Tag Archives: refineries

My EIES Study: ‘Liquidating the Russian Petrostate.’ New USA-Ukrainian oil-war effective. Siberian fields threatened.

A new USA-Ukrainian strategy has replaced the failed Russian oil-price cap. Oil is the material basis of Moscow’s capacity not only to fight Ukraine, but for its subversion in former USSR states, in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. In the US, one finds strong bipartisan sentiment that “Russia is a gas station, masquerading as a state,” as former-Senator John McCain famously remarked, and that Moscow must be deprived of its easy petrosate riches.

My study for European Initiative for Energy Security (EIES, based in Brussels, is associated with SAFE in Washington, DC, though policy-independent), traces the new USA-Ukrainian joint war on Russian oil, which includes sanctions, tariffs; drone strikes on Russian refineries, ports and oil tankers, and seizures of shadow fleet ships at sea. All these are part of a coherent campaign begun in Spring 2025, as the Trump administration realized that its focus on offering Putin economic enticements to end the war was proving ineffective. It became clear that the application of “pain”, as Trump put it, would be necessary.

The present study shows, in some technical detail, how it is possible to, first, physically stop the majority of Russian seaborn oil exports, secondly, that this can force the shutdown of old, delicate W. Siberian oil fields in winter resulting in the permanent or semi-permanent ruin of these fields, the material basis of the Russian petrostate economy.

This, in fact, is the real threat, the “pain”, which Putin has begun to fear, inducing him to engage for the first time a bit more seriously in negotiations.

The Report also draws attention to and analyses the unfortunate incapacity of many European expert observers and think tanks to see the outlines of this coherent oil war strategy, distracted by the considerable bluster and threats employed by President Trump.

Third, in parallel, the study explains presently favorable oil market conditions consisting of a persistent supply glut, making any major cutoff of Russian seaborne oil exports feasible without sparking a lasting spike in world prices. I show how the OPEC-Gulf states, especially the Saudis and UAE, have facilitated this glut in coordination with President Trump et al, with the prospect of regaining much of the Indian and Chinese market discounted Russian oil has taken since 2022.

For the longer term, however, in the conclusion to this report, it is shown how the return of Venezuelan barrels to the market (and perhaps Iranian barrels as well) are part of a comprehensive USA energy strategy to create market conditions enabling both persistent low prices and, if necessary, the permanent “Liquidation of the Russian Petrostate,” to end the Ukraine war and Moscow’s international significance-in-general.

This is all seen to be part-and-parcel of the Trump administrations detailed commitment – with significant bipartisan support – to exercise “USA Energy Dominance” as a pillar of USA geo-economic power and geostrategy.

I am available for interviews and speaking on this Report’s topic. Contact EIES or me directly.

The US & Ukraine pound Russian oil | my Kanal24, Kyiv

On 5 November, I told Kanal24, Kyiv that a US-Ukraine campaign to disable the Russian petrostate’s oil sector is underway. I stressed that this is a multi-spectral campaign combining (i) severe USA sanctions and secondary tariffs on Russian oil exports in parallel with (ii) Ukrainian military action on oil refineries and export-terminal ports. These attacks are known to be conducted and planned in close cooperation with USA military intelligence (FT,12 Oct.).

This means that an assessment of either aspect of this campaign on its own is inadequate. The synergy of sanctions plus military hits is the issue.

Secondary Sanctions. It has been widely recognized that the USA would need to, as promised, vigorously impose secondary tariffs on any entities that violated its recent tariff announcement. Indeed, on Sunday, President Trump lent support to a bill being drafted in Congress to hit any entity “doing business with Russia.”, not only buying its oil (i.e., “Trump says Republicans drafting bill to sanction countries that trade with Russia, Reuters. November 17). This sounds similar to the Senators Lindsey Graham (R, SC) and Richard Blumenthal’s (D Conn) so-called “bone-crushing sanctions” bill (Politico, 7 June) endorsed by 83 senators on 3 June.

The apparent aim of the port drone and missile attacks is to slash oil exports from Russia’s three or four biggest westward facing terminals. The focus thus far is on Black Sea terminals:

Continue reading

Why USA alarm? [PL/EN] Analityk: Ukraina pokazała, że może zakłócić eksport rosyjskiej ropy przez porty /Analyst: Ukraine has shown it could disrupt Russian ports exporting oil

Money.pl Getty …

In an Easter Sunday interview in 20+ Polish papers [POLISH & ENGLISH below], I said White House reasons for Ukraine not to hit Russian refineries don’t make sense. The “elephant in the room” alarming DC is that Ukraine can now disrupt Primorsk, UST-Luga and Novorossiskya oil ports, needed for 60% of Russian exports.

This would not only deny Moscow vital oil revenues needed to wage war, it would also spark a spectacular global oil market shock. I explain that the USA and allies can urgently prepare for this, while the Ukrainians are still maintaining strategic patience.

Continue reading

My Kyiv Post Interview: “Russia Lost 12% of Its Oil Refinery Capacity in a Day: What’s the Impact?”

According to energy and geopolitics expert Tom O’Donnell, Ukrainian allies’ oil price cap, in conjunction with Ukrainian drones’ physical damage could be a significant hit to Russian revenues.

by Jason Jay Smart | March 15, 2024, 2:16 pm | Please read at Kyiv Post if possible

Tom O’Donnell, PhD, an expert on energy and geopolitics, sat down with Kyiv Post to explain what Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s energy sector will mean for the larger Russian energy sector.

It sounds like a huge number. But how much do you think losing 12 percent of production, in a day, will affect Russia?

First off, although these refineries hit by Ukrainian drones yesterday represent about 12 percent of Russian production, experience shows that they might not each be totally impaired from production. Nevertheless, there are two particularly significant implications for Russia.

First, whatever percentage of Russian refined oil products this impairs, the damage will both deprive the war economy of needed export revenues and/or of much-needed fuels to keep the domestic war economy running.

Already, Russia had announced it will ban the export of gasoline from March 1 in order to tame prices for consumers in the runup to the presidential elections mid-month. In 2023 about 17 percent of Russian gasoline was exported.

What is the origin of the current price pressure?

The present price pressure is both a result of the demands of the war economy as well as previously successful Ukrainian hits on other refineries that began in January.

Read more: My Kyiv Post Interview: “Russia Lost 12% of Its Oil Refinery Capacity in a Day: What’s the Impact?”

This gets to my second point – the successful refinery strikes of yesterday, involving a reported launch of 58 drones, as well as recent hits on a Russian domestic gas transmission pipeline, all demonstrate that the January successes were not one-off special operations, but rather the beginning of what will be a sustained Ukraine armed forces campaign capable of, over time, significantly disrupting Russia’s all-important oil and gas import revenues and internal refined-product supplies.

Kyiv has launched some of its largest air attacks on Russia this week ahead of the vote, which is set to hand President Vladimir Putin another six-year term in the Kremlin.

If Russia continues to lose refineries, which appears likely, what new complications will it create for Russia?

First, from a strategic point of view, it is important to see these physical strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in conjunction with the sanctions efforts of the USA, EU and other allies aimed at reducing Russian oil profits. These drone strikes should be seen as a “force multiplier” to allied oil sanctions.

How so?

Consider that, with Russia no longer having the Druzba oil pipeline flowing into Central Europe due to EU sanctions, this has forced it to shift its Urals-region oil exports to seaports on the Baltic coast of Russia and to a new western-Arctic port.  Hence, hitting any refining or export facilities inside Russia along this general Urals-oil export corridor has a significant effect on Russia sustaining export revenues. This oil mainly flows to Turkey, India and China, with Russian oil tankers representing the main users of the Suez and then the Red Sea.  Due to sanctions, most of these ships are now either directly or indirectly Russian-controlled, to avoid the sanctions oil-price cap.

There has been a discussion in US-EU security-and-sanctions circles that these ships could be stopped for inspection by Sweden and/or Denmark in the Baltic, in the straights between their countries, and many might be refused passage due to having sketchy insurance and/or being unsafe, old vessels. 

Advertisement

What do you think of the oil price cap? Is it a good idea?

From the point of view of strategic impact, the allies’ choice of an oil-price cap has been, in my view, a weak and overly complex-to-enforce instrument.  However, in conjunction with Ukrainian drones’ physical damage, the overall hit to Russian revenues might become significant.

Secondly, Ukraine has also hit refineries in Russia just east of its own territory, which will mainly undermine the region’s war economy and complicate supplying the massive demand from Russia’s invasion forces.  This region already has chronic fuel-supply problems, with farmers last year protesting against a lack of diesel for harvests, causing Russia to ban diesel exports during that season.

Dr. Tom O’Donnell is Berlin-based and is a Global Fellow of the Wilson Center.

Jason Jay Smart

Jason Jay Smart

Jason Jay Smart, Ph.D., is a political adviser who has lived and worked in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Latin America. Due to his work with the democratic opposition to Pres. Vladimir Putin, Smart was persona non grata, for life, by Russia in 2010. His websites can be found at http://www.JasonJaySmart.com / http://www.AmericanPoliticalServices.com / fb.com/jasonjaysmart / Twitter: @OfficeJJSmart

Related references for assertions I made in my interview – Tom O’D.

China’s big NOCs slash prices to take market from private oil refiners ~ I’m quoted in “China Oil Week”

sinopec_station_china_newsbase_21jul17

A Sinopec station in China.  Sinopec and other big NOC’s are slashing prices to take business from Chna’s small private “Tea Pot” refiners.

Last week, I was quoted on my assessment of how China’s “Tea Pot” refineries (small, private outfits) will fare in the face of  China’s big National Oil Companies (NOCs) cutting  prices to grab the Tea Pots’ business.  My main point to Newsbase reporter Saw Wright was that China is far from a completely “free market” and the state can be expected to weigh in on one side or another, complicating any outcome predictions based on market and/or tech strengths and weaknesses.  I’m quoted a couple times near the article’s end, here:
Continue reading