Tag Archives: politics

Analysis: Vance saw Zelensky as publicly rearguing an agreed deal |Trump will force or flatter his plan on Ukraine & Russia, as needed

TRT asked me to be ready to comment, live, on the Oval Office meeting just before it blew up. I said Vance acted “infantile”. What I should have stressed, however, is that understanding Vance’s decision to blow up the meeting is key to understanding Trump’s strategy towards Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. (So, in this post the written analysis is the main thing, not the video.)

My TRT quick take, 28 Feb. See my later analysis, in the blog post.

There is plenty of facile analyses of this clash. Many say the blowup reflected “chaos” in Trump’s policy on Ukraine and Russia, or that Trump has an “impulsive” strategy, that he “dislikes Ukraine”, he’s “pro-Russian,” or that the blowup was a “prearranged ambush” to “humiliate” Zelensky, or similar.

Too few consider the possibility that the rebuke is consistent with a well-defined USA strategy. What quickly becomes clear from listening, at face value, to multiple statements by Trump himself and his team is that they have a consistent strategy. This is clearly not the first Trump administration. This second administration is different in its unity and consistency on its Ukraine, Russia, and Europe policies.

What was the purpose of the “minerals” deal that Zelensky came to sign?

The weeks-long USA-Ukrainian clash over this deal has reflected their geostrategic differences on a peace deal with Russia. After heated exchanges and compromises, clearly the Ukrainian side was not pleased with the issues it had had to give up in the minerals deal. Nevertheless, Zelensky’s Council of Ministers voted to endorse the deal, and Zelensky went to DC explicitly to sign it.

Interestingly, just before he went to the White House, President Zelensky met with a group of Republican and Democratic senators, who had “… all told him sign the deal and don’t get into an argument.” (War on the Rocks, timestamp 7:58-8:19, 06.03.25). Alas, if one watches Zelensky’s public argumentation, from the start of the press conference, and his telling Trump that a deal without a US security guarantee won’t work, all of which is in contradiction to the deal he is about to sign, it is clear that he precipitated the breakdown. In my reading of the event, he seemed to not be able to restrain himself, seemingly out of an understandable deep anguish at being about to sign an accord contrary to his better judgment.

What did each side want in the “minerals” deal, and who got what?

Everything I found to have been said by the actors on the USA and Ukrainian sides as to what each wanted in the document is quite consistent.

On the Ukrainian side, the big one was a USA security guarantee for any deal Trump makes with Putin. The Ukrainians certainly welcome the willingness of European allies to extend security guarantees for any deal, especially the public commitments made by both the UK and France to contribute troops, but they were clear that they did not think this can substitute for a USA guarantee standing behind theirs. Related to this, the Ukrainians opposed taking NATO membership for them off the table. Another was a seat at the table for Ukraine and the Europeans during negotiations with Russia (Trump wants something more like a shuttle diplomacy between the two.) Related to this, is that the USA should not negotiate a cease fire deal without them. Still another was refusing to agree beforehand to give up any Ukrainian territory that has been occupied by Russia.

Obviously the USA disagreed and de facto or openly refused all these conditions. However, the disagreement over the security guarantee seemed to be the most hot-button issue between them. Trump flatly refused. His reasoning, as explained to the press was interesting, revealing a lot about his philosophy or method for negotiating a peace deal. He said that the two sides obviously hated one another and he had to go between the two to negotiate anything. (Read Trump’s own words, in the transcript below.)

The Trump concept of economic interests and security interests

He also said that they had to trust him, saying that it just would not work if he first gave a security guarantee, taking Ukraine’s side so clearly beforehand. He also said that the ultimate security guarantee “is the easy part” and getting the deal “is the hard part.” He said the guarantees can “come later.” It became clear that, in his approach, this minerals deal was to be the signal to Putin that the USA would have long-term economic interests in Ukraine and would, of course, in Trump’s view of how the world works, defend against any threats to those economic interests.

This approach is clearly seen as highly risky by Ukraine, which has been abandoned once before under what was an explicit security guarantee, the Bucharest Memorandum, extended in return for giving up its nuclear weapons in the 1990’s. As Zelensky recounted for Trump, no signatories of the Minsk Accords extended security guarantees after Russia’s 2014 aggression, and Putin broke them constantly

The text of the final document, the one the Ukrainian ministers approved, is known; it was published in Kyiv two days before the Oval Office meeting. (The full text of the Ukraine-US Minerals Agreement, European Pravda, Kyiv, 26.02.25). So, it is easy to see that Kyiv didn’t get its main demands, although the USA did compromise, in a sense, on one of them, agreeing to an explicit mention of a “security guarantee.” However, the USA did not extend one as a quid-pro-quo for the minerals deal, rather in Section 10. the wording is:

The Government of the United States of America supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace. Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments, as defined in the Fund Agreement.

So, the USA vision of security, to “protect mutual investments,” is asserted in association..

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Our Gdansk chat: Baltic energy risks | USA ousting China from post-war order | “Transition” will be simple: nuclear & mass-transit. “Critical” minerals overblown | EU’s failing model: all-renewables, new grids, grid-storage & EVs | Poland’s risk: China uses Russia

This is in English, after Eugene Romer of Układ Sił media introduces me in Polish. This was at the “3 Seas -1 Opportunity Forum” in Gdansk, last June 4-5, 2024. I have been wanting to post it ever since, as the questions remain relevant. My thanks to Eugene and his team, and to his Opportunity Think Tank colleagues.

My panel at the forum was on problems of relying on energy security that arrives via the sea. So, think Poland and Lithuania’s LNG terminals, of the many sub-sea pipelines, power and communications cables between Baltic and Nordic states. And, since June, all the incidents where ships leaving Russian ports “accidentally” dragged their anchors, cutting such vital links. So, this conference was rather prescient. My sincere thanks to our hosts The Opportunity Institute for Foreign Affairs.

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My TVP: To cripple Putin, Trump can sanction oil ports, let Ukraine strike them / Seeking a new North Stream deal is Merkel 2.0; realism is a new, nuclear ‘Green’ Deal

[TWO “discoveries” just after this interview:

First, Bloomberg reported Ukraine had destroyed an oil pumping station on the pipeline feeding Russia’s big Ust Luga oil export terminal on the Baltic Sea. This is the first time Kyiv has shutdown a Russian oil port, … which is exactly what I advocated in the interview above and since early-2024 as a military tactic to accompany imposition of “real” USA-EU oil sanctions on the three Russian west-facing oil ports, replacing the failed “oil price cap” policy.

Second, Christof Ruhl, former-BP VP, and -World Bank Moscow rep., now at the Columbia U. Energy Center, had an OP-ED in the FT, with a similar argument that Russian oil can be replaced with OPEC crude. I recommend it: Trump should call on Opec in his bid to negotiate with Putin Ukraine’s western allies must join forces with the oil cartel to really squeeze Russia’s war economy” Christof Ruhl, 30jan25.]

There are two topics in this interview with Diana Skya of Poland’s national broadcaster, TVP:

  1. Putin’s oil export income can be slashed via new sanctions and military policies, in line with Trump’s interest in forcing a “deal”
  2. EU member states that seek a new Putin gas partnership are dysfunctionally replaying Merkel-ism and avoiding the real solution of reforming the Green Deal to put nuclear energy in the center. (See: “EU debates return to Russian gas as part of Ukraine peace deal. Advocates say reopening pipelines could help settlement with Moscow and cut energy costs” Henry Foy and Alice Hancock in Brussels and Christopher Miller in Kyiv, FT, 30jan25)
  1. OIL SANCTIONS:

I have argued for three years that the rationale behind the USA-EU imposition of a Russian “oil-price cap” rather than simply imposing real oil sanctions has been flawed, and the policy has failed.

It was conceived in early-2022, apparently by former-central-banker Mario Draghi of Italy and taken up by then-USA-Treasury-head Janet Yellen, neither of whom understood global oil trade sufficiently to see how easily the Russians could get around this scheme, as they have with a “shadow fleet” of oil tankers insured by Chinese, Russian or other non-EU, non-UK firms.

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My Asharq-Bloomberg: Ukraine OKs Azerbaijani-only gas transit; Orban & Fico vote Russian sanctions | Trump could crush RU oil if Putin won’t deal

English here (Arabic is below). Asharq-Bloomberg.
(Arabic. English is above). Asharq-Bloomberg spot.

Last night, Asharq, the Mideast Bloomberg news affiliate, asked me three questions (roughly translated):

  1. The the EU wants to extend the sanctions (on Russian gas), at the same time they want to open open the Russian pipeline through Ukraine. What is this contradiction? How to understand it in practise?
  2. How will Ukraine respond to these talks? Don’t you think that Ukraine will accept, for example, to open this project or to reopen these pipelines to resupply gas? Don’t you think the other European nations that were impacted neglecting or abandoning this Russian gas?
  3. Doctor, don’t you think that there has been a change in US policies, economic and political policies towards Russia after the reelection of Trump? Do you think we may see a change?

Here is a transcript of the Q&A (AI generated)

1
00:00:00,052 –> 00:00:02,772
are joined by Doctor Thomas Odoner. From

2
00:00:02,932 –> 00:00:05,052
Berlin. Welcome back, Doctor. Happy to

3
00:00:05,052 –> 00:00:07,972
have you with us tonight. So the EU

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My Asharq/Bloomberg: European gas surplus slashed as (1) Russian gas via Ukraine ends, (2) low wind & sun starve renewables. Yet the EU rejects new long-term gas import deals, betting on green-hydrogen. [EN/AR]

English voice-over version.

I appeared alongside Dr. Hashem Aqel, Oil and Energy Expert, Associate Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, who contributed several insights. Asharq News is the Mideast Bloomberg partner. My further analysis follows:

Arabic, original broadcast version.

The recent rise in EU gas prices and the rapid depletion of what had been a significant surplus in EU storage, is principally a two-sided story.

  1. One side is indeed about the impending cutoff of Russian gas, still flowing across Ukraine. This has been expected for months, and so is already largely priced in. Expectations of new transit across Ukraine of Russian-origin gas re-labelled as Azerbaijani was being negotiated. However, this deal fell apart, with the final nail in its coffin being when Ukraine’s President Zelensky asserted that Ukraine would not transit any further Russian-origin gas after 31 December unless payments to Russia are withheld until after the war ends. This seems a very reasonable demand for a country fighting for its survival against a Russian invasion. [See “Ukraine will not allow transit of Russian gas with Azeri label, Zelenskyy says, dashing Slovak hopes,” EuroNews, Jorge Liboreir 19 Dec. 2024.] This marks the end of the five-year contract, which was only agreed to at the last moment before New Year 2020, when the US Senate finally forced then-President Trump to agree to sanctions on Nord Stream 2 construction (I was in Kyiv, for Naftogaz, and on Ukrainian television, analyzing Washington sanctions, Kyiv-Moscow negotiations, and the pro-Nord Stream position of Berlin.)
  2. The other side is a story of yet another European energy own-goal, a consequence of its over-reliance on weather-dependent renewable energy generation. This overreliance has made its electricity supply increasingly volatile, in sync with the weather. In November and early December, especially north and western Europe experienced what the Germans call “Dunkelflaute“, a protracted wind and solar drought. Batteries can only substitute for perhaps 40 minutes, or at best an hour. So, the de facto long-term, grid-scale “storage” backing up Europe’s plethora of wind and sun generation is really just natural-gas turbine electrical generation plants. The reality of increased generation (and hence, electricity market) volatility and dependence on gas backup generation was analyzed this week in a data-driven manner by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. [See: “Dunkelflaute: Driving Europe Gas Demand Volatility” Energy Insight: 161, by Anouk Honoré and Jack Sharples, Senior Research Fellows, OIES, 2024/12.]
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My BBC(Cairo)+Alhurra(Wash DC): What if Israel bombs Iran’s oil? Does Israel have an end strategy? “Smite enemies, repeat in 10 years”?

Again, oil security is determined by both global-market balances and geostrategic realities – at present the Mideast war and Russia’s War on Ukraine. My analyses this weekend were featured in: (a) an AlHurra video (LHS English, RHS Arabic), and below these (b) a detailed BBC-Cairo print interview (LHS English Google Translate, RHS Arabic original). where I make similar points as my Friday video in Warsaw.

Alhurra ENGLISH. My comments at 2:45 & 8:20. Date: 5 Oct 2024, with co-guest GPI President Paolo von Schirach, Washington.
Alhurra ARABIC, 5 October 2024

My BBC (CAIRO) print interview in Arabic and English (Google Translate):

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My Newsweek interview (USA): India won’t buy Russia’s USA-sanctioned ‘Arctic LNG2.’ A big blow to Putin.

Below, I am quoted repeatedly (marked in bold -TO’D), by Newsweek’s intrepid Brendan Cole, reporting from London on Russia and Ukraine. I was on the Berlin-Warsaw express, heading to the Warsaw Security Forum. At the end are links to several other-language versions. Read on …

Putin’s Arctic Project Suffers Blow From Top Trade Ally

By Brendan Cole Senior News Reporter FOLLOW

India has refused to buy liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Vladimir Putin‘s flagship Arctic energy project delivering a “major blow” to Moscow’s fuel exports, an energy analyst has told Newsweek.

India’s oil secretary, Pankaj Jain, has said that New Delhi is “not touching” any commodity from the Arctic LNG 2 project due to sanctions that followed Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine aimed at stifling Russian energy revenues, which the United States stepped up this month.

Putin had high hopes for the seaborne resource after losing the lucrative European market for pipeline gas due to sanctions and the president’s move to weaponize the fuel, which only spurred countries to find other suppliers.

Following huge losses, Gazprom cut its fuel production while a proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline to transport increasingly stranded Russian gas resources to China remains delayed amid haggling over price.

However, attempts by state firm Novatek to get Russia’s gas to market through the Arctic LNG 2 project have so far failed after Jain said last Friday, “We are not buying any sanctioned commodity.”

Newsweek reached out to Novatek for comment.

Berlin-based energy analyst Tom O’Donnell said Russia’s switch to boosting LNG exports has been fraught with difficulties due to sanctions.

“They have had to considerably cut back because they can’t get either the equipment to build it or the ships to transport it,” he told Newsweek.

“LNG from the new Arctic LNG 2 project was very important for Putin to be able to ship it to India and to China,” he said. “With India dropping out, this will be a major blow.”

Russia plans to triple its LNG exports by 2030 to 100 million tons. The country is expected to play a key role in India’s energy strategy, which has built terminals to receive the fuel.

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Why USA alarm? [PL/EN] Analityk: Ukraina pokazała, że może zakłócić eksport rosyjskiej ropy przez porty /Analyst: Ukraine has shown it could disrupt Russian ports exporting oil

Money.pl Getty …

In an Easter Sunday interview in 20+ Polish papers [POLISH & ENGLISH below], I said White House reasons for Ukraine not to hit Russian refineries don’t make sense. The “elephant in the room” alarming DC is that Ukraine can now disrupt Primorsk, UST-Luga and Novorossiskya oil ports, needed for 60% of Russian exports.

This would not only deny Moscow vital oil revenues needed to wage war, it would also spark a spectacular global oil market shock. I explain that the USA and allies can urgently prepare for this, while the Ukrainians are still maintaining strategic patience.

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My Kyiv Post Interview: “Russia Lost 12% of Its Oil Refinery Capacity in a Day: What’s the Impact?”

According to energy and geopolitics expert Tom O’Donnell, Ukrainian allies’ oil price cap, in conjunction with Ukrainian drones’ physical damage could be a significant hit to Russian revenues.

by Jason Jay Smart | March 15, 2024, 2:16 pm | Please read at Kyiv Post if possible

Tom O’Donnell, PhD, an expert on energy and geopolitics, sat down with Kyiv Post to explain what Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s energy sector will mean for the larger Russian energy sector.

It sounds like a huge number. But how much do you think losing 12 percent of production, in a day, will affect Russia?

First off, although these refineries hit by Ukrainian drones yesterday represent about 12 percent of Russian production, experience shows that they might not each be totally impaired from production. Nevertheless, there are two particularly significant implications for Russia.

First, whatever percentage of Russian refined oil products this impairs, the damage will both deprive the war economy of needed export revenues and/or of much-needed fuels to keep the domestic war economy running.

Already, Russia had announced it will ban the export of gasoline from March 1 in order to tame prices for consumers in the runup to the presidential elections mid-month. In 2023 about 17 percent of Russian gasoline was exported.

What is the origin of the current price pressure?

The present price pressure is both a result of the demands of the war economy as well as previously successful Ukrainian hits on other refineries that began in January.

Read more: My Kyiv Post Interview: “Russia Lost 12% of Its Oil Refinery Capacity in a Day: What’s the Impact?”

This gets to my second point – the successful refinery strikes of yesterday, involving a reported launch of 58 drones, as well as recent hits on a Russian domestic gas transmission pipeline, all demonstrate that the January successes were not one-off special operations, but rather the beginning of what will be a sustained Ukraine armed forces campaign capable of, over time, significantly disrupting Russia’s all-important oil and gas import revenues and internal refined-product supplies.

Kyiv has launched some of its largest air attacks on Russia this week ahead of the vote, which is set to hand President Vladimir Putin another six-year term in the Kremlin.

If Russia continues to lose refineries, which appears likely, what new complications will it create for Russia?

First, from a strategic point of view, it is important to see these physical strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in conjunction with the sanctions efforts of the USA, EU and other allies aimed at reducing Russian oil profits. These drone strikes should be seen as a “force multiplier” to allied oil sanctions.

How so?

Consider that, with Russia no longer having the Druzba oil pipeline flowing into Central Europe due to EU sanctions, this has forced it to shift its Urals-region oil exports to seaports on the Baltic coast of Russia and to a new western-Arctic port.  Hence, hitting any refining or export facilities inside Russia along this general Urals-oil export corridor has a significant effect on Russia sustaining export revenues. This oil mainly flows to Turkey, India and China, with Russian oil tankers representing the main users of the Suez and then the Red Sea.  Due to sanctions, most of these ships are now either directly or indirectly Russian-controlled, to avoid the sanctions oil-price cap.

There has been a discussion in US-EU security-and-sanctions circles that these ships could be stopped for inspection by Sweden and/or Denmark in the Baltic, in the straights between their countries, and many might be refused passage due to having sketchy insurance and/or being unsafe, old vessels. 

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What do you think of the oil price cap? Is it a good idea?

From the point of view of strategic impact, the allies’ choice of an oil-price cap has been, in my view, a weak and overly complex-to-enforce instrument.  However, in conjunction with Ukrainian drones’ physical damage, the overall hit to Russian revenues might become significant.

Secondly, Ukraine has also hit refineries in Russia just east of its own territory, which will mainly undermine the region’s war economy and complicate supplying the massive demand from Russia’s invasion forces.  This region already has chronic fuel-supply problems, with farmers last year protesting against a lack of diesel for harvests, causing Russia to ban diesel exports during that season.

Dr. Tom O’Donnell is Berlin-based and is a Global Fellow of the Wilson Center.

Jason Jay Smart

Jason Jay Smart

Jason Jay Smart, Ph.D., is a political adviser who has lived and worked in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Latin America. Due to his work with the democratic opposition to Pres. Vladimir Putin, Smart was persona non grata, for life, by Russia in 2010. His websites can be found at http://www.JasonJaySmart.com / http://www.AmericanPoliticalServices.com / fb.com/jasonjaysmart / Twitter: @OfficeJJSmart

Related references for assertions I made in my interview – Tom O’D.