Category Archives: drones

My LRT: Ukraine chokes Russian petrostate, as US presses Russia-Iran-Venezuela energy “shaping operations.” [EN, LT]

Two key themes here: Ukraine’s advances against Russia’s domestic oil infrastructure, and the Trump Administration’s global energy offensive, as shaping operations for a future conflict with China – or with the China-Russia-Iran axis.
(Watch in Lithuanian) I told Aleksandra Ketlerienė, at Lithuanian national TV, that Ukraine is perhaps half way along in its kinetic capacities to forcing a collapse of a large part of domestic Russian refining capacities. (Interview in Lithuanian 14jul26).

I stressed that Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia must be taken as one side of a two-sided offensive vs. the Russian petrostate, with the other side being Washington’s targeting, logistics and other assistance to Ukraine’s air campaign, its harsh sanctions vs Rosneft and Lukoil, plus the announcement of a deal with Trump to impose the late-Senator Lindsey Graham (Rep., S. C.) and Sen. Richard Blumenthal’s (Dem. Conn.) self-described “draconian” secondary Russian sanctions, backed by about 93% of US senators, plus the US offensives vs. Iran and Venezuela focused on the oil-and-energy sector, and its continued work to pull India away from Russian oil — not as separate or chaotic events, but as part of a conscious, global energy offensive by the USA jointly with Ukraine and other allies, one which should be assessed as such, and not merely as individual, disjoint, haphazard “crises”. (On Ukrainian strategy, I cited its energy and intelligence expert, Mykhailo Gonchar, “From burning refineries to maritime blockade: a new strategy of pressure on Russia.” a valued colleague. 01jul26)

My assessment, since early 2026, has been that these should be understood as energy-sector “shaping operations.”
That is, these are energy conflicts-of-choice aimed at optimizing the strategic post”ure of the USA and its allies to: destroy the petrostate basis of Russian power (see my EIES analytic paper, “Liquidating the Russian Petrostate, jan26), to secure allied access to Venezuelan (and Western Hemisphere-in-general) oil flows, and to Persian Gulf (Hormuz) oil flows in preparation for a kinetic conflict of whatever magnitude with China in the Indo-Pacific region. I should add that these energy “shaping operations” are intrinsic to the larger Trump administration strategy of “USA Energy Dominance” strategy, which I have discussed at GlobalBarrel.com.

NOTE – I believe it is important not to allow various sharp difficulties, setbacks or even failures that surely will occur on any of these fronts – vs. Russia, Iran and Hormuz, in Venezuela, with India, or directly with China – on the energy, and especially the oil front, to cause a loss of perspective that there is a global energy offensive or even a global energy war taking place, as a central part o the USA and de facto as part of the entire allied preparations (viz., as “shaping operations”) for a looming kinetic conflict with China and its allies – or, perhaps, is sufficiently successful, to dissuade China from aggression.

Also, recognizing the connected strategy is one thing, analyzing and critiquing the individual parts and overall rationale is another.
For more, go to my blog at https://GlobalBarrel.com

Dr. Tom O’Donnell (for a keynote, consult or commissioned analysis for your organization, write twod(at)umich.edu )

The US & Ukraine pound Russian oil | my Kanal24, Kyiv

On 5 November, I told Kanal24, Kyiv that a US-Ukraine campaign to disable the Russian petrostate’s oil sector is underway. I stressed that this is a multi-spectral campaign combining (i) severe USA sanctions and secondary tariffs on Russian oil exports in parallel with (ii) Ukrainian military action on oil refineries and export-terminal ports. These attacks are known to be conducted and planned in close cooperation with USA military intelligence (FT,12 Oct.).

This means that an assessment of either aspect of this campaign on its own is inadequate. The synergy of sanctions plus military hits is the issue.

Secondary Sanctions. It has been widely recognized that the USA would need to, as promised, vigorously impose secondary tariffs on any entities that violated its recent tariff announcement. Indeed, on Sunday, President Trump lent support to a bill being drafted in Congress to hit any entity “doing business with Russia.”, not only buying its oil (i.e., “Trump says Republicans drafting bill to sanction countries that trade with Russia, Reuters. November 17). This sounds similar to the Senators Lindsey Graham (R, SC) and Richard Blumenthal’s (D Conn) so-called “bone-crushing sanctions” bill (Politico, 7 June) endorsed by 83 senators on 3 June.

The apparent aim of the port drone and missile attacks is to slash oil exports from Russia’s three or four biggest westward facing terminals. The focus thus far is on Black Sea terminals:

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My Kyiv Kanal24: Ukraine’s drones hit Russian refineries hard. USA apparently blocks hits on oil ports. Why?

Dear colleagues and friends — there are two key energy aspects in this detailed interview with Nataliia Lutsenko of Channel 24, an all-news TV channel from Kyiv: (1) Ukraine’s attritional war on Russia’s domestic oil sector and (2) whether Ukrainian long-range drone capacities will be called upon (viz., permitted by the USA) to accomplish what the new US policy of ending Russian oil exports seeks to accomplish through secondary tariffs. Elaborating:

(1) Domestic Russian oil refining capacities: I explained that, If Ukraine can sustain these new drone attacks at a faster rate than Russia can repair them, this will be a major blow to the supply of diesel fuel required by the Russian war economy, especially to war industries, railways (i.e., to locomotive fuel), for harvesting of crops this fall, and to supply the war front and occupied Ukraine. The last time this was tried on a large scale, roughly two years ago, Ukraine caused significant hardships to Russian refining, but ultimately it did not achieve sustained damage at a rate necessary to collapse Russia’s immense national refining capacity. However, as I pointed out to Nataliia, Ukraine’s drone production and sophistication is now greater, and chances of success therefore better. We should know in some weeks or perhaps a few months if Ukraine can now overwhelm Russia’s repair capacities.

Already, fuel prices have spiked in Russia, with Moscow deciding to insure refiners receive a special subsidy they would otherwise not get due to high prices they are charging for fuel, to address difficulties with the renewed drone war. (Russian Refiners Hit Rough Patch, Hope for State Support, E.I., 20August25, [paywall].)

(2) Russian oil export capacities: Why does Ukraine’s war on the Russian oil sector not include destruction of Russia’s three westward facing oil ports, the terminals it uses to export the overwhelming bulk of its oil exports? These are Ust-Luga and Primorsk in the Baltic, and Novorossiya on the Black Sea. Why has the oil export capacities of these ports essentially never been hit?

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Why USA alarm? [PL/EN] Analityk: Ukraina pokazała, że może zakłócić eksport rosyjskiej ropy przez porty /Analyst: Ukraine has shown it could disrupt Russian ports exporting oil

Money.pl Getty …

In an Easter Sunday interview in 20+ Polish papers [POLISH & ENGLISH below], I said White House reasons for Ukraine not to hit Russian refineries don’t make sense. The “elephant in the room” alarming DC is that Ukraine can now disrupt Primorsk, UST-Luga and Novorossiskya oil ports, needed for 60% of Russian exports.

This would not only deny Moscow vital oil revenues needed to wage war, it would also spark a spectacular global oil market shock. I explain that the USA and allies can urgently prepare for this, while the Ukrainians are still maintaining strategic patience.

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My Newsweek: 1) Ukraine could hit Russian oil exports-but hasn’t. 2) Gen. Hodges is right–USA stand regrettable.

Credit: Kyiv Post 13mar24

“O’Donnell told Newsweek that that if Ukrainians really wanted to hit oil exports, they would go after Novorossiysk Fuel Oil Terminal in the [eastern] Black Sea and Primorsk Oil Terminal at the end of the Baltic Pipeline System.

“‘These are the two major exports sites for Russian oil and they are demonstrated to be within range of aerial drones and perhaps, in the case the Black Sea, their seaborne drones,’ he said. ‘If they really want to cut Russia’s oil income, they would go after those ports and they haven’t—that might be in deference to Americans concerns.’ (Russia Faces Major Gas Headache After Ukraine Strikes, Newsweek, article by Brendan Cole, Mar 25, 2024.)

Last week, Newsweek (USA) twice cited my analysis of Ukrainian drone strikes. In one instance, I had the honor of following an interview with General Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army, Europe, with whom I concur in regretting the USA opposition.

(Aside: I hope to have an Op-Ed, perhaps tomorrow, in Europe, assessing that (i) the USA’s stated reasons versus Ukraine’s drone strikes to date do not make sense, and (ii) the “elephant in the room,” which must really have alarmed the White House, is that Ukraine’s strikes on refineries ipso facto demonstrate they COULD, if they so chose, disrupt anywhere up to 60% of Russian oil exports. Lastly,(iii) if the USA, EU and allies do not rapidly prepare non-Russian oil-sector producers for this eventuality, a global oil price shock could result.)

Here are the links to last week’s two new interviews/citations by Newsweek:

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My DW, VoA & Newsweek interviews: “Ukrainian drones cripple Russian refineries.” Thoughts on strategy, impacts and history

Interview 1/3: Kate Lycock of DW Radio’s Inside Europe interviewed me yesterday, on the historical role of fuel-denial in war, and the impacts of Ukraine’s drone strategy on Russia (first story, on 21 March)

Aside from some WW2 history, I identified two separate impacts we can see in the present Ukrainian campaign: a) The impact on Russian fuel deliveries to the war zones themselves and to the domestic Russian war economy, and b) their possible impact as a “force multiplier” for the oil-price cap sanctions on Russian oil exports, designed to deny Moscow its all-important oil revenues that are financing its aggression. I also speculated a bit as to how these strikes, together with Black Sea sea-drone operations, might be shaping coming Ukrainian offensive(s). (This show is also syndicated in the USA as I recall.)

2/3: on 20 March, I was also interviewed on the drone strikes by Voice of America’s Harry Ridgwell, while I was at the Berlin Energy Transition Dialogue, held at the German Federal Foreign Office. (See Video in LHS column.)

3/3: Lastly, I was quoted a couple times by Brendan Cole of the USA national magazine, Newsweek, on 18 March:

Read more: My DW, VoA & Newsweek interviews: “Ukrainian drones cripple Russian refineries.” Thoughts on strategy, impacts and history

Russia Faces ‘Serious’ Threat as Ukraine Attacks Refineries

Mar 18, 2024. By Brendan Cole, Senior News Reporter. You can read it HERE.

Note, there are new developments since yesterday, including Russia’s revenge strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure (reports are that 1 million Ukrainians have no electricity today) and on its Special Operations Headquarters. However, of the 30 Russian drones that swarmed to target this Kyiv building, every one was shot down.

Also, there are reports (Financial Times) that the USA is warning Ukraine that the strikes will draw retaliation and raise the price of oil.

Who cares! This has gone on for simply too long. There are vastly sufficient oil reserves in the world that can be tapped to fully replace Russian oil even if it were totally taken offline. After over two years of war, Washington and the EU Members should have by now begun a concerted effort to get sufficient new oil on line to enable blocking a high percentage of Russian exports from being exported to the world market

I talk about one possible approach to this in my DW interview, involving Denmark and Sweden inspecting and banning passage of sketchy Russian tankers through their economic zones in the Baltic Sea.

After two-plus years of war, there is no excuse to still be playing around with the oil price cap without either significantly lowing it — say, to $30/barrel as the Ukrainians suggest, in any case begin stepwise lowering it below the present $60, which would be a signal to producers to start developing new fields — and/or finding ways to block shipments more directly.

This is not to diminish the clever and difficult work people at especially OFAC and the USA Justice Department in Washington and their colleagues in London and Brussels have carried out to tighten and make more effective the oil price cap. However, as it stands, the cap is too high and a weak instrument.

The entire political preoccupation with keeping Russian oil on the market is fundamentally flawed, Signals must be given to the market that it will be step-wise taken off the market, which will instill/stimulate IOCs, NOCs and smaller firms to rapidly bring undeveloped oil reserves online to permanently replace Russian exports.

LAST: Here are some references for further reading that I found useful in my research.