How to understand Trump? Below is one of the interviews I gave the Polish press a while back on European attempts at peace talks with Russia. It also examines renewed interest of some German political parties to repair North Stream and bring Russian gas back to Germany.

However, they should understand that, for Washington, this would only happen if Putin agrees to a peace deal. Reopening Nord Stream is but one of many enticements Trump is again offering Putin, along with his diesel deal, he’s also offered a return of Russian frozen assets, “trillions” in USA investments into the Russian economy, and many other “carrots” to entice Putin to make a deal ending Russia’s Ukraine war.

This sudden return to the enticements Trump offered Putin during his first three-or-four months in office, is seen by many observers as simply “treason”, a fawning after Putin. However, the press and most every commentator are missing the other side, the “big stick” Trump is also carrying as he makes these offers.

I am, of course, drawing an analogy to President Theodore Roosevelt’s adage, for dealing with foreign adversaries, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Well, Trump is not so adept at speaking “softly” but his elaborate economic and other enticements are essentially “speaking softly” to Putin. What I am saying is that these seemingly obsequious offers are only half the story. Often, in diplomacy, as any negotiation, there are important levers one or the other side can wield, whose obvious presence, as a sort of “sword of Damocles” hovering over the proceedings goes unspoken, at least publicly. These are things any objective analysis needs to bring to light. In this case, there are, objectively, two aspects, not one, to the Trump-administrations present approach to Russia:

• The “carrots”, which everyone hears about, consisting of big economic and energy-sector offers to the Russian Federation, some gratuitous mean-mouthing of Ukraine’s President Zelensky that Trump hopes might win Putin’s trust, plus, I expect, some difficult concessions he will push Ukraine to accept regarding Donbas and other occupied territories, and
• The “big stick”, which is barely mentioned, or simply dismissed, are the recently enacted Lindsey-Graham “draconian” sanctions-and-tariffs which, had Trump not issued a discretionary presidential waver, would otherwise now be in force, acting in tandem with the ever-intensifying Ukrainian air campaign against Russian refineries. As I have often explained, the consequences of these sanctions, if imposed as designed, would indeed be as both the late-Senator Graham and his partner, Democratic Party Sen. Richard Blumenthal, as well as many other senators, had repeatedly said they intended: to permanently shut down virtually all Russian petroleum exports, the lifeblood of the Russian state’s economy, literally ending the petrostate economic basis of the Russian Federation.

In my view, Trump has no problem whatsoever with the fact he is being seen as a “traitor” to the Ukrainian, NATO and western-allies’ fight to push back Russian imperial aggression in Ukraine and against its “hybrid” activities (sabotage, drones, assassinations, etc.) vs. Europe. In fact, such accusations serve the purposes of lending plausibility, in the eyes of the Russians, that Trump would actually go through with his present charm-campaign offers to Putin, should Moscow end the war.

This was what was also said of Trump’s essentially identical charm campaign of economic and even territorial enticements for Putin to end the war, which he executed for over several months upon first taking office again in late-January 2025. However, in that case, as was widely predicted, Putin continually refused Trump’s economic and territorial enticements for ending the war. Indeed, he continually “tapped (Trump) along,” as Trump himself eventually said. In that case, Trump then turned to a “Plan B,” which his Cabinet had considered as early as January in case Trump’s “Plan A” failed. Plan B consisted of inflicting pain (“Pain, I can do pain,” as Trump then said.) One side was new military aid to Ukraine (paid for this time by Europe) and the other side was backing a concerted US-G7-NATO-EU sanctions campaign against Russian oil exports (i.e., de facto dropping the failed “oil price cap” strategy) and assisting Ukraine in developing a new air campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, including refineries. (see my detailed assessment of this turn, for EIES, late-January 2026.)

In my assessment, if and when Putin rejects the present basket of “carrots” and insists on continuing the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, Trump will be constrained to, and likely plans to, return to a policy of increased “pain”. With appropriate manifestations of anger against Moscow for rebuffing his generous offers, he would recind his waiver of the Graham sanctions and tariffs. At that point, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) would begin implementing these penalties and secondary sanctions, imposing severe pressure on the top five importers of Russian oil to be able to any longer do so.

In my view, this is a cycle Trump follows. It is his way of conducting diplomacy, mixed with “a big stick” and then “pain”, to end the war in a way he prefers. His preferred way is to end it with the Russian Federation once again economically reconnected to Europe and also the USA, with the intention of thereby pulling it away from China. This is his “reverse Nixon” strategy, one he has persisted in pursuing since the start of his first term. Here, for the present, I am not examining the feasibility or importance of any such “reverse Nixon” strategy, rather I am striving to understand dispassionately what Trump et al, what USA geostrategy, is up to, which is undoubtedly something important to understand accurately.

However, it would seem that, if Trump’s preferred manner to end the Ukraine war is with a “reverse Nixon” pulling-away of Russia from China, then he might very well feel that pressing Ukraine to accept some very unpalatable concessions is a necessary and/or acceptable trade off in the greater interest of splitting Russia from China, given that China is clearly seen, by both political parties in Washington as the USA’s and its allies’ chief, peer competitor and security threat.

Of course, the Russia-Ukraine war has now gone on another 15 or more months since the last time Trump “carrots” policy turned to sticks, and the Russian Federation’s capacities and resilience have been greatly eroded by Ukrainian forces – with USA and EU assistance – and it is of course possible that Putin might, for the first time, engage in some real exploration of an end to the war. However, to date, I have seen no public evidence he is ready to in fact begin on this path, one which, of course, eventually he – or some successor – will inevitably have to take. Indeed, Ukraine has, to all appearances, already grappled with the notion that it will have to accept a peace, or at least a long-term ceasefire, under which it will have to accept that presently occupied territories of Ukraine will remain under Russian control.

Before bringing readers to my Polish-press interviews, below (they are a few weeks old, but still, in my view, relevant), a comment on developments in German national politics in the face of the present Trump administration machinations vis-a-vis Russia:

The AfD and various other German parties’ misconceptions of US Nord Stream policy

The AfD’s (Alternative for Deutschland, the farthest-right, insurgent German party) leader, Ms. Alice Weidel, has made repeated demands that Germany should again “take” Russian gas (actually, Russia cut it off, not Germany, but let us not dwell on details) even without any Russian concessions, seems unaware of what Trump’s strategy when he once again raises this possibility (e.g. see Ms. Weidel’s interview with the Economist).

It seems significant portions of other German parties – the SPD, Die Linke, BSD, and even a smallish faction of Merz’ ruling CDU, miss this too, seeing only a necessity to stand for “Germany first” and to consider only “German national interests” and not Ukraine’s war difficulties, as Weidel put it.

My comments, in speaking with these circles in Belin and elsewhere has been, that “Alice has been sounding rather ‘Angela-like’ of late” on Russian gas as a panacea solution to Germany’s Energiewende push for 100% “green” energy. This national policy is indeed certainly not going well, especially since the last government’s green hubris led them to shut down and start destroying the last of the 17 German nuclear plants during, incredibly, an “energy war” over natural gas imposed by Russian on Europe in support of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian shut off of gas supplies to Europe, almost 45% of Europe’s then-total imports, caused an epic energy crisis throughout 2021-22, and its effects still continue.

It is no secret that the German Energiewende, adopted fully in 2011, commenced with little consideration of what engineering and economic realities might constrain success of this Green Party-originated “ambition”. Germany certainly does need gas now, and no doubt Russian gas might lower prices. However, any gas Germany eventually takes, perhaps after some future peace with deal with Russia, along with any more windmills or solar farms it continues to install, must all be treated merely as a bridge to a Messmer-like (i.e., French=like) full buildout of a new nuclear-based energy system.

Will Trump’s present “carrots” for the Russian Federation bring a peace deal?

It is clear that Russia is very unlikely to win its war in Ukraine. Ukraine is holding the line vs. Russia. Logic would demand a peace deal, or at least a cease fire in place. President Zelensky told President Trump, months ago, that he’d accept this, on condition there was some guarantee of the cease fire. In fact, Trump coaxed the Europeans into forming a “coalition of the willing” to do just that when a deal is reached. However, Putin has not agreed to anything. He insists on fighting on, and I doubt that he will accept Trump’s current elaborate economic enticements for a peace deal, though it is certainly now more likely than it was in early 2025, the last time Trump tried this. If and when Putin finally rejects these new overtures, Trump will have no choice but to unsheathe the “big stick” of the Graham sanctions, and proceed to crush the Russian petrostate for the foreseeable future. Perhaps only then will Putin, or a successor, finally agree to a peace deal.

Expert: Germany hopes to return to business with Russia. This would be “salvation” for their economy

Faulty geopolitical and energy decisions are leading the German economy to ruin. Some of the German elites would like to quickly return to “business as usual” with Russia, says Thomas O’Donnell, an American expert on energy and geopolitics, in an interview with Newsmax Polska.

Author:Artur Ciechanowicz, Newsmax Poland, 17/08/2026

According to Bloomberg, in July, former officials from the UK, France, and Germany met with Russian envoys in Vienna. The purpose was to discuss the terms of negotiations aimed at ending the Russia-Ukraine war. We asked our source what Germany’s interest in such meetings was.

“Germany is not doing well in economic competition with the United States and China. For some German businesses, the old strategy of treating Russia as a geopolitical safety valve – and an easier market that would not require competing on equal terms with two world powers – may remain attractive, ” explains O’Donnell.

“This view is not unique to SPD circles. A similar approach may also be present among conservative economic elites,” he adds.

At the same time, according to the expert, the actions of the E3 countries – Great Britain, France and Germany – aimed at resuming negotiations show that some European leaders are counting on a diplomatic “bypass” of Donald Trump.

“Europeans seem both confused and concerned about his policies, which is why they are trying to maintain their own, independent channels of communication,” says Thomas O’Donnell.

“Meanwhile, the United States is pursuing a decisive plan to reduce the importance of the Russian oil sector. The Trump administration is seeking to reshape the global energy market, and one element of this strategy is the sale of assets of the Venezuelan oil company PDVSA to a large Indian oil company. In practice, this would mean India taking over a significant portion of the assets,” the analyst says.

“Such an arrangement would limit the possibility of China increasing its influence in a region with some of the world’s largest oil reserves, while at the same time providing India with access to non-Russian energy sources. This, in turn, could make it easier for New Delhi to limit its imports of Russian oil, ” he explains.

Another element of this strategy is sanctions against the Russian energy sector. In early August, the US Senate passed a bill providing for sanctions and high tariffs against countries purchasing Russian energy. Donald Trump agreed to sign it. The legislation allows for the imposition of tariffs of up to 100% on goods from countries importing Russian raw materials, O’Donnell reminds.

According to the expert, if this plan is consistently implemented, Washington will not only reduce Russia’s income from energy exports , but will also change the balance of power in the global raw materials market.

Ekspert: Niemcy liczą na powrót do biznesu z Rosją. To byłoby „zbawienie” dla ich gospodarki

Wadliwe decyzje geopolityczne i w dziedzinie energetyki prowadzą niemiecką gospodarkę do ruiny. Część tamtejszych elit chciałaby szybkiego powrotu do “business as usual” z Rosją – mówi w rozmowie z Newsmax Polska Thomas O’Donnell, amerykański ekspert ds. energii i geopolityki.

Autor:Artur Ciechanowicz, Newsmax Poland, 17/08/2026

Według Bloomberga w lipcu byli urzędnicy z Wielkiej Brytanii, Francji, i Niemiec spotkali się z wysłannikami Rosji w Wiedniu. Celem było omówienie warunków negocjacji mających doprowadzić do zakończenia wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej. Zapytaliśmy naszego rozmówcę jaki interes w takich spotkaniach mają Niemcy.

“Niemcy nie najlepiej sobie radzą w rywalizacji gospodarczej ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi i Chinami. Dla części niemieckiego biznesu atrakcyjna może więc pozostać dawna strategia traktowania Rosji jako geopolitycznego wentyla bezpieczeństwa – a także łatwiejszego rynku, który nie wymagałby konkurowania na równych zasadach z dwiema światowymi potęgami” – tłumaczy O’Donnell.

“Nie jest to wyłącznie pogląd charakterystyczny dla środowisk związanych z SPD. Podobne podejście może być obecne również wśród konserwatywnych elit gospodarczych” – dodaje.

Jednocześnie, zdaniem eksperta, działania państw E3 – Wielkiej Brytanii, Francji i Niemiec – zmierzające do wznowienia negocjacji pokazują, że część europejskich przywódców liczy na dyplomatyczne “obejście” Donalda Trumpa.

“Europejczycy wydają się jednocześnie zdezorientowani i zaniepokojeni jego polityką, dlatego próbują utrzymać własne, niezależne kanały komunikacji” – ocenia Thomas O’Donnell.

“Tymczasem Stany Zjednoczone realizują zdecydowany plan ograniczenia znaczenia rosyjskiego sektora naftowego. Administracja Trumpa dąży do przebudowy globalnego rynku energii, a jednym z elementów tej strategii jest sprzedaż aktywów wenezuelskiego koncernu naftowego PDVSA dużej indyjskiej firmie naftowej. W praktyce oznaczałoby to przejęcie znacznej części aktywów przez Indie” – mówi analityk.

“Taki układ ograniczałby możliwość zwiększenia wpływów Chin w regionie posiadającym jedne z największych złóż ropy na świecie, a jednocześnie zapewniałby Indiom dostęp do nierosyjskich źródeł energii. To z kolei mogłoby ułatwić New Delhi ograniczenie importu rosyjskiej ropy” – tłumaczy.

Kolejnym elementem tej strategii są sankcje wobec rosyjskiego sektora energetycznego. Na początku sierpnia amerykański Senat przyjął ustawę przewidującą sankcje i wysokie cła wobec państw kupujących rosyjską energię. Donald Trump zgodził się ją podpisać. Przepisy zakładają możliwość nałożenia ceł sięgających nawet 100 proc. na towary z państw importujących rosyjskie surowce – przypomina O’Donnell.

Zdaniem eksperta, jeśli ten plan zostanie konsekwentnie zrealizowany, Waszyngton doprowadzi nie tylko do ograniczenia dochodów Rosji z eksportu energii, lecz także zmieni układ sił na światowym rynku surowców.