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My DW, VoA & Newsweek interviews: “Ukrainian drones cripple Russian refineries.” Thoughts on strategy, impacts and history

Interview 1/3: Kate Lycock of DW Radio’s Inside Europe interviewed me yesterday, on the historical role of fuel-denial in war, and the impacts of Ukraine’s drone strategy on Russia (first story, on 21 March)

Aside from some WW2 history, I identified two separate impacts we can see in the present Ukrainian campaign: a) The impact on Russian fuel deliveries to the war zones themselves and to the domestic Russian war economy, and b) their possible impact as a “force multiplier” for the oil-price cap sanctions on Russian oil exports, designed to deny Moscow its all-important oil revenues that are financing its aggression. I also speculated a bit as to how these strikes, together with Black Sea sea-drone operations, might be shaping coming Ukrainian offensive(s). (This show is also syndicated in the USA as I recall.)

2/3: on 20 March, I was also interviewed on the drone strikes by Voice of America’s Harry Ridgwell, while I was at the Berlin Energy Transition Dialogue, held at the German Federal Foreign Office. (See Video in LHS column.)

3/3: Lastly, I was quoted a couple times by Brendan Cole of the USA national magazine, Newsweek, on 18 March:

Read more: My DW, VoA & Newsweek interviews: “Ukrainian drones cripple Russian refineries.” Thoughts on strategy, impacts and history

Russia Faces ‘Serious’ Threat as Ukraine Attacks Refineries

Mar 18, 2024. By Brendan Cole, Senior News Reporter. You can read it HERE.

Note, there are new developments since yesterday, including Russia’s revenge strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure (reports are that 1 million Ukrainians have no electricity today) and on its Special Operations Headquarters. However, of the 30 Russian drones that swarmed to target this Kyiv building, every one was shot down.

Also, there are reports (Financial Times) that the USA is warning Ukraine that the strikes will draw retaliation and raise the price of oil.

Who cares! This has gone on for simply too long. There are vastly sufficient oil reserves in the world that can be tapped to fully replace Russian oil even if it were totally taken offline. After over two years of war, Washington and the EU Members should have by now begun a concerted effort to get sufficient new oil on line to enable blocking a high percentage of Russian exports from being exported to the world market

I talk about one possible approach to this in my DW interview, involving Denmark and Sweden inspecting and banning passage of sketchy Russian tankers through their economic zones in the Baltic Sea.

After two-plus years of war, there is no excuse to still be playing around with the oil price cap without either significantly lowing it — say, to $30/barrel as the Ukrainians suggest, in any case begin stepwise lowering it below the present $60, which would be a signal to producers to start developing new fields — and/or finding ways to block shipments more directly.

This is not to diminish the clever and difficult work people at especially OFAC and the USA Justice Department in Washington and their colleagues in London and Brussels have carried out to tighten and make more effective the oil price cap. However, as it stands, the cap is too high and a weak instrument.

The entire political preoccupation with keeping Russian oil on the market is fundamentally flawed, Signals must be given to the market that it will be step-wise taken off the market, which will instill/stimulate IOCs, NOCs and smaller firms to rapidly bring undeveloped oil reserves online to permanently replace Russian exports.

LAST: Here are some references for further reading that I found useful in my research.

My DW TV: Why Putin cuts EU gas bit-by-bit? Can Germany handle it? Wind’s low, so we’re buring gas! | Many EU states warned Berlin: “Don’t open our door to Putin’s Trojan horse!”

It’s always great to talk with Deutschewelle’s Rob Watson on “DW Business.” We spoke at midday 26 Jul 2022 on the new NS1 . gas pipeline cut in flows to only 20% by Putin’s regime.

The title tells most of it. I explain why I think Putin is playing with gas, not oil and the EU and German vulnerabilities.

Now, German storage will not be able to be filled to the ministry’s target level of 95% by November, according to the Federal Transmission System chief, Mr. Klaus Muller – in fact, even if NS1 were still flowing at 40%.

Not only that, although Energy Minister Habeck has agreed to bring back online all the coal power plants possible, in fact Germany has a poorly thought-out over dependence on wind and it simply is not blowing much this summer. So, in actuality, we are burning more gas now to produce electricity than last year – a complete waste of gas. Also, the Rhine is low and coal barges are having difficulty delivering coal to power plants.

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I tell DW TV: Nord Stream 2 is geopolitical. Berlin & Moscow aim to reroute Russia-to-EU gas around “insecure” Ukraine.

My DW Business live, with host Chris Kober, Feb 12,

In this live interview with Deutsche Welle (DW.de) on 12 February, I told host Christoph Kober, that this pipeline is clearly “geopolitical”.

Without Nord Stream 2, Putin can’t significantly escalate his war inside Ukraine; he’d risk his lucrative gas-export business with EU. That’s because, without Nord Stream 2, most of the gas Russia exports to EU countries currently has to arrive via pipelines transiting Ukraine that belong to its finance ministry (the remainder Russia pipes to EU states arrives via Belarus-Poland).

I pointed out that, by invading Ukraine in 2014, Putin created his own worries about his lucrative gas business with the EU. Unfortunately for Ukraine, Germany’s government also frets about this gas, fully 40% of all EU imports, having to pass through Ukraine. And so, Berlin made a “realpolitik” decision in 2015, to assist Russia’s Gazprom to build a huge new a detour pipeline around Ukraine. (I analyzed this policy, in 2017, as a “Neue Neue Ost Politik” and here – i.e., the New New Eastern Politics, a third historical iteration of German elites’ reorientations towards Moscow.)

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