Tag Archives: United States

Analysis: The USA & China each have failings preparing for a trade war (from Poznan)

Xi Jinping has still not built China’s domestic market to escape its trade-war vulnerabilities from over-dependence on exports, a weakness he openly discussed back in February 2012 on his USA tour before becoming premier.

For the USA, Trump had apparently planned to have resolved the Ukraine war and in some way undermined the Russia-China alliance, inducing Russia to move closer to the USA before going after China. But, ending the war has proven far more difficult than he anticipated. His lack of success with Russia will weigh on his ability to negotiate from a position of strength with all the countries he is competing to win away from China’s geoeconomics orbit such as India, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand and etc. — the states that Treasury Secretary would say are in the “yellow zone” as opposed to the USA#s closest allies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, in the so-called “green zone.” For details – see this post on my blog,

Continue reading

My Asharq-Bloomberg: (1)Trump is following Miran’s tariff strategy (2)My reply to Jeff Sachs on US dollar role (3)Tariffs boost EU deindustrialization & (4)turbocharge German auto-crisis (5)Trump’s EU energy-purchase demands

Here’s my interview and a written elaboration – in lieu of a transcript:

  1. Trump’s “tariff shock” on everyone was intended mainly to force negotiations. Especially this is to insure no country:
    • Functions as a transit state for Chinese exports to get into the USA without paying crippling tariffs, or
    • Provides a Chinese-owned manufacturing site in their country with the same aim of accessing the USA market without crippling tariffs..
      • Trump’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers Miran and Treasury Secretary Bessent have been fairly clear about this, if one listens in detail.
  2. Trump Tariffs’ impact on Europe – Deindustrialization. German auto sector as an example.
    • While Trump and his circle militate against “deindustrialization” of the USA accomplished over the past few decades by the growth of Chinese manufacturing capacity and the export of these products into the USA market, Europe has an immediate problem, however, with the current advance of its “deindustrialization” or, as some more optimistically say, its new industrial “evolution”. [Some references from major German economic institutes on deindustrialization: IFO Institute, IW Institute, Kiel Institute, the latter of which has evolved a bit on this].
    • Taking the German auto industry as an example, it was already suffering from well known, chronic problems of Germany’s own making. These include two decades of low infrastructure investments, poor digitalization, high taxes, and being subjected to arbitrary government mandates to reduce diesel sales and increase battery electric vehicle production, and etc. ON top of this, German industry has also suffered high energy prices due to the countries exceptionally complex all-renewables energy transition model. On top of this came suddenly, from 2021, the Russian energy war, which denied Europe half of the cheap gas that European, and especially German industry was relying on to compensate for the high-cost of the all-renewables transition.
    • This energy war – and on the heels of the Covid shock – was devastating to German manufacturing and heavy industries, providing the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. In my assessment at the time, this was the point at which German industry’s problems of multi-faceted uncompetitiveness morphed into a form of deindustrialization,
    • Germany is in its third year of recession. However, this is not just a recession. Note that the VW, the German auto firm, for example, in September 2024, began mass layoffs for the first time in 87 years in September 2024. BASF is in a similar conundrum. In my view this is a systemic, secular problem over and above any present economic downturn.
    • So, the point of painting this detailed picture of the crisis of German automobile manufacturing, as an example, is that one can now really only imagine what a sharp knock-on effect Trump’s auto tariffs and his other tariffs might have on top of all this.  This is devastating. Already the CEO of Mercedes has said if the tariffs continue he will move the production of the cheaper models to the USA. Already one of the largest exporters of cats from the USA is a German factory.
  3. My response (critique) of Jeff Sacks‘ dollar-decline predictions
    • I was asked to listen to a clip from Asharq/Bloomberg’s earlier on-air interview with Nobel Prize economist, Jeffry Sachs, about his prediction that the US dollar would lose its reserve currency status in this decade and be replaced by regional currencies.
    • My take was that there was little new (or old) factual evidence of this, plus Trump’s tariff shock is not necessarily a long-term tactic. So, I commented that Sachs has had this theory for a long time, an it is nothing new. (I think it is fair to say he is quite sympathetic to China in various interviews, for some years now.) So, I simply said I was not surprised he says this, as he has for a long time.
    • However, I explained (with a bit more factual detail than Sachs, I hope) that indeed, even Trump’s theorist Miran and Bessent too agree that the tariffs strategy is designed to reduce the value of the dollar (its aims is precisely a weak dollar), and this should normally mean that the dollar loses its reserve currency status, its preferred use in the world, that these Trump theorists have a plan for a “Mar-a-Lago” or similar accord for states that are seen as being key, close allies, who would agree to peg their currencies to the dollar, and that they should be expected to agree as they need to trade into the USA market.. This is based on the observation that the USA market has a special status in the world. If this were to pass, they theorize that this would in fact preserve the special, preferred reserve status of the US dollar.  Trump likes this as he has said that if this status is lost, then the destiny of the USA is to be a “third world” economy. **Continued at GlobalBarrel.com ….
Continue reading

My Al Jazeera: The EU will retaliate against Trump’s arbitrary tariffs | Attacking allies, Trump dilutes fight vs. real threats from highly subsidized Chinese exports.

Last night, I was live on Al Jazeera’s evening news to give an “EU perspective” on Trump’s sweeping tariffs on the EU and have a bit of a debate with Hon. Robert Arlett, Sussex County Council, Delaware, USA – a MAGA supporter. I was happy to do so.

I think I made several decent points of criticism about how the entire premise for “retaliation” against the EU on trade was “made up” under an “arbitrary” formula that “makes no sense.” I allowed that, as is often the case with Trump, much of this, the “retaliatory” portion, might be a pressure tactic for some other, still-to-be-revealed concession Trump is aiming for from Europe.

Of course, this is the geo-economic side to Trump’s geostrategic undermining of a unified USA-EU approach to facing Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. (However exactly how that new geostrategic relationship with Europe and NATO might all fit into Trump’s larger, global security strategy is still mostly up in the air, a matter still taking shape.)

However, as for these massive tariffs on Europe and Asian allies, these are a systematic attempt to dismantle globalization as we have known it and instead to focus on the subordination of European and Asian allies to a system where hegemon is unwilling to pay certain costs of maintaining its allies within its system.

Trump envisions a system where the USA makes no sacrifices or pays no communal costs, but must profit at every step from each and every ally. Indeed, the USA has powerful tools afforded it from its geo-economic dominance, tools which Trump seeks to exploit to unilaterally shape international economic and geopolitical relations, while forcing its allies to pay for the privilege and advantages of belonging to the USA-hegemon-maintained system.

Continue reading

My Q1 Polish press: |1|Does Germany want Russian gas back? |2|Green Deal model has a tech problem. |3|German deindustrialization: bankruptcies up. |4|Warsaw, Paris & London must act fast for Ukraine!

Opening of Nord Stream1 pipeline, 2011. Gazprom via PAP

Below are links to 12 articles that appeared in the Polish press in the last few months, interviewing or quoting me on four topics I feel are important. The topics are listed in the title above.

The links are below, sorted by topic. The first or left column has English translations of the titles, and the second or right column has the original Polish — which unfortunately I don’t speak! If you follow the links, Google Translate or Deepl will translated the Polish articles pretty well into English. My special thanks to the intrepid Polish journalist, Artur Ciechanowicz at BiznesAlert in Warsaw for his interviews in the list. (I also had about 33 quotes or interviews in several other languages since December [1]).

ENGLISH titles and links:

  1. On German (far-right) & USA (Trump) each plotting a Russian gas return to Germany
    • A former Stasi agent lobbies for the resumption of Nord Stream. Expert: One of the gas pipeline lines ready to be launched,, By,: Artur Ciechanowicz, March 3, 2025, biznesAlert.pl
    • Some EU countries believed that Gazprom gas would be in Europe forever BiznesAlert.pl
    • “Like a Drug Addict Returning to Heroin.” Analyst on the Idea of ​​Unblocking Gas Imports from Russia to Europe, Author: Artur Ciechanowicz, February 1, 2025, 07:21
  2. Failures of EU Green Deal on technology and energy security.
    • American expert: recommendation to reduce emissions by 90 percent by 2040 is “fantasy” | Energetyka24
    • Expert: EC recommendation to reduce gas emissions is fantasy wpolityce.pl
    • Unrealistic EU climate plan. Expert opinion crushes – Super Business
    • “Rearranging deckchairs on the sinking Titanic”. Expert slams the eco-target dictates of Brussels Eurocrats PCH24.pl
  3. Trump, EU & Poland: Ukraine War crisis.
    • First talk with Putin. Trump has visions of ending the war in Ukraine | Newsweek Jan 21
    • How Trump Can Bring Down the Russian Economy: Analysts: He Has an Arsenal of Means to Do It, By Artur Ciechanowicz, Jan 24, 2025 | Biznes Alert
    • Trump may use [oil] sanctions to finish off Moscow, which is running out of money for the National Welfare Fund. – 16 January 2026 UBN
    • Expert: Washington, London, Warsaw should work quickly. Kiev can’t afford to be patient – Dziennik.pl
  4. German deindustrialization: Energy & economic crisis
    • Major shoe retailer goes bankrupt A sharp increase in bankruptcies in Germany

Polish titles and links:

  1. First topic.
    • Agent Stasi lobbuje za wznowieniem Nord Stream. Ekspert: Jedna z nitek gazociągu gotowa do uruchomienia biznesalert.pl
    • Część krajów Unii uwierzyła, że gaz z Gazpromu będzie w Europie na zawsze BiznesAlert.pl
    • “Jak powrót narkomana do heroiny”. Analityk o pomyśle odblokowania importu gazu z Rosji do Europy | BizNes Alert
  2. 2nd Topic
    • Amerykański ekspert: zalecenie redukcji emisji o 90 proc. do 2040 r. to „fantastyka” | Energetyka24
    • Ekspert: Zalecenie KE redukcji emisji gazów to fantastyka wpolityce.pl
    • Nierealny plan klimatyczny UE. Opinia eksperta miażdży – Super Business
    • “Przestawianie leżaków na tonącym Titanicu”. Ekspert nie zostawia suchej nitki na eko-dyktaturze brukselskich eurokratów – PCH24.pl
  3. Third topic
    • Donald Trump chce uchronić świat przed III wojną światową | Newsweek
    • Jak Trump może złamać rosyjską gospodarkę?
    • Trump may use [oil] sanctions to finish off Moscow, which is running out of money for the National Welfare Fund. – UBN
    • Ekspert: Waszyngton, Londyn, Warszawa powinny szybko działać. Kijowa nie stać na cierpliwość – Dziennik.pl
  4. Fourth topic

Notes:

  • [1] Other than being cited/interviewed in Poland, I was also quoted elsewhere about 33 times so far in 2025, mainly in the USA, with many then translated to languages of Europe, Asia and Latin America. I never know what to do with all these print interviews. Here at GlobalBarrel.com, I often publish videos of some of my live-on-air expert commentary, usually accompanied by a detailed blog post. So, my idea is I will make a new tab at the top of the GlobalBarrel.com site, next to the “About Me” tab, where I can simply list link to my recent press citations or Op-Eds. [Back to text]

Analysis: Vance saw Zelensky as publicly rearguing an agreed deal |Trump will force or flatter his plan on Ukraine & Russia, as needed

TRT asked me to be ready to comment, live, on the Oval Office meeting just before it blew up. I said Vance acted “infantile”. What I should have stressed, however, is that understanding Vance’s decision to blow up the meeting is key to understanding Trump’s strategy towards Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. (So, in this post the written analysis is the main thing, not the video.)

My TRT quick take, 28 Feb. See my later analysis, in the blog post.

There is plenty of facile analyses of this clash. Many say the blowup reflected “chaos” in Trump’s policy on Ukraine and Russia, or that Trump has an “impulsive” strategy, that he “dislikes Ukraine”, he’s “pro-Russian,” or that the blowup was a “prearranged ambush” to “humiliate” Zelensky, or similar.

Too few consider the possibility that the rebuke is consistent with a well-defined USA strategy. What quickly becomes clear from listening, at face value, to multiple statements by Trump himself and his team is that they have a consistent strategy. This is clearly not the first Trump administration. This second administration is different in its unity and consistency on its Ukraine, Russia, and Europe policies.

What was the purpose of the “minerals” deal that Zelensky came to sign?

The weeks-long USA-Ukrainian clash over this deal has reflected their geostrategic differences on a peace deal with Russia. After heated exchanges and compromises, clearly the Ukrainian side was not pleased with the issues it had had to give up in the minerals deal. Nevertheless, Zelensky’s Council of Ministers voted to endorse the deal, and Zelensky went to DC explicitly to sign it.

Interestingly, just before he went to the White House, President Zelensky met with a group of Republican and Democratic senators, who had “… all told him sign the deal and don’t get into an argument.” (War on the Rocks, timestamp 7:58-8:19, 06.03.25). Alas, if one watches Zelensky’s public argumentation, from the start of the press conference, and his telling Trump that a deal without a US security guarantee won’t work, all of which is in contradiction to the deal he is about to sign, it is clear that he precipitated the breakdown. In my reading of the event, he seemed to not be able to restrain himself, seemingly out of an understandable deep anguish at being about to sign an accord contrary to his better judgment.

What did each side want in the “minerals” deal, and who got what?

Everything I found to have been said by the actors on the USA and Ukrainian sides as to what each wanted in the document is quite consistent.

On the Ukrainian side, the big one was a USA security guarantee for any deal Trump makes with Putin. The Ukrainians certainly welcome the willingness of European allies to extend security guarantees for any deal, especially the public commitments made by both the UK and France to contribute troops, but they were clear that they did not think this can substitute for a USA guarantee standing behind theirs. Related to this, the Ukrainians opposed taking NATO membership for them off the table. Another was a seat at the table for Ukraine and the Europeans during negotiations with Russia (Trump wants something more like a shuttle diplomacy between the two.) Related to this, is that the USA should not negotiate a cease fire deal without them. Still another was refusing to agree beforehand to give up any Ukrainian territory that has been occupied by Russia.

Obviously the USA disagreed and de facto or openly refused all these conditions. However, the disagreement over the security guarantee seemed to be the most hot-button issue between them. Trump flatly refused. His reasoning, as explained to the press was interesting, revealing a lot about his philosophy or method for negotiating a peace deal. He said that the two sides obviously hated one another and he had to go between the two to negotiate anything. (Read Trump’s own words, in the transcript below.)

The Trump concept of economic interests and security interests

He also said that they had to trust him, saying that it just would not work if he first gave a security guarantee, taking Ukraine’s side so clearly beforehand. He also said that the ultimate security guarantee “is the easy part” and getting the deal “is the hard part.” He said the guarantees can “come later.” It became clear that, in his approach, this minerals deal was to be the signal to Putin that the USA would have long-term economic interests in Ukraine and would, of course, in Trump’s view of how the world works, defend against any threats to those economic interests.

This approach is clearly seen as highly risky by Ukraine, which has been abandoned once before under what was an explicit security guarantee, the Bucharest Memorandum, extended in return for giving up its nuclear weapons in the 1990’s. As Zelensky recounted for Trump, no signatories of the Minsk Accords extended security guarantees after Russia’s 2014 aggression, and Putin broke them constantly

The text of the final document, the one the Ukrainian ministers approved, is known; it was published in Kyiv two days before the Oval Office meeting. (The full text of the Ukraine-US Minerals Agreement, European Pravda, Kyiv, 26.02.25). So, it is easy to see that Kyiv didn’t get its main demands, although the USA did compromise, in a sense, on one of them, agreeing to an explicit mention of a “security guarantee.” However, the USA did not extend one as a quid-pro-quo for the minerals deal, rather in Section 10. the wording is:

The Government of the United States of America supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace. Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments, as defined in the Fund Agreement.

So, the USA vision of security, to “protect mutual investments,” is asserted in association..

Continue reading

Our Gdansk chat: Baltic energy risks | USA ousting China from post-war order | “Transition” will be simple: nuclear & mass-transit. “Critical” minerals overblown | EU’s failing model: all-renewables, new grids, grid-storage & EVs | Poland’s risk: China uses Russia

This is in English, after Eugene Romer of Układ Sił media introduces me in Polish. This was at the “3 Seas -1 Opportunity Forum” in Gdansk, last June 4-5, 2024. I have been wanting to post it ever since, as the questions remain relevant. My thanks to Eugene and his team, and to his Opportunity Think Tank colleagues.

My panel at the forum was on problems of relying on energy security that arrives via the sea. So, think Poland and Lithuania’s LNG terminals, of the many sub-sea pipelines, power and communications cables between Baltic and Nordic states. And, since June, all the incidents where ships leaving Russian ports “accidentally” dragged their anchors, cutting such vital links. So, this conference was rather prescient. My sincere thanks to our hosts The Opportunity Institute for Foreign Affairs.

Continue reading

My Asharq-Bloomberg: Ukraine OKs Azerbaijani-only gas transit; Orban & Fico vote Russian sanctions | Trump could crush RU oil if Putin won’t deal

English here (Arabic is below). Asharq-Bloomberg.
(Arabic. English is above). Asharq-Bloomberg spot.

Last night, Asharq, the Mideast Bloomberg news affiliate, asked me three questions (roughly translated):

  1. The the EU wants to extend the sanctions (on Russian gas), at the same time they want to open open the Russian pipeline through Ukraine. What is this contradiction? How to understand it in practise?
  2. How will Ukraine respond to these talks? Don’t you think that Ukraine will accept, for example, to open this project or to reopen these pipelines to resupply gas? Don’t you think the other European nations that were impacted neglecting or abandoning this Russian gas?
  3. Doctor, don’t you think that there has been a change in US policies, economic and political policies towards Russia after the reelection of Trump? Do you think we may see a change?

Here is a transcript of the Q&A (AI generated)

1
00:00:00,052 –> 00:00:02,772
are joined by Doctor Thomas Odoner. From

2
00:00:02,932 –> 00:00:05,052
Berlin. Welcome back, Doctor. Happy to

3
00:00:05,052 –> 00:00:07,972
have you with us tonight. So the EU

Continue reading

My interview at Lithuania’s LRT: Trump could seriously harm Russia if he wants to | Trumpas, jeigu tik norėtų, galėtų stipriai pakenkti Rusijai

My long print interview at Lithuania’s LRT [Lithuanian PDF | English PDF​] with Aleksandra ​Ketlerienė, deputy editor-in-chief of Lithuania’s LRT.lt, published 7January. We spoke in Warsaw, 19 November. My thanks to Aleksandra for her insightful questioning and editorial care. We discussed:

  • The EU’s systemic energy​-policy “own goals” ​since its initial energy-crisis win ​after Moscow began cutting gas exports early in 2021​.
  • Reforming failed/ineffective Russian price-cap sanctions for real sanctions, and how the global oil market is now favorable for “maximum pressure.”
  • Historical perspectives on oil, gas, renewables, and nuclear sectors, essential for realistic policy formation.
  • An historical overview of China’s decades-long effort to overcome its energy security, learning lessons of Japan’s WW2 weaknesses.
  • (​See topics summary))
Continue reading

My two Sky News: Russian gas via Ukraine not needed: 1) EU has won initial Energy War. 2) But, crisis continues: Volatile EU wind/solar gobbling gas, boosting prices & deindustrialization. Green Deal needs reform. 3) Trump’s demand EU buy more US LNG has seller & buyer risks.

1st row: English (my voice). 2nd row: Arabic (all). EN transcripts below.

EN SkyNews 01.01.25
EN SkyNews 02.01.25
AR SkyNews 01.01.25
AR SkyNews 01.01.25
Continue reading

My BiznesAlert: German elites have no idea how to get out of the crisis / Ekspert dla Biznes Alert: niemieckie elity nie mają pomysłu na wyjście zkryzysu

Last night, leaving the Polish Sejm, after a long discussion, invited by a leader.

URL CORRECTIONS: ENGLISH Biznes Interview LINK & POLISH Biznes Interview LINK

[Warsaw, 21 Nov] Here’s my interview with BiznesAlert’s Artur Ciechanowicz (in EN & Pl) on Germany’s energy, industrial and political crises. I spoke here in Warsaw Monday at the CEE Energy Security Conference, attended Wednesday’s 25 Years of NATO Membership conference, and was invited yesterday evening, by a leader of the Sejm (parliament) for a long talk in his offices, joined by Mark Voyger (American University Kyiv and former-NATO). More soon. Tom O’D.

Continue reading

My BBC(Cairo)+Alhurra(Wash DC): What if Israel bombs Iran’s oil? Does Israel have an end strategy? “Smite enemies, repeat in 10 years”?

Again, oil security is determined by both global-market balances and geostrategic realities – at present the Mideast war and Russia’s War on Ukraine. My analyses this weekend were featured in: (a) an AlHurra video (LHS English, RHS Arabic), and below these (b) a detailed BBC-Cairo print interview (LHS English Google Translate, RHS Arabic original). where I make similar points as my Friday video in Warsaw.

Alhurra ENGLISH. My comments at 2:45 & 8:20. Date: 5 Oct 2024, with co-guest GPI President Paolo von Schirach, Washington.
Alhurra ARABIC, 5 October 2024

My BBC (CAIRO) print interview in Arabic and English (Google Translate):

Continue reading

My Briefing Paper for USA House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, “… Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector.”

—– Click image to open PDF

I was asked to write a Brief for the USA House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs (Europe Subcommittee) 12 March hearing: “Going Nuclear on Rosatom: Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector,” submitted via Wilson Center in Washington, where I am a Global Fellow (external). There are two aspects to the Brief:

  1. My assessment of how threats posed to the 3-Seas-Region Member States executing a pragmatic energy transition incorporating nuclear energy emanate both from the role of Russia’s Rosneft, and equally from the activities of seven anti-nuclear Member States led by Germany, and
  2. Detailed research on Russia’s nuclear energy dangers contributed by colleagues in Poland and Ukraine.  Their research includes:
  • Appendix A: Some facts and policy recommendations on Rosatom activities, based on research by Warsaw colleagues at The Polish Economic Institute (PEI), Dr. Adam Juszczak, and Mr. Kamil Lipiński (p. 6);
  • Appendix B. Rosatom may be assisting in circumventing sanctions., from research by colleagues at DiXiE Group, Kyiv, Ukraine, especially Mr. Roman Nitsovych, and Ms. Olena Pavlenko (p. 7);
  • Appendix C. Why sanction Rosatom: Link between “peaceful” Rosatom energy & Russian nuclear weapons, based on research by CGS Strategy XXI , Kyiv, Ukraine, in particular Mykhailo M. Gonchar, Founder and President, and Chief Editor of the Black Sea Security Journal (p. 11.)

I highly recommend their three Appendices.

I should note that what I wrote in the main body was likely unexpected. I wrote that, for accomplishing a pragmatic, nuclear-power-inclusive energy transition in the 3-Seas Region (i.e., the EU’s Central and Eastern Europe, Baltic, and Balkan Member States), the continued dependencies on Russia’s Rosatom are not the only threats. The threat from the Group of Seven anti-nuclear states, led by Germany, is clearly equally or more disruptive to the Region accomplishing a pragmatic energy security-and-transition policy. I’ll quote a bit of the report on this point:

Continue reading

1st “Berlin Energy Forum” 21 May | A monthly disruption of the local ‘energy echo chamber.’

Dear Colleagues & friends, Below is an invite to our first Berlin Energy Forum (jump to details | jump to register), but first a personal note.

First, a personal note: As some of you know, this is an idea I’ve been floating in Berlin since well before Corona. Then, last October, I had an experimental test run, a one-off, sponsored by the Qatari embassy’s Divan – and it went very well.

However, the biggest success from that event was that Ben Aris, co-founder and editor-in-chief of bne IntelliNews enthusiastically joined me to found the Berlin Energy Forum as a regular monthly sort of membership club. Amongst the longest serving foreign correspondents in Eastern Europe, Ben has been covering Russia since 1993, with stints in the Baltics and Central Asia. He is a former Moscow bureau chief for the Daily Telegraph and was a contributing editor at The Banker and Euromoney for a decade amongst writing for many other publications. He is also a professional photographer, and nowadays based in Berlin.

Ben is one of those rare people who relishes doing analysis and data-driven writing (non-stop!), AND who knows how to do business – and thoroughly enjoys doing it. Just the partner for this endeavor.

My model and inspiration for this forum was always the New York Energy Forum, which has run for over 40 years now. I happily attended while teaching in NYC. My experience with that forum, plus familiarity with a few top DC think tanks, and various foreign diplomats (esp. in NYC/UN), is how, as an academic, I got to know a broad spectrum of USA oil and gas executives, journalists, financial-institution analysts and government officials. Those personal connections have, over the years, anchored my assessments of USA, of OPEC MENA-and-Latin American members’, and of Russian and Chinese strategy. This sort of community doesn’t exist in Europe in such a focused manner, save perhaps in London. Perhaps we can now bring a bit of that world to Berlin with our new BEF.

Continue reading

Jerusalem Post asked me: “Why can’t Israel make unilateral decisions on its multifront war?”

I was asked by Debbie Mohblatt for the Jerusalem Post on Thursday: Why can’t Israel make unilateral decisions [i.e., as to whether and how to attack Iran]? Two other geopolitical experts interviewed were Jack Kennedy, head of Middle East and North Africa Country Risk at S&P Global Market Intelligence, and Noa Meir, founder of the Gideon Meir Diplomacy Center. My quoted remarks follow, the full article is here, and farther below I put today’s performative Israeli response in perspective..

Israel dependent on American decisions

Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, a global fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington who teaches in Berlin, told The Media Line that Israel was very dependent on American decisions. He added that in this case, Israel could carry out some small-scale symbolic response that would not necessarily draw an additional Iranian attack leading to escalation.

“Israel has always gotten huge amounts of support from the United States—military and otherwise. It’s quite clear that it [Israel] can’t sustain a protracted war, especially a protracted war of the nature it would be against Iran, without the United States’ support, and there’s no other country that is capable or willing to give that support,” he said.

O’Donnell added that very few of the world’s countries can make these kinds of decisions without considering their allies. “A small country can go to war with another small country. But if this is going to bring in larger powers, they have to be very careful,” he continued.

… O’Donnell explained that ever since President George W. Bush’s administration, which came before Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, the United States has been very clear that it made a mistake by putting too many boots on the ground in the Middle East and that it must get out of the region. “It has to focus on great power competition against Russia and China. And this is becoming more urgent by the day,” he continued, explaining part of the rationale behind the US not wanting a major escalation between Israel and Iran. (Read the entire article for the others’ comments.)

Continue reading

New “CEE Nuclear Energy Network” holds 1st policy consultation with Polish officials & experts.

On 4 April, in Warsaw, the first meeting of our new CEE Nuclear Expert Network (a policy network) was held to consult with Polish officials and experts. The network organizers include:

Below, I explain: i) Our event, who attended and such, and ii) our other planned 2024 Nuclear Expert Network events for Poland and the 3 Seas Region.

i) 1st “Chatham House” Nuclear Expert Network meeting

Attending were representatives of the Ministry of Climate and Environment, the Ministry of Technology and Development, the Prime Minister’s office, National Development Bank of Poland (BGK), Industrial Development Agency (ARP), Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne S.A. (PSE – the national electric grid operator or TSO), a consultancy advising the ministry, and others. (See also Kamil Lipinski’s LinkedIn Post’s list below.),

Continue reading