Xi Jinping has still not built China’s domestic market to escape its trade-war vulnerabilities from over-dependence on exports, a weakness he openly discussed back in February 2012 on his USA tour before becoming premier.
For the USA, Trump had apparently planned to have resolved the Ukraine war and in some way undermined the Russia-China alliance, inducing Russia to move closer to the USA before going after China. But, ending the war has proven far more difficult than he anticipated. His lack of success with Russia will weigh on his ability to negotiate from a position of strength with all the countries he is competing to win away from China’s geoeconomics orbit such as India, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand and etc. — the states that Treasury Secretary would say are in the “yellow zone” as opposed to the USA#s closest allies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, in the so-called “green zone.” For details – see this post on my blog,
Credit: Vėjo jėgainė | J. Stacevičiaus / LRT nuotr.
My gratitude to LRT.lt journalist Vaida Kalinkaitė-Matuliauskienė for this in-depth print interview. We spoke just after Baltic states had disconnected from the Russian-Belarus electrical grid, BRELL, and had connected with the European grid. This was a complex and costly project, executed rapidly and flawlessly. [My comment continue below, after the English (first link) and Lithuanian (second link) versions:]
The Baltic states’ impetus was obvious: a deep mistrust of Russia after its 2022 cutoff of half of all European gas imports intended to pressure EU states to abandon solidarity with Ukraine as Russia invaded it. So, switching to the European grid is a great relief. However, the dangers haven’t ended.
I felt greatly honored to speak in Ireland, the home of my ancestors, at a high-level Irish-Polish event, invited by the Polish embassy as part of Poland’s Presidency of the European Council. [Spoiler alert: my assessment of the Green Deal’s impact on EU energy security and competitiveness was highly critical. And, I called for a radical reform, modeled on the 1970-80’s French Messmer nuclear program, the response to a similarly dire European energy and competitiveness crisis.]
For Ireland we had Secretary General Oonagh Buckley and Wind Energy Ireland CEO Noel Cunniffee; for Poland, Daniel Piekarsky, Head of Energy Security Unit in the Foreign Ministry, and myself, Global Fellow of the Wilson Center, Washington (external) working in Europe, from Berlin.
Our moderator, from the Polish Embassy, Dublin, was the Polish diplomat and patriot, Dr. Jacek Rosa — a good friend, with whom I had the great pleasure of closely collaborating, for several years, in opposition to the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 gas-pipeline partnership, before the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Below is the lineup, the initial invitation and some pictures. The event was off-the-record, so I show here only my own, slightly redacted talk.
Opening of Nord Stream1 pipeline, 2011. Gazprom via PAP
Below are links to 12 articles that appeared in the Polish press in the last few months, interviewing or quoting me on four topics I feel are important. The topics are listed in the title above.
The links are below, sorted by topic. The first or left column has English translations of the titles, and the second or right column has the original Polish — which unfortunately I don’t speak! If you follow the links, Google Translate or Deepl will translated the Polish articles pretty well into English. My special thanks to the intrepid Polish journalist, Artur Ciechanowicz at BiznesAlert in Warsaw for his interviews in the list. (I also had about 33 quotes or interviews in several other languages since December [1]).
ENGLISH titles and links:
On German (far-right) & USA (Trump) each plotting a Russian gas return to Germany
A former Stasi agent lobbies for the resumption of Nord Stream. Expert: One of the gas pipeline lines ready to be launched,, By,:Artur Ciechanowicz, March 3, 2025, biznesAlert.pl
Some EU countries believed that Gazprom gas would be in Europe forever BiznesAlert.pl
“Like a Drug Addict Returning to Heroin.” Analyst on the Idea of Unblocking Gas Imports from Russia to Europe, Author: Artur Ciechanowicz, February 1, 2025, 07:21
Failures of EU Green Deal on technology and energy security.
American expert: recommendation to reduce emissions by 90 percent by 2040 is “fantasy” | Energetyka24
Expert: EC recommendation to reduce gas emissions is fantasy wpolityce.pl
Unrealistic EU climate plan. Expert opinion crushes – Super Business
“Rearranging deckchairs on the sinking Titanic”. Expert slams the eco-target dictates of Brussels Eurocrats – PCH24.pl
Trump, EU & Poland: Ukraine War crisis.
First talk with Putin. Trump has visions of ending the war in Ukraine | Newsweek Jan 21
How Trump Can Bring Down the Russian Economy: Analysts: He Has an Arsenal of Means to Do It, By Artur Ciechanowicz, Jan 24, 2025 | Biznes Alert
Trump may use [oil] sanctions to finish off Moscow, which is running out of money for the National Welfare Fund. – 16 January 2026 UBN
Expert: Washington, London, Warsaw should work quickly. Kiev can’t afford to be patient – Dziennik.pl
German deindustrialization: Energy & economic crisis
Major shoe retailer goes bankrupt A sharp increase in bankruptcies in Germany
Polish titles and links:
First topic.
Agent Stasi lobbuje za wznowieniem Nord Stream. Ekspert: Jedna z nitek gazociągu gotowa do uruchomienia biznesalert.pl
Część krajów Unii uwierzyła, że gaz z Gazpromu będzie w Europie na zawsze BiznesAlert.pl
“Jak powrót narkomana do heroiny”. Analityk o pomyśle odblokowania importu gazu z Rosji do Europy | BizNes Alert
2nd Topic
Amerykański ekspert: zalecenie redukcji emisji o 90 proc. do 2040 r. to „fantastyka” | Energetyka24
Ekspert: Zalecenie KE redukcji emisji gazów to fantastyka wpolityce.pl
Nierealny plan klimatyczny UE. Opinia eksperta miażdży – Super Business
“Przestawianie leżaków na tonącym Titanicu”. Ekspert nie zostawia suchej nitki na eko-dyktaturze brukselskich eurokratów – PCH24.pl
Third topic
Donald Trump chce uchronić świat przed III wojną światową | Newsweek
Jak Trump może złamać rosyjską gospodarkę?
Trump may use [oil] sanctions to finish off Moscow, which is running out of money for the National Welfare Fund. – UBN
Ekspert: Waszyngton, Londyn, Warszawa powinny szybko działać. Kijowa nie stać na cierpliwość – Dziennik.pl
[1] Other than being cited/interviewed in Poland, I was also quoted elsewhere about 33 times so far in 2025, mainly in the USA, with many then translated to languages of Europe, Asia and Latin America. I never know what to do with all these print interviews. Here at GlobalBarrel.com, I often publish videos of some of my live-on-air expert commentary, usually accompanied by a detailed blog post. So, my idea is I will make a new tab at the top of the GlobalBarrel.com site, next to the “About Me” tab, where I can simply list link to my recent press citations or Op-Eds. [Back to text]
TRT asked me to be ready to comment, live, on the Oval Office meeting just before it blew up. I said Vance acted “infantile”. What I should have stressed, however, is that understanding Vance’s decision to blow up the meeting is key to understanding Trump’s strategy towards Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. (So, in this post the written analysis is the main thing, not the video.)
My TRT quick take, 28 Feb. See my later analysis, in the blog post.
There is plenty of facile analyses of this clash. Many say the blowup reflected “chaos” in Trump’s policy on Ukraine and Russia, or that Trump has an “impulsive” strategy, that he “dislikes Ukraine”, he’s “pro-Russian,” or that the blowup was a “prearranged ambush” to “humiliate” Zelensky, or similar.
Too few consider the possibility that the rebuke is consistent with a well-defined USA strategy. What quickly becomes clear from listening, at face value, to multiple statements by Trump himself and his team is that they have a consistent strategy. This is clearly not the first Trump administration. This second administration is different in its unity and consistency on its Ukraine, Russia, and Europe policies.
What was the purpose of the “minerals” deal that Zelensky came to sign?
The weeks-long USA-Ukrainian clash over this deal has reflected their geostrategic differences on a peace deal with Russia. After heated exchanges and compromises, clearly the Ukrainian side was not pleased with the issues it had had to give up in the minerals deal. Nevertheless, Zelensky’s Council of Ministers voted to endorse the deal, and Zelensky went to DC explicitly to sign it.
Interestingly, just before he went to the White House, President Zelensky met with a group of Republican and Democratic senators, who had “… all told him sign the deal and don’t get into an argument.” (War on the Rocks, timestamp 7:58-8:19, 06.03.25). Alas, if one watches Zelensky’s public argumentation, from the start of the press conference, and his telling Trump that a deal without a US security guarantee won’t work, all of which is in contradiction to the deal he is about to sign, it is clear that he precipitated the breakdown. In my reading of the event, he seemed to not be able to restrain himself, seemingly out of an understandable deep anguish at being about to sign an accord contrary to his better judgment.
What did each side want in the “minerals” deal, and who got what?
Everything I found to have been said by the actors on the USA and Ukrainian sides as to what each wanted in the document is quite consistent.
On the Ukrainian side, the big one was a USA security guarantee for any deal Trump makes with Putin. The Ukrainians certainly welcome the willingness of European allies to extend security guarantees for any deal, especially the public commitments made by both the UK and France to contribute troops, but they were clear that they did not think this can substitute for a USA guarantee standing behind theirs. Related to this, the Ukrainians opposed taking NATO membership for them off the table. Another was a seat at the table for Ukraine and the Europeans during negotiations with Russia (Trump wants something more like a shuttle diplomacy between the two.) Related to this, is that the USA should not negotiate a cease fire deal without them. Still another was refusing to agree beforehand to give up any Ukrainian territory that has been occupied by Russia.
Obviously the USA disagreed and de facto or openly refused all these conditions. However, the disagreement over the security guarantee seemed to be the most hot-button issue between them. Trump flatly refused. His reasoning, as explained to the press was interesting, revealing a lot about his philosophy or method for negotiating a peace deal. He said that the two sides obviously hated one another and he had to go between the two to negotiate anything. (Read Trump’s own words, in the transcript below.)
The Trump concept of economic interests and security interests
He also said that they had to trust him, saying that it just would not work if he first gave a security guarantee, taking Ukraine’s side so clearly beforehand. He also said that the ultimate security guarantee “is the easy part” and getting the deal “is the hard part.” He said the guarantees can “come later.” It became clear that, in his approach, this minerals deal was to be the signal to Putin that the USA would have long-term economic interests in Ukraine and would, of course, in Trump’s view of how the world works, defend against any threats to those economic interests.
This approach is clearly seen as highly risky by Ukraine, which has been abandoned once before under what was an explicit security guarantee, the Bucharest Memorandum, extended in return for giving up its nuclear weapons in the 1990’s. As Zelensky recounted for Trump, no signatories of the Minsk Accords extended security guarantees after Russia’s 2014 aggression, and Putin broke them constantly
The text of the final document, the one the Ukrainian ministers approved, is known; it was published in Kyiv two days before the Oval Office meeting. (The full text of the Ukraine-US Minerals Agreement, European Pravda, Kyiv, 26.02.25). So, it is easy to see that Kyiv didn’t get its main demands, although the USA did compromise, in a sense, on one of them, agreeing to an explicit mention of a “security guarantee.” However, the USA did not extend one as a quid-pro-quo for the minerals deal, rather in Section 10. the wording is:
The Government of the United States of America supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace. Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments, as defined in the Fund Agreement.
So, the USA vision of security, to “protect mutual investments,” is asserted in association..
10-12 February, I was invited to contribute to the NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) on critical European infrastructure, organized in Podgorica by the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, a NATO member, and The International Society for Risk Management (ISRM), Serbia, a non-NATO member. This partnership plus experts from neighboring states made the workshop on risks to regional and West Balkan infrastructure very informative. I felt quite honored, as a regional outsider, an American working on EU energy and geosecurity (based in Berlin), to be invited. Conference FB link
I planned to discuss drivers of EU deindustrialization, but decided to focus on one sharp example: how tech failures in the EU’s energy-infrastructure model, the Green Deal, is causing the unexpected 2025 EU natural gas crisis. This comes while gas prices were still high and supply still problematic from the 2022-23 Energy War – caused by Russia maliciously stopping Nord Stream pipeline flows. This new hit to European competitiveness and security was, however, an eminently avoidable “own goal.” (The workshop discussion is off the record, but I may post my own talk.)
How has the Green Deal model caused another gas crisis?
The EU Green Deal model requires installation of high percentages of wind and solar renewables. However, to supply energy reliably, installation of wind and solar renewable (RE) technology must be paired with installation of sufficient universal, long-term, grid-scale storage (ULTGSS) technology. The idea is excess electricity generated on very sunny, windy and mild days should be stored to compensate supply on dark, calm and cold days. (Let’s put aside, for now, expert debunking of this RE-plus-storage model using weather and tech data.) Over-installation of solar and wind beyond what can be backed up by some other source, is a critical vulnerability to energy infrastructure reliability during periods of cloudy, calm and cold weather. This is called “Dunkelflaute” in German.
However, the reality is that, after some four decades of storage-tech R&D, such a technology still does not exist. There is no lack of studies and data on this. However, EU members remain mandated by the Green Deal and ancillary EU and/or national laws to continue installing ever higher percentages of renewable generation.
As a result, Dunkelflaute conditions in late-November and early December 2024, and again in February 2025 across northern Europe led to prolonged periods of plunging RE generation. Without the aforementioned ULTGSS backup (my acronym), the “de facto ULTGSS” has primarily been natural-gas-fueled generation, plus importing of nuclear, hydro and coal generation from neighboring countries having excess capacity in these.
My talk was an analysis the root cause for another EU natural gas crisis this winter. I explained that the EU’s initial win in the energy war imposed on it by Putin, overcoming the initial, acute crisis of 2022, is nevertheless evolving dangerously into a Pyrrhic victory – into a defeat. This is because EU energy policy, the Green Deal, has critical technological failings, and the present EU Commission leadership refuses to reform it, rejects any serious criticism of the model, and is instead doubling down on an all-renewables system ASAP. In fact, it is assumed that Van der Leyen will announce, late in February, adoption of a new, more “ambitious” target of 90% net-zero emissions by 2040 relative to 1990. (GlobalBarrel.com readers might recall I termed this as “fantasy” in Op-Eds last year in the Polish daily press and elsewhere.)
A Green Deal reform, based on science, is not inherently “right”, “center” or “left”
I explained why a radical reform of this Green Deal model should not be a matter of political philosophy, rather ait requires only an honest recognition that the tech simply does not exist for this scale of installations. Refusal to reform is no longer only anti-science Green populism. After ca. 15 years of this Green Model’s hegemony in various member states, then in Brussels, ALL PARTIES are beset with ideological-scientific confusion and need a certain fresh start, a reeducation or green-energy deprogramming. In particular, center-right parties, such as the CDU in Germany, are typically confused in that they tend to see the entire problem as one of the methods of financing the Green Deal (and the German Energiewende, which provided the model the Green Deal is based on). They focus on having less government mandates, less subsidies, more public financing, and a more liberal, interconnected electricity market in Europe. All well and fine. However, if one is talking about alchemy, funding the transmutation of lead into gold, then it matters little how efficiently it is financed, and how liberal is the market model. In this case, the problem is that a highly RE based model (much less the German, Spanish, Austrian, etc. model of 100% renewables), lacking any universally applicable, long-term, grid-scale storage, is simply energy-infrastructure “alchemy”. It is simply impossible without an entire parallel natural gas system on standby awaiting any instance of Dunkelfloute. This is a disaster, an impossibly complex and expensive model that guarantees ever deeper EU deindustrialization.
Even the farthest right and left parties are hesitant to embrace a fundamentally different model of massive large-scale nuclear as the basis, with also extensive electricity-fueled mass transit build-outs as a clearly already-proven model. The alternative is further high energy prices, deindustrialization and undercutting of European security.
This is in English, after Eugene Romer of Układ Sił media introduces me in Polish. This was at the “3 Seas -1 Opportunity Forum” in Gdansk, last June 4-5, 2024. I have been wanting to post it ever since, as the questions remain relevant. My thanks to Eugene and his team, and to his Opportunity Think Tank colleagues.
My panel at the forum was on problems of relying on energy security that arrives via the sea. So, think Poland and Lithuania’s LNG terminals, of the many sub-sea pipelines, power and communications cables between Baltic and Nordic states. And, since June, all the incidents where ships leaving Russian ports “accidentally” dragged their anchors, cutting such vital links. So, this conference was rather prescient. My sincere thanks to our hosts The Opportunity Institute for Foreign Affairs.
First, Bloomberg reported Ukraine had destroyed an oil pumping station on the pipeline feeding Russia’s big Ust Luga oil export terminal on the Baltic Sea. This is the first time Kyiv has shutdown a Russian oil port, … which is exactly what I advocated in the interview above and since early-2024 as a military tactic to accompany imposition of “real” USA-EU oil sanctions on the three Russian west-facing oil ports, replacing the failed “oil price cap” policy.
Second, Christof Ruhl, former-BP VP, and -World Bank Moscow rep., now at the Columbia U. Energy Center, had an OP-ED in the FT, with a similar argument that Russian oil can be replaced with OPEC crude. I recommend it:“Trump should call on Opec in his bid to negotiate with Putin Ukraine’s western allies must join forces with the oil cartel to really squeeze Russia’s war economy” Christof Ruhl, 30jan25.]
There are two topics in this interview with Diana Skya of Poland’s national broadcaster, TVP:
Putin’s oil export income can be slashed via new sanctions and military policies, in line with Trump’s interest in forcing a “deal”
EU member states that seek a new Putin gas partnership are dysfunctionally replaying Merkel-ism and avoiding the real solution of reforming the Green Deal to put nuclear energy in the center. (See: “EU debates return to Russian gas as part of Ukraine peace deal. Advocates say reopening pipelines could help settlement with Moscow and cut energy costs” Henry Foy and Alice Hancock in Brussels and Christopher Miller in Kyiv, FT, 30jan25)
OIL SANCTIONS:
I have argued for three years that the rationale behind the USA-EU imposition of a Russian “oil-price cap” rather than simply imposing real oil sanctions has been flawed, and the policy has failed.
It was conceived in early-2022, apparently by former-central-banker Mario Draghi of Italy and taken up by then-USA-Treasury-head Janet Yellen, neither of whom understood global oil trade sufficiently to see how easily the Russians could get around this scheme, as they have with a “shadow fleet” of oil tankers insured by Chinese, Russian or other non-EU, non-UK firms.
(Arabic. English is above). Asharq-Bloomberg spot.
Last night, Asharq, the Mideast Bloomberg news affiliate, asked me three questions (roughly translated):
The the EU wants to extend the sanctions (on Russian gas), at the same time they want to open open the Russian pipeline through Ukraine. What is this contradiction? How to understand it in practise?
How will Ukraine respond to these talks? Don’t you think that Ukraine will accept, for example, to open this project or to reopen these pipelines to resupply gas? Don’t you think the other European nations that were impacted neglecting or abandoning this Russian gas?
Doctor, don’t you think that there has been a change in US policies, economic and political policies towards Russia after the reelection of Trump? Do you think we may see a change?
Here is a transcript of the Q&A (AI generated)
1 00:00:00,052 –> 00:00:02,772 are joined by Doctor Thomas Odoner. From
2 00:00:02,932 –> 00:00:05,052 Berlin. Welcome back, Doctor. Happy to
3 00:00:05,052 –> 00:00:07,972 have you with us tonight. So the EU
My long print interview at Lithuania’s LRT [Lithuanian PDF | English PDF] with Aleksandra Ketlerienė, deputy editor-in-chief of Lithuania’s LRT.lt, published 7January. We spoke in Warsaw, 19 November. My thanks to Aleksandra for her insightful questioning and editorial care. We discussed:
The EU’s systemic energy-policy “own goals” since its initial energy-crisis win after Moscow began cutting gas exports early in 2021.
Reforming failed/ineffective Russian price-cap sanctions for real sanctions, and how the global oil market is now favorable for “maximum pressure.”
Historical perspectives on oil, gas, renewables, and nuclear sectors, essential for realistic policy formation.
An historical overview of China’s decades-long effort to overcome its energy security, learning lessons of Japan’s WW2 weaknesses.
I appeared alongside Dr. Hashem Aqel, Oil and Energy Expert, Associate Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, who contributed several insights. Asharq News is the Mideast Bloomberg partner. My further analysis follows:
Arabic, original broadcast version.
The recent rise in EU gas prices and the rapid depletion of what had been a significant surplus in EU storage, is principally a two-sided story.
One side is indeed about the impending cutoff of Russian gas, still flowing across Ukraine. This has been expected for months, and so is already largely priced in. Expectations of new transit across Ukraine of Russian-origin gas re-labelled as Azerbaijani was being negotiated. However, this deal fell apart, with the final nail in its coffin being when Ukraine’s President Zelensky asserted that Ukraine would not transit any further Russian-origin gas after 31 December unless payments to Russia are withheld until after the war ends. This seems a very reasonable demand for a country fighting for its survival against a Russian invasion. [See “Ukraine will not allow transit of Russian gas with Azeri label, Zelenskyy says, dashing Slovak hopes,” EuroNews, Jorge Liboreir 19 Dec. 2024.] This marks the end of the five-year contract, which was only agreed to at the last moment before New Year 2020, when the US Senate finally forced then-President Trump to agree to sanctions on Nord Stream 2 construction (I was in Kyiv, for Naftogaz, and on Ukrainian television, analyzing Washington sanctions, Kyiv-Moscow negotiations, and the pro-Nord Stream position of Berlin.)
The other side is a story of yet another European energy own-goal, a consequence of its over-reliance on weather-dependent renewable energy generation. This overreliance has made its electricity supply increasingly volatile, in sync with the weather. In November and early December, especially north and western Europe experienced what the Germans call “Dunkelflaute“, a protracted wind and solar drought. Batteries can only substitute for perhaps 40 minutes, or at best an hour. So, the de facto long-term, grid-scale “storage” backing up Europe’s plethora of wind and sun generation is really just natural-gas turbine electrical generation plants. The reality of increased generation (and hence, electricity market) volatility and dependence on gas backup generation was analyzed this week in a data-driven manner by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. [See: “Dunkelflaute: Driving Europe Gas Demand Volatility” Energy Insight: 161, by Anouk Honoré and Jack Sharples, Senior Research Fellows, OIES, 2024/12.]
[Warsaw, 21 Nov] Here’s my interview with BiznesAlert’s Artur Ciechanowicz (in EN & Pl)on Germany’s energy, industrial and political crises. I spoke here in Warsaw Monday at the CEE Energy Security Conference, attended Wednesday’s 25 Years of NATO Membership conference, and was invited yesterday evening, by a leader of the Sejm (parliament) for a long talk in his offices, joined by Mark Voyger (American University Kyiv and former-NATO). More soon. Tom O’D.
ENGLISH Interview | Al Watan, Cairo. Thurs 10Oct24. 15 minutes
ARABIC Interview
At first, we focused on IEA warnings of a possible EU winder gas shortage due to supply-and-demand mismatches. I agree and expand on the IEA points.
Second, I explained that if Israel retaliates against Iran so strongly that it threatens the regimes survival, or is seen as intending to provoke regime change, then the Iranian leadership will have “nothing to lose” by in-turn escalating to the maximum. Aside from unleashing the maximum response of its proxies surrounding Israel, Tehran’s most potent weapon would be to spark a global oil and gas crisis.
Consider oil: Iran can either shut down the Straights of Hormuz (or simply make them unsafe for tankers) and/or, it can use missiles and drones to destroy significant parts of Saudi, UAE and other Gulf oil facilities, including perhaps even Azerbaijan’s as some Iranian propagandists have threatened.
Consider natural gas: Shutting the Straights or directly hitting Qatar’s massive LNG exports infrastructure would immediately stop Qatari LNG exports. As the world’s second largest LNG exporter, this would immediately cause a separate global natural gas crisis.
Again, oil security is determined by both global-market balances and geostrategic realities – at present the Mideast war and Russia’s War on Ukraine. My analyses this weekend were featured in: (a)an AlHurra video (LHS English, RHS Arabic), and below these (b)a detailed BBC-Cairo print interview (LHS English Google Translate, RHS Arabic original). where I make similar points as my Friday video in Warsaw.
Alhurra ENGLISH. My comments at 2:45 & 8:20. Date: 5 Oct 2024, with co-guest GPI President Paolo von Schirach, Washington.
Alhurra ARABIC, 5 October 2024
My BBC (CAIRO) print interview in Arabic and English (Google Translate):
The Global Barrel 