Category Archives: diesel

My Al Jazeera. Diesel deal: Trump’s chasing votes, but he’s also, again, offering Putin many other bribes to end the war. (see text below video).

[Correction: I misspoke. Russia formerly exported about 800,000, not 800 “million” barrels of diesel per day to Europe, before sanctions cut that off. I also added the NYT quote below before widely sending this post out.] As I post this, I am thinking this is not ONLY about US elections. Why? Trump et al have been claiming for a couple weeks that Russia wants to talk – though there is no public evidence. And Trump’s team are engaged in other, similar maneuvers:

  1. Offering Moscow to reopen the Nord Stream pipelines under ownership of a US firm. This is an old idea Trump et al had dropped by ca. April 2025, when it became obvious that enticing Putin with big deals and investments was not going to sway him to end his war in Ukraine. (This move has the German AfD excited, but they’re not significant players here.)
  2. Trump’s negotiators have also offered Moscow a that some western firm(s) could purchase Russia’s sanctioned Lukoil oil-and-gas infrastructure located mainly in Europe, which can no longer be used by Lukoil due to US sanctions,
  3. Plus, there is this unrealistic diesel deal, which Trump clearly hopes will make US voters think he is getting fuel prices down before November elections. I say “unrealistic” because, if Russia actually had significant extra diesel to sell, it would not have banned exports of diesel for many months while its refineries burn due to Ukrainian drone hits.
  4. And now (10Oct26 addition), there were earlier attempts, in September, also to bribe Putin to end the war. Here is the NY Times on what happened in NYC on the sidelines of the General Assembly opening:

“…, when the Trump administration opened the latest diplomatic track on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in late September, Ukrainian officials were startled by how far Mr. Kushner and Mr. Witkoff went in their offerings to Russia.
According to officials familiar with the discussions, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss confidential diplomatic talks, the Americans put three lucrative economic incentives on the table to coax Moscow into a limited cease-fire, either on energy infrastructure or at sea.

“Washington floated releasing billions of Russian sovereign assets immobilized in the West. The money, the officials said, was viewed as an upfront incentive for partial truces, not a reward for their enactment. This revived a proposal from last year to release funds to Russia. Then, the suggestion was to release up to $100 billion.

“The Americans also revisited a plan to sell off parts of the Russian oil giant Lukoil in a multibillion-dollar deal that would go to a group of Middle Eastern investors, including some with business ties to U.S. negotiators.

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My Al Jazeera: EU’s release of 100M bbl of diesel stocks will help to lower prices as Hormuz flow rises & to offset Russian & Chinese export stops

This is a brief live-on-air commentary just after the G7 announced that it would release 100M barrels of diesel fuel to supply markets that are tight due to the Hormuz crisis. This will go a long way to keep inflation in the US, Europe and Asian allies down, protecting consumers and economies.

While Hormuz is already, as I said, transiting as much CRUDE OIL as before the Iranian regime closed it – i.e., Tehran has lost control of the Straight to the US military, which is successfully escorting ships out even in daylight now.

Meanwhile, the amount of REFINED OIL products flowing out has not yet gotten up to pre-war levels, and so we see the present refined-fuel-market shortages and high prices.

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My Kyiv Kanal24: Ukraine’s drones hit Russian refineries hard. USA apparently blocks hits on oil ports. Why?

Dear colleagues and friends — there are two key energy aspects in this detailed interview with Nataliia Lutsenko of Channel 24, an all-news TV channel from Kyiv: (1) Ukraine’s attritional war on Russia’s domestic oil sector and (2) whether Ukrainian long-range drone capacities will be called upon (viz., permitted by the USA) to accomplish what the new US policy of ending Russian oil exports seeks to accomplish through secondary tariffs. Elaborating:

(1) Domestic Russian oil refining capacities: I explained that, If Ukraine can sustain these new drone attacks at a faster rate than Russia can repair them, this will be a major blow to the supply of diesel fuel required by the Russian war economy, especially to war industries, railways (i.e., to locomotive fuel), for harvesting of crops this fall, and to supply the war front and occupied Ukraine. The last time this was tried on a large scale, roughly two years ago, Ukraine caused significant hardships to Russian refining, but ultimately it did not achieve sustained damage at a rate necessary to collapse Russia’s immense national refining capacity. However, as I pointed out to Nataliia, Ukraine’s drone production and sophistication is now greater, and chances of success therefore better. We should know in some weeks or perhaps a few months if Ukraine can now overwhelm Russia’s repair capacities.

Already, fuel prices have spiked in Russia, with Moscow deciding to insure refiners receive a special subsidy they would otherwise not get due to high prices they are charging for fuel, to address difficulties with the renewed drone war. (Russian Refiners Hit Rough Patch, Hope for State Support, E.I., 20August25, [paywall].)

(2) Russian oil export capacities: Why does Ukraine’s war on the Russian oil sector not include destruction of Russia’s three westward facing oil ports, the terminals it uses to export the overwhelming bulk of its oil exports? These are Ust-Luga and Primorsk in the Baltic, and Novorossiya on the Black Sea. Why has the oil export capacities of these ports essentially never been hit?

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Why USA alarm? [PL/EN] Analityk: Ukraina pokazała, że może zakłócić eksport rosyjskiej ropy przez porty /Analyst: Ukraine has shown it could disrupt Russian ports exporting oil

Money.pl Getty …

In an Easter Sunday interview in 20+ Polish papers [POLISH & ENGLISH below], I said White House reasons for Ukraine not to hit Russian refineries don’t make sense. The “elephant in the room” alarming DC is that Ukraine can now disrupt Primorsk, UST-Luga and Novorossiskya oil ports, needed for 60% of Russian exports.

This would not only deny Moscow vital oil revenues needed to wage war, it would also spark a spectacular global oil market shock. I explain that the USA and allies can urgently prepare for this, while the Ukrainians are still maintaining strategic patience.

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My Newsweek: 1) Ukraine could hit Russian oil exports-but hasn’t. 2) Gen. Hodges is right–USA stand regrettable.

Credit: Kyiv Post 13mar24

“O’Donnell told Newsweek that that if Ukrainians really wanted to hit oil exports, they would go after Novorossiysk Fuel Oil Terminal in the [eastern] Black Sea and Primorsk Oil Terminal at the end of the Baltic Pipeline System.

“‘These are the two major exports sites for Russian oil and they are demonstrated to be within range of aerial drones and perhaps, in the case the Black Sea, their seaborne drones,’ he said. ‘If they really want to cut Russia’s oil income, they would go after those ports and they haven’t—that might be in deference to Americans concerns.’“ (Russia Faces Major Gas Headache After Ukraine Strikes, Newsweek, article by Brendan Cole, Mar 25, 2024.)

Last week, Newsweek (USA) twice cited my analysis of Ukrainian drone strikes. In one instance, I had the honor of following an interview with General Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army, Europe, with whom I concur in regretting the USA opposition.

(Aside: I hope to have an Op-Ed, perhaps tomorrow, in Europe, assessing that (i) the USA’s stated reasons versus Ukraine’s drone strikes to date do not make sense, and (ii) the “elephant in the room,” which must really have alarmed the White House, is that Ukraine’s strikes on refineries ipso facto demonstrate they COULD, if they so chose, disrupt anywhere up to 60% of Russian oil exports. Lastly,(iii) if the USA, EU and allies do not rapidly prepare non-Russian oil-sector producers for this eventuality, a global oil price shock could result.)

Here are the links to last week’s two new interviews/citations by Newsweek:

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My DW, VoA & Newsweek interviews: “Ukrainian drones cripple Russian refineries.” Thoughts on strategy, impacts and history

Interview 1/3: Kate Lycock of DW Radio’s Inside Europe interviewed me yesterday, on the historical role of fuel-denial in war, and the impacts of Ukraine’s drone strategy on Russia (first story, on 21 March)

Aside from some WW2 history, I identified two separate impacts we can see in the present Ukrainian campaign: a) The impact on Russian fuel deliveries to the war zones themselves and to the domestic Russian war economy, and b) their possible impact as a “force multiplier” for the oil-price cap sanctions on Russian oil exports, designed to deny Moscow its all-important oil revenues that are financing its aggression. I also speculated a bit as to how these strikes, together with Black Sea sea-drone operations, might be shaping coming Ukrainian offensive(s). (This show is also syndicated in the USA as I recall.)

2/3: on 20 March, I was also interviewed on the drone strikes by Voice of America’s Harry Ridgwell, while I was at the Berlin Energy Transition Dialogue, held at the German Federal Foreign Office. (See Video in LHS column.)

3/3: Lastly, I was quoted a couple times by Brendan Cole of the USA national magazine, Newsweek, on 18 March:

Read more: My DW, VoA & Newsweek interviews: “Ukrainian drones cripple Russian refineries.” Thoughts on strategy, impacts and history

Russia Faces ‘Serious’ Threat as Ukraine Attacks Refineries

Mar 18, 2024. By Brendan Cole, Senior News Reporter. You can read it HERE.

Note, there are new developments since yesterday, including Russia’s revenge strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure (reports are that 1 million Ukrainians have no electricity today) and on its Special Operations Headquarters. However, of the 30 Russian drones that swarmed to target this Kyiv building, every one was shot down.

Also, there are reports (Financial Times) that the USA is warning Ukraine that the strikes will draw retaliation and raise the price of oil.

Who cares! This has gone on for simply too long. There are vastly sufficient oil reserves in the world that can be tapped to fully replace Russian oil even if it were totally taken offline. After over two years of war, Washington and the EU Members should have by now begun a concerted effort to get sufficient new oil on line to enable blocking a high percentage of Russian exports from being exported to the world market

I talk about one possible approach to this in my DW interview, involving Denmark and Sweden inspecting and banning passage of sketchy Russian tankers through their economic zones in the Baltic Sea.

After two-plus years of war, there is no excuse to still be playing around with the oil price cap without either significantly lowing it — say, to $30/barrel as the Ukrainians suggest, in any case begin stepwise lowering it below the present $60, which would be a signal to producers to start developing new fields — and/or finding ways to block shipments more directly.

This is not to diminish the clever and difficult work people at especially OFAC and the USA Justice Department in Washington and their colleagues in London and Brussels have carried out to tighten and make more effective the oil price cap. However, as it stands, the cap is too high and a weak instrument.

The entire political preoccupation with keeping Russian oil on the market is fundamentally flawed, Signals must be given to the market that it will be step-wise taken off the market, which will instill/stimulate IOCs, NOCs and smaller firms to rapidly bring undeveloped oil reserves online to permanently replace Russian exports.

LAST: Here are some references for further reading that I found useful in my research.