Tag Archives: geopolitics

Asharq live: No EU embargo agreed vs. Russian oil. Some too cautious (Germany), others pro-Putin (Hungary). Yet, EU has months of oil in storage. [EN audio, AR video]

Posted on 14.May.2022 | Leave a comment
Above: ENGLISH Audio }} Below: ARABIC video
I was on with the expert, Sona Muzikarova,a chief economist at GLOBSEC in Bratislava, Slovakia.

We discussed the EU’s repeated failures to impose an embargo in Russian oil. Now, (after Monday 30 May) they are considering a sea-borne-oil-only embargo.

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Posted in Asharq, Energy and Geopolitics, European Union, Germany, Global Oil Market, Interview, Russia, Sanctions, Uncategorized

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My Al Jazeera: Finland, the Baltics & Poland prepared well for Gazprom’s cutoff. Germany & Austria did the opposite, putting EU at risk.

Posted on 14.May.2022 | Leave a comment
ABOVE is English audio — BELOW is Arabic video. Recorded live; Al Jazeera, 21 May 2022.

I told Al Jazeera that Finland is well prepared, having worked since 2017 with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – the Baltic states – and with Poland to connect them all together with new pipelines, also to access LNG, storage and soon, new supplies from Norway.

Finland has also rented a regasification ship, from a US firm, to receive 5 billion cubic meters per year of LNG, whch will be plenty to supply both itself and Estonia in the wake of Putin cutting off Gazprom supplies of natural gas. Finland refuses, as did Poland too, to pay Moscow in rubles and so are being punished by Putin.

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Posted in Baltic States, Energy and Geopolitics, Estonia, EU gas, European Union, Finland, gas, gas crisis, Gazprom, gazprom, geopolitics, Germany, LNG, Nord Stream, Nord Stream 2, Poland, Putin, Russia, Sanctions, shale gas, The USA, Three Seas, Ukraine, Uncategorized

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My Kosatka (Kyiv) Q&A: “Biden’s ‘gas airlift’ & Kremlin revenue. Tom O’Donnell on Russian gas embargo” [Ru/En/Ua]

Posted on 14.May.2022 | 2 comments

Kostaka.Media (Kyiv) independent journalists continue informing the Ukranian people on energy affairs. I was interviewed from afar by YAROSLAV MARKIN, TETIANA HUZENKO. We focused on gas issues – would Putin cut Europe’s gas? What have the Americans been organizing, now with the Europeans? How would this affect Europe, Ukraine and Putin’s income?

Below are links to the article in Kostaka’s three languages (EN, RU, UA). I pasted in the English one below, in case you have access problems. This interview had to be written, not audio/video, due to wartime difficulties. [Also, here’s my previous (in-person Kyiv) interview with Kostaka.Media.]

Biden’s Gas Air Lift and the impact on Kremlin revenue: Thomas W. O’Donnell on the russian gas embargo
28 April 2022 — Author YAROSLAV MARKIN, TETIANA HUZENKO
Europe is going to cut the consumption of gas by a ⅔ in 2022, that is obviously will affect the Kremlin’s revenue. However, an embargo is highly possible as well. Both the Kremlin and the EU, in response to Russia’s new war crimes in Ukraine, could stop the gas flows.
In such a case, LNG supplies are to help weather the crisis of 2022-2023 via Biden Air Lift. The last mentioned is being set up by the US and EU diplomats and is patterned on the Berlin Air Lift of 1949. Berlin Air Lift was a system of food and coal supply during the times when the USSR had been blocking land routes.
This would be the end of Russian gas supplies to Europe forever, an international expert and senior energy and geopolitics analyst at GlobalBarrel.com, Dr Thomas W. O’Donnell believes.
He told Kosatka.Media how quickly Europe would be able to abandon Russian gas, what alternative supply routes could be used, and whether Hungary and Austria, obsessed with Russian gas, could prevent this.

The analogue of Putin’s army in the energy sector
• How much gas does Europe import from Russia per year? Who are the major consumers?

There are two different market processes whereby Russian gas is purchased by Europe. If we speak about only gas delivered by pipeline, these are:
І. Via long-term contracts, agreements which are for natural gas to be delivered for several years, perhaps from five to as much as 20 years.

ІІ. Via the “spot” market. These are short-term contracts for gas to be delivered the following month. It is also possible to buy gas day-by-day, where traders agree to a price for gas delivered the next day. Here, gas traders consult the future’s market, which has set the price for gas delivered the next day, or the next month, or some number of months in the future.

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Posted in Energy and Geopolitics, EU gas, gas crisis, Gazprom, geopolitics, Germany, Interview, Naftogaz, Russia, Sanctions, The USA, Ukraine, Uncategorized

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Le dije a Radio Clarín Buenos Aires: Putin amenaza con cortarle el gas a la UE/Alemania, pero no tiene otra fuente de dinero. Si lo hace, Biden y la UE organizarán un “Gas-Lift” … [Spanish]

Posted on 14.May.2022 | Leave a comment
Lo sentimos, la calidad de la comunicación celular desde Alemania no es buena. Por lo tanto, he escrito mi respuesta larga a la primera pregunta a continuación. Las otras preguntas también están abajo. Muchas gracias a los periodistas de Radio Clarín y La Nacion en Argentina (y en París).

Re: Urgente Pedido de Entrevista Periodística – Corresponsales Clarín y La Nación – Argentina

De Maria E… … Fri, Apr 29, 11:50 PM

Dr. O ´Donnell, … Estas son las preguntas para la entrevista del domingo:

1¿Alemania tiene otra posibilidad que no sea seguir comprando el gas ruso? ¿Cuáles serían sus otras opciones?

Repuesta: Antes que nada, muchas gracias por esta oportunidad de hablar con su audiencia argentina.

Pues, debo señalar que hay dos problemas diferentes: el suministro de petróleo ruso a Alemania y Europa y el suministro de gas ruso a Alemania y Europa. Me preguntas por el gas. El gas es mucho más difícil para Europa y para Alemania que el petróleo Hay dos casos: una reducción gradual o parcial de gas o un corte inmediato.

Un corte gradual se puede manejar bastante bien. Ahora Putin está tratando de dividir y conquistar Europa cortando el suministro de gas a Polonia y Bulgaria.

Un recorte inmediato, ya sea por parte de Putin o debido a las sanciones de la UE, crearía una gran crisis energética en Europa. Sin embargo, es importante entender que, al final, Putin está en una posición mucho más débil.

Si Putin corta todos los suministros de gas a Europa, ahora no hay suficiente gas en el mercado mundial para compensar. Pero Occidente, y especialmente EE. UU., la administración Biden, se ha estado preparando para esto al menos dos meses antes de que Putin invadiera Ucrania, incluso antes de que Europa creyera las advertencias de EE. UU. de que Putin atacaría Ucrania.

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Posted in Berlin, Climate Change, Ehergiewende, Energiewende, Energy and Geopolitics, Energy and Geostrategy, EU gas, Euroepen Union, gas crisis, Gazprom, gazprom, geopolitics, Germany, Global Oil Market, international relations, Iran, Iran nuclear, Iran sanctions, Latin America, Nord Stream, oil, Oil Crisis, Oil prices, Oil supply, Poland, Putin, Russia, Sanctions, The USA, Ukraine, Ukraine, Uncategorized

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Would EU sanctions on Russian oil cost Germany “too much”? No. Scholz & Habeck pose the wrong questions. [Asharq/Bloomberg live: En & Ar]

Posted on 14.Apr.2022 | Leave a comment
Above: English Audio || Below: Arabic Video
.

24 April 2022: My Asharq/live evening TV news interview is a bit over seven minutes.

Would an oil embargo be “effective”?

I respond, What is “effective”? Clearly it would not end the war. However, a Ukranian soldier who decides to give his life to resist the Russian invaders has no illusion that his or her sacrifice, on its own, will end the war. But, he will makes what contribution he can.

So, the German leadership refuses to send Ukraine heavy weapons, and certainly won’t send German troops. However, Germany and the EU can at least step up and make this contribution – sanctionRussian oil now. This will greatly hinder Putin’s ability, within two to three months, to finance his war.

  • We discuss the question raised by the German leadership – by Chancellor Scholz (SPD party), Energy and Environment Minister Habeck (Greens) and Finance Minister Lindner (FDP liberals) – that supposedly an embargo in Russian oil (or gas) would do more harm to German citizens than to the Russian leadership.
  • The argument heard repeatedly from Berlin is that this is “not worth it” and also, that such an embargo it “would not end the war.”
  • Also, I answer the question of how much oil could Putin’s Russia divert from Europe to India if the EU and Germany embargoed oil.

I think I posed useful answers to these questions given the time we had. Your thoughts and critiques are welcomed, and solicited.

Best, Tom O’Donnell, Berlin

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Posted in Asharq, Euroepen Union, geopolitics, Germany, Global Oil Market, Interview, Oil Crisis, Oil prices, Russia, Sanctions, Ukraine, Uncategorized

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My Al Jazeera: Yes, the EU can embargo Russian oil now: OPEC’s role, Germany’s Druzhba refineries OK, SPRs, weak demand. [Arabic & English]

Posted on 14.Apr.2022 | 1 comment
Above: ENGLISH AUDIO }} Below: ARABIC VIDEO

Can the EU embargo Russian oil now? I explain yes, it can, and how. Also what OPEC will do. My Live Al Jazeera interview on 12.03.22 (ca. 00:20 CET, 18:20 EST). Here are the main points coved, quickly, from memory.

Afer an initial price spike from an EU embargo, the IEA’s SPR – strategic pertroleum reserves – can make up any shortall of oil for some weeks or so or months while OPEC and the USA increase production.

Especially the UAE and most especially Saudi Arabia have significant excess capacity, at least 2 million barrel/day (mbd) they can add to the market. Oil is fungable, there is one global market, so in principle the shock of an embargo could be ended rather quickly.

Regarding Germany: it is the main EU Member state now opposed to an immediate Russian oil embargo. However, I am confident it is being overly cautious and that Germany can do this now without significant disruptions.

In particular, Germany worries about the fact that several refineries in Germany and Central Europe are located inland, and supplied by the Druzhba Pipeline bringing about 700,000 barrels per day of Urals grade oil (i.e., hevier, sulferous oil) as their feedstock. So, the German government is claiming it would be very difficult to supply these refineries. However, this is not such a problem.

Consider that two German refineries, in the South of Germany, Bavaria for example; these two refineries are on a second pipeline, the Transalpine pipeline. This comes from the port of Trieste Italy. So these two refineries are fine. In an embargo of Russian Druzhba Pipeline oil they can be supplied from Trieste.

However, the refinery the German leaders most worry about is called Svedt, and it is located in Germany near the Polish border, also on the Druzhba pipeline [i.e., PCK Oil Refinery, at Schwedt, Oder River, Brandenburg State, Germany]. However, I can make some immediate points about this refinery.

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Posted in Energy and Geopolitics, Energy and Geostrategy, Euroepen Union, European Union, Uncategorized

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My Nexus TV: Sanctions hobble Putin; we agreed in London, Berlin, Kyiv & Moscow | Me: Putin must sell oil/gas at any price; they’ll be sanctioned too

Posted on 14.Apr.2022 | Leave a comment
My comments start at timestamp 15:20.

TRT’s Nexus with Matthew Moore, was recorded 30 April 2021, from London.

My fellow guests were:

  • Patrick Boyle, Professor of Finance at Kings College — London, UK
  • Andrii Dligach, Co-Founder of the Centre for Economic Recovery — Kyiv, Ukraine
  • Maxum Bouev, Vice Rector at the New Economic School — Moscow, Russia
  • Myself, Thomas O’Donnell, Energy and Geopolitical Analyst, also teaching in — Berlin, Germany

My further comment: Russian oil can perfectly well be sanctioned now by Europe, and they should do it. It would deprive Putin’s regime of his main remaining source of income. Natural gas will be more difficult, but it is also possible to be sanctoned. It shoudl be done.

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Mi DW en español: Explico las razones geoestratégicas de dos gruops de las élites alemanas para depender del gas natural ruso. Permitieron un desastre para Ucrania.

Posted on 14.Mar.2022 | Leave a comment
On Deutsche Welle (DW.de), the German international broadcaster, I explain [in´Spanish] the two different rationales of two distinct sections of the German elites (one centered on the SPD – the center left party, with defacto support of the ultra-left and ultra-right parties, and the other centered on the center right, on Merkel’s CDU party) as to why they both insisted, over many years, to depended on Russian natural gas, actively partnering with Putin against the interests of Ukraine and other Central and Eastern European states.
This nationalistic geopolitics of natural gas has now facilitated Putin to bring disaster for Ukraine.

Best, Tom O’Donnell – in Berlin

To see mroe commentary / para mas commentarios / go to GlobalBarrel.com / vayas a GlobalBarrel.com

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My Al Jazeera: Global oil price expectations due to Russia’s war on Ukraine [Arabic & English]

Posted on 14.Mar.2022 | Leave a comment

Here’s: i) English audio ii) Arabic video iii) my English blog points

My Al Jazeera, Arabic 07 March 2022 live:The 2022 Global Oil Crisis of Russia’s Ukraine war has begun.

Al Jazeera asked me, about the Russian Foreign minister’s declaration that oil prices could go to $300/barrel if the West sanctions its oil. [Note: this interview was a week ago; but still relevant.]

I said: Finally the Russian minister has said something true. However, I explained that USA sanctions – as the EU also wanted – initially (Note: at the time of this interview, President Biden had not yet banned USA imports of Russian oil) had included exemptions from the larger SWIFT sanctions on Russian bank transactions specifically allowing continued payments for Russian oil and gas exports. And, last week, Putin, for his part, specifically also said he would not cut off Russian oil and gas deliveries to the West. So, why do we suddenly have the beginnings of a crisis of undersupply of Russian oil to the “”‘Global Barrel’ (dot com)”” oil market? It turned out that global-oil market actors themselves – the western banks that finance purchases, the spot market traders who make daily deals and oil-tanker owners who have to send their tankers to Russian ports to pick up oil – have broadly and voluntarily backed off from buying Russian oil. There are various reasons – there is over-compliance to sanctions, being super careful not to inadvertently violate the complex sanctions, reduce risk of sudden supply disruption from the Russian side, and also the fact that no tanker will pick up oil in a war zone or nearby without appropriate insurance, etc. There are also reputational issues of being seen by civil society as engaging in war profiteering if an entity purchases what is now deeply discounted Russian crude. I also explained that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) system of the OECD states, which should hold at minimum 90-days of the total imports of any OECD state’s oil imports, will soften the shortage of oil should the purchase of Russian oil be sanctioned by the USA and/or EU, or if Putin and Lavrov decide to cut off Russia’s oil supply to Europe.

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EU Gas Crisis: German elites chose Putin’s pipeline over Ukraine “risk” | My DW ‘Inside Europe’ interview (NPR syndicated)

Posted on 14.Mar.2022 | Leave a comment
Piece image
My thanks to Deutsche Welle’s (DW, German public broadcaster) Kate Laycock for this interview (and intrepid producer Helen). Their website link is below for this 25.02.22 podcast as war began

IE: Inside Europe, 2/25/2022 From: DW – Deutsche Welle Series: Inside Europe: News and Current Affairs ~ Weekly from DW

This week on the show: Russia-Ukraine war. UK sanctions on Russia. Russia gas. The mood in Russia. How ordinary people are struggling to get by…

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My TRT/Istanbul: Biden names Qatar a “major non-NATO ally,” seeks LNG for EU. Energy scenarios of a Russian war vs. Ukraine.

Posted on 14.Feb.2022 | Leave a comment

Strait Talk with host Aisha-Aura Sbadus @suberker in Istanbul. My co-panelist was Tom Marzec-Manser @tmarzecmanser Head of Gas Analytics at @ICISOfficial

We discussed scenarios for how the EU energy crisis might go in a new Russian war against Ukraine, and the significance of USA President Biden designating Qatar as a “major non-NATO ally.”

In particular, we discussed how much could Qatari LNG be made available and what its impact would be alongside the massive US LNG deliveries so far this year.

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Plan C: Gazprom’s failures on Nord Stream 2 | My talk, Ukrainian Energy Security Dialogue [English & Ukrainian]

Posted on 14.Dec.2022 | Leave a comment
ENGLISH – Dr. Tom O’Donnell spoke from Berlin (Українське відео розміщене нижче)
Українська мова: з Берліна говорив доктор Томас О’Доннел

Here is my talk [English & Ukrainian videos] for the Ukraine Energy Security Dialogue of 01.12.21, via Zoom, organized by Kyiv’s Dixie Group. Program & Speakers are below.

I outlined failures of the legal and political models Russia’s Gazprom has embraced to eventually bring the Nord Stream 2 pipeline into operation under the anti-monopoly provisions of the EU’s Third Energy Package law..

Critical observers have understandably interpreted the public optimism and “gas-Godfather”-like posturing of Kremlin and Gazprom officials as evidence of self-confidence, even arrogance. In contrast, here I outlined what actually amounts to a history of repeated failures of Nord Stream 2 AG strategies.

I termed its first two failed strategies as “Plan A” and “Plan B,” and the current one as “Plan C.”

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Posted in Ehergiewende, Energiewende, Energy and Geopolitics, EU gas, Euroepen Union, gas crisis, geopolitics, German Green Party, Germany, hydrogen, Naftogaz, Nord Stream 2, Renewables, Ukraine, Uncategorized

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I’m quoted-at-length: EXPLAINER: Europe lacks natural gas. Is it Russia’s fault? [Associated Press] Putin acts like the EU’s “Gas Godfather” during a shortage crisis.

Posted on 14.Nov.2022 | Leave a comment
AP – The Lakhta Centre tower under construction, the headquarters of Russian gas monopoly Gazprom, is silhouetted against the sunset in St. Petersburg, Russia, on April 15, 2018.

This AP article today quotes me (about half way in, marked in red) on Nord Stream 2, on Putin acting like the EU’s “gas godfather,” and on the implications for the EU gas crisis. It’s in numerous USA local papers. A nice job by AP’s  DAVID McHUGH (Frankfurt) and VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV (Moscow).

FRANKFURT, Germany — Europe is short of natural gas — dangerously short. A cold winter could mean a severe crunch, and utility bills are headed higher, burdening ordinary people and weighing on the economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has promised to help fill European gas storages as energy prices soar — but supply shortages and political tensions have continued to rattle energy markets, keeping prices high. That’s pinched businesses and forced them to pass along costs to customers already facing higher bills at home.

With Europe dependent on imported gas and Russia supplying 40% or more of those imports, Putin has leverage. He’s said the new pipeline already is filled with gas and could help increase supplies “the day after” it’s approved.

Here are important factors behind the gas crisis:

HOW DID EUROPE GET INTO THIS MESS?

Multiple reasons. One was a cold winter that drained gas reserves, which are used to generate electrical power and typically replenished in summer. That didn’t happen this year.

Hot weather drained more gas than usual through demand for air conditioning. Less wind meant less renewable electricity, leading generators to reach for gas fuel. Limited supplies of liquid natural gas, an expensive option that can be delivered by ship instead of pipeline, were snapped up by customers in Asia.

On top of that, Europe for years has pushed for day-to-day spot pricing, instead of long-term contracts. Russian-controlled gas giant Gazprom has fulfilled those long-term contracts but hasn’t pumped additional gas beyond that. Putin says customers who have those contracts pay much less for gas than other buyers.

Prices were seven times higher in October than they were at the beginning of the year and have eased to about four times higher lately.

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Kyiv Video: I moderated the EU-Ukraine debate: “Thinking Beyond Tomorrow–Energy Transition” – Ukraine Gas Investment Congress, 22.10.21

Posted on 14.Nov.2022 | 2 comments
Ukraine-EU Debate: Energy Transition – Beyond Tomorrow

I moderated this very lively & frank panel at the Ukraine Gas Investment Congress (UGIC) in Kyiv on 22 October 2021. [The high-level event participants are listed below].

I thoroughly enjoyed this lively debate, and learned a good deal. It’s an hour long; but I think it is well worth a watch, especially as the debate gets going.

PANEL PARTICIPANTS

* Torsten Wöllert, Minister Counsellor; Energy, EU Delegation to Ukraine

* Olga Bielkova , Director on Government & International Affairs Gas Transmission System Operator (GTSOU)

* Oleksiy Ryabchyn (Rye ab chen), Advisor to the Chairman of the Board, Naftogaz of Ukraine

* Sergiy Nahorniak, (Nach hor niak) MP and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Energy Efficiency Verkhovna (Ver kavna) Rada Committee on Energy and Housing and Communal Services

* Steve Freeman, Head of Energy Transition, Digital and Integration Schlumberger

* Dr. James Watson , Secretary General, Eurogas

* Moderator: Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin; and Energy and International Affairs Analyst

It was a respectful but clearly exasperating confrontation, a between contradictory imperatives pitting:


a) Ukraine’s necessity to boost its domestic natural gas production in the interests of its national security and independence, and the people’s social-economic needs,

against

b) The demands from Brussels and especially from highly developed Western-EU Member States insisting that Ukraine abandon all fossil fuels (including gas) ASAP,

Green-Deal-inspired insistence by Brussels for rapid gas-abandonment imposes the difficulty or outright banning of financing for increasing Ukraine’s domestic gas production. Many EU-zone financial institutions cannot any longer finance “upstream” projects (E&P: exploration and production), including the World Bank, whose representative pointed out earlier at the Congress that his institution is now outright banned from making such investments.

Nevertheless, no one on my panel, or throughout the Congress disagreed that, for the foreseeable future, investments in new upstream natural gas exploration and production are precisely what Ukraine urgently needs. The constant threats from Moscow, of Putin, his energy ministry and Gazprom to end transit of Russian gas to the EU via Ukraine would make the present “virtual reverse flow: method by which Ukraine obtains much of its natural gas, so vital for electricity generation but especially for citizens winter heating, will become impossible.

This is whey how to raise financing for domestic new gas E&P was precisely the urgent topic of this Congress organized by Naftogaz, the state natural gas company.

What is Ukraine to do? Is this fair?

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UPDATE: Gazprom begins “tepid” filling of EU gas storage. Transparency lacking from EU’s main supplier during crisis.

Posted on 14.Nov.2022 | Leave a comment
Este informe y mi entrevista están en español. Euronews 8.11.21

First: My Euronews 8 November interview is also in Hungarian  – Italian – Spanish (posted here) and English (yesterday’s post)

1. Factual Update:

The interview was on Monday with no evidence of Gazprom filling EU storage on the date promised. Today, Wednesday, Gazprom has begun filling at least two of five promised EU storage sites.

To the best of my knowledge, from various sources who follow the industry and/or politics of this closely:

  • Gazprom began using its recently unused Yamal pipeline, flowing 30mcm/day (million cubic meters per day) to the Mallnow, Germany pumping station. This Russia-Belarus-Poland-Germany. pipeline, has a total capacity of  85 mcm/day (31 bcm/year – billion cubic meters per year).
  • Gazprom also applied to use its previously booked-and-paid-for but also recently unused capacity across Ukraine under the December 2019 transit contract with Naftogaz of 40 bcm/year (109.3 mcm/day). Of this, :Velke Kapusany, Slovakia station is receiving 92mcm/day, with SE Poland and Moldova receiving 18 mcm/day.
  • Gazprom is flowing via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline (directly from Russia into Germany via the Baltic Sea) 165mcm/day.  This would be 60 bcm/year if continuous with no annual maintenance downtime, but its annual nameplate capacity is 55 bcm).
  • I recommended the article “Gazprom makes slow start on boosting gas supplies to Europe: Markets react tepidly as volumes remain too low to stave off supply fears,” by Max Seddon in Moscow, David Sheppard in London, and Roman Olearchyk in Kyiv  (paywall, perhaps a few articles free/month)
2. My Analytical Points:
  • This is well below the total flow Gazprom was routinely sending in recent years via Yamal (31 bcm) plus via Ukrainian pipes (89.6 bcm in 2019, and 55.8+ bcm in 2020)
  • Thus, these are not yet “surge” supplies; it is not yet a concerted effort to urgently replenish the EU’s worryingly low gas storage levels before winter gets colder and in the likely event winter winds will drop significantly as they did last year, requiring still-more gas, for electrical generation. (This combination ran the then-nearly full EU and Ukrainian storages to very low levels, which have still not been replenished sufficiently for this winter.).
  • Such drama and uncertainty from Europe’s main energy supplier when it needs reliability and transparency is heghly problematic (though, of course, Europe and especially Berlin have been amply warned about this high degree of dependence on Gazprom)..
  • Oh, and note that the USA is evidently quite concerned about the Russian troop buildup on Ukraine’s border. However, the EU seems at a complete loss, absolutely absent from joining with the Biden Administration in dissuading Mr. Putin from some new aggression. 
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