analogy to President Theodore Roosevelt’s adage, for dealing with foreign adversaries, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Well, Trump is not so adept at speaking “softly” but his elaborate economic and other enticements are essentially “speaking softly” to Putin. What I am saying is that these seemingly obsequious offers are only half the story. Often, in diplomacy, as any negotiation, there are important levers one or the other side can wield, whose obvious presence, as a sort of “sword of Damocles” hovering over the proceedings goes unspoken, at least publicly. These are things any objective analysis needs to bring to light. In this case, there are, objectively, two aspects, not one, to the Trump-administrations present approach to Russia:
[Correction: I misspoke. Russia formerly exported about 800,000, not 800 “million” barrels of diesel per day to Europe, before sanctions cut that off. I also added the NYT quote below before widely sending this post out.] As I post this, I am thinking this is not ONLY about US elections. Why? Trump et al have been claiming for a couple weeks that Russia wants to talk – though there is no public evidence. And Trump’s team are engaged in other, similar maneuvers:
Offering Moscow to reopen the Nord Stream pipelines under ownership of a US firm. This is an old idea Trump et al had dropped by ca. April 2025, when it became obvious that enticing Putin with big deals and investments was not going to sway him to end his war in Ukraine. (This move has the German AfD excited, but they’re not significant players here.)
Trump’s negotiators have also offered Moscow a that some western firm(s) could purchase Russia’s sanctioned Lukoil oil-and-gas infrastructure located mainly in Europe, which can no longer be used by Lukoil due to US sanctions,
Plus, there is this unrealistic diesel deal, which Trump clearly hopes will make US voters think he is getting fuel prices down before November elections. I say “unrealistic” because, if Russia actually had significant extra diesel to sell, it would not have banned exports of diesel for many months while its refineries burn due to Ukrainian drone hits.
And now (10Oct26 addition), there were earlier attempts, in September, also to bribe Putin to end the war. Here is the NY Times on what happened in NYC on the sidelines of the General Assembly opening:
“…, when the Trump administration opened the latest diplomatic track on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in late September, Ukrainian officials were startled by how far Mr. Kushner and Mr. Witkoff went in their offerings to Russia. According to officials familiar with the discussions, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss confidential diplomatic talks, the Americans put three lucrative economic incentives on the table to coax Moscow into a limited cease-fire, either on energy infrastructure or at sea.
“Washington floated releasing billions of Russian sovereign assets immobilized in the West. The money, the officials said, was viewed as an upfront incentive for partial truces, not a reward for their enactment. This revived a proposal from last year to release funds to Russia. Then, the suggestion was to release up to $100 billion.
“The Americans also revisited a plan to sell off parts of the Russian oil giant Lukoil in a multibillion-dollar deal that would go to a group of Middle Eastern investors, including some with business ties to U.S. negotiators.
Maxym Krapivnyy, host at Ukraine’s Kanal24 in Kyiv, spoke with me recently while I was in the USA about: Ukraine’s drone war vs. Russian energy, Russia’s economy, and the USA’s expanding energy war targeting Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and India’s Russian oil imports. I explained that soon, the late-Lindsey Graham’s (R, S.C.) and Richard Blumenthal’s (D., Conn.) “draconian” secondary sanctions bill is expected to be signed by Trump, blocking most Russian oil exports. (Note: the Senate yesterday voted 86-12, to advance the bill. See Blumenthal, here.)
However, Maxym also then asked my view on the likeliness of Putin soon agreeing to serious peace talks. I said I expected Russia would be unwilling to soon end the war even if its forces were pushed back to the Russian border. Why? To admit defeat would devastate Russian credibility as a Great Power in Eurasia and beyond. (See below for a comparison to the USA in Vietnam.)
On the energy war, I stressed that Russia is well known to be a petrostate. Russia’s wealth and capacity to finance aggression abroad overwhelmingly depends on its oil export revenues. Russia’s continued existence as a-petrostate is what the ongoing Ukrainian and USA energy offensives are targeting, on two main fronts.
There are two sides to this energy war. One is the Ukrainian’s kinetic war against Russia’s domestic refineries, the other is the USA and allies’ global sanctions offensive. Both aspects are evolving in breath and complexity:
First, there is the Ukrainian drone and missile campaign, including deep strikes against domestic Russian oil refineries and infrastructure. This has been gaining in success. I pointed out that these attacks have to, however, increase still more, requiting heavier missiles to close refineries and oil export terminal ports for sufficient time to render repairs unprofitable. However, Ukraine is now testing and has begun to produce such heavier weapons, which should be available in the short-to-medium term. We discussed Russia’s refined product supply problems, and what Ukraine must yet accomplish.
Second, oil which increasingly cannot be refined is pouring into Russian export terminals, its big Baltic and Black Sea oil ports. This was already the situation before the Iran war began on February 28. At that time, oil that could not be refined due to drone attacks was being loaded on ships for export. However, with USA sanctions having been intensified, many of these ships had no customers, it had nowhere to go. During the initial phase of the Iran war, the USA allowed India and other allies to purchase this oil (i.e., it unsanctioned oil already loaded on ships without any clear destination) to avert it going to China. This accumulation is apparently again building up, for the same reasons.
the USA now maintains sanctions against Russian oil firms Rosneft and Lukoil, and is working to supply India with non-Russian oil to end its Russian oil purchases, making it harder for Russia to find export markets besides China. However, the reclosing of Hormuz will of course make this somewhat easier for Russia to find buyers.
Two key themes here: Ukraine’s advances against Russia’s domestic oil infrastructure, and the Trump Administration’s global energy offensive, as shaping operations for a future conflict with China – or with the China-Russia-Iran axis. (Watch in Lithuanian) I told Aleksandra Ketlerienė, at Lithuanian national TV, that Ukraine is perhaps half way along in its kinetic capacities to forcing a collapse of a large part of domestic Russian refining capacities. (Interview in Lithuanian 14jul26).
I stressed that Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia must be taken as one side of a two-sided offensive vs. the Russian petrostate, with the other side being Washington’s targeting, logistics and other assistance to Ukraine’s air campaign, its harsh sanctions vs Rosneft and Lukoil, plus the announcement of a deal with Trump to impose the late-Senator Lindsey Graham (Rep., S. C.) and Sen. Richard Blumenthal’s (Dem. Conn.) self-described “draconian” secondary Russian sanctions, backed by about 93% of US senators, plus the US offensives vs. Iran and Venezuela focused on the oil-and-energy sector, and its continued work to pull India away from Russian oil — not as separate or chaotic events, but as part of a conscious, global energy offensive by the USA jointly with Ukraine and other allies, one which should be assessed as such, and not merely as individual, disjoint, haphazard “crises”. (On Ukrainian strategy, I cited its energy and intelligence expert, Mykhailo Gonchar, “From burning refineries to maritime blockade: a new strategy of pressure on Russia.” a valued colleague. 01jul26)
My assessment, since early 2026, has been that these should be understood as energy-sector “shaping operations.” That is, these are energy conflicts-of-choice aimed at optimizing the strategic post”ure of the USA and its allies to: destroy the petrostate basis of Russian power (see my EIES analytic paper, “Liquidating the Russian Petrostate, jan26), to secure allied access to Venezuelan (and Western Hemisphere-in-general) oil flows, and to Persian Gulf (Hormuz) oil flows in preparation for a kinetic conflict of whatever magnitude with China in the Indo-Pacific region. I should add that these energy “shaping operations” are intrinsic to the larger Trump administration strategy of “USA Energy Dominance” strategy, which I have discussed at GlobalBarrel.com.
NOTE – I believe it is important not to allow various sharp difficulties, setbacks or even failures that surely will occur on any of these fronts – vs. Russia, Iran and Hormuz, in Venezuela, with India, or directly with China – on the energy, and especially the oil front, to cause a loss of perspective that there is a global energy offensive or even a global energy war taking place, as a central part o the USA and de facto as part of the entire allied preparations (viz., as “shaping operations”) for a looming kinetic conflict with China and its allies – or, perhaps, is sufficiently successful, to dissuade China from aggression.
Also, recognizing the connected strategy is one thing, analyzing and critiquing the individual parts and overall rationale is another. For more, go to my blog at https://GlobalBarrel.com
Dr. Tom O’Donnell (for a keynote, consult or commissioned analysis for your organization, write twod(at)umich.edu )
I spoke with Kyiv Kanal24’s Nataly Lutsenko on three issues. Jump to a topic here: 1) Ukrainian drones in Russia 00:00:192) G7 push v Russian oil. 00:05:253) Who won the US-Iran war? 00:10:27 Recorded 18 June 2026.
Note on number 3: I said it is not yet clear who won the US-Iran war. This has to do with military capacities which the USA (and its allies) could bring to bear but are now deeply reluctant or unwilling to bring to bear.
If Iran is unwilling to compromise or, worse, plays games, as it has already in the past few days with its “Persian Gulf Strait Authority,” the USA might decide it is constrained to employ whatever means necessary (Carter Doctrine) to end the Islamic Republic’s capacity to restrict the free flow of energy from the Gulf.
Trump and USA officials understand that a full-on military option is not an optimal resolution. This led them to accept an MoU that is quite conciliatory to Tehran in order to get the Straight reopened, and also apparently in response to many of its Gulf allies unwillingness to absorb the punishment Iranian missiles and drones would inflict before the Straight is forcibly reopened and Iran’s missile capacities are eventually suppressed. The administration knows that a massive bombing campaign of the entire country’s military-industrial and civilian infrastructure, plus an occupation of the Iranian coast along the Straight could likely achieved their aims of removing the Straight from Iranian hegemony. However, this in turn, is likely to require a protracted force commitment to contain whatever regime forces remain active. No matter how minor, remaining missiles and drones, proxy forces and terrorist capacities could require a long time to resolve.
I was interviewed by David Karalvanov at bTV (Bulgaria) on the US-Venezuela confrontation under Trump and Maduro (01Dec). David used excerpts for a documentary and kindly gave me the full video here. An outline of the five questions and answers is below here.
Three Asides:
I recall vividly how Trump and co., in his first term, easily misled a naively dependent Venezuelan opposition into believing that the USA was planning to forcibly remove Maduro. In turn, the opposition convinced the country’s population that the USA was preparing to forcibly liberate them. This belief was deeply corrosive to advancing any self-reliant domestic anti-Maduro pro-democracy movement. In the end, the Trump administration tried a poorly prepared putsch. John Bolton, Trump’s then-National Security Advisor, the organizer, was embarrassingly gamed by the Venezuelan regime’s intelligence police. Meanwhile, the present Venezuelan opposition has long been unwilling to organize or endorse any popular movement to forcibly restore democracy from below.
In a recent CNN interview I spoke about Trump rationales for the present confrontation. See: “Why Trump wants a Venezuelan oil boom …“) and dangers of not preparing for the day-after possibilities of chaotic events, terrorism or resistance by armed pro-Chavista military or collectivo groups, and/or x-Colombian guerilla groups long active in the country.
I’ve written for 20 years on Venezuela, Chavismo and oil, including two years as visiting professor, Universidad Central de Venezuela’s UCV/CENDES, Caracas.–I’m happy to speak or consult on Ven.-US-China-Russia-Iran-Colombian-EU-… and/or Ven. domestic matters in English or Spanish.- Tom O’D
Here is the video of our 10 Nov. event, organized by EIES (European Institute for Energy Security). Our topic was the turn in US Trump administration policy on ending Russia’s war against Ukraine and the Russian oil sector.
My sincere thanks to EIES, and especially Executive Director Albéric Mongrenier, for inviting me along with distinguished energy and geopolitics experts. (Note: EIES is affiliated with, but policy-independent of, SAFE in Washington).
Our distinguished expert panel included:
Dr. Jaak Aviksoo, Former Minister of Defence of Estonia, EIES Energy Security Leadership Council
Christof Rühl, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, former BP Chief Economist
Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, Energy and Geopolitical Strategist and Founder of GlobalBarrel.com
Moderated by Rosemary Griffin, OPEC+ Lead Reporter, S&P Global Commodity Insights
Opened by Peter Flory, Senior Fellow, EIES, Former NATO Assistant Secretary General
A central question we addressed was the turn in the Trump administration policy to apply significant coercive measures against the Russian oil sector to undermine the ability of the Putin government to continue its was in Ukraine. We discussed how effective the new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil might be and what is the synergistic effect of the Ukrainian drone and missile campaign against Russian domestic refineries and oil export terminal ports.
For an update on expanded attacks on Russian Black Sea oil ports and their meaning, see the written comments accompanying my Kanal24 video interview, posted on Monday, 17 Nov. “The US & Ukraine pound Russian oil | my Kanal24, Kyiv“).
You are invited to register now for Monday, 10 Nov. at 14:00 UK || 15:00 CET || 9:00 ET, an EIES Webinar. [My view: the USA, Ukraine & allies can dismantle the Russian petrostate. My posts on this are linked at the end]. I’m honored to join experts:
Dr. Jaak Aviksoo, Former Minister of Defence of Estonia, EIES Energy Security Leadership Council
Christof Rühl, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, former BP Chief Economist
Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, Energy and Geopolitical Strategist and Founder of GlobalBarrel.com
Moderated by Rosemary Griffin, OPEC+ Lead Reporter, S&P Global Commodity Insights
Opened by Peter Flory, Senior Fellow, EIES, Former NATO Assistant Secretary General
Dismantling the Petrostate: Moment of Truth for Russian Oil? – Webinar: Monday 10 Nov.
Register Now – Allies have so far failed to break Putin’s war machine. The EU recently agreed on a 19th round of sanctions and plans to further ramp down Russian energy supplies. But EU sanctions have shown their limits, political leaders have not been able to use Russia’s frozen assets to aid Ukraine, and Moscow’s hydrocarbons still flow into the Union and other major markets.
Washington’s and London’s most recent sanctions may change the game. As we enter another winter of war, can Europe and the United States build on hard-won Transatlantic convergence to strike a decisive blow to the engine of the Kremlin’s aggression: Russia’s oil exports? Can the EU agree to and successfully manage the phaseout of Russian oil and gas?
Dear colleagues and friends — there are two key energy aspects in this detailed interview with Nataliia Lutsenko of Channel 24, an all-news TV channel from Kyiv: (1) Ukraine’s attritional war on Russia’s domestic oil sector and (2) whether Ukrainian long-range drone capacities will be called upon (viz., permitted by the USA) to accomplish what the new US policy of ending Russian oil exports seeks to accomplish through secondary tariffs. Elaborating:
(1) Domestic Russian oil refining capacities: I explained that, If Ukraine can sustain these new drone attacks at a faster rate than Russia can repair them, this will be a major blow to the supply of diesel fuel required by the Russian war economy, especially to war industries, railways (i.e., to locomotive fuel), for harvesting of crops this fall, and to supply the war front and occupied Ukraine. The last time this was tried on a large scale, roughly two years ago, Ukraine caused significant hardships to Russian refining, but ultimately it did not achieve sustained damage at a rate necessary to collapse Russia’s immense national refining capacity. However, as I pointed out to Nataliia, Ukraine’s drone production and sophistication is now greater, and chances of success therefore better. We should know in some weeks or perhaps a few months if Ukraine can now overwhelm Russia’s repair capacities.
Already, fuel prices have spiked in Russia, with Moscow deciding to insure refiners receive a special subsidy they would otherwise not get due to high prices they are charging for fuel, to address difficulties with the renewed drone war. (Russian Refiners Hit Rough Patch, Hope for State Support, E.I., 20August25, [paywall].)
(2) Russian oil export capacities: Why does Ukraine’s war on the Russian oil sector not include destruction of Russia’s three westward facing oil ports, the terminals it uses to export the overwhelming bulk of its oil exports? These are Ust-Luga and Primorsk in the Baltic, and Novorossiya on the Black Sea. Why has the oil export capacities of these ports essentially never been hit?
This Friday, Trump and Putin will talk in Alaska about the future of Ukraine. Why has Putin asked for this meeting?
The two have spoken repeatedly on the phone …. but, something changed. As I indicated in my previous post (here), Trump has turned from his preferred plan to end the war, to one of confrontation and coercion of Putin (what I have called “Plan B”), aiming to force him into halting his war of aggression and seriously discuss peace proposals.
It was an honor to speak with Natalia Lutsenko of Channel 24 TV in Kyiv, and the Ukrainian national audience on these heavy issues of war and peace. The video interview – about 34 minutes long – goes into some detail of my analysis of the balance of forces.
In the last two weeks, I was in Warsaw twice. First, for the Three Seas One Opportunity conference (3S1O) on 27 April, organized by the Opportunity Think Tank, where I co-chaired a session. This was an official side event of the Three Seas Summit (a ministerial conference). Second, for the Warsaw Security Forum’s Public Dialogue. (WSF) 7 May. I will soon post here about both these very interesting events.
However, I was asked by TVP, the Polish national broadcaster, to come to their Warsaw studios on 8 May, the day after the WSF, for a live-on-air commentary on the recent drama in the German Bundestag (parliament) where the new Chancellor, Fredrich Merz, embarrassingly failed to get the necessary votes on the first ballot. He finally succeeded on second ballot, after intense politicking and consultations within his party, the center-right CDU, in its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, and in his coalition-partner party, the center-left SPD.
So, first; I was asked to explain this surprising electoral fiasco for the new chancellor, Merz, and his party, and how it may have weakened his new government.
Secondly, Merz immediately, after being sworn in, undertook a one-day whirlwind trip to Paris and then Warsaw, to visit his prospective main partners in the European Union, President Macron of France and Prime Minister Tusk of Poland. (Continued ….)
El día de Pascua, 20.04, me entrevistaron en directo por radio, en muchas ciudades de Europa y del hemisferio occidental. On Easter Sunday, April 20, 2025, I was interviewed live in several cities of Europe and the Western Hemisphere.The interview was in Spanish. An English Google translation is below (RHS column). The topic was the negotiations of the Trump USA administration between Russia and Ukraine to end the war. Tom OD.)
Mi agradecimiento por la invitación de María Eugenia Plano, productora del programa radial Corresponsales en Línea, realizado por las corresponsales de los diarios Clarín y La Nación en París y Londres (María Laura Avignolo), París (Danielle Raymond), Madrid (Silvia Pisani), Berlin (Araceli Viceconte), Washington ( Paula Lugones) y San Pablo (Cristina Veiga) con la conducción de Silvia Naishtat (Editora de Economía de Clarín). en vivo y en directo para Radio Ciudad en Buenos Aires, los días domingos de 10 a 12 AM Hora Argentina. My thanks for the invitation from María Eugenia Plano, producer of the radio program Corresponsales en Línea, made by the correspondents of the newspapers Clarín and La Nación in Paris and London (María Laura Avignolo), Paris (Danielle Raymond), Madrid (Silvia Pisani), Berlin (Araceli Viceconte), Washington (Paula Lugones) and Sao Paulo (Cristina Veiga) hosted by Silvia Naishtat (Economics Editor of Clarín). live and direct for Radio Ciudad in Buenos Aires, Sundays from 10 to 12 AM Argentine time.
Above: Audio of my comments to (various) press on 22 April 25, on the impact of falling oil prices on Russia’s capacity to war on Ukraine. Also, a scenario I have discussed for over a year, first privately and then publicly, of how the USA could shut down the great majority of Russia’s seaborne oil exports, to devastating consequences for its oil sector and capacity to continue the war. In the present market situation of oversupply and anticipated continued weak demand, this could be done in a way that does not spike global oil prices.
This will only be done if Trump decides he needs to use harsh coercion to force Putin into an acceptable peace deal with Ukraine, AND if Trump were willing to impose lasting harm on the older Russian oil fields.
Xi Jinping has still not built China’s domestic market to escape its trade-war vulnerabilities from over-dependence on exports, a weakness he openly discussed back in February 2012 on his USA tour before becoming premier.
For the USA, Trump had apparently planned to have resolved the Ukraine war and in some way undermined the Russia-China alliance, inducing Russia to move closer to the USA before going after China. But, ending the war has proven far more difficult than he anticipated. His lack of success with Russia will weigh on his ability to negotiate from a position of strength with all the countries he is competing to win away from China’s geoeconomics orbit such as India, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand and etc. — the states that Treasury Secretary would say are in the “yellow zone” as opposed to the USA#s closest allies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, in the so-called “green zone.” For details – see this post on my blog,
