Tag Archives: Energiewende

My BizNesAlert.pl — American expert: Germany is again contemplating Russian gas — Amerykański ekspert: Niemcy znów myślą o gazie z Rosji

x.com/_FriedrichMerz

I discussed with Artur Ciechanowicz  (BizNesAlert.pl) how Chancellor Merz and Energy Minister Reiche refuse the one reform that can really boost German energy security: focusing on nuclear energy as France has, and Poland has begun to do. (Read below in English or in Polish) — Twice last week, Merz indicated willingness to work with Russia when the Ukraine war ends. For two decades before the war, working with Russia meant more Russian gas imports, building Nord Stream 1 & 2. Now Merz worries about dependence on USA LNG. However, the German model he continues, one of installing BOTH a full-scale, wildly complex renewables system, plus a full-scale natural-gas backup system, guarantees high-cost energy, deindustrialization and foreign energy dependence.(Polish at BizNesAlert.pl)

Amerykański ekspert: Niemcy znów myślą o gazie z Rosji

Autor: Artur Ciechanowicz27 stycznia, 2026, 07:05

Wcześniej czy później Niemcy ponownie będą racjonalizować podporządkowanie się Gazpromowi Putina w imię +dywersyfikacji+ dostaw – ocenia Thomas O’Donnell, ekspert ds. energii i geopolityki z amerykańskiego think-tanku Wilson Center. Na zdjęciu kanclerz Niemiec Friedrich Merz.FOTO: x.com/_FriedrichMerz

Berlin zaczyna zmieniać kurs wobec Rosji i znów będzie racjonalizować współpracę z Putinem w imię „dywersyfikacji” dostaw gazu. Stanie się tak, bo Niemcy nadal opierają swoją strategię energetyczną na OZE wspierane gazem, zamiast postawić na atom jako priorytet – ocenia w rozmowie z Biznes Alert amerykański ekspert Thomas O’Donnell.

Wypowiedzi kanclerza Niemiec Friedricha Merza o potrzebie „pojednania” z Rosją, wygłoszone dwukrotnie nie da się traktować, jako wyrwanych z kontekstu i przypadkowych. To sygnał polityczny. Najbogatsze państwo Europy i przemysłowy motor Unii Europejskiej zaczyna rewidować swoją linię wobec Moskwy.

Merz z ufnością o Rosji

– Jeśli uda nam się przywrócić pokój i wolność w Europie, jeśli ponownie odnajdziemy równowagę w relacjach z naszym największym europejskim sąsiadem, czyli z Rosją, jeśli zapanuje pokój i zostanie zapewniona wolność –  jeśli to wszystko nam się powiedzie, wtedy Unia Europejska, a wraz z nią my w Niemczech, przejdziemy kolejny test i będziemy mogli z ufnością patrzeć w przyszłość także po 2026 roku – powiedział szef niemieckiego rządu na spotkaniu noworocznym z przedstawicielami przemysłu i handlu 14 stycznia w Halle, dodając potem: „(…) jeśli w dłuższej perspektywie uda nam się na nowo przywrócić równowagę w relacjach z Rosją, gdy zapanuje pokój i gdy wolność będzie zagwarantowana”.

Niemiecki przemysł od 2023 roku zmaga się z wysokimi cenami energii, spadkiem konkurencyjności, rosnącą presją chińskich producentów oraz stagnacją wzrostu gospodarczego. W 2024 roku niemiecka gospodarka formalnie weszła w recesję techniczną, a prognozy wzrostu na 2025 rok były jednymi z najsłabszych w UE.

Wypowiedzi Merza nie oznaczają natychmiastowego zwrotu w polityce wobec Moskwy ani propozycji zniesienia sankcji. Nie są ofertą pokoju ani jednostronnym gestem. Wskazują jednak na rosnące przekonanie w niemieckich elitach politycznych i gospodarczych, że obecny stan konfrontacji – bez realistycznej strategii wyjścia – osiągnął dla nich próg bólu.

„Powrót do „mafijnego bossa od gazu”

Thomas O’Donnell, ekspert ds. energii i geopolityki z amerykańskiego think-tanku Wilson Center wyjaśnia w rozmowie z Biznes Alertem intencje Merza: „Niemieckiemu kanclerzowi chodzi przede wszystkim o uniezależnienie się od pełnego sojuszu z USA, od zależności od Stanów Zjednoczonych. Jednak powrót do starego +mafijnego bossa od gazu+, Władimira Putina, trudno nazwać niezależną strategią”.

Z analizowanych przez O’Donnella wypowiedzi i komentarzy, a także z poufnych rozmów wynika, że niemieccy urzędnicy rządowi traktują amerykańską energię, jako potencjalnie równie zawodną jak tę z Rosji.

– Merz zlecił w związku z tym swoim ludziom znalezienie rozwiązań.  Oczywiście, metody Donalda Trumpa w relacjach z sojusznikami nie są konstruktywne. Mimo że Niemcy są teraz ogromnym odbiorcą LNG z USA, to amerykański prezydent traktuje te biznesowe więzi również jako instrument nacisku – zaznacza ekspert.

– Jednak źródło problemu leży w nierealistycznej polityce energetycznej ostatnich czterech kanclerzy. Merz dostrzega problem silnie subsydiowanych odnawialnych źródeł energii oraz nadmiernej zależności od rosyjskiego gazu. Ale wciąż nie widzi, że Niemcy nie mogą zapewnić sobie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego ani przystępnych cen, opierając się na zależnych od pogody OZE wspieranych gazem. Postawienie na nową energetykę jądrową jako priorytet to jedyna droga — co Francja jasno udowodniła – dodaje.

Niemcy znowu pomyślą o gazie z Rosji

O’Donnell zwraca uwagę, że Merz i jego rząd popierają kontynuację budowy tych samych dwóch równoległych systemów, które tworzyli poprzedni dwaj kanclerze: jednego opartego wyłącznie na OZE i drugiego — gazowego — jako zaplecza na dni bez wiatru lub słońca.

– W praktyce tak zwana reforma polityki energetycznej Merza polega na tym, że dalsza rozbudowa OZE i sieci ma być teraz w większym zakresie finansowana z prywatnych środków, a planowane ogromne instalacje turbin gazowych również mają powstać — tyle że zasilane LNG z USA, a nie rosyjskim gazem – podkreśla Thomas O’Donnell i ocenia, że nie jest to radykalna, strukturalna reforma energetyczno‑przemysłowa, której Niemcy potrzebują, a jedynie kosmetyczna zmiana.

– W sposób konieczny wcześniej czy później doprowadzi to do tego, że Niemcy ponownie będą racjonalizować podporządkowanie się Gazpromowi Putina w imię +dywersyfikacji+ dostaw. Czy to z powodu ideologiczno‑technologiczno‑politycznego zamieszania, czy oportunizmu — niemieccy przywódcy nie dostrzegają, że już istniejące OZE i każda nowa generacja gazowa powinny być traktowane jedynie jako rozwiązania pomostowe, podczas gdy rozwój energetyki jądrowej powinien być priorytetem – jako jedyna realna droga – podsumowuje amerykański ekspert.

Artur Ciechanowicz

American expert: Germany is considering gas from Russia again

Author: Artur Ciechanowicz January 27, 2026, 07:05

Sooner or later, Germany will once again rationalize its subordination to Putin’s Gazprom in the name of “diversification” of supplies, says Thomas O’Donnell, an energy and geopolitics expert at the American think tank Wilson Center. Pictured is German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. PHOTO: x.com/_FriedrichMerz

Berlin is beginning to change course towards Russia and will once again rationalize cooperation with Putin in the name of “diversifying” gas supplies. This will happen because Germany continues to base its energy strategy on renewable energy supported by gas, instead of prioritizing nuclear power, American expert Thomas O’Donnell told Biznes Alert.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s statements about the need for “reconciliation” with Russia, made twice, cannot be dismissed as out of context or coincidental. They are a political signal. Europe’s richest country and the industrial engine of the European Union is beginning to reconsider its stance towards Moscow.

Merz with confidence about Russia

– If we manage to restore peace and freedom in Europe, if we manage to find balance again in relations with our largest European neighbor, Russia, if peace prevails and freedom is guaranteed – if all this succeeds, then the European Union, and with it we in Germany, will have passed another test and will be able to look to the future with confidence even after 2026 – said the head of the German government at a New Year’s meeting with representatives of industry and trade on January 14 in Halle, later adding: “(…) if in the long term we manage to restore balance again in relations with Russia, when peace prevails and freedom is guaranteed.”

German industry has been struggling with high energy prices, declining competitiveness, increasing pressure from Chinese manufacturers, and stagnant economic growth since 2023. In 2024, the German economy formally entered a technical recession, and growth forecasts for 2025 were among the weakest in the EU.

Merz’s statements do not signal an immediate shift in policy toward Moscow or a proposal to lift sanctions . They are not an offer of peace or a unilateral gesture. However, they indicate a growing conviction among German political and economic elites that the current state of confrontation—without a realistic exit strategy—has reached their pain threshold.

“Return to the ‘Mafia Gas Boss'”

Thomas O’Donnell, an energy and geopolitics expert from the American think-tank Wilson Center, explains Merz’s intentions in an interview with Biznes Alert: “The German chancellor is primarily concerned with becoming independent from a full alliance with the United States, from dependence on the United States. However, returning to the old ‘mafia gas boss’, Vladimir Putin, is hardly an independent strategy.”

Statements and comments analyzed by O’Donnell, as well as confidential conversations, indicate that German government officials view American energy as potentially as unreliable as that from Russia.

“Merz has therefore tasked his people with finding solutions. Of course, Donald Trump’s methods in relations with allies are not constructive. Even though Germany is now a huge recipient of LNG from the US, the American president also uses these business ties as a tool for pressure,” the expert notes.

“However, the root of the problem lies in the unrealistic energy policies of the last four chancellors. Merz recognizes the problem of heavily subsidized renewable energy sources and excessive dependence on Russian gas. But he still fails to see that Germany cannot ensure energy security and affordable prices by relying on weather-dependent renewable energy sources supported by gas. Prioritizing new nuclear energy is the only way forward—as France has clearly demonstrated,” he adds.

Germany will think about gas from Russia again

O’Donnell points out that Merz and his government support the continuation of the construction of the same two parallel systems that the previous two chancellors created: one based solely on renewable energy and the other – gas – as a backup for days without wind or sun.

– In practice, the so-called Merz energy policy reform means that further expansion of renewable energy sources and the grid is now to be financed to a greater extent from private funds, and the planned huge gas turbine installations are also to be built – but powered by LNG from the USA, not Russian gas – emphasizes Thomas O’Donnell, assessing that this is not the radical, structural energy and industrial reform that Germany needs, but merely a cosmetic change.

“Sooner or later, this will inevitably lead to Germany once again rationalizing its subordination to Putin’s Gazprom in the name of ‘diversification’ of supplies. Whether due to ideological, technological, and political confusion or opportunism, German leaders fail to recognize that existing renewable energy sources and any new gas-fired generation should be treated merely as bridge solutions, while the development of nuclear energy should be a priority—the only viable path,” the American expert concludes.

Artur Ciechanowicz

My Dublin talk: “The role of renewables in securing Europe’s energy” [at EU Commission Representation, Polish Presidency event]

I felt greatly honored to speak in Ireland, the home of my ancestors, at a high-level Irish-Polish event, invited by the Polish embassy as part of Poland’s Presidency of the European Council. [Spoiler alert: my assessment of the Green Deal’s impact on EU energy security and competitiveness was highly critical. And, I called for a radical reform, modeled on the 1970-80’s French Messmer nuclear program, the response to a similarly dire European energy and competitiveness crisis.]

For Ireland we had Secretary General Oonagh Buckley and Wind Energy Ireland CEO Noel Cunniffee; for Poland, Daniel Piekarsky, Head of Energy Security Unit in the Foreign Ministry, and myself, Global Fellow of the Wilson Center, Washington (external) working in Europe, from Berlin.

Our moderator, from the Polish Embassy, Dublin, was the Polish diplomat and patriot, Dr. Jacek Rosa — a good friend, with whom I had the great pleasure of closely collaborating, for several years, in opposition to the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 gas-pipeline partnership, before the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Below is the lineup, the initial invitation and some pictures. The event was off-the-record, so I show here only my own, slightly redacted talk.

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Part 2: “Does EU Climate Policy Need Evolution or Revolution? What Should We Change in the Green Deal?” My critical remarks at “Energy Security in CEE Conference,” Warsaw

This is a continuation of my remarks in Warsaw, on 18 November. Part 1, which posted on 19 December, reviewed failures to develop critical tech elements required by the EU Green Deal, a program modeled on the German Energiewende. I argued that, after decades of R&D efforts, these technology failures indicate the systemic failure of heavily renewable models, pointing to a need for “radical reform” of the Green Deal. I advocated for the historically proven Messmer model, which succeeded, some 40 years ago, in decarbonizing French electrical generation using nuclear power, without any need for new grids or long-term grid-scale storage tech.

Below, Part 2 (edited for clarity) focuses on the political intransigence of the new Von der Leyen commission, which is doubling down on the Green Deal’s renewable model. I argue this is not “reindustrializing” Europe or making it “more competitive” as claimed, but rather driving it into deindustrialization. This mirrors the process underway in Germany via its continuing push for new “green tech,” on the theory this should spark a broad new European industrial competitiveness. From an historical perspective, this is theoretical and practical nonsense – or so I argue. Critiques are welcomed. (PS, Happy holidays!)

Leon (moderator): So, I’m going to turn to Thomas again. You argued that that some form of radical overhaul is necessary, you know, with regards to the EU Green Deal, if I understand it correctly, and you’ve cited one of the issues is the complexity of the fact that there are certain technologies that haven’t emerged over the last 30 years that have just been growing incrementally rather than rapidly to meet our needs. But at the same time there’s seems to be some sort of political rationale for why this sort of revolutionary approach. How would you respond to that?

Tom: Yes, politically, I do think the new Commission presents a big problem for European competitiveness, for energy policy and security.

The new commission is anti-energy-policy reform

Firstly this is because Ms. Teresa Ribera, from Spain, is President Von der Leyen’s new chief executive vice-president.  She is in charge of attaining both the Green Deal and has also been given responsibility for “industrialization of Europe,” for making it competitive again.

The problem is, Ms. Ribera is a true believer in all-renewable energy systems, I would say a career-long renewable fundamentalist.

For example, she’s said to be so good at negotiating that she managed to get the Spanish nuclear industry and civil society to agree on a timetable to close all the Spanish nuclear power plants, and she’s very proud of this. This is politically and ideologically identical to what Mr. Robert Habeck, the German Green Party leader, who is energy and economics minister, carried out with the approval of Chancellor Scholz of the SPD-party. Habeck closed Germany’s last three nuclear power plants during a wartime, Russian-instigated, European energy crisis.

The fact that Von der Leyen fought hard to appoint Ribera and then put her in charge of the Green Deal and of European industrialization, and made her the most powerful commissioner, the executive vice president of the commission, shows that Von der Leyen, a member of the German conservatives, the CDU, has no interest in reform of the renewables model despite its suffering technological failures on several key aspects.

The problem is not that Europe has not had an industrial policy. Europe has had an industrial policy, one that has failed

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Part 1: “Does EU Climate Policy Need Evolution or Revolution? What Should We Change in the Green Deal?” My critical remarks at “Energy Security in CEE Conference,” Warsaw

This is long, so posted in two parts. It ended up a sort of manifesto for radical reform of the EU Green Deal model. First, I explain key technological failings of the all-renewables model. Second, I stressed that political intransigence of the new Commission to reforming this model is weakening EU war-time energy security and driving industrial decline.

  • Anna Bryłka – Member of European Parliament, European Affairs Director Freedom & Independence Confederation
  • Dr. Thomas W. O’Donnell – American energy & geopolitics strategist based in Berlin, Global Fellow of Wilson Center, Wash, DC (external) & an experimental nuclear physicist
  • Sam Williams – EU Policy Manager, energy & climate at EPICO Climate & Innovation Brussels
  • prof. Leszek Jesień – Director, International Cooperation at PSE. Poland’s transmission system operator for electricity (TSO)
  • Moderator: Dr. Leon Hartwell – Senior Associate LSE IDEAS, London School of Econ., co-founder Russia-Ukraine Dialogues, & former Sotirov Fellow.

Note: The conference video is unpublished, so I print only my own remarks, unfortunately not my co-panelists’ as well. Starting from an AI transcript I greatly reworked into more like a long article, but with the moderator’s questions unchanged. I also added subtitles.

Dr. Leon Hartwell: Now, I’m going to now turn to you, Thomas, because you’ve written about everything from oil to nuclear energy, and I hope you’ll throw a few spanners in the wheel. So, to give us some food for thought. The title of our panel of course, Evolution or Revolution. What does the Green Deal need and why? What’s your take on this, Tom?

Dr. Tom O’Donnell: Thanks, Leon. Well, first off, I’m not going to say anything I haven’t said for 20 something years, I didn’t just write it for this panel.  I have also taught seminars critiquing the Green Transition Model, the German Model, over many years.

Dr. Tom O’Donnell, CEE Energy Security Conference, Warsaw 18.11.24

So, the question posed is: “Evolution or Revolution in the Green New Deal?” and the other iterations of it, “Fit for 55” and such?  I would say it would be nice to have evolution, but it’s not possible.

It’s a failure, a policy disaster, which is going to require radical action by Europe if you’re not going to deindustrialize, and also for security reasons. There are two aspects here to this failure.

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My BiznesAlert: German elites have no idea how to get out of the crisis / Ekspert dla Biznes Alert: niemieckie elity nie mają pomysłu na wyjście zkryzysu

Last night, leaving the Polish Sejm, after a long discussion, invited by a leader.

URL CORRECTIONS: ENGLISH Biznes Interview LINK & POLISH Biznes Interview LINK

[Warsaw, 21 Nov] Here’s my interview with BiznesAlert’s Artur Ciechanowicz (in EN & Pl) on Germany’s energy, industrial and political crises. I spoke here in Warsaw Monday at the CEE Energy Security Conference, attended Wednesday’s 25 Years of NATO Membership conference, and was invited yesterday evening, by a leader of the Sejm (parliament) for a long talk in his offices, joined by Mark Voyger (American University Kyiv and former-NATO). More soon. Tom O’D.

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NAPEC ’24, Oran: Why does the EU insist Algeria develop hydrogen & a big pipeline despite Equinor & Shell refusals due to “no customers”?

I explain EU/German motives for seeking “green H2” import pipes, then (at time 11:30) questions I raised moderating at NAPEC re. EU-Algerian pipeline MOU.

Here’s my video from Oran, Algeria, after a very informative “Africa and Mediterranean Energy & Hydrogen Exhibition & Conference,” NAPEC 2024 (video highlights here). Two parts to my analysis:

First, (up to time 11:30) I explain the rationale and impetus for the EU drive for massive green hydrogen gas imports. This is primarily driven by Germany’s increasing desperation at being locked into over-reliance on weather-variable renewables, whose high prices are sparking its “deindustrialization,” especially after losing Russian gas pipeline imports due to Putin’s war on Ukraine, plus due to the own-goal shutting down of their zero-carbon, amortized (paid for) nuclear plants during the European energy crisis. (Note: I misspoke: “Grey” hydrogen would NOT have the CO2 stored, “Blue” would. Both are derived from natural gas.)

I also explain how this massive green hydrogen “fix” to “renewables fundamentalist” policy is a techno-panacea that simply cannot work. Then ..

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My Al Qahera, Cairo: Germany’s VW auto crisis, Green Energy Errors & Deindustrialization (English/Arabic)

English audio here. Arabic video is below.
Arabic video here. English video is above.

Al Qahera, news TV in Cairo, asked me questions on Germany’s VW crisis. VW announced yesterday it will close at least two facilities and move to break the long-term agreement with its workers’ union for no layoffs till 2029. This is serious in that 1) VW, since its founding in 1937, has never shut any plants, and 2) it’s not just VW. and it’s not just the German auto sector.


I told Al Qahera that the same story can be told about Germany’s steel industry (i.e., Thyssen-Krupp), or its chemical industry (i.e., BASF).


German energy intensive industries are facing not merely the creeping uncompetitiveness long decried in the country, but outright deindustrialization.


I described to Al Qahera how this decline of German industry reminds me of USA deindustrialization (the “rust belt” collapse) during my years working in the USA auto industry in the mid-1970’s to early 1980’s (both at Chrysler and Ford, in Detroit) and USA Railways (I worked on the Michigan Central when it was consolidated with other railways, by the federal government, to form Conrail). I remarked how it took the USA some 15 or more years to restructure and again become a modern, digitalized manufacturer. There is no guarantee Germany could pull this restructuring off, and there was no guarantee the USA would either, but that was a special case of a mammoth economy,

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At ‘Berlin Energy Forum,’ 2 Sept., I’ll argue: Germany’s green-hydrogen import strategy is unrealistic & ignores African needs

NOTE: Last call to Sign Up Here for our 2nd Berlin Energy Forum, on “Germany’s Quest for Green Hydrogen: from Ukraine to Mauritania & back,” 4:00 – 5:30 PM (CET), Berlin Capital Club, followed by networking and drinks. The Capital Club is atop the Hilton Hotel, adjacent to Gendarme Market in Berlin’s Mitte district. Looks like we’ll have a full house again. There is also a delayed-video sign-up option. -o-o-o-o-o- Speakers: I’ll be joined by Dr. Dawud Ansari of SWP think tank where he leads H2 research, and Ms. Olena Pavlenko, President Kyiv’s Dixie Group via video link. Moderation: Ben Aris, Editor-in-chief & founder of bneIntelliNews, & our forum co-organizer.

Second: While writing my talk, I began rethinking a 2023 post on Germany’s  green-hydrogen import scheme for Mauritania. Below is my update. — Tom O’D.

German Green Hydrogen Import Strategy is Unworkable & Ignores Mauritania’s needs

Referring to the green hydrogen MOU signed with Mauritania in 2023, Conjuncta CEO Stefan Liebing said, “(This project) will have a strong link to Germany both as a technology provider and a potential offtaker of green energy.” (“Consortium signs $34 billion MoU for hydrogen project in Mauritania,” Reuters, 8 Mar 23.)

German public broadcaster Deutsche Welle seemed quite impressed: “It has a planned capacity of 10 gigawatts – the output of roughly five to six standard nuclear power plants. The first phase of the project is set to be completed by 2028” (“Mauritania set to export green hydrogen to Germany,” DW Business, 09Mar23 archived at YouTube.)

Indeed, the MOU aims for “10 gigawatts” of electrolyzers outputting “8 million tonnes/year” (Mt/y) of green hydrogen (H2) and other products, such as ammonia. However, according to the press announcement, in 2028 the facility will have a 400 MW capacity, or one-twenty-fifth of 10 gigawatts envisioned .

The German coalition government faces a formidable energy dilemma.

On one hand, it must urgently develop enough natural gas generation capacity at a reasonable cost to halt deindustrialization, and shut coal plants it brought back online when it closed the last nuclear plants To this end, Minister Habeck (Greens) urgently won approval for installation of 25 GW capacity of new natural gas turbine generation by 2030. In addition, this new natural gas capacity is needed to back up Germany’s growing, renewable-electricity dependence, as it simply has no feasible grid storage tech to offset its weather-variability.

So too, in response to Russia cutting off gas deliveries to Germany, as part of its full scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany urgently moved to install up to seven offshore LNG floating regasification ships (FRSOs). These aimed for a new natural gas import capacity of 25 bcm/year as LNG in 2023,

In January 2024, the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) reported that, “According to preliminary figures, the total volume of natural gas imported into Germany in 2023 was 968 T”Wh (2022: 1,437 TWh).” of which 7% or almost 70 TWh was LNG. The reduction from 2022 largely reflects the fall in industrial production it is now suffering.

On the other hand, Germany urgently seeks enough future “green energy” import projects to eventually replace all this natural gas if it is to meet its decarbonization targets. The government published its “National Hydrogen Strategy” in summer 2023. (Also, “Gremany’s National Hydrogen Strategy,” Factsheet, 26 Jul 2023, by Sören Amelang and Julian Wettengela, Clean Energy Wire, is very useful.)

The (IMHO) dogmatic insistence on refusing to re-open several still-operable nuclear plants and to develop new German nuclear capacity means that the only low-carbon way the government coalition and many other political and business actors can imagine to replace all this natural gas is with green hydrogen produced from renewables in distant African, Mideast, Latin American and other states, or from developing new renewable-generated electricity it can import from nearby European countries.

This self-induced straitjacketing of the German energy system is, as I have described it, a sort of “renewable fundamentalism” — a maximalist insistence to fuel everything with 100% renewables and absolutely no nuclear.

How much of Germany’s new LNG-supplied energy could the Mauritania project replace in 2028?

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1st “Berlin Energy Forum” 21 May | A monthly disruption of the local ‘energy echo chamber.’

Dear Colleagues & friends, Below is an invite to our first Berlin Energy Forum (jump to details | jump to register), but first a personal note.

First, a personal note: As some of you know, this is an idea I’ve been floating in Berlin since well before Corona. Then, last October, I had an experimental test run, a one-off, sponsored by the Qatari embassy’s Divan – and it went very well.

However, the biggest success from that event was that Ben Aris, co-founder and editor-in-chief of bne IntelliNews enthusiastically joined me to found the Berlin Energy Forum as a regular monthly sort of membership club. Amongst the longest serving foreign correspondents in Eastern Europe, Ben has been covering Russia since 1993, with stints in the Baltics and Central Asia. He is a former Moscow bureau chief for the Daily Telegraph and was a contributing editor at The Banker and Euromoney for a decade amongst writing for many other publications. He is also a professional photographer, and nowadays based in Berlin.

Ben is one of those rare people who relishes doing analysis and data-driven writing (non-stop!), AND who knows how to do business – and thoroughly enjoys doing it. Just the partner for this endeavor.

My model and inspiration for this forum was always the New York Energy Forum, which has run for over 40 years now. I happily attended while teaching in NYC. My experience with that forum, plus familiarity with a few top DC think tanks, and various foreign diplomats (esp. in NYC/UN), is how, as an academic, I got to know a broad spectrum of USA oil and gas executives, journalists, financial-institution analysts and government officials. Those personal connections have, over the years, anchored my assessments of USA, of OPEC MENA-and-Latin American members’, and of Russian and Chinese strategy. This sort of community doesn’t exist in Europe in such a focused manner, save perhaps in London. Perhaps we can now bring a bit of that world to Berlin with our new BEF.

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“Is Europe Winning the Energy War?” Berlin Energy Roundtable -24 Oct.- Invitation

Space is limited. Registration is required.

You are invited to attend the 1st Berlin Energy Roundtable, on 24 October. Our three distinguished speakers share decades of Eurasian and Mideast gas-sector experience. I’ll have the pleasure of moderating.

As many of you know, this is a format I long sought to establish in Berlin; but, which during Corona and the energy-crisis after the largescale Russian invasion of Ukraine, was difficult to advance.

The event is made possible with the generous sponsorship of the Divan Culture House in Berlin. Hopefully there will be several more in the coming year.

My Sky News: Germany-Mauritania green hydrogen plan is complex, costly & slow. Not mentioned: Mauritania & Senegal to soon export LNG.

Note: The Arab-to-English interpreter’s voice has been inserted over the interviewers. T.O’D.’s is direct.

Sky News Arabia asked me to assess the memorandum Mauritania signed on 8 March with German project developer Conjuncta, UAE firm Masdar and Egypt’s Infinity to produce “green hydrogen.”  I tried to give Sky News a data-driven assessment of this project.

According to Conjuncta CEO Stefan Liebing, “(This project) will have a strong link to Germany both as a technology provider and a potential offtaker of green energy.” (“Consortium signs $34 billion MoU for hydrogen project in Mauritania,” Reuters, 8 Mar 23.)

The German public broadcaster, Deutsche Welle, seemed impressed: “It has a planned capacity of 10 gigawatts – the output of roughly five to six standard nuclear power plants. The first phase of the project is set to be completed by 2028” (“Mauritania set to export green hydrogen to Germany,” DW Business, 09Mar23 archived at YouTube.)

While indeed, this MOU was advertised as aiming for “10 gigawatts” of electrolyzers, the initial goal is actually 400 MW (i.e., 0.4 GW) by 2028. That’s one-twenty-fifth the total  According to the announcement, this means 8 million tonnes/year of green hydrogen by 2028.

How significant is this?

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Reply of IEA’s Dr. Fatih Birol to my critical questions on Germany’s “100% renewables & no nuclear” at P-TECC in Warsaw

Video is set to Dr. Fadi Birol’s interesting answers to my two critical questions. However, I recommend going back and watching his entire talk – and others.

I was quite happy with the answer of IEA (International Energy Agency*) director, Dr. Fadi Birol, to two critical questions I posed, first on how the European Commission should include nuclear power in its “green financing taxonomy,” and secondly, against German over-reliance on variable renewables (I termed this “renewable fundamentalism”) which I said produces high “organizational entropy,” that is, unworkable and unaffordable, completely “reinvented” so-called “smart grids” with “grid scale stage” whose technology is not sufficiently developed all to cope with the problem of unavoidable wind and solar energy fluctuations, which become more massive as the percentage of installed renewables increases. This is a significant contribution to Germany’s (and the EU’s) present crises of energy supply and price security. (The video above is set to start at my two questions.)

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“US Expert Perspectives on German Energy Vulnerabilities” – My AICGS/Washington Project

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German Chancellor Merkel listens to Russian President Putin [Photo: dw.de 29.4.14]

Throughout April and May I’m researching US Expert Perspectives on German [and EU] Energy Vulnerabilities – as a visiting fellow of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) in Washington, DC, funded by the German DAAD.  You can read the proposal below.  But, first, I’d like to ask Global Barrel readers for two things:

(1) Is there anyone you feel I should interview here in Washington–the idea is to interview US energy experts, government officials and business people?

(2) What is your opinion of German and EU energy policies and their geopolitical implications. This includes issues ranging from German/EU dependence on Russian gas, the Ukraine and Turkey as gas-transit states, the new European “Energy Union,”  the German Energiewende, and moreno matter on which side of the Atlantic you live. 

[I’ve deleted the names of people I propose to interview, as not all will agree to have their remarks made public. I’m happy to keep opinions private and use them in general summaries of my findings.]