Tag Archives: Vance

I told Pakistan TV: US sees Iran’s Hormuz oil lever as losing effectiveness -&- Al Jazeera: German policy risks another natural gas crisis

Pakistan TV, 9 Aug. We discussed the Trump administration’s two retreats from forcefully reopening Hormuz. This is not so simple as who is winning and who is losing.

The first of two key factors to note: It was GCC allies who sharply blocked Trump from executing planned big assaults on Iran to facilitate reopening Hormuz, on fear of Iranian missile punishment which would continue until the US military finished silencing most of Iran’s missile capacities. The Saudis and Qataris were most sharply opposed to accepting this punishment. What are the implications?

a) On the one hand, their refusal to allow Trump to use force to resolve the Hormuz crisis is a de facto success for the Iranian strategy of attacking all GCC states expecting them to then oppose USA military action against Iran.

b) On the other hand, I suspect the Trump-Vance response to GCC allies caving in to Iranian missiles was similar to the attitude the administration took to Europe and NATO in early 2025, for being seen as unwilling to really fight for either Ukraine or their own nations’ security, assuming the bulk of the task would be performed by the USA. Trump’s comments that Gulf allies should “pay the United States” for protecting them once the Straight is reopened, seems a reflection of this mindset.

Interestingly, we then see the rapid emergence of a new “Islamic NATO” mutual defense alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and perhaps soon Egypt. And simultaneously the Saudi-led new 19-country Red Sea defense league.

These are a striking departure from past Gulf practice. They should be seen, among other things, as an urgent Saudi recognition that the USA either refuses and/or is incapable of continuing to bear the burden of their defense, especially via American “boots on the ground.” I recall when the Obama administration told the Saudis the same, and indeed the Saudis made some military adjustments, including in Yemen, but obviously nothing anywhere like these alliances.

Now, with its new military alliances, the Saudis and their Gulf allies will increasingly be capable of fighting and be expected to actually join in any fight against Iran’s push for hegemony in Hormuz, in the Gulf Region and MENA generally.

The second large factor to note: I also explained how the Iranian leadership’s key lever, their ability to disrupt and partially close Hormuz, is seen by the US administration as a diminishing lever. There are two main indications of this:

  • First, the absence of what had been widely predicted to be astronomical oil price spikes after Hormuz was closed and,
  • Second, agreements are now in place in several Gulf states that four or five new oil pipelines to be built in the next couple years to bypass the Straight.

In fact, Sec. Bessent said exactly this shortly after my interview where I had anticipated this USA attitude. He (characteristically over-) confidently declared these pipelines mean the Straight will become “irrelevant”. And, shortly thereafter, Sec. of Energy Chris Wright was insistent that USA forces are now escorting eight or nine million barrels per day (mbd) of oil out of the Straight, implying a decreasing capacity of Iran to interrupt shipping.

As I have said before here, this tells the administration that it objectively has much more leeway, timewise, for resolving this crisis than any other administration would have before. This is part of their calculation that they can now, in effect pause any significant offensive military operations and focus on a new (really a second) “economic war” against Iran, to undermine it. However, IMHO, this in-itself cannot, with this particular IRGC-led regime, be sufficient to resolve the Hormuz crisis. In the end, this will require with the use of substantial USA force to accomplish physical occupation, with troops and electronically, of the shore-region of the Straight, and significant further erosion of Iranian missile and drone stocks and capacities to import and/or produce these. Alternatively, a USA back-down, a partial “surrender” is required, which would be almost impossible for any president to accept considering Iranian demands at present, which are hardly conciliatory.

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Analysis: Vance saw Zelensky as publicly rearguing an agreed deal |Trump will force or flatter his plan on Ukraine & Russia, as needed

TRT asked me to be ready to comment, live, on the Oval Office meeting just before it blew up. I said Vance acted “infantile”. What I should have stressed, however, is that understanding Vance’s decision to blow up the meeting is key to understanding Trump’s strategy towards Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. (So, in this post the written analysis is the main thing, not the video.)

My TRT quick take, 28 Feb. See my later analysis, in the blog post.

There is plenty of facile analyses of this clash. Many say the blowup reflected “chaos” in Trump’s policy on Ukraine and Russia, or that Trump has an “impulsive” strategy, that he “dislikes Ukraine”, he’s “pro-Russian,” or that the blowup was a “prearranged ambush” to “humiliate” Zelensky, or similar.

Too few consider the possibility that the rebuke is consistent with a well-defined USA strategy. What quickly becomes clear from listening, at face value, to multiple statements by Trump himself and his team is that they have a consistent strategy. This is clearly not the first Trump administration. This second administration is different in its unity and consistency on its Ukraine, Russia, and Europe policies.

What was the purpose of the “minerals” deal that Zelensky came to sign?

The weeks-long USA-Ukrainian clash over this deal has reflected their geostrategic differences on a peace deal with Russia. After heated exchanges and compromises, clearly the Ukrainian side was not pleased with the issues it had had to give up in the minerals deal. Nevertheless, Zelensky’s Council of Ministers voted to endorse the deal, and Zelensky went to DC explicitly to sign it.

Interestingly, just before he went to the White House, President Zelensky met with a group of Republican and Democratic senators, who had “… all told him sign the deal and don’t get into an argument.” (War on the Rocks, timestamp 7:58-8:19, 06.03.25). Alas, if one watches Zelensky’s public argumentation, from the start of the press conference, and his telling Trump that a deal without a US security guarantee won’t work, all of which is in contradiction to the deal he is about to sign, it is clear that he precipitated the breakdown. In my reading of the event, he seemed to not be able to restrain himself, seemingly out of an understandable deep anguish at being about to sign an accord contrary to his better judgment.

What did each side want in the “minerals” deal, and who got what?

Everything I found to have been said by the actors on the USA and Ukrainian sides as to what each wanted in the document is quite consistent.

On the Ukrainian side, the big one was a USA security guarantee for any deal Trump makes with Putin. The Ukrainians certainly welcome the willingness of European allies to extend security guarantees for any deal, especially the public commitments made by both the UK and France to contribute troops, but they were clear that they did not think this can substitute for a USA guarantee standing behind theirs. Related to this, the Ukrainians opposed taking NATO membership for them off the table. Another was a seat at the table for Ukraine and the Europeans during negotiations with Russia (Trump wants something more like a shuttle diplomacy between the two.) Related to this, is that the USA should not negotiate a cease fire deal without them. Still another was refusing to agree beforehand to give up any Ukrainian territory that has been occupied by Russia.

Obviously the USA disagreed and de facto or openly refused all these conditions. However, the disagreement over the security guarantee seemed to be the most hot-button issue between them. Trump flatly refused. His reasoning, as explained to the press was interesting, revealing a lot about his philosophy or method for negotiating a peace deal. He said that the two sides obviously hated one another and he had to go between the two to negotiate anything. (Read Trump’s own words, in the transcript below.)

The Trump concept of economic interests and security interests

He also said that they had to trust him, saying that it just would not work if he first gave a security guarantee, taking Ukraine’s side so clearly beforehand. He also said that the ultimate security guarantee “is the easy part” and getting the deal “is the hard part.” He said the guarantees can “come later.” It became clear that, in his approach, this minerals deal was to be the signal to Putin that the USA would have long-term economic interests in Ukraine and would, of course, in Trump’s view of how the world works, defend against any threats to those economic interests.

This approach is clearly seen as highly risky by Ukraine, which has been abandoned once before under what was an explicit security guarantee, the Bucharest Memorandum, extended in return for giving up its nuclear weapons in the 1990’s. As Zelensky recounted for Trump, no signatories of the Minsk Accords extended security guarantees after Russia’s 2014 aggression, and Putin broke them constantly

The text of the final document, the one the Ukrainian ministers approved, is known; it was published in Kyiv two days before the Oval Office meeting. (The full text of the Ukraine-US Minerals Agreement, European Pravda, Kyiv, 26.02.25). So, it is easy to see that Kyiv didn’t get its main demands, although the USA did compromise, in a sense, on one of them, agreeing to an explicit mention of a “security guarantee.” However, the USA did not extend one as a quid-pro-quo for the minerals deal, rather in Section 10. the wording is:

The Government of the United States of America supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace. Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments, as defined in the Fund Agreement.

So, the USA vision of security, to “protect mutual investments,” is asserted in association..

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