Category Archives: Saudi Arabia

With Iran & Hormuz, the US would act as arbiter of China’s Gulf oil & LNG access, while ensuring access for Indo-Asian allies. Venezuelan oil growth will enable Trump to impose phased cuts of Russian exports, after the Iran war. [Kanal24, Kyiv]

This is a longish, ca. 30 minute video. Host Nataly Lutsenko kindly told me she wanted to make a long interview.

(During time of crisis like this, I have so many TV and press interviews that I don’t have time to put most of them online. So, I will refrain from writing long posts to accompany videos to get more online, if I think they are useful interviews. – Tom O’D)

My TRT London: “US Energy Dominance” & global glut give Trump historic leeway to hit Iran without an oil crisis.

Last night on TRT World Global News (London), I emphasized that despite the modest spike in oil prices from about $70 to $78 per barrel as of yesterday, Trump has an historically unprecedented advantage for exercising “US Energy Dominance.”

Fig. 1. IEA projects global oil glut throughout 202

The campaigns against Venezuela and Iran, plus the turning of the Indian oil-consuming behemoth towards USA and Western interests vs Russian oil, are examples of the geopolitical leverage the USA’s now-dominant role in global oil affairs has afforded the Trump administration.

This oil-market advantage comes mainly from of two things:

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My EIES Study: ‘Liquidating the Russian Petrostate.’ New USA-Ukrainian oil-war effective. Siberian fields threatened.

A new USA-Ukrainian strategy has replaced the failed Russian oil-price cap. Oil is the material basis of Moscow’s capacity not only to fight Ukraine, but for its subversion in former USSR states, in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. In the US, one finds strong bipartisan sentiment that “Russia is a gas station, masquerading as a state,” as former-Senator John McCain famously remarked, and that Moscow must be deprived of its easy petrosate riches.

My study for European Initiative for Energy Security (EIES, based in Brussels, is associated with SAFE in Washington, DC, though policy-independent), traces the new USA-Ukrainian joint war on Russian oil, which includes sanctions, tariffs; drone strikes on Russian refineries, ports and oil tankers, and seizures of shadow fleet ships at sea. All these are part of a coherent campaign begun in Spring 2025, as the Trump administration realized that its focus on offering Putin economic enticements to end the war was proving ineffective. It became clear that the application of “pain”, as Trump put it, would be necessary.

The present study shows, in some technical detail, how it is possible to, first, physically stop the majority of Russian seaborn oil exports, secondly, that this can force the shutdown of old, delicate W. Siberian oil fields in winter resulting in the permanent or semi-permanent ruin of these fields, the material basis of the Russian petrostate economy.

This, in fact, is the real threat, the “pain”, which Putin has begun to fear, inducing him to engage for the first time a bit more seriously in negotiations.

The Report also draws attention to and analyses the unfortunate incapacity of many European expert observers and think tanks to see the outlines of this coherent oil war strategy, distracted by the considerable bluster and threats employed by President Trump.

Third, in parallel, the study explains presently favorable oil market conditions consisting of a persistent supply glut, making any major cutoff of Russian seaborne oil exports feasible without sparking a lasting spike in world prices. I show how the OPEC-Gulf states, especially the Saudis and UAE, have facilitated this glut in coordination with President Trump et al, with the prospect of regaining much of the Indian and Chinese market discounted Russian oil has taken since 2022.

For the longer term, however, in the conclusion to this report, it is shown how the return of Venezuelan barrels to the market (and perhaps Iranian barrels as well) are part of a comprehensive USA energy strategy to create market conditions enabling both persistent low prices and, if necessary, the permanent “Liquidation of the Russian Petrostate,” to end the Ukraine war and Moscow’s international significance-in-general.

This is all seen to be part-and-parcel of the Trump administrations detailed commitment – with significant bipartisan support – to exercise “USA Energy Dominance” as a pillar of USA geo-economic power and geostrategy.

I am available for interviews and speaking on this Report’s topic. Contact EIES or me directly.

Video: “Dismantling the Petrostate: Moment of Truth for Russian Oil?” | Our EIES Webinar

Here is the video of our 10 Nov. event, organized by EIES (European Institute for Energy Security). Our topic was the turn in US Trump administration policy on ending Russia’s war against Ukraine and the Russian oil sector.

My sincere thanks to EIES, and especially Executive Director Albéric Mongrenier, for inviting me along with distinguished energy and geopolitics experts. (Note: EIES is affiliated with, but policy-independent of, SAFE in Washington).

Our distinguished expert panel included:

  • Dr. Jaak Aviksoo, Former Minister of Defence of Estonia, EIES Energy Security Leadership Council
  • Christof Rühl, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, former BP Chief Economist 
  • Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, Energy and Geopolitical Strategist and Founder of GlobalBarrel.com 
  • Moderated by Rosemary Griffin, OPEC+ Lead Reporter, S&P Global Commodity Insights
  • Opened by Peter Flory, Senior Fellow, EIES, Former NATO Assistant Secretary General

A central question we addressed was the turn in the Trump administration policy to apply significant coercive measures against the Russian oil sector to undermine the ability of the Putin government to continue its was in Ukraine. We discussed how effective the new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil might be and what is the synergistic effect of the Ukrainian drone and missile campaign against Russian domestic refineries and oil export terminal ports.

For an update on expanded attacks on Russian Black Sea oil ports and their meaning, see the written comments accompanying my Kanal24 video interview, posted on Monday, 17 Nov. “The US & Ukraine pound Russian oil | my Kanal24, Kyiv“).

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“12-Day War”: Why no energy crisis? Iran regime was cornered. Seeing USA’s limited aims, it dared not escalate, gave up. | My Al Jazeera comments

The ceasefire Trump brokered will hopefully end this “12-Day War.” I want to discuss here why this war did not trigger a global energy crisis. [Here’s what I said about this to Al Jazeera last week, in the last five paragraphs. A PDF is also embedded below. I’ll also post a TRT-London show on Iran’s nuclear strategy, recorded Tuesday, soon.]

To assess the risk to energy supplies, understanding the aims of the combatants is key. Throughout this war, it was the USA-Israel side setting the agenda, and there were two strategic aims they could pursue. One was to “only” destroy Iran’s nuclear program and its existing conventional regional power-projection capacities. The second was to go beyond this to undermine the viability of the Islamic Republic, up to forcing a regime change. Why do I say this?

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My TVP live: Merz election drama. Merz visit to Tusk reevokes security & migration frictions. If Merz fails to halt German deindustrialization, Poland too faces crisis.

In the last two weeks, I was in Warsaw twice. First, for the Three Seas One Opportunity conference (3S1O) on 27 April, organized by the Opportunity Think Tank, where I co-chaired a session. This was an official side event of the Three Seas Summit (a ministerial conference). Second, for the Warsaw Security Forum’s Public Dialogue. (WSF) 7 May. I will soon post here about both these very interesting events.

However, I was asked by TVP, the Polish national broadcaster, to come to their Warsaw studios on 8 May, the day after the WSF, for a live-on-air commentary on the recent drama in the German Bundestag (parliament) where the new Chancellor, Fredrich Merz, embarrassingly failed to get the necessary votes on the first ballot. He finally succeeded on second ballot, after intense politicking and consultations within his party, the center-right CDU, in its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, and in his coalition-partner party, the center-left SPD.

So, first; I was asked to explain this surprising electoral fiasco for the new chancellor, Merz, and his party, and how it may have weakened his new government.

Secondly, Merz immediately, after being sworn in, undertook a one-day whirlwind trip to Paris and then Warsaw, to visit his prospective main partners in the European Union, President Macron of France and Prime Minister Tusk of Poland. (Continued ….)

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My interview at Lithuania’s LRT: Trump could seriously harm Russia if he wants to | Trumpas, jeigu tik norėtų, galėtų stipriai pakenkti Rusijai

My long print interview at Lithuania’s LRT [Lithuanian PDF | English PDF​] with Aleksandra ​Ketlerienė, deputy editor-in-chief of Lithuania’s LRT.lt, published 7January. We spoke in Warsaw, 19 November. My thanks to Aleksandra for her insightful questioning and editorial care. We discussed:

  • The EU’s systemic energy​-policy “own goals” ​since its initial energy-crisis win ​after Moscow began cutting gas exports early in 2021​.
  • Reforming failed/ineffective Russian price-cap sanctions for real sanctions, and how the global oil market is now favorable for “maximum pressure.”
  • Historical perspectives on oil, gas, renewables, and nuclear sectors, essential for realistic policy formation.
  • An historical overview of China’s decades-long effort to overcome its energy security, learning lessons of Japan’s WW2 weaknesses.
  • (​See topics summary))
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My Al Watan(Cairo): Iran would seek global energy crisis if an Israeli/USA strike threatened regime survival | IEA warns on EU winter gas

ENGLISH Interview | Al Watan, Cairo.  Thurs 10Oct24. 15 minutes
ARABIC Interview

At first, we focused on IEA warnings of a possible EU winder gas shortage due to supply-and-demand mismatches. I agree and expand on the IEA points.

Second, I explained that if Israel retaliates against Iran so strongly that it threatens the regimes survival, or is seen as intending to provoke regime change, then the Iranian leadership will have “nothing to lose” by in-turn escalating to the maximum. Aside from unleashing the maximum response of its proxies surrounding Israel, Tehran’s most potent weapon would be to spark a global oil and gas crisis.

Consider oil: Iran can either shut down the Straights of Hormuz (or simply make them unsafe for tankers) and/or, it can use missiles and drones to destroy significant parts of Saudi, UAE and other Gulf oil facilities, including perhaps even Azerbaijan’s as some Iranian propagandists have threatened.

Consider natural gas: Shutting the Straights or directly hitting Qatar’s massive LNG exports infrastructure would immediately stop Qatari LNG exports. As the world’s second largest LNG exporter, this would immediately cause a separate global natural gas crisis.

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My BBC(Cairo)+Alhurra(Wash DC): What if Israel bombs Iran’s oil? Does Israel have an end strategy? “Smite enemies, repeat in 10 years”?

Again, oil security is determined by both global-market balances and geostrategic realities – at present the Mideast war and Russia’s War on Ukraine. My analyses this weekend were featured in: (a) an AlHurra video (LHS English, RHS Arabic), and below these (b) a detailed BBC-Cairo print interview (LHS English Google Translate, RHS Arabic original). where I make similar points as my Friday video in Warsaw.

Alhurra ENGLISH. My comments at 2:45 & 8:20. Date: 5 Oct 2024, with co-guest GPI President Paolo von Schirach, Washington.
Alhurra ARABIC, 5 October 2024

My BBC (CAIRO) print interview in Arabic and English (Google Translate):

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What if Israel bombs Iran’s oil? Four points on market & geopolitics. Video-Warsaw 03oct24

Recorded Thurs AM, 03Oct24. Warsaw Old Town, Castle Square.

Will Israel hit Iranian oil infrastructure? And, what part of it? To what effect on markets, and geopolitics, (i.e., Mideast, OPEC, Russia and Ukraine war)? A video report.

MAIN POINTS (see transcript):

1. What if Israel hits Iran oil infrastructure in retaliation for missile strikes on Tel Aviv on Tuesday night? 1.a. The difference effects of hitting Iranian refineries vs oil export terminals In itself, neither target would make big difference in the market. The market would immediately jump, of course, but in principle the effect would be small. 1b OPEC+ and Western Hemisphere have plenty of spare capacity.

2. Consider Saudi market tactics … reportedly they want to now go for share over price support, as price support is failing after well over a year of output cuts (about 6 mb/d). Note: Shortly after this recording the Saudis repudiated the WSJ that reported the switch in tactics to defending share. Likely they’ll now want to wait and see what happens to Iranian exports, or if this Israel-Iran tit-for-tat gets out of hand.

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My SkyNews: Saudis can & will limit oil price before tanking customers’ economies. Russian cap has had impact; but it’s lessening.

This has English audio.
This is the on-air ARABIC version – T.O’D.

Two key, of several, points I made:

[02.10.23 Note: Some typos/syntax corrected. Somehow could not edit w/ my phone yesterday.]

–1– The Saudis have no intention to spike oil price over $100/barrel, at least not for long – that’s my read.

Their customers’ economies are troubled, especially China, but Europe too – where too-high-an-oil-price could re-boost inflation, even push them into recession(s) killing oil demand.

Over the last year, the Saudi’s were newly proactive (their traditional mode was always to react after-the-fact). And their economists’ market calls were correct.

For several months, OPEC+ cumulative production cuts barely held prices stable. Only in recent months, along with new (though tepid) demand, did prices climb, form high-$80s to now mid $90s.

The Saudi minister professes to be unsure whether demand will rise in Q4. The IEA and the futures market (in backwardian now) see tightness. The Saudi minister answers that, if that happens, he has plenty of oil ready to put back into markets.

But – Nota Bene – despite present drawdowns in USA oil stocks and apparent tightness elsewhere, suddenly many oil analysts are saying that the present price rally could be short lived, and that OPEC-plus may have to keep or even deepen its cuts to maintain prices as they are.

Here are three very useful reports to this effect:

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My Asharq with Saudi expert: MENA green hydrogen exports will be inefficient & counter-productive for climate. Renewables still almost “nonexistent”, nuclear is pragmatic.

My Asharq interview, along with Mohammed Al-Dabai, Saudi energy journalist, on 13 April 23. (This post has English interpreter’s audio and my voice over the Arabic. View in Arabic here.)

At about timestamp 5:30, I discuss the difficulties with the Gulf states exporting “green hydrogen” to Germany and the EU.

So little renewable carbon-free energy is produced in MENA and esp. in Gulf states (i.e., almost none), and it would be so inefficient to convert this into “green hydrogen” and then further into “green ammonia” (as many in Germany and the EU now advocate), and then to ship it all the way to Germany or elsewhere in the EU, that it would make little sense, except in so far as Germany and EU states are willing to pay a good price.

However, it would also leave the MENA region with little improvement in their carbon-heavy electricity consumption. Mr. Al-Dabai generally concurred on the “scientific” problems, as he described them, of producing and exporting green hydrogen.

We were discussing a recent Ember consultancy report (London, link below) on the progress of renewable electricity worldwide, and how there is little progress in the Gulf and larger MENA region.

However, I briefly pointed to nuclear developments, the building of new So. Korean Generation 3+ plants in the UAE, and to Saudi plans, as very promising.

However, as with other renewables-focused outfits, Ember doesn’t seem to see any value in this pragmatic approach, not to mention the benefits of coal-to-natural-gas switching as a very reasonable, carbon-emmissions-reduction strategy.

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My Al Jazeera comments: OPEC+ strikes delicate balance as UAE & Russia defy Saudis

Here’s an English transcript of my Al Jazeera comments on OPEC+ negotiations and some further remarks on the group’s agreement to raise production.
Good evening from Berlin.
Answer 1. Well, OPEC-Plus is faced with maintaining a very delicate balance.
On the one hand, demand in the Western world is down, its weak, while in the Eastern world, in Asia – in China and India – demand is relatively strong. And this is a complicating matter.
At the same time, in supply, in Libya, for example, the oil production is not under the [OPEC+] agreement and has been coming back on the market.
OPEC has been doing relatively well, in the last few months or so, of balancing the market. The question is, how to maintain this going forward, with its exports, how to balance supply with demand.
But what is appearing is not the big split between Russia and Saudi Arabia that we saw last year in the Oil Price War. Now we have differences … such as we see with the UAE [i.e., versus the Saudis]. The UAE would like, as we have seen, also Russia has said, an increase in production. That would be very difficult for other, more expensive producers to do at this point.
Answer 2: Yes. It does. I mean, of course the UAE has been getting a lot of press [about its demand to increase production], … so it is a matter of how serious the UAE is, and how serious the Russians are to want to raise production in some way.

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Oil Price War 3: My AlJazeera spot on negative price, Putin’s rout, shale, and Trump’s dilemma: independents v big oil

The 24.04 video: Aljazeera asked me about negative prices and we got into storage, Putin’s huge blunder in launching the price war, the fate of US shale, and the dilemma faced by Trump and the Texas Railway Commission on cutting US production: there’s no way to please both the independent US producers and the big US international oil companies.  One or the other is going will be very upset. (Note: English audio record replaces original Arabic here. Thanks to AlJazeera for the clip.)

Facing urgent oil-cut decision, Trump & Texas Railway Commission dither

Let me expand a bit on this point I made at the end of the interview: Trump is dithering as the day of reckoning approaches – the day when US oil’s physical storage is full.  Then it won’t be just the WTI Nymex futures price going negative overnight, the physical, spot market would go negative and freeze up.

So, either Trump has to invoke national security and use federal powers to order proportional, across-the-board cuts nationally, or the Texas Railway Commission and its Continue reading

Decoding the Oil Price War 2: My Wikistrat webinar “Oil Price War & COVID Crisis” transcript

covid-oil_war_2bd-cropped-graphic_wikistrat_12apr20_captureMy Wikistrat webinar transcript “Oil Price War & COVID” from a couple weeks ago is now available on their website as a PDF.  Issues discussed include:

  • Why did Moscow declare the “war”? [Note: Putin & Sechin’s initial boasts Russia would hold out for “years”, kill shale & end sanctions all stopped in only a couple days!]
  • The Saudi response was sharply focused against Russian oil-pipeline markets in W Europe (Druzhba) & Asia.  [I believe this focused Mr. Putin’s attention on economic realities as opposed to Mr. Sechin’s anger-driven desire for revenge against US sanctions that had inflated his (self-)image of Rosneft and Russian oil-market prowess when up against a concerted Saudi counter-war, and the prospects of various US responses.  Reports are that Putin spend three days on the phone to undo this fiasco and, in the end, had to accept significant cuts to Russian output.  See my GlobalBarrel.com post of last week explaining the initial, flawed Russian strategy.]
  • The options Trump had to choose from undermine his long antipathy to OPEC. (Did he secretly offer Putin any Nord Stream 2, Ukraine or Venezuela sanctions relief? If so, Congress won’t approve.) Also: Big Oil (American Petroleum Institute) and W. Texas/other independent producers are pulling at Trump in two very different policy directions re. OPEC, tariffs, production controls, etc
  • And more (esp. in the Q&A): probable impact on carbon mitigation policies, the China market for LNG, US shale’s financial and production future, etc.

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