Category Archives: Energy crisis

Part 2: “Does EU Climate Policy Need Evolution or Revolution? What Should We Change in the Green Deal?” My critical remarks at “Energy Security in CEE Conference,” Warsaw

This is a continuation of my remarks in Warsaw, on 18 November. Part 1, which posted on 19 December, reviewed failures to develop critical tech elements required by the EU Green Deal, a program modeled on the German Energiewende. I argued that, after decades of R&D efforts, these technology failures indicate the systemic failure of heavily renewable models, pointing to a need for “radical reform” of the Green Deal. I advocated for the historically proven Messmer model, which succeeded, some 40 years ago, in decarbonizing French electrical generation using nuclear power, without any need for new grids or long-term grid-scale storage tech.

Below, Part 2 (edited for clarity) focuses on the political intransigence of the new Von der Leyen commission, which is doubling down on the Green Deal’s renewable model. I argue this is not “reindustrializing” Europe or making it “more competitive” as claimed, but rather driving it into deindustrialization. This mirrors the process underway in Germany via its continuing push for new “green tech,” on the theory this should spark a broad new European industrial competitiveness. From an historical perspective, this is theoretical and practical nonsense – or so I argue. Critiques are welcomed. (PS, Happy holidays!)

Leon (moderator): So, I’m going to turn to Thomas again. You argued that that some form of radical overhaul is necessary, you know, with regards to the EU Green Deal, if I understand it correctly, and you’ve cited one of the issues is the complexity of the fact that there are certain technologies that haven’t emerged over the last 30 years that have just been growing incrementally rather than rapidly to meet our needs. But at the same time there’s seems to be some sort of political rationale for why this sort of revolutionary approach. How would you respond to that?

Tom: Yes, politically, I do think the new Commission presents a big problem for European competitiveness, for energy policy and security.

The new commission is anti-energy-policy reform

Firstly this is because Ms. Teresa Ribera, from Spain, is President Von der Leyen’s new chief executive vice-president.  She is in charge of attaining both the Green Deal and has also been given responsibility for “industrialization of Europe,” for making it competitive again.

The problem is, Ms. Ribera is a true believer in all-renewable energy systems, I would say a career-long renewable fundamentalist.

For example, she’s said to be so good at negotiating that she managed to get the Spanish nuclear industry and civil society to agree on a timetable to close all the Spanish nuclear power plants, and she’s very proud of this. This is politically and ideologically identical to what Mr. Robert Habeck, the German Green Party leader, who is energy and economics minister, carried out with the approval of Chancellor Scholz of the SPD-party. Habeck closed Germany’s last three nuclear power plants during a wartime, Russian-instigated, European energy crisis.

The fact that Von der Leyen fought hard to appoint Ribera and then put her in charge of the Green Deal and of European industrialization, and made her the most powerful commissioner, the executive vice president of the commission, shows that Von der Leyen, a member of the German conservatives, the CDU, has no interest in reform of the renewables model despite its suffering technological failures on several key aspects.

The problem is not that Europe has not had an industrial policy. Europe has had an industrial policy, one that has failed

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My PAP, Poland: “Expert: EC recommendation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 90% by 2040 is fantasy” / “Ekspert: zalecenie KE redukcji emisji gazów cieplarnianych o 90% do 2040 roku to fantastyka”

I’ve been thinking about what to say on Monday in Warsaw: at the “Energy Security in Central & Eastern Europe” conference. As soon as I saw the title of my panel: “Does EU Climate Policy Need Evolution or Revolution? What Should We Change in the European Green Deal?” I accepted! This question goes beyond politics – left, right or center – it is a pressing matter for European energy security

Then, I recalled my syndicated interview with Polish AP’s Arthur Ciechanowicz (Brussels) this February. It’s exactly what I should say in Warsaw (see below: LHS in EN, RHS in PL), especially given President Von der Leyen’s choices of long-time anti-nuclear politicians to be her top commissioners for climate and (re)industrialization (Teresa Ribera), and for energy (Dan Jørgensen). (**Details in footnotes). See what you think.

* Footnotes: References on new EU Commissioners’ anti-nuclear attitudes:

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NAPEC ’24, Oran: Why does the EU insist Algeria develop hydrogen & a big pipeline despite Equinor & Shell refusals due to “no customers”?

I explain EU/German motives for seeking “green H2” import pipes, then (at time 11:30) questions I raised moderating at NAPEC re. EU-Algerian pipeline MOU.

Here’s my video from Oran, Algeria, after a very informative “Africa and Mediterranean Energy & Hydrogen Exhibition & Conference,” NAPEC 2024 (video highlights here). Two parts to my analysis:

First, (up to time 11:30) I explain the rationale and impetus for the EU drive for massive green hydrogen gas imports. This is primarily driven by Germany’s increasing desperation at being locked into over-reliance on weather-variable renewables, whose high prices are sparking its “deindustrialization,” especially after losing Russian gas pipeline imports due to Putin’s war on Ukraine, plus due to the own-goal shutting down of their zero-carbon, amortized (paid for) nuclear plants during the European energy crisis. (Note: I misspoke: “Grey” hydrogen would NOT have the CO2 stored, “Blue” would. Both are derived from natural gas.)

I also explain how this massive green hydrogen “fix” to “renewables fundamentalist” policy is a techno-panacea that simply cannot work. Then ..

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My Al Watan(Cairo): Iran would seek global energy crisis if an Israeli/USA strike threatened regime survival | IEA warns on EU winter gas

ENGLISH Interview | Al Watan, Cairo.  Thurs 10Oct24. 15 minutes
ARABIC Interview

At first, we focused on IEA warnings of a possible EU winder gas shortage due to supply-and-demand mismatches. I agree and expand on the IEA points.

Second, I explained that if Israel retaliates against Iran so strongly that it threatens the regimes survival, or is seen as intending to provoke regime change, then the Iranian leadership will have “nothing to lose” by in-turn escalating to the maximum. Aside from unleashing the maximum response of its proxies surrounding Israel, Tehran’s most potent weapon would be to spark a global oil and gas crisis.

Consider oil: Iran can either shut down the Straights of Hormuz (or simply make them unsafe for tankers) and/or, it can use missiles and drones to destroy significant parts of Saudi, UAE and other Gulf oil facilities, including perhaps even Azerbaijan’s as some Iranian propagandists have threatened.

Consider natural gas: Shutting the Straights or directly hitting Qatar’s massive LNG exports infrastructure would immediately stop Qatari LNG exports. As the world’s second largest LNG exporter, this would immediately cause a separate global natural gas crisis.

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My Newsweek interview (USA): India won’t buy Russia’s USA-sanctioned ‘Arctic LNG2.’ A big blow to Putin.

Below, I am quoted repeatedly (marked in bold -TO’D), by Newsweek’s intrepid Brendan Cole, reporting from London on Russia and Ukraine. I was on the Berlin-Warsaw express, heading to the Warsaw Security Forum. At the end are links to several other-language versions. Read on …

Putin’s Arctic Project Suffers Blow From Top Trade Ally

By Brendan Cole Senior News Reporter FOLLOW

India has refused to buy liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Vladimir Putin‘s flagship Arctic energy project delivering a “major blow” to Moscow’s fuel exports, an energy analyst has told Newsweek.

India’s oil secretary, Pankaj Jain, has said that New Delhi is “not touching” any commodity from the Arctic LNG 2 project due to sanctions that followed Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine aimed at stifling Russian energy revenues, which the United States stepped up this month.

Putin had high hopes for the seaborne resource after losing the lucrative European market for pipeline gas due to sanctions and the president’s move to weaponize the fuel, which only spurred countries to find other suppliers.

Following huge losses, Gazprom cut its fuel production while a proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline to transport increasingly stranded Russian gas resources to China remains delayed amid haggling over price.

However, attempts by state firm Novatek to get Russia’s gas to market through the Arctic LNG 2 project have so far failed after Jain said last Friday, “We are not buying any sanctioned commodity.”

Newsweek reached out to Novatek for comment.

Berlin-based energy analyst Tom O’Donnell said Russia’s switch to boosting LNG exports has been fraught with difficulties due to sanctions.

“They have had to considerably cut back because they can’t get either the equipment to build it or the ships to transport it,” he told Newsweek.

“LNG from the new Arctic LNG 2 project was very important for Putin to be able to ship it to India and to China,” he said. “With India dropping out, this will be a major blow.”

Russia plans to triple its LNG exports by 2030 to 100 million tons. The country is expected to play a key role in India’s energy strategy, which has built terminals to receive the fuel.

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My Al Qahera, Cairo: Germany’s VW auto crisis, Green Energy Errors & Deindustrialization (English/Arabic)

English audio here. Arabic video is below.
Arabic video here. English video is above.

Al Qahera, news TV in Cairo, asked me questions on Germany’s VW crisis. VW announced yesterday it will close at least two facilities and move to break the long-term agreement with its workers’ union for no layoffs till 2029. This is serious in that 1) VW, since its founding in 1937, has never shut any plants, and 2) it’s not just VW. and it’s not just the German auto sector.


I told Al Qahera that the same story can be told about Germany’s steel industry (i.e., Thyssen-Krupp), or its chemical industry (i.e., BASF).


German energy intensive industries are facing not merely the creeping uncompetitiveness long decried in the country, but outright deindustrialization.


I described to Al Qahera how this decline of German industry reminds me of USA deindustrialization (the “rust belt” collapse) during my years working in the USA auto industry in the mid-1970’s to early 1980’s (both at Chrysler and Ford, in Detroit) and USA Railways (I worked on the Michigan Central when it was consolidated with other railways, by the federal government, to form Conrail). I remarked how it took the USA some 15 or more years to restructure and again become a modern, digitalized manufacturer. There is no guarantee Germany could pull this restructuring off, and there was no guarantee the USA would either, but that was a special case of a mammoth economy,

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At ‘Berlin Energy Forum,’ 2 Sept., I’ll argue: Germany’s green-hydrogen import strategy is unrealistic & ignores African needs

NOTE: Last call to Sign Up Here for our 2nd Berlin Energy Forum, on “Germany’s Quest for Green Hydrogen: from Ukraine to Mauritania & back,” 4:00 – 5:30 PM (CET), Berlin Capital Club, followed by networking and drinks. The Capital Club is atop the Hilton Hotel, adjacent to Gendarme Market in Berlin’s Mitte district. Looks like we’ll have a full house again. There is also a delayed-video sign-up option. -o-o-o-o-o- Speakers: I’ll be joined by Dr. Dawud Ansari of SWP think tank where he leads H2 research, and Ms. Olena Pavlenko, President Kyiv’s Dixie Group via video link. Moderation: Ben Aris, Editor-in-chief & founder of bneIntelliNews, & our forum co-organizer.

Second: While writing my talk, I began rethinking a 2023 post on Germany’s  green-hydrogen import scheme for Mauritania. Below is my update. — Tom O’D.

German Green Hydrogen Import Strategy is Unworkable & Ignores Mauritania’s needs

Referring to the green hydrogen MOU signed with Mauritania in 2023, Conjuncta CEO Stefan Liebing said, “(This project) will have a strong link to Germany both as a technology provider and a potential offtaker of green energy.” (“Consortium signs $34 billion MoU for hydrogen project in Mauritania,” Reuters, 8 Mar 23.)

German public broadcaster Deutsche Welle seemed quite impressed: “It has a planned capacity of 10 gigawatts – the output of roughly five to six standard nuclear power plants. The first phase of the project is set to be completed by 2028” (“Mauritania set to export green hydrogen to Germany,” DW Business, 09Mar23 archived at YouTube.)

Indeed, the MOU aims for “10 gigawatts” of electrolyzers outputting “8 million tonnes/year” (Mt/y) of green hydrogen (H2) and other products, such as ammonia. However, according to the press announcement, in 2028 the facility will have a 400 MW capacity, or one-twenty-fifth of 10 gigawatts envisioned .

The German coalition government faces a formidable energy dilemma.

On one hand, it must urgently develop enough natural gas generation capacity at a reasonable cost to halt deindustrialization, and shut coal plants it brought back online when it closed the last nuclear plants To this end, Minister Habeck (Greens) urgently won approval for installation of 25 GW capacity of new natural gas turbine generation by 2030. In addition, this new natural gas capacity is needed to back up Germany’s growing, renewable-electricity dependence, as it simply has no feasible grid storage tech to offset its weather-variability.

So too, in response to Russia cutting off gas deliveries to Germany, as part of its full scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany urgently moved to install up to seven offshore LNG floating regasification ships (FRSOs). These aimed for a new natural gas import capacity of 25 bcm/year as LNG in 2023,

In January 2024, the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) reported that, “According to preliminary figures, the total volume of natural gas imported into Germany in 2023 was 968 T”Wh (2022: 1,437 TWh).” of which 7% or almost 70 TWh was LNG. The reduction from 2022 largely reflects the fall in industrial production it is now suffering.

On the other hand, Germany urgently seeks enough future “green energy” import projects to eventually replace all this natural gas if it is to meet its decarbonization targets. The government published its “National Hydrogen Strategy” in summer 2023. (Also, “Gremany’s National Hydrogen Strategy,” Factsheet, 26 Jul 2023, by Sören Amelang and Julian Wettengela, Clean Energy Wire, is very useful.)

The (IMHO) dogmatic insistence on refusing to re-open several still-operable nuclear plants and to develop new German nuclear capacity means that the only low-carbon way the government coalition and many other political and business actors can imagine to replace all this natural gas is with green hydrogen produced from renewables in distant African, Mideast, Latin American and other states, or from developing new renewable-generated electricity it can import from nearby European countries.

This self-induced straitjacketing of the German energy system is, as I have described it, a sort of “renewable fundamentalism” — a maximalist insistence to fuel everything with 100% renewables and absolutely no nuclear.

How much of Germany’s new LNG-supplied energy could the Mauritania project replace in 2028?

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My Briefing Paper for USA House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, “… Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector.”

—– Click image to open PDF

I was asked to write a Brief for the USA House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs (Europe Subcommittee) 12 March hearing: “Going Nuclear on Rosatom: Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector,” submitted via Wilson Center in Washington, where I am a Global Fellow (external). There are two aspects to the Brief:

  1. My assessment of how threats posed to the 3-Seas-Region Member States executing a pragmatic energy transition incorporating nuclear energy emanate both from the role of Russia’s Rosneft, and equally from the activities of seven anti-nuclear Member States led by Germany, and
  2. Detailed research on Russia’s nuclear energy dangers contributed by colleagues in Poland and Ukraine.  Their research includes:
  • Appendix A: Some facts and policy recommendations on Rosatom activities, based on research by Warsaw colleagues at The Polish Economic Institute (PEI), Dr. Adam Juszczak, and Mr. Kamil Lipiński (p. 6);
  • Appendix B. Rosatom may be assisting in circumventing sanctions., from research by colleagues at DiXiE Group, Kyiv, Ukraine, especially Mr. Roman Nitsovych, and Ms. Olena Pavlenko (p. 7);
  • Appendix C. Why sanction Rosatom: Link between “peaceful” Rosatom energy & Russian nuclear weapons, based on research by CGS Strategy XXI , Kyiv, Ukraine, in particular Mykhailo M. Gonchar, Founder and President, and Chief Editor of the Black Sea Security Journal (p. 11.)

I highly recommend their three Appendices.

I should note that what I wrote in the main body was likely unexpected. I wrote that, for accomplishing a pragmatic, nuclear-power-inclusive energy transition in the 3-Seas Region (i.e., the EU’s Central and Eastern Europe, Baltic, and Balkan Member States), the continued dependencies on Russia’s Rosatom are not the only threats. The threat from the Group of Seven anti-nuclear states, led by Germany, is clearly equally or more disruptive to the Region accomplishing a pragmatic energy security-and-transition policy. I’ll quote a bit of the report on this point:

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1st “Berlin Energy Forum” 21 May | A monthly disruption of the local ‘energy echo chamber.’

Dear Colleagues & friends, Below is an invite to our first Berlin Energy Forum (jump to details | jump to register), but first a personal note.

First, a personal note: As some of you know, this is an idea I’ve been floating in Berlin since well before Corona. Then, last October, I had an experimental test run, a one-off, sponsored by the Qatari embassy’s Divan – and it went very well.

However, the biggest success from that event was that Ben Aris, co-founder and editor-in-chief of bne IntelliNews enthusiastically joined me to found the Berlin Energy Forum as a regular monthly sort of membership club. Amongst the longest serving foreign correspondents in Eastern Europe, Ben has been covering Russia since 1993, with stints in the Baltics and Central Asia. He is a former Moscow bureau chief for the Daily Telegraph and was a contributing editor at The Banker and Euromoney for a decade amongst writing for many other publications. He is also a professional photographer, and nowadays based in Berlin.

Ben is one of those rare people who relishes doing analysis and data-driven writing (non-stop!), AND who knows how to do business – and thoroughly enjoys doing it. Just the partner for this endeavor.

My model and inspiration for this forum was always the New York Energy Forum, which has run for over 40 years now. I happily attended while teaching in NYC. My experience with that forum, plus familiarity with a few top DC think tanks, and various foreign diplomats (esp. in NYC/UN), is how, as an academic, I got to know a broad spectrum of USA oil and gas executives, journalists, financial-institution analysts and government officials. Those personal connections have, over the years, anchored my assessments of USA, of OPEC MENA-and-Latin American members’, and of Russian and Chinese strategy. This sort of community doesn’t exist in Europe in such a focused manner, save perhaps in London. Perhaps we can now bring a bit of that world to Berlin with our new BEF.

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Why USA alarm? [PL/EN] Analityk: Ukraina pokazała, że może zakłócić eksport rosyjskiej ropy przez porty /Analyst: Ukraine has shown it could disrupt Russian ports exporting oil

Money.pl Getty …

In an Easter Sunday interview in 20+ Polish papers [POLISH & ENGLISH below], I said White House reasons for Ukraine not to hit Russian refineries don’t make sense. The “elephant in the room” alarming DC is that Ukraine can now disrupt Primorsk, UST-Luga and Novorossiskya oil ports, needed for 60% of Russian exports.

This would not only deny Moscow vital oil revenues needed to wage war, it would also spark a spectacular global oil market shock. I explain that the USA and allies can urgently prepare for this, while the Ukrainians are still maintaining strategic patience.

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My Newsweek: 1) Ukraine could hit Russian oil exports-but hasn’t. 2) Gen. Hodges is right–USA stand regrettable.

Credit: Kyiv Post 13mar24

“O’Donnell told Newsweek that that if Ukrainians really wanted to hit oil exports, they would go after Novorossiysk Fuel Oil Terminal in the [eastern] Black Sea and Primorsk Oil Terminal at the end of the Baltic Pipeline System.

“‘These are the two major exports sites for Russian oil and they are demonstrated to be within range of aerial drones and perhaps, in the case the Black Sea, their seaborne drones,’ he said. ‘If they really want to cut Russia’s oil income, they would go after those ports and they haven’t—that might be in deference to Americans concerns.’ (Russia Faces Major Gas Headache After Ukraine Strikes, Newsweek, article by Brendan Cole, Mar 25, 2024.)

Last week, Newsweek (USA) twice cited my analysis of Ukrainian drone strikes. In one instance, I had the honor of following an interview with General Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army, Europe, with whom I concur in regretting the USA opposition.

(Aside: I hope to have an Op-Ed, perhaps tomorrow, in Europe, assessing that (i) the USA’s stated reasons versus Ukraine’s drone strikes to date do not make sense, and (ii) the “elephant in the room,” which must really have alarmed the White House, is that Ukraine’s strikes on refineries ipso facto demonstrate they COULD, if they so chose, disrupt anywhere up to 60% of Russian oil exports. Lastly,(iii) if the USA, EU and allies do not rapidly prepare non-Russian oil-sector producers for this eventuality, a global oil price shock could result.)

Here are the links to last week’s two new interviews/citations by Newsweek:

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“Is Europe winning the energy war?” Roundtable views: (i) Russian oil-price cap failing; anti-trust tax could help. (ii) Green-energy inflation & subsidies plus low oil & gas development disarm Europe.

Berlin Energy Roudtable. L to R: Ben Aris, Tom O’Donnell, Morten Frisch & Andriy Kobolyev (video link from Kyiv) 24 October 2023, Haus der Bunderpresskonferenz – PHOTO GALLERY BELOW (Divan staff)

On 24 October, I was honored to moderate a great roundtable in Berlin with three European energy experts, sponsored by Der Divan Kulturehaus. SUGGESTION: While listening, open up that speaker’s file below. You’ll find Ben Aris’ data-slides on Russian price-cap failings, Andriy Kobolyev’s proposal to tax Moscow’s oil & Morten Frisch’s slides on EU renewable shortcomings & continued oil and gas needs.

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“Is Europe Winning the Energy War?” Berlin Energy Roundtable -24 Oct.- Invitation

Space is limited. Registration is required.

You are invited to attend the 1st Berlin Energy Roundtable, on 24 October. Our three distinguished speakers share decades of Eurasian and Mideast gas-sector experience. I’ll have the pleasure of moderating.

As many of you know, this is a format I long sought to establish in Berlin; but, which during Corona and the energy-crisis after the largescale Russian invasion of Ukraine, was difficult to advance.

The event is made possible with the generous sponsorship of the Divan Culture House in Berlin. Hopefully there will be several more in the coming year.

My SkyNews: Saudis can & will limit oil price before tanking customers’ economies. Russian cap has had impact; but it’s lessening.

This has English audio.
This is the on-air ARABIC version – T.O’D.

Two key, of several, points I made:

[02.10.23 Note: Some typos/syntax corrected. Somehow could not edit w/ my phone yesterday.]

–1– The Saudis have no intention to spike oil price over $100/barrel, at least not for long – that’s my read.

Their customers’ economies are troubled, especially China, but Europe too – where too-high-an-oil-price could re-boost inflation, even push them into recession(s) killing oil demand.

Over the last year, the Saudi’s were newly proactive (their traditional mode was always to react after-the-fact). And their economists’ market calls were correct.

For several months, OPEC+ cumulative production cuts barely held prices stable. Only in recent months, along with new (though tepid) demand, did prices climb, form high-$80s to now mid $90s.

The Saudi minister professes to be unsure whether demand will rise in Q4. The IEA and the futures market (in backwardian now) see tightness. The Saudi minister answers that, if that happens, he has plenty of oil ready to put back into markets.

But – Nota Bene – despite present drawdowns in USA oil stocks and apparent tightness elsewhere, suddenly many oil analysts are saying that the present price rally could be short lived, and that OPEC-plus may have to keep or even deepen its cuts to maintain prices as they are.

Here are three very useful reports to this effect:

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EU sets $60 Russian-oil-price cap. What now? [My Al Jazeera & Asharq (Blmbrg) interviews]

FIRST: Al Jazeera, 10:05 AM, 02.12.22 CET, Berlin & Doha: — English audio below, then Arabic video.

SECOND: Asharq (exclusive Bloomberg affiliate, Gulf) , about 10:00 PM, 02.12.22 CET, Berlin & Doha — English Audio below, then Arabic video.