In an Easter Sunday interview in 20+ Polish papers [POLISH & ENGLISH below], I said White House reasons for Ukraine not to hit Russian refineries don’t make sense. The “elephant in the room” alarming DC is that Ukraine can now disrupt Primorsk, UST-Luga and Novorossiskya oil ports, needed for 60% of Russian exports.
This would not only deny Moscow vital oil revenues needed to wage war, it would also spark a spectacular global oil market shock. I explain that the USA and allies can urgently prepare for this, while the Ukrainians are still maintaining strategic patience.
“O’Donnell told Newsweek that that if Ukrainians really wanted to hit oil exports, they would go after Novorossiysk Fuel Oil Terminal in the [eastern] Black Sea and Primorsk Oil Terminal at the end of the Baltic Pipeline System.
“‘These are the two major exports sites for Russian oil and they are demonstrated to be within range of aerial drones and perhaps, in the case the Black Sea, their seaborne drones,’ he said. ‘If they really want to cut Russia’s oil income, they would go after those ports and they haven’t—that might be in deference to Americans concerns.’“ (Russia Faces Major Gas Headache After Ukraine Strikes, Newsweek, article by Brendan Cole, Mar 25, 2024.)
Last week, Newsweek (USA) twice cited my analysis of Ukrainian drone strikes. In one instance, I had the honor of following an interview with General Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army, Europe, with whom I concur in regretting the USA opposition.
(Aside: I hope to have an Op-Ed, perhaps tomorrow, in Europe, assessing that (i) the USA’s stated reasons versus Ukraine’s drone strikes to date do not make sense, and (ii) the “elephant in the room,” which must really have alarmed the White House, is that Ukraine’s strikes on refineries ipso facto demonstrate they COULD, if they so chose, disrupt anywhere up to 60% of Russian oil exports. Lastly,(iii) if the USA, EU and allies do not rapidly prepare non-Russian oil-sector producers for this eventuality, a global oil price shock could result.)
Here are the links to last week’s two new interviews/citations by Newsweek:
Interview 1/3: Kate Lycock of DW Radio’s Inside Europe interviewed me yesterday, on the historical role of fuel-denial in war, and the impacts of Ukraine’s drone strategy on Russia (first story, on 21 March)
Aside from some WW2 history, I identified two separate impacts we can see in the present Ukrainian campaign: a) The impact on Russian fuel deliveries to the war zones themselves and to the domestic Russian war economy, and b) their possible impact as a “force multiplier” for the oil-price cap sanctions on Russian oil exports, designed to deny Moscow its all-important oil revenues that are financing its aggression. I also speculated a bit as to how these strikes, together with Black Sea sea-drone operations, might be shaping coming Ukrainian offensive(s). (This show is also syndicated in the USA as I recall.)
2/3: on 20 March, I was also interviewed on the drone strikes by Voice of America’s Harry Ridgwell, while I was at the Berlin Energy Transition Dialogue, held at the German Federal Foreign Office. (See Video in LHS column.)
3/3: Lastly, I was quoted a couple times by Brendan Cole of the USA national magazine, Newsweek, on 18 March:
Note, there are new developments since yesterday, including Russia’s revenge strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure (reports are that 1 million Ukrainians have no electricity today) and on its Special Operations Headquarters. However, of the 30 Russian drones that swarmed to target this Kyiv building, every one was shot down.
Also, there are reports (Financial Times) that the USA is warning Ukraine that the strikes will draw retaliation and raise the price of oil.
Who cares! This has gone on for simply too long. There are vastly sufficient oil reserves in the world that can be tapped to fully replace Russian oil even if it were totally taken offline. After over two years of war, Washington and the EU Members should have by now begun a concerted effort to get sufficient new oil on line to enable blocking a high percentage of Russian exports from being exported to the world market
I talk about one possible approach to this in my DW interview, involving Denmark and Sweden inspecting and banning passage of sketchy Russian tankers through their economic zones in the Baltic Sea.
After two-plus years of war, there is no excuse to still be playing around with the oil price cap without either significantly lowing it — say, to $30/barrel as the Ukrainians suggest, in any case begin stepwise lowering it below the present $60, which would be a signal to producers to start developing new fields — and/or finding ways to block shipments more directly.
This is not to diminish the clever and difficult work people at especially OFAC and the USA Justice Department in Washington and their colleagues in London and Brussels have carried out to tighten and make more effective the oil price cap. However, as it stands, the cap is too high and a weak instrument.
The entire political preoccupation with keeping Russian oil on the market is fundamentally flawed, Signals must be given to the market that it will be step-wise taken off the market, which will instill/stimulate IOCs, NOCs and smaller firms to rapidly bring undeveloped oil reserves online to permanently replace Russian exports.
LAST: Here are some references for further reading that I found useful in my research.
Highly recommended, by my friend, the intrepid Михайло Гончар – Україна уразила вже третину найбільших російських НПЗ – Главредhttps://glavred.net/article/v-rossii-krasivo-gorit-ukraina-porazila-uzhe-tret-krupneyshih-rossiyskih-npz-gonchar-10550015.html (Translation: Russia is on fire: Ukraine has already hit a third of the largest Russian refineries – Interview with Michael Gonchar, March 14, 2024, 4:02 p.m, Ukrainian drones are reducing oil refining in Russia and creating a fuel shortage there, Mykhailo Gonchar believes.)
Ukraine Drone Strike Hits Refining Complex Deep in Russia || Peter Zeihan – YouTube (NOTE: added a gap to URL before ‘.com’ to prevent it displaying here) https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=86YrV2D-nB4
According to energy and geopolitics expert Tom O’Donnell, Ukrainian allies’ oil price cap, in conjunction with Ukrainian drones’ physical damage could be a significant hit to Russian revenues.
Tom O’Donnell, PhD, an expert on energy and geopolitics, sat down with Kyiv Post to explain what Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s energy sector will mean for the larger Russian energy sector.
It sounds like a huge number. But how much do you think losing 12 percent of production, in a day, will affect Russia?
First off, although these refineries hit by Ukrainian drones yesterday represent about 12 percent of Russian production, experience shows that they might not each be totally impaired from production. Nevertheless, there are two particularly significant implications for Russia.
First, whatever percentage of Russian refined oil products this impairs, the damage will both deprive the war economy of needed export revenues and/or of much-needed fuels to keep the domestic war economy running.
Already, Russia had announced it will ban the export of gasoline from March 1 in order to tame prices for consumers in the runup to the presidential elections mid-month. In 2023 about 17 percent of Russian gasoline was exported.
What is the origin of the current price pressure?
The present price pressure is both a result of the demands of the war economy as well as previously successful Ukrainian hits on other refineries that began in January.
This gets to my second point – the successful refinery strikes of yesterday, involving a reported launch of 58 drones, as well as recent hits on a Russian domestic gas transmission pipeline, all demonstrate that the January successes were not one-off special operations, but rather the beginning of what will be a sustained Ukraine armed forces campaign capable of, over time, significantly disrupting Russia’s all-important oil and gas import revenues and internal refined-product supplies.
Kyiv has launched some of its largest air attacks on Russia this week ahead of the vote, which is set to hand President Vladimir Putin another six-year term in the Kremlin.
If Russia continues to lose refineries, which appears likely, what new complications will it create for Russia?
First, from a strategic point of view, it is important to see these physical strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in conjunction with the sanctions efforts of the USA, EU and other allies aimed at reducing Russian oil profits. These drone strikes should be seen as a “force multiplier” to allied oil sanctions.
How so?
Consider that, with Russia no longer having the Druzba oil pipeline flowing into Central Europe due to EU sanctions, this has forced it to shift its Urals-region oil exports to seaports on the Baltic coast of Russia and to a new western-Arctic port. Hence, hitting any refining or export facilities inside Russia along this general Urals-oil export corridor has a significant effect on Russia sustaining export revenues. This oil mainly flows to Turkey, India and China, with Russian oil tankers representing the main users of the Suez and then the Red Sea. Due to sanctions, most of these ships are now either directly or indirectly Russian-controlled, to avoid the sanctions oil-price cap.
There has been a discussion in US-EU security-and-sanctions circles that these ships could be stopped for inspection by Sweden and/or Denmark in the Baltic, in the straights between their countries, and many might be refused passage due to having sketchy insurance and/or being unsafe, old vessels.
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What do you think of the oil price cap? Is it a good idea?
From the point of view of strategic impact, the allies’ choice of an oil-price cap has been, in my view, a weak and overly complex-to-enforce instrument. However, in conjunction with Ukrainian drones’ physical damage, the overall hit to Russian revenues might become significant.
Secondly, Ukraine has also hit refineries in Russia just east of its own territory, which will mainly undermine the region’s war economy and complicate supplying the massive demand from Russia’s invasion forces. This region already has chronic fuel-supply problems, with farmers last year protesting against a lack of diesel for harvests, causing Russia to ban diesel exports during that season.
Dr. Tom O’Donnell is Berlin-based and is a Global Fellow of the Wilson Center.
Jason Jay Smart, Ph.D., is a political adviser who has lived and worked in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Latin America. Due to his work with the democratic opposition to Pres. Vladimir Putin, Smart was persona non grata, for life, by Russia in 2010. His websites can be found at http://www.JasonJaySmart.com / http://www.AmericanPoliticalServices.com / fb.com/jasonjaysmart / Twitter: @OfficeJJSmart
Related references for assertions I made in my interview – Tom O’D.
Berlin Energy Roudtable. L to R: Ben Aris, Tom O’Donnell, Morten Frisch & Andriy Kobolyev (video link from Kyiv) 24 October 2023, Haus der Bunderpresskonferenz – PHOTO GALLERY BELOW(Divan staff)
On 24 October, I was honored to moderate a great roundtable in Berlin with three European energy experts, sponsored by Der Divan Kulturehaus. SUGGESTION: While listening, open up that speaker’s file below. You’ll find Ben Aris’ data-slides on Russian price-cap failings, Andriy Kobolyev’s proposal to tax Moscow’s oil & Morten Frisch’s slides on EU renewable shortcomings & continued oil and gas needs.
You are invited to attend the 1st Berlin Energy Roundtable, on 24 October. Our three distinguished speakers share decades of Eurasian and Mideast gas-sector experience. I’ll have the pleasure of moderating.
As many of you know, this is a format I long sought to establish in Berlin; but, which during Corona and the energy-crisis after the largescale Russian invasion of Ukraine, was difficult to advance.
The event is made possible with the generous sponsorship of the Divan Culture Housein Berlin. Hopefully there will be several more in the coming year.
Today (Mon., 12.09.23; 12:16 CET) EuroNews-Serbia interviewed me (Video has English audio-overlay). I explained:
Saudi logic for cutting, with Russia, about 125 million barrels from the market so far, and by the end of 2023 some 245 million barrels [1] is its prediction of soft demand due to China’s slow recovery and somewhat the EU too; plus the Saudi minister points to central banks continuing to fight inflation with high rates.
However, the IEA disagrees, seeing a shortage of supply in Q4. I added that the market is in backwardian, and so agrees with IEA.
My assessment:
Price over $100 is likely this year; it is after all fairly close now, in the 90’s.
I answered a question about who gets hurt the most from high prices.
It is the countries who do not produce oil and are relatively poor. So, mainly some states in Asia and So. Asia, Africa and Latin America.
As for Europe, rising oil price will be somewhat inflationary; especially hitting Eastern Europe, where inflation is generally still a greater problem.
However, I pointed out that compared to historical peaks in 2008-09 and 2010-11, $100 or even $125/bbl or even higher prices are needed to begin approaching the REAL price of oil back in those cases.
So, $100 oil is now not so inflationary as it was back then (and in general oil is not as inflationary as it was in the last century, because economies have larger service and knowledge sectors that are not as strongly affected by fuel prices as manufacturing and chemical industries.
I also explained that the Russian oil price cap sanctions have actually “put money in the pockets” of people in poorer states, as its enforcement meant that Russia, while still selling its oil, has been forced to sell it cheaper.
In particular, up till the start of last month (start of Sept), Russia was losing about half the revenues it would have ordinarily made on its oil exports. (This can be seen on a chart recently released by the USA Treasury Department. [3])
However, as a higher percentage of its oil (about 75% now) is sold via tankers that are not owned or insured by the EU or UK , it can be sold at higher prices without falling under the price cap enforcement mechanism. This higher price is, then, also now contributing to the higher price of oil on the global market. [2]
Video: My answers in English; Host’s questions in Arabic.
Tom O’Donnell, on Asharq, 28 Jan 23. Written explanations of my answers are below.
Note: Questions in Arabic; my responses in English.
I explained how the crude oil cap is thus far successful. This bodes well for the products’ cap effectiveness.
The market situation is relatively favorable for application of EU sanctions on all Russian refined products on 5 February. Demand is still soft as Europe, even if it is not going into recession, and it is coming out of an unusually war winter that also softened demand. Also, China is not yet roaring back from its COVID reopening attempts.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz looks on prior to deliver a speech at the Congress centre during the World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting in Davos on January 18, 2023. Fabrice COFFRINI / AFP
Summary (Added only on blog, T.O’D.): Scholz’s resistance to sending Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine has freed up many in Germany and beyond with reservations about the direction of the West’s strategy to become vocal.
Scholz is opposed to the recently changed USA-NATO strategic understanding that Putin’s new, long-war-of-attrition strategy could give sufficient time for his larger economic and energy war on Europe to bear fruit, seriously disrupting the West’s solidarity with Ukraine.
Biden and the NATO majority concluded that Putin’s long war of attrition strategy must be smashed. This requires large numbers of heavy weapons – tanks, aircraft, etc. – for Ukraine.
However, Scholz’ faction in Germany and in other EU states see a stalemate (e.g., war of attrition)) as likely positive, as it might lead in time to the two sides accepting a negotiated settlement or frozen conflict. This, they feel, is the path to ending the dangerous Russian-EU energy and economic war.
However, the majority pro-escalation camp, expects that a war of attrition (aka stalemate) risks the destabilizing effects of a prolonged and costly economic-and-energy “Cold War. 2” on Western stability and solidarity.
Scholz’, by demonstrably stalling NATO’s ability to send German tanks, effectively signaled his leadership of the no-escalation and pro-stalemate EU-wide faction, which is of significant size. In Germany sections of every political party now align with Scholz’ strategy. He and his faction wait for their time, when and if the new NATO escalation strategy fails.
All German parties were deeply involved in the previous energy partnership with Moscow; there is no significant organized opposition faction able to take leadership from Scholz and implement a Zeitenwende. This vacuum drives a gathering German – and EU – political crisis
Moscow is well aware of these matters. (Kyiv Post Opinion piece follows)
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s resistance to sending Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine has freed up many in Germany with deep reservations about the direction of the West’s strategy and policy, to voice their frustrations, fears and, for many, an unwillingness to join in a Russian-Ukraine war, as opposed to containing it.
Al Jazeera asked for an online commentary within an hour of Putin’s announcement. These were my initial thoughts.
I also spoke to AJ Arabic, and a couple hours later, on Germany’s Deutsche Welle’s English language service elaborated on these points (see video, next blog post).
The question is where will the EU-USA-g7 western alliance go from here. If they stepwise lower the cap, and also work hard to get new oil online (from OPEC and the USA), they can gradually keep lowering Russia’s market share. However, as I indicated, the coming recession – esp. in Europe – and the uncertainties of Chinese demand as it exits COVID shutdowns in early 2023, complicate calculations of whether the globala oil market will be short or long on supplies and if the price will spike or not. I said this will be “a chess game.”
I explain further in the blog post, way below. English audio is above. Arabic video just below.
To defeat Russia’s energy war, OPEC should invest in CAPACITY to produce more oil. So should USA shale.
The title above says much more succinctly what I was hoping to get into in this interview. Below are the beginning of an article I was writing for this blog post. However, a USA organization is interested in using it for an Op-Ed. So, only the initial part is below. I hope to post on this fully very soon (i.e., a published article). – Tom O’D.
In my view, the Biden Administration has unwisely gotten into an exaggerated public clash with the Saudis and OPEC/OPEC+ over their 2 mbd quota cut.
The key here is the need for more investment rapidly into both the OPEC states (which have plenty of oil reserves that can be developed) and into USA shale resources (that are also abundant and need to be more rapidly expanded).
The looming global recession discourages investors in both instances, of course. And, the Biden administration has reason to worry, both if a global recession soon begins, slashing oil demand, and especially if it doesn’t (but, it will).
…
I agree with Ed Morse (video interview on CNN here), veteran oil-market analyst, head of Citibank’s Global Commodities: Regardless of the OPEC quota cut, given the strong trend towards a global recession, which is proceeding relatively slower in the USA than elsewhere, it’s likely oil prices will be “in the $70’s at the end of the year.”
Just as President Von der Leyen finished her speech, I was asked for an analysis of her proposals to cope with the energy crisis – which Member States’ will meet to approve or reject on 30 September.
EU Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen presented the commission’s plan to address the growing energy crisis before and during the coming winter. Now there will be two weeks of discussions among Member states until their energy ministers gather on 30 September to decide which to endorse. There will undoubtedly be no price caps on Russian or other natural gas. There will be liquidity for those energy companies struggling to purchase high-priced gas. There are measures to decouple the effects, at least, of the coupling of the electricity prices to high natural gas prices in the wake of Putin’s regime cutting its pipeline flows to Europe. The idea here, as I explained, is a sort of “windfall profits taxes” on low-cost energy producers, such as renewables and nuclear, to capture their rents and redistribute them to those citizens and firms struggling to pay energy bills during the crisis. I explain that this is a wholly appropriate measure during wartime, which is what this is – an economic and energy war vs. Russia to support the Ukrainian people’s fight against Russian aggression. I was asked, again, as on other networks recently, whether the EU is “divided” on these measures. I explained how there are absolutely no proposals that the EU (or USA) back down on its sanctions program vs. Russia and esp. vs. Russian energy. I explained how, despite Orban of Hungary and some similar examples, these have been pretty well handled by the majority of Member states and the Commission and in fact the sanctions and emergency measures have gone forward. I noted that in two or so years, Russia will be relegated to a second-level energy exporter, and the EU will certainly be able to be independent of Putin’s regime in the energy sector.
He did not insist, as have various Russian Federation officials lately, that Nord Stream 1 gas flow has been cut for technical reasons to do with the lack of a Siemens compressor.
The compressor in question was sent to Canada for repairs, but its return has been waived from sanctions restrictions. As Chancellor Scholz rightly said, the lack of a compressor is clearly not what cutting gas to Europe is about. It is political.
Nor did the expert in Moscow claim it was due to bureaucratic German-Russian difficulties with paperwork, as Putin and others have claimed..
He instead pointed out that the EU has said it will stop by year’s end the import of Russian oil, and Germany has said it will not use Russian gas in two years, and, without this and some sort of “political compromise,” gas could undoubtedly be fully flowing again from Russian into the EU.
So, I asked – rhetorically – just what possible sort of “compromise” might Putin be angling for? The Donbas for gas? Odessa for gas?
I asserted my opinion that “Europeans have their sense of dignity” and would never agree to such a “compromise.” Put that way, they will prefer to be cold this winter and to have industries and businesses have to shut for lack of gas.
We also discussed a few details of what sort of suffering – rationing of energy, low temperature heating and closing of businesses – Germany and the EU can expect to have to endure this winter.
It’s always great to talk with Deutschewelle’s Rob Watson on “DW Business.” We spoke at midday 26 Jul 2022 on the new NS1 . gas pipeline cut in flows to only 20% by Putin’s regime.
The title tells most of it. I explain why I think Putin is playing with gas, not oil and the EU and German vulnerabilities.
Now, German storage will not be able to be filled to the ministry’s target level of 95% by November, according to the Federal Transmission System chief, Mr. Klaus Muller – in fact, even if NS1 were still flowing at 40%.
Not only that, although Energy Minister Habeck has agreed to bring back online all the coal power plants possible, in fact Germany has a poorly thought-out over dependence on wind and it simply is not blowing much this summer. So, in actuality, we are burning more gas now to produce electricity than last year – a complete waste of gas. Also, the Rhine is low and coal barges are having difficulty delivering coal to power plants.
We discuss the excuses Putin is giving for cutting Nord Stream 1 flows now from 40% to only 20%. I asserted that they are nonsense. (Various links are below, under Read More.)
This pipeline has been in service since 2011 and there has never been a cut back of flow due to a defective or poorly maintained compressor, and now Russia is claiming a second one is in disrepair. Putin, in Tehran, last week warned he would do this and also said that Ukraine refusing to transit Russian gas through territory Russia has forcibly occupied is another reason he might cut Nord Stream 1 flows. So, this is clearly political, not technical.
This will mean, according to comments recently by Klaus Mueller – head of the German Federal Gas Transit Agency, that it will be impossible to fill German storage to the 95% level the minister has ordered — Mueller had said this was the case even at the former 40% flows of NS1.
I explained the reason Putin is playing this game with gas deliveries – because natural gas brings his regime far less revenues than the all-important business of Russian oil exports, while at the same time natural gas is much harder now for Europe to replace for some years hence from other sources – as it arrives mostly via pipelines from Russia, not by sea like most oil. So, gas is Putin’s greatest lever for now in the energy front of the economic war being waged in support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
The Global Barrel 