Category Archives: Ehergiewende

My Ukraine Ch24 TV: Seeing Trump can kill his oil sales, Putin asked talks | “Bone-crushing” tariffs on Russian-oil buyers during a market glut can be very effective

This Friday, Trump and Putin will talk in Alaska about the future of Ukraine. Why has Putin asked for this meeting?

The two have spoken repeatedly on the phone …. but, something changed. As I indicated in my previous post (here), Trump has turned from his preferred plan to end the war, to one of confrontation and coercion of Putin (what I have called “Plan B”), aiming to force him into halting his war of aggression and seriously discuss peace proposals.

It was an honor to speak with Natalia Lutsenko of Channel 24 TV in Kyiv, and the Ukrainian national audience on these heavy issues of war and peace. The video interview – about 34 minutes long – goes into some detail of my analysis of the balance of forces.

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My TVP live: Merz election drama. Merz visit to Tusk reevokes security & migration frictions. If Merz fails to halt German deindustrialization, Poland too faces crisis.

In the last two weeks, I was in Warsaw twice. First, for the Three Seas One Opportunity conference (3S1O) on 27 April, organized by the Opportunity Think Tank, where I co-chaired a session. This was an official side event of the Three Seas Summit (a ministerial conference). Second, for the Warsaw Security Forum’s Public Dialogue. (WSF) 7 May. I will soon post here about both these very interesting events.

However, I was asked by TVP, the Polish national broadcaster, to come to their Warsaw studios on 8 May, the day after the WSF, for a live-on-air commentary on the recent drama in the German Bundestag (parliament) where the new Chancellor, Fredrich Merz, embarrassingly failed to get the necessary votes on the first ballot. He finally succeeded on second ballot, after intense politicking and consultations within his party, the center-right CDU, in its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, and in his coalition-partner party, the center-left SPD.

So, first; I was asked to explain this surprising electoral fiasco for the new chancellor, Merz, and his party, and how it may have weakened his new government.

Secondly, Merz immediately, after being sworn in, undertook a one-day whirlwind trip to Paris and then Warsaw, to visit his prospective main partners in the European Union, President Macron of France and Prime Minister Tusk of Poland. (Continued ….)

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My Asharq-Bloomberg: (1)Trump is following Miran’s tariff strategy (2)My reply to Jeff Sachs on US dollar role (3)Tariffs boost EU deindustrialization & (4)turbocharge German auto-crisis (5)Trump’s EU energy-purchase demands

Here’s my interview and a written elaboration – in lieu of a transcript:

  1. Trump’s “tariff shock” on everyone was intended mainly to force negotiations. Especially this is to insure no country:
    • Functions as a transit state for Chinese exports to get into the USA without paying crippling tariffs, or
    • Provides a Chinese-owned manufacturing site in their country with the same aim of accessing the USA market without crippling tariffs..
      • Trump’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers Miran and Treasury Secretary Bessent have been fairly clear about this, if one listens in detail.
  2. Trump Tariffs’ impact on Europe – Deindustrialization. German auto sector as an example.
    • While Trump and his circle militate against “deindustrialization” of the USA accomplished over the past few decades by the growth of Chinese manufacturing capacity and the export of these products into the USA market, Europe has an immediate problem, however, with the current advance of its “deindustrialization” or, as some more optimistically say, its new industrial “evolution”. [Some references from major German economic institutes on deindustrialization: IFO Institute, IW Institute, Kiel Institute, the latter of which has evolved a bit on this].
    • Taking the German auto industry as an example, it was already suffering from well known, chronic problems of Germany’s own making. These include two decades of low infrastructure investments, poor digitalization, high taxes, and being subjected to arbitrary government mandates to reduce diesel sales and increase battery electric vehicle production, and etc. ON top of this, German industry has also suffered high energy prices due to the countries exceptionally complex all-renewables energy transition model. On top of this came suddenly, from 2021, the Russian energy war, which denied Europe half of the cheap gas that European, and especially German industry was relying on to compensate for the high-cost of the all-renewables transition.
    • This energy war – and on the heels of the Covid shock – was devastating to German manufacturing and heavy industries, providing the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. In my assessment at the time, this was the point at which German industry’s problems of multi-faceted uncompetitiveness morphed into a form of deindustrialization,
    • Germany is in its third year of recession. However, this is not just a recession. Note that the VW, the German auto firm, for example, in September 2024, began mass layoffs for the first time in 87 years in September 2024. BASF is in a similar conundrum. In my view this is a systemic, secular problem over and above any present economic downturn.
    • So, the point of painting this detailed picture of the crisis of German automobile manufacturing, as an example, is that one can now really only imagine what a sharp knock-on effect Trump’s auto tariffs and his other tariffs might have on top of all this.  This is devastating. Already the CEO of Mercedes has said if the tariffs continue he will move the production of the cheaper models to the USA. Already one of the largest exporters of cats from the USA is a German factory.
  3. My response (critique) of Jeff Sacks‘ dollar-decline predictions
    • I was asked to listen to a clip from Asharq/Bloomberg’s earlier on-air interview with Nobel Prize economist, Jeffry Sachs, about his prediction that the US dollar would lose its reserve currency status in this decade and be replaced by regional currencies.
    • My take was that there was little new (or old) factual evidence of this, plus Trump’s tariff shock is not necessarily a long-term tactic. So, I commented that Sachs has had this theory for a long time, an it is nothing new. (I think it is fair to say he is quite sympathetic to China in various interviews, for some years now.) So, I simply said I was not surprised he says this, as he has for a long time.
    • However, I explained (with a bit more factual detail than Sachs, I hope) that indeed, even Trump’s theorist Miran and Bessent too agree that the tariffs strategy is designed to reduce the value of the dollar (its aims is precisely a weak dollar), and this should normally mean that the dollar loses its reserve currency status, its preferred use in the world, that these Trump theorists have a plan for a “Mar-a-Lago” or similar accord for states that are seen as being key, close allies, who would agree to peg their currencies to the dollar, and that they should be expected to agree as they need to trade into the USA market.. This is based on the observation that the USA market has a special status in the world. If this were to pass, they theorize that this would in fact preserve the special, preferred reserve status of the US dollar.  Trump likes this as he has said that if this status is lost, then the destiny of the USA is to be a “third world” economy. **Continued at GlobalBarrel.com ….
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My LRT.lt Lithuania interview: As Baltic states quit Russia’s grid, someone’s cutting their undersea cables & pipes | Baltics: Beware German-style overdependence on variable renewables

Credit: Vėjo jėgainė | J. Stacevičiaus / LRT nuotr.

My gratitude to LRT.lt journalist Vaida Kalinkaitė-Matuliauskienė for this in-depth print interview. We spoke just after Baltic states had disconnected from the Russian-Belarus electrical grid, BRELL, and had connected with the European grid. This was a complex and costly project, executed rapidly and flawlessly. [My comment continue below, after the English (first link) and Lithuanian (second link) versions:]

If you had stayed in BRELL, it would have been much easier for Russia
[a Google translation PDF]12 Mar 2025 — Of course, this zone is not only yours, it is connected to the European Union (EU). Thomas O’Donnell | Warsaw Conference “Energy Security in the Middle and… || LRThttps://www.lrt.lt › Verslas ||

jeigu būtumėte likę BRELL, Rusijai būtų daug lengviau
12 Mar 2025 — Žinoma, ši zona ne tik jūsų, ji sujungta su Europos Sąjunga (ES). Thomas O’Donnell | Varšuvos konferencijos „Energetinis saugumas Vidurio ir… || LRThttps://www.lrt.lt › Verslas || Translate this

The Baltic states’ impetus was obvious: a deep mistrust of Russia after its 2022 cutoff of half of all European gas imports intended to pressure EU states to abandon solidarity with Ukraine as Russia invaded it. So, switching to the European grid is a great relief. However, the dangers haven’t ended.

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My Dublin talk: “The role of renewables in securing Europe’s energy” [at EU Commission Representation, Polish Presidency event]

I felt greatly honored to speak in Ireland, the home of my ancestors, at a high-level Irish-Polish event, invited by the Polish embassy as part of Poland’s Presidency of the European Council. [Spoiler alert: my assessment of the Green Deal’s impact on EU energy security and competitiveness was highly critical. And, I called for a radical reform, modeled on the 1970-80’s French Messmer nuclear program, the response to a similarly dire European energy and competitiveness crisis.]

For Ireland we had Secretary General Oonagh Buckley and Wind Energy Ireland CEO Noel Cunniffee; for Poland, Daniel Piekarsky, Head of Energy Security Unit in the Foreign Ministry, and myself, Global Fellow of the Wilson Center, Washington (external) working in Europe, from Berlin.

Our moderator, from the Polish Embassy, Dublin, was the Polish diplomat and patriot, Dr. Jacek Rosa — a good friend, with whom I had the great pleasure of closely collaborating, for several years, in opposition to the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 gas-pipeline partnership, before the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Below is the lineup, the initial invitation and some pictures. The event was off-the-record, so I show here only my own, slightly redacted talk.

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My Q1 Polish press: |1|Does Germany want Russian gas back? |2|Green Deal model has a tech problem. |3|German deindustrialization: bankruptcies up. |4|Warsaw, Paris & London must act fast for Ukraine!

Opening of Nord Stream1 pipeline, 2011. Gazprom via PAP

Below are links to 12 articles that appeared in the Polish press in the last few months, interviewing or quoting me on four topics I feel are important. The topics are listed in the title above.

The links are below, sorted by topic. The first or left column has English translations of the titles, and the second or right column has the original Polish — which unfortunately I don’t speak! If you follow the links, Google Translate or Deepl will translated the Polish articles pretty well into English. My special thanks to the intrepid Polish journalist, Artur Ciechanowicz at BiznesAlert in Warsaw for his interviews in the list. (I also had about 33 quotes or interviews in several other languages since December [1]).

ENGLISH titles and links:

  1. On German (far-right) & USA (Trump) each plotting a Russian gas return to Germany
    • A former Stasi agent lobbies for the resumption of Nord Stream. Expert: One of the gas pipeline lines ready to be launched,, By,: Artur Ciechanowicz, March 3, 2025, biznesAlert.pl
    • Some EU countries believed that Gazprom gas would be in Europe forever BiznesAlert.pl
    • “Like a Drug Addict Returning to Heroin.” Analyst on the Idea of ​​Unblocking Gas Imports from Russia to Europe, Author: Artur Ciechanowicz, February 1, 2025, 07:21
  2. Failures of EU Green Deal on technology and energy security.
    • American expert: recommendation to reduce emissions by 90 percent by 2040 is “fantasy” | Energetyka24
    • Expert: EC recommendation to reduce gas emissions is fantasy wpolityce.pl
    • Unrealistic EU climate plan. Expert opinion crushes – Super Business
    • “Rearranging deckchairs on the sinking Titanic”. Expert slams the eco-target dictates of Brussels Eurocrats PCH24.pl
  3. Trump, EU & Poland: Ukraine War crisis.
    • First talk with Putin. Trump has visions of ending the war in Ukraine | Newsweek Jan 21
    • How Trump Can Bring Down the Russian Economy: Analysts: He Has an Arsenal of Means to Do It, By Artur Ciechanowicz, Jan 24, 2025 | Biznes Alert
    • Trump may use [oil] sanctions to finish off Moscow, which is running out of money for the National Welfare Fund. – 16 January 2026 UBN
    • Expert: Washington, London, Warsaw should work quickly. Kiev can’t afford to be patient – Dziennik.pl
  4. German deindustrialization: Energy & economic crisis
    • Major shoe retailer goes bankrupt A sharp increase in bankruptcies in Germany

Polish titles and links:

  1. First topic.
    • Agent Stasi lobbuje za wznowieniem Nord Stream. Ekspert: Jedna z nitek gazociągu gotowa do uruchomienia biznesalert.pl
    • Część krajów Unii uwierzyła, że gaz z Gazpromu będzie w Europie na zawsze BiznesAlert.pl
    • “Jak powrót narkomana do heroiny”. Analityk o pomyśle odblokowania importu gazu z Rosji do Europy | BizNes Alert
  2. 2nd Topic
    • Amerykański ekspert: zalecenie redukcji emisji o 90 proc. do 2040 r. to „fantastyka” | Energetyka24
    • Ekspert: Zalecenie KE redukcji emisji gazów to fantastyka wpolityce.pl
    • Nierealny plan klimatyczny UE. Opinia eksperta miażdży – Super Business
    • “Przestawianie leżaków na tonącym Titanicu”. Ekspert nie zostawia suchej nitki na eko-dyktaturze brukselskich eurokratów – PCH24.pl
  3. Third topic
    • Donald Trump chce uchronić świat przed III wojną światową | Newsweek
    • Jak Trump może złamać rosyjską gospodarkę?
    • Trump may use [oil] sanctions to finish off Moscow, which is running out of money for the National Welfare Fund. – UBN
    • Ekspert: Waszyngton, Londyn, Warszawa powinny szybko działać. Kijowa nie stać na cierpliwość – Dziennik.pl
  4. Fourth topic

Notes:

  • [1] Other than being cited/interviewed in Poland, I was also quoted elsewhere about 33 times so far in 2025, mainly in the USA, with many then translated to languages of Europe, Asia and Latin America. I never know what to do with all these print interviews. Here at GlobalBarrel.com, I often publish videos of some of my live-on-air expert commentary, usually accompanied by a detailed blog post. So, my idea is I will make a new tab at the top of the GlobalBarrel.com site, next to the “About Me” tab, where I can simply list link to my recent press citations or Op-Eds. [Back to text]

Our Gdansk chat: Baltic energy risks | USA ousting China from post-war order | “Transition” will be simple: nuclear & mass-transit. “Critical” minerals overblown | EU’s failing model: all-renewables, new grids, grid-storage & EVs | Poland’s risk: China uses Russia

This is in English, after Eugene Romer of Układ Sił media introduces me in Polish. This was at the “3 Seas -1 Opportunity Forum” in Gdansk, last June 4-5, 2024. I have been wanting to post it ever since, as the questions remain relevant. My thanks to Eugene and his team, and to his Opportunity Think Tank colleagues.

My panel at the forum was on problems of relying on energy security that arrives via the sea. So, think Poland and Lithuania’s LNG terminals, of the many sub-sea pipelines, power and communications cables between Baltic and Nordic states. And, since June, all the incidents where ships leaving Russian ports “accidentally” dragged their anchors, cutting such vital links. So, this conference was rather prescient. My sincere thanks to our hosts The Opportunity Institute for Foreign Affairs.

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My interview at Lithuania’s LRT: Trump could seriously harm Russia if he wants to | Trumpas, jeigu tik norėtų, galėtų stipriai pakenkti Rusijai

My long print interview at Lithuania’s LRT [Lithuanian PDF | English PDF​] with Aleksandra ​Ketlerienė, deputy editor-in-chief of Lithuania’s LRT.lt, published 7January. We spoke in Warsaw, 19 November. My thanks to Aleksandra for her insightful questioning and editorial care. We discussed:

  • The EU’s systemic energy​-policy “own goals” ​since its initial energy-crisis win ​after Moscow began cutting gas exports early in 2021​.
  • Reforming failed/ineffective Russian price-cap sanctions for real sanctions, and how the global oil market is now favorable for “maximum pressure.”
  • Historical perspectives on oil, gas, renewables, and nuclear sectors, essential for realistic policy formation.
  • An historical overview of China’s decades-long effort to overcome its energy security, learning lessons of Japan’s WW2 weaknesses.
  • (​See topics summary))
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Part 2: “Does EU Climate Policy Need Evolution or Revolution? What Should We Change in the Green Deal?” My critical remarks at “Energy Security in CEE Conference,” Warsaw

This is a continuation of my remarks in Warsaw, on 18 November. Part 1, which posted on 19 December, reviewed failures to develop critical tech elements required by the EU Green Deal, a program modeled on the German Energiewende. I argued that, after decades of R&D efforts, these technology failures indicate the systemic failure of heavily renewable models, pointing to a need for “radical reform” of the Green Deal. I advocated for the historically proven Messmer model, which succeeded, some 40 years ago, in decarbonizing French electrical generation using nuclear power, without any need for new grids or long-term grid-scale storage tech.

Below, Part 2 (edited for clarity) focuses on the political intransigence of the new Von der Leyen commission, which is doubling down on the Green Deal’s renewable model. I argue this is not “reindustrializing” Europe or making it “more competitive” as claimed, but rather driving it into deindustrialization. This mirrors the process underway in Germany via its continuing push for new “green tech,” on the theory this should spark a broad new European industrial competitiveness. From an historical perspective, this is theoretical and practical nonsense – or so I argue. Critiques are welcomed. (PS, Happy holidays!)

Leon (moderator): So, I’m going to turn to Thomas again. You argued that that some form of radical overhaul is necessary, you know, with regards to the EU Green Deal, if I understand it correctly, and you’ve cited one of the issues is the complexity of the fact that there are certain technologies that haven’t emerged over the last 30 years that have just been growing incrementally rather than rapidly to meet our needs. But at the same time there’s seems to be some sort of political rationale for why this sort of revolutionary approach. How would you respond to that?

Tom: Yes, politically, I do think the new Commission presents a big problem for European competitiveness, for energy policy and security.

The new commission is anti-energy-policy reform

Firstly this is because Ms. Teresa Ribera, from Spain, is President Von der Leyen’s new chief executive vice-president.  She is in charge of attaining both the Green Deal and has also been given responsibility for “industrialization of Europe,” for making it competitive again.

The problem is, Ms. Ribera is a true believer in all-renewable energy systems, I would say a career-long renewable fundamentalist.

For example, she’s said to be so good at negotiating that she managed to get the Spanish nuclear industry and civil society to agree on a timetable to close all the Spanish nuclear power plants, and she’s very proud of this. This is politically and ideologically identical to what Mr. Robert Habeck, the German Green Party leader, who is energy and economics minister, carried out with the approval of Chancellor Scholz of the SPD-party. Habeck closed Germany’s last three nuclear power plants during a wartime, Russian-instigated, European energy crisis.

The fact that Von der Leyen fought hard to appoint Ribera and then put her in charge of the Green Deal and of European industrialization, and made her the most powerful commissioner, the executive vice president of the commission, shows that Von der Leyen, a member of the German conservatives, the CDU, has no interest in reform of the renewables model despite its suffering technological failures on several key aspects.

The problem is not that Europe has not had an industrial policy. Europe has had an industrial policy, one that has failed

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My PAP, Poland: “Expert: EC recommendation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 90% by 2040 is fantasy” / “Ekspert: zalecenie KE redukcji emisji gazów cieplarnianych o 90% do 2040 roku to fantastyka”

I’ve been thinking about what to say on Monday in Warsaw: at the “Energy Security in Central & Eastern Europe” conference. As soon as I saw the title of my panel: “Does EU Climate Policy Need Evolution or Revolution? What Should We Change in the European Green Deal?” I accepted! This question goes beyond politics – left, right or center – it is a pressing matter for European energy security

Then, I recalled my syndicated interview with Polish AP’s Arthur Ciechanowicz (Brussels) this February. It’s exactly what I should say in Warsaw (see below: LHS in EN, RHS in PL), especially given President Von der Leyen’s choices of long-time anti-nuclear politicians to be her top commissioners for climate and (re)industrialization (Teresa Ribera), and for energy (Dan Jørgensen). (**Details in footnotes). See what you think.

* Footnotes: References on new EU Commissioners’ anti-nuclear attitudes:

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NAPEC ’24, Oran: Why does the EU insist Algeria develop hydrogen & a big pipeline despite Equinor & Shell refusals due to “no customers”?

I explain EU/German motives for seeking “green H2” import pipes, then (at time 11:30) questions I raised moderating at NAPEC re. EU-Algerian pipeline MOU.

Here’s my video from Oran, Algeria, after a very informative “Africa and Mediterranean Energy & Hydrogen Exhibition & Conference,” NAPEC 2024 (video highlights here). Two parts to my analysis:

First, (up to time 11:30) I explain the rationale and impetus for the EU drive for massive green hydrogen gas imports. This is primarily driven by Germany’s increasing desperation at being locked into over-reliance on weather-variable renewables, whose high prices are sparking its “deindustrialization,” especially after losing Russian gas pipeline imports due to Putin’s war on Ukraine, plus due to the own-goal shutting down of their zero-carbon, amortized (paid for) nuclear plants during the European energy crisis. (Note: I misspoke: “Grey” hydrogen would NOT have the CO2 stored, “Blue” would. Both are derived from natural gas.)

I also explain how this massive green hydrogen “fix” to “renewables fundamentalist” policy is a techno-panacea that simply cannot work. Then ..

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At ‘Berlin Energy Forum,’ 2 Sept., I’ll argue: Germany’s green-hydrogen import strategy is unrealistic & ignores African needs

NOTE: Last call to Sign Up Here for our 2nd Berlin Energy Forum, on “Germany’s Quest for Green Hydrogen: from Ukraine to Mauritania & back,” 4:00 – 5:30 PM (CET), Berlin Capital Club, followed by networking and drinks. The Capital Club is atop the Hilton Hotel, adjacent to Gendarme Market in Berlin’s Mitte district. Looks like we’ll have a full house again. There is also a delayed-video sign-up option. -o-o-o-o-o- Speakers: I’ll be joined by Dr. Dawud Ansari of SWP think tank where he leads H2 research, and Ms. Olena Pavlenko, President Kyiv’s Dixie Group via video link. Moderation: Ben Aris, Editor-in-chief & founder of bneIntelliNews, & our forum co-organizer.

Second: While writing my talk, I began rethinking a 2023 post on Germany’s  green-hydrogen import scheme for Mauritania. Below is my update. — Tom O’D.

German Green Hydrogen Import Strategy is Unworkable & Ignores Mauritania’s needs

Referring to the green hydrogen MOU signed with Mauritania in 2023, Conjuncta CEO Stefan Liebing said, “(This project) will have a strong link to Germany both as a technology provider and a potential offtaker of green energy.” (“Consortium signs $34 billion MoU for hydrogen project in Mauritania,” Reuters, 8 Mar 23.)

German public broadcaster Deutsche Welle seemed quite impressed: “It has a planned capacity of 10 gigawatts – the output of roughly five to six standard nuclear power plants. The first phase of the project is set to be completed by 2028” (“Mauritania set to export green hydrogen to Germany,” DW Business, 09Mar23 archived at YouTube.)

Indeed, the MOU aims for “10 gigawatts” of electrolyzers outputting “8 million tonnes/year” (Mt/y) of green hydrogen (H2) and other products, such as ammonia. However, according to the press announcement, in 2028 the facility will have a 400 MW capacity, or one-twenty-fifth of 10 gigawatts envisioned .

The German coalition government faces a formidable energy dilemma.

On one hand, it must urgently develop enough natural gas generation capacity at a reasonable cost to halt deindustrialization, and shut coal plants it brought back online when it closed the last nuclear plants To this end, Minister Habeck (Greens) urgently won approval for installation of 25 GW capacity of new natural gas turbine generation by 2030. In addition, this new natural gas capacity is needed to back up Germany’s growing, renewable-electricity dependence, as it simply has no feasible grid storage tech to offset its weather-variability.

So too, in response to Russia cutting off gas deliveries to Germany, as part of its full scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany urgently moved to install up to seven offshore LNG floating regasification ships (FRSOs). These aimed for a new natural gas import capacity of 25 bcm/year as LNG in 2023,

In January 2024, the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) reported that, “According to preliminary figures, the total volume of natural gas imported into Germany in 2023 was 968 T”Wh (2022: 1,437 TWh).” of which 7% or almost 70 TWh was LNG. The reduction from 2022 largely reflects the fall in industrial production it is now suffering.

On the other hand, Germany urgently seeks enough future “green energy” import projects to eventually replace all this natural gas if it is to meet its decarbonization targets. The government published its “National Hydrogen Strategy” in summer 2023. (Also, “Gremany’s National Hydrogen Strategy,” Factsheet, 26 Jul 2023, by Sören Amelang and Julian Wettengela, Clean Energy Wire, is very useful.)

The (IMHO) dogmatic insistence on refusing to re-open several still-operable nuclear plants and to develop new German nuclear capacity means that the only low-carbon way the government coalition and many other political and business actors can imagine to replace all this natural gas is with green hydrogen produced from renewables in distant African, Mideast, Latin American and other states, or from developing new renewable-generated electricity it can import from nearby European countries.

This self-induced straitjacketing of the German energy system is, as I have described it, a sort of “renewable fundamentalism” — a maximalist insistence to fuel everything with 100% renewables and absolutely no nuclear.

How much of Germany’s new LNG-supplied energy could the Mauritania project replace in 2028?

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My Briefing Paper for USA House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, “… Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector.”

—– Click image to open PDF

I was asked to write a Brief for the USA House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs (Europe Subcommittee) 12 March hearing: “Going Nuclear on Rosatom: Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector,” submitted via Wilson Center in Washington, where I am a Global Fellow (external). There are two aspects to the Brief:

  1. My assessment of how threats posed to the 3-Seas-Region Member States executing a pragmatic energy transition incorporating nuclear energy emanate both from the role of Russia’s Rosneft, and equally from the activities of seven anti-nuclear Member States led by Germany, and
  2. Detailed research on Russia’s nuclear energy dangers contributed by colleagues in Poland and Ukraine.  Their research includes:
  • Appendix A: Some facts and policy recommendations on Rosatom activities, based on research by Warsaw colleagues at The Polish Economic Institute (PEI), Dr. Adam Juszczak, and Mr. Kamil Lipiński (p. 6);
  • Appendix B. Rosatom may be assisting in circumventing sanctions., from research by colleagues at DiXiE Group, Kyiv, Ukraine, especially Mr. Roman Nitsovych, and Ms. Olena Pavlenko (p. 7);
  • Appendix C. Why sanction Rosatom: Link between “peaceful” Rosatom energy & Russian nuclear weapons, based on research by CGS Strategy XXI , Kyiv, Ukraine, in particular Mykhailo M. Gonchar, Founder and President, and Chief Editor of the Black Sea Security Journal (p. 11.)

I highly recommend their three Appendices.

I should note that what I wrote in the main body was likely unexpected. I wrote that, for accomplishing a pragmatic, nuclear-power-inclusive energy transition in the 3-Seas Region (i.e., the EU’s Central and Eastern Europe, Baltic, and Balkan Member States), the continued dependencies on Russia’s Rosatom are not the only threats. The threat from the Group of Seven anti-nuclear states, led by Germany, is clearly equally or more disruptive to the Region accomplishing a pragmatic energy security-and-transition policy. I’ll quote a bit of the report on this point:

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“Is Europe winning the energy war?” Roundtable views: (i) Russian oil-price cap failing; anti-trust tax could help. (ii) Green-energy inflation & subsidies plus low oil & gas development disarm Europe.

Berlin Energy Roudtable. L to R: Ben Aris, Tom O’Donnell, Morten Frisch & Andriy Kobolyev (video link from Kyiv) 24 October 2023, Haus der Bunderpresskonferenz – PHOTO GALLERY BELOW (Divan staff)

On 24 October, I was honored to moderate a great roundtable in Berlin with three European energy experts, sponsored by Der Divan Kulturehaus. SUGGESTION: While listening, open up that speaker’s file below. You’ll find Ben Aris’ data-slides on Russian price-cap failings, Andriy Kobolyev’s proposal to tax Moscow’s oil & Morten Frisch’s slides on EU renewable shortcomings & continued oil and gas needs.

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Le dije a Radio Clarín Buenos Aires: Putin amenaza con cortarle el gas a la UE/Alemania, pero no tiene otra fuente de dinero. Si lo hace, Biden y la UE organizarán un “Gas-Lift” … [Spanish]

Lo sentimos, la calidad de la comunicación celular desde Alemania no es buena. Por lo tanto, he escrito mi respuesta larga a la primera pregunta a continuación. Las otras preguntas también están abajo. Muchas gracias a los periodistas de Radio Clarín y La Nacion en Argentina (y en París).

Re: Urgente Pedido de Entrevista Periodística – Corresponsales Clarín y La Nación – Argentina

De Maria E… … Fri, Apr 29, 11:50 PM

Dr. O ´Donnell, … Estas son las preguntas para la entrevista del domingo:

1¿Alemania tiene otra posibilidad que no sea seguir comprando el gas ruso? ¿Cuáles serían sus otras opciones?

Repuesta: Antes que nada, muchas gracias por esta oportunidad de hablar con su audiencia argentina.

Pues, debo señalar que hay dos problemas diferentes: el suministro de petróleo ruso a Alemania y Europa y el suministro de gas ruso a Alemania y Europa. Me preguntas por el gas. El gas es mucho más difícil para Europa y para Alemania que el petróleo Hay dos casos: una reducción gradual o parcial de gas o un corte inmediato.

Un corte gradual se puede manejar bastante bien. Ahora Putin está tratando de dividir y conquistar Europa cortando el suministro de gas a Polonia y Bulgaria.

Un recorte inmediato, ya sea por parte de Putin o debido a las sanciones de la UE, crearía una gran crisis energética en Europa. Sin embargo, es importante entender que, al final, Putin está en una posición mucho más débil.

Si Putin corta todos los suministros de gas a Europa, ahora no hay suficiente gas en el mercado mundial para compensar. Pero Occidente, y especialmente EE. UU., la administración Biden, se ha estado preparando para esto al menos dos meses antes de que Putin invadiera Ucrania, incluso antes de que Europa creyera las advertencias de EE. UU. de que Putin atacaría Ucrania.

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