Both Christof Rühl (bio) and Jack Kemp (bio) had great, data-driven media this past week. I too addressed these issues (spoiler: I assess Trump is not bluffing on Iran talks, and oil supply remains adequate.) My conflict-trajectory take differs a bit from Chrisof, perhaps closer to Jack K here.. My Al Jazeera was just after Trump announced talks.
Dear readers, This paper, which I wrote in 2008-09, analyzed the evolution of interests underlying the US-Iran crisis till then, interests which persist in the 2026 US-Iran war.
That is, Trump’s “USA Energy Dominance” strategy does not seek to fundamentally alter the structure or logic of the post-1973 global, market-centered, USA-led-and-protected oil order. However, to preserve it, the USA now feels the necessity of removing the Iranian mullahs as custodians of Iran’s oil for persistently insisting on projecting power and seeking hegemony in the energy-critical Gulf Region.
What is new from 2008, is the bipartisan urgency felt in Washington to renovate the existing oil market-and-security order, reconsolidating the USA as primary arbiter of energy flows via Hormuz to both China and US allied and friendly states of the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, to be capable of significantly blocking Russian oil exports and thereby its petrostate-fueled aggression elsewhere.
In particular, it mush achieve these aims, vis-a-vis Russia and China, without causing global oil shocks. (continued in full-column below …)
Mar 12, 2026. Is the Iran war about the US containing China? For my part, I explained how control of Hormuz would give the US two key levers:
The USA will control half of China’s oil imports, 5.4 million barrels per day (mbd), which flow through Hormuz.
The USA will insure that during any Pacific war China might start that Iran, acting in solidarity with China, could not block oil flows to US Asian allies such as Japan, S. Korea, Australia, Philippines, or flows to others whose supplies it would also want to guarantee, such as Viet Nam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, etc..
This is a longish, ca. 30 minute video. Host Nataly Lutsenko kindly told me she wanted to make a long interview.
(During time of crisis like this, I have so many TV and press interviews that I don’t have time to put most of them online. So, I will refrain from writing long posts to accompany videos to get more online, if I think they are useful interviews. – Tom O’D)
Last night on TRT World Global News (London), I emphasized that despite the modest spike in oil prices from about $70 to $78 per barrel as of yesterday, Trump has an historically unprecedented advantage for exercising “US Energy Dominance.”
Fig. 1. IEA projects global oil glut throughout 202
The campaigns against Venezuela and Iran, plus the turning of the Indian oil-consuming behemoth towards USA and Western interests vs Russian oil, are examples of the geopolitical leverage the USA’s now-dominant role in global oil affairs has afforded the Trump administration.
This oil-market advantage comes mainly from of two things:
MY COMMENTS: 1) USA long-planned surprise strategy 2) Iran leaders’ 20-year nukes brinkmanship strategy aimed for USA ssecurity-guarantee deal
ALL GUESTS – TRT-London, USA bombing
I was invited on TRT-World, London, 24 June, for a panel after US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites (see the panelist lineup below. I answered two questions at some length – see the 2nd video.)
In summary: Trump claims USA Operation Midnight Hammer “obliterated” the country’s nuclear capacity, but how much have they really been degraded?
My analysis is that it does not matter. If the USA decides to bomb again at will, without Iran having air defenses the USA and Israel can destroy or disrupt most any renewed Iranian work on its nuclear or conventional missile program. If, as he stated, repeat bombings as needed are Trump’s intention, then this should be the case. This now leaves Iran very little negotiating leverage. The regional proxies it always intended to use for retaliation in just such a scenario have been decimated by Israel.
Therefore, there is a high likelihood Iran will be forced by Trump to negotiate from a now much weaker position. If Tehran resists, it could fall back to rely on state-sponsored terrorist methods, which are of limited usefulness for maintaining a modern functioning state and economy.
Overall, I emphasize that this “12 Day War” has been especially motivated, by Trump, to assure USA Gulf allies that they can now safely enter into the Abraham Accords with Israel and the USA, establishing a new regional security structure. Trump will be constrained to do whatever is necessary, militarily and in negotiations, to insure the Iranian threat these allies have felt acutely remains under control. In turn, if these accords, which Trump’s chief negotiator, Steve Witkoff, was reportedly already working on among the USA’s Gulf Arab allies immediately after the USA bombing is intended to allow the USA to move on, focusing more squarely on Great Power competition elsewhere.
This is my general assessment. There are many details and some possible derailments here, of course. – Tom O’D.
The ceasefire Trump brokered will hopefully end this “12-Day War.” I want to discuss here why this war did not trigger a global energy crisis. [Here’s what I said about this to Al Jazeera last week, in the last five paragraphs. A PDF is also embedded below. I’ll also post a TRT-London show on Iran’s nuclear strategy, recorded Tuesday, soon.]
To assess the risk to energy supplies, understanding the aims of the combatants is key. Throughout this war, it was the USA-Israel side setting the agenda, and there were two strategic aims they could pursue. One was to “only” destroy Iran’s nuclear program and its existing conventional regional power-projection capacities. The second was to go beyond this to undermine the viability of the Islamic Republic, up to forcing a regime change. Why do I say this?
ENGLISH Interview | Al Watan, Cairo. Thurs 10Oct24. 15 minutes
ARABIC Interview
At first, we focused on IEA warnings of a possible EU winder gas shortage due to supply-and-demand mismatches. I agree and expand on the IEA points.
Second, I explained that if Israel retaliates against Iran so strongly that it threatens the regimes survival, or is seen as intending to provoke regime change, then the Iranian leadership will have “nothing to lose” by in-turn escalating to the maximum. Aside from unleashing the maximum response of its proxies surrounding Israel, Tehran’s most potent weapon would be to spark a global oil and gas crisis.
Consider oil: Iran can either shut down the Straights of Hormuz (or simply make them unsafe for tankers) and/or, it can use missiles and drones to destroy significant parts of Saudi, UAE and other Gulf oil facilities, including perhaps even Azerbaijan’s as some Iranian propagandists have threatened.
Consider natural gas: Shutting the Straights or directly hitting Qatar’s massive LNG exports infrastructure would immediately stop Qatari LNG exports. As the world’s second largest LNG exporter, this would immediately cause a separate global natural gas crisis.
Again, oil security is determined by both global-market balances and geostrategic realities – at present the Mideast war and Russia’s War on Ukraine. My analyses this weekend were featured in: (a)an AlHurra video (LHS English, RHS Arabic), and below these (b)a detailed BBC-Cairo print interview (LHS English Google Translate, RHS Arabic original). where I make similar points as my Friday video in Warsaw.
Alhurra ENGLISH. My comments at 2:45 & 8:20. Date: 5 Oct 2024, with co-guest GPI President Paolo von Schirach, Washington.
Alhurra ARABIC, 5 October 2024
My BBC (CAIRO) print interview in Arabic and English (Google Translate):
Re: Urgente Pedido de Entrevista Periodística – Corresponsales Clarín y La Nación – Argentina
De Maria E… … Fri, Apr 29, 11:50 PM
Dr. O ´Donnell, … Estas son las preguntas para la entrevista del domingo:
1¿Alemania tiene otra posibilidad que no sea seguir comprando el gas ruso? ¿Cuáles serían sus otras opciones?
Repuesta: Antes que nada, muchas gracias por esta oportunidad de hablar con su audiencia argentina.
Pues, debo señalar que hay dos problemas diferentes: el suministro de petróleo ruso a Alemania y Europa y el suministro de gas ruso a Alemania y Europa. Me preguntas por el gas. El gas es mucho más difícil para Europa y para Alemania que el petróleo Hay dos casos: una reducción gradual o parcial de gas o un corte inmediato.
Un corte gradual se puede manejar bastante bien. Ahora Putin está tratando de dividir y conquistar Europa cortando el suministro de gas a Polonia y Bulgaria.
Un recorte inmediato, ya sea por parte de Putin o debido a las sanciones de la UE, crearía una gran crisis energética en Europa. Sin embargo, es importante entender que, al final, Putin está en una posición mucho más débil.
Si Putin corta todos los suministros de gas a Europa, ahora no hay suficiente gas en el mercado mundial para compensar. Pero Occidente, y especialmente EE. UU., la administración Biden, se ha estado preparando para esto al menos dos meses antes de que Putin invadiera Ucrania, incluso antes de que Europa creyera las advertencias de EE. UU. de que Putin atacaría Ucrania.
It was my pleasure to be with Thierry Bros of Sciences Po University, Paris, and Peter Zalmayev, Ukrainian security analyst and executive director of Eurasian Democracy Initative on David Foster’s Roundtable on TRT World, London, broadcast 9 June 2021.
I discussed Biden’s apparent reasoning for waiving Nord Stream 2 sanctions:
First off, the German government of Angela Merkel simply would not cooperate otherwise. Allowing her pet energy project to go forward was the price she had demanded for trans-Atlantic “unity” before Biden’s summit with Putin.
(Aside: My research in Berlin and elsewhere has convinced me that, at no point from the late-Trump administration through Biden’s six months in office, did the German side actually engage in any meaningful “negotiation” or discussions with the US side to seek to find some compromise or to initiate a moratorium on construction. Not until Biden waived sanctions on Nord Stream 2 AG, and decided not to sanction any German firms inolved in construction did Merkel show any real interest in discussions. She emphasized her change of attitude on negotiating with Biden about: “what now are also the necessary commonalities in the relationship with Russia” in comments during a German national broadcast interview immediately following Biden’s sanctions waiver. Until this waiver, she had held up any real discussion of the pressing issues of trans-Atlantic unity-in-general, whcih urgently needed attention.
Secondly, as the EU and NATO allies all realize, Biden has to have this summit with Putin for a number of reasons. As I indicated on the show, the summit is needed to discuss:
Here are four issues on the Biden-Blinkin sanctions decision I discussed with EuroNews and other news media in the last few days:
-1- Regarding Biden’s waiving of sanctions on the company Nord Stream 2 AG and its head Matthias Warnig (former Stazi officer):
These sanctions would be unlikely to stop NS2, though it would cause difficulty for the firm and the European oil and gas firms that are partnering with it.
I am not surprised, however, in light of the upcoming Biden-Putin summit. It should be noted that the Russian side (e.g., their ambassador here in Berlin) has made clear, publicly, that sanctions would kill the Biden-Putin summit — which both sides need on many hot issues (see my comments of yesterday, on Iran negotiations, and US necessity to withdraw on-the-ground forces from the Middle East, and to focus on “Great Power Competition” vs. especially China, and Russia).
-2- As for effect of the new sanctions on the pipeline’s construction, and what options the US has:
Soldiers deployed in Poland are a kind of warning to the Kremlin. – Source: GazetaPrawna.pl
My interview on Trump’s announced US troop draw downs from Germany and partial reassignment to Poland appeared in the Polish economic press Gazeta Prawna on 25 June 2020 by the Polish journalist Artur Ciechanowicz. You can read it (a) in ENGLISH below (via Google Translate, with minor fixes) or (b) in the POLISH original at this link.
O’Donnell: Soldiers at the borders of Russia are a signal to the Kremlin [INTERVIEW]
From a military point of view, deploying too many troops too close to the border with a potential enemy is dangerous because there is a risk that they can be overrun rapidly – says Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, energy and international affairs analyst, and adjunct faculty at Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.
Question: US President Donald Trump has decided to increase the US military presence in Poland, while also reducing the contingent in Germany. Where do these decisions come from?
On the one hand, they logically result from the American National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 2017. Work on it began during Barack Obama’s term of office and was completed by the Donald Trump administration. According to the NSS, the US priority is no longer the war on terror and the situation in the Middle East, but competition with China and Russia. It is therefore quite natural that the United States moves its troops and increases its military presence in countries closer to Russia – the Baltic States, Poland and Romania. The second factor that led to these decisions was the personal involvement of Donald Trump, who is running his election campaign.
Poland’s security will increase?
As a rule, increasing the US military presence in Poland is of course good news. The Pentagon’s activities have been moving in this direction for some time, although the US military is of the opinion that this should be done a little slower and not at the expense of Germany. From a military point of view, deploying too much of the army too close to the border with a potential enemy is dangerous because there is a risk that it will be overrun too soon. There is therefore a tactical reason to keep some of the army a little further from the Russian border. Therefore, the rapid relocation of a significant number of soldiers to Poland is viewed skeptically by some American commanders. Remember, soldiers deployed in Poland are a kind of warning against the Kremlin. There are enough of them for Vladimir Putin to think twice before doing anything. However, not enough – even after increasing the quota – to stop the first strike. The rule is simple here: if Russia decided to attack Poland and American soldiers would die, it would mean a war with all the power of the US. Neither any president nor Congress would hesitate a single moment.
Some American commanders are opposed to the permanent presence of US troops in Poland. Why? Continue reading →
Last week, Gillian Rich at Investor’s Business Daily (Washington), asked me (Berlin) and others about the OPEC’s 20-21 June meeting. Below here, I give my views in more detail, including the tie-in to the Trump project to isolate Iran and my comment about Putin likely betraying the Iranians again. The IBD piece is here: Trump Could Make OPEC’s Next Meeting As Dysfunctional As G-7 Summit. 15 June ’18.
We spoke about market and geopolitical aspects. On the latter, I emphasized both the Trump Administration’s evolving plan to sanction and isolate Iran, and Russia’s new role as a central player with OPEC ever since the 2016 joint Russian-OPEC decision to raise production.
That’s when Putin played a new role for any Russian leader. Not only did he coordinate Russian oil policy with OPEC’s, he got personally involved in heated discussions, getting on the phone late in the last night with Iranian and Saudi leaders to get the deal sealed. Continue reading →
To put Iran’s recent production increases in perspective: On its own, for 37 years, Iran has struggled to produce two-thirds of its pre-revolutionary level of 6 million barrels/day. Now, domestic opposition is again limiting foreign oil companies’ participation to boost production.
Since the Obama-administration’s and Europe’s nuclear sanctions were lifted early this year (marked ‘e’ on the chart), Iran has been expanding its production and exports more rapidly than most experts had expected. Tehran has actually tripled exports since late-2015 (see point ‘f’). But, here’s the big question: Can Iran sustain this years’ production gains?
If to, this could seriously undermine Saudi Arabia’s global oil-market share, and boost Iran’s sanctions-damaged economy to a long-awaited recovery.
The short answer: Now that foreign sanctions are finally lifted, the battle to boost Iran’s oil exports has shifted to a domestic clash over whether to allow foreign oil companies to have significant upstream involvement. This is a domestic Iranian issue with a long history.
Historical perspective
Let’s start with some historical perspective: The Iranian National Oil Company (NIOC) can only do so much on its own to boost production. After decades of sanctions, it lacks the needed technology and finance. I told CNNMoney‘s Matt Egan, on Wednesday, that the faster Iran expands on its own, the faster production will plateau. (His CNNMoney article today quotes me .).
This was what happened after the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.(‘b’ on the chart). By about 1992, production had plateaued at almost 4 million barrels/day, under 2/3 of the pre-revolutionary, late-1970’s level of roughly 6 million barrels per day. (‘a’ on chart). The Iranian president at the time, Rafsanjani, argued to religious conservative and nationalist members of the Majilis that only foreign oil companies’ technology and investments could expand production further. However, he only won grudging approval for an offshore project due to fears that foreigners would bring their irreligious ways ashore and/or undermine the hard-won nationalization of Iran’s oil sector. Continue reading →