My comments are linked here:: -1- 02:21, -2- 06:52 -3- 14:30 -4- 20:50, but hear Aura & Oktay too!
I was happy to address Türkiye’s push to become a gas hub: both for its own domestic security of supply, and to become an indispensable supplier to the European market. I was on with esteemed gas-sector analysts Aura Sabadus and Oktay TanriseverI, and host Yusuf Erim. TRT is a state-supported Turkish national broadcaster. The Turkish, East Med, Central Asian, Caspian regions involved are fairly complex, and I will simply let the interview speak for itself. Turkey is making progress but needs to end market-price setting, as Aura Sabadus stressed – and I agreed, as well as further diversification of supplies. I stressed the self-destructive EU lack of interest in long-term new pipeline gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan it could indeed contract for, which would all transit Turkey.
You will see (my 3rd answer) that I raised again my view that Europe will become ever more deeply in need (i.e., dependent) on natural gas imports, but is acting rather “schizophrenic” about this. Brussels et al seems not to be willing to face this reality. Natural gas importance and its geostrategic nature will only increase due, perhaps counter-intuitively, to EU over-dependence on renewables. But, where is the urgency, then, to sign long-term pipeline-gas contracts from neighboring states via a developing Turkish gas-sales hub? Such supplies would generally be cheaper than LNG imports, especially if the LNG is purchased on short-term spot markets. Indeed, even its main pipeline supplies now, from Norway, are reportedly mainly via short-term spot purchases (See Morten Frisch, Norwegian gas-sector veteran). I find this astonishing for both price and security of supply.
10-12 February, I was invited to contribute to the NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) on critical European infrastructure, organized in Podgorica by the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, a NATO member, and The International Society for Risk Management (ISRM), Serbia, a non-NATO member. This partnership plus experts from neighboring states made the workshop on risks to regional and West Balkan infrastructure very informative. I felt quite honored, as a regional outsider, an American working on EU energy and geosecurity (based in Berlin), to be invited. Conference FB link
I planned to discuss drivers of EU deindustrialization, but decided to focus on one sharp example: how tech failures in the EU’s energy-infrastructure model, the Green Deal, is causing the unexpected 2025 EU natural gas crisis. This comes while gas prices were still high and supply still problematic from the 2022-23 Energy War – caused by Russia maliciously stopping Nord Stream pipeline flows. This new hit to European competitiveness and security was, however, an eminently avoidable “own goal.” (The workshop discussion is off the record, but I may post my own talk.)
How has the Green Deal model caused another gas crisis?
The EU Green Deal model requires installation of high percentages of wind and solar renewables. However, to supply energy reliably, installation of wind and solar renewable (RE) technology must be paired with installation of sufficient universal, long-term, grid-scale storage (ULTGSS) technology. The idea is excess electricity generated on very sunny, windy and mild days should be stored to compensate supply on dark, calm and cold days. (Let’s put aside, for now, expert debunking of this RE-plus-storage model using weather and tech data.) Over-installation of solar and wind beyond what can be backed up by some other source, is a critical vulnerability to energy infrastructure reliability during periods of cloudy, calm and cold weather. This is called “Dunkelflaute” in German.
However, the reality is that, after some four decades of storage-tech R&D, such a technology still does not exist. There is no lack of studies and data on this. However, EU members remain mandated by the Green Deal and ancillary EU and/or national laws to continue installing ever higher percentages of renewable generation.
As a result, Dunkelflaute conditions in late-November and early December 2024, and again in February 2025 across northern Europe led to prolonged periods of plunging RE generation. Without the aforementioned ULTGSS backup (my acronym), the “de facto ULTGSS” has primarily been natural-gas-fueled generation, plus importing of nuclear, hydro and coal generation from neighboring countries having excess capacity in these.
My talk was an analysis the root cause for another EU natural gas crisis this winter. I explained that the EU’s initial win in the energy war imposed on it by Putin, overcoming the initial, acute crisis of 2022, is nevertheless evolving dangerously into a Pyrrhic victory – into a defeat. This is because EU energy policy, the Green Deal, has critical technological failings, and the present EU Commission leadership refuses to reform it, rejects any serious criticism of the model, and is instead doubling down on an all-renewables system ASAP. In fact, it is assumed that Van der Leyen will announce, late in February, adoption of a new, more “ambitious” target of 90% net-zero emissions by 2040 relative to 1990. (GlobalBarrel.com readers might recall I termed this as “fantasy” in Op-Eds last year in the Polish daily press and elsewhere.)
A Green Deal reform, based on science, is not inherently “right”, “center” or “left”
I explained why a radical reform of this Green Deal model should not be a matter of political philosophy, rather ait requires only an honest recognition that the tech simply does not exist for this scale of installations. Refusal to reform is no longer only anti-science Green populism. After ca. 15 years of this Green Model’s hegemony in various member states, then in Brussels, ALL PARTIES are beset with ideological-scientific confusion and need a certain fresh start, a reeducation or green-energy deprogramming. In particular, center-right parties, such as the CDU in Germany, are typically confused in that they tend to see the entire problem as one of the methods of financing the Green Deal (and the German Energiewende, which provided the model the Green Deal is based on). They focus on having less government mandates, less subsidies, more public financing, and a more liberal, interconnected electricity market in Europe. All well and fine. However, if one is talking about alchemy, funding the transmutation of lead into gold, then it matters little how efficiently it is financed, and how liberal is the market model. In this case, the problem is that a highly RE based model (much less the German, Spanish, Austrian, etc. model of 100% renewables), lacking any universally applicable, long-term, grid-scale storage, is simply energy-infrastructure “alchemy”. It is simply impossible without an entire parallel natural gas system on standby awaiting any instance of Dunkelfloute. This is a disaster, an impossibly complex and expensive model that guarantees ever deeper EU deindustrialization.
Even the farthest right and left parties are hesitant to embrace a fundamentally different model of massive large-scale nuclear as the basis, with also extensive electricity-fueled mass transit build-outs as a clearly already-proven model. The alternative is further high energy prices, deindustrialization and undercutting of European security.
(Arabic. English is above). Asharq-Bloomberg spot.
Last night, Asharq, the Mideast Bloomberg news affiliate, asked me three questions (roughly translated):
The the EU wants to extend the sanctions (on Russian gas), at the same time they want to open open the Russian pipeline through Ukraine. What is this contradiction? How to understand it in practise?
How will Ukraine respond to these talks? Don’t you think that Ukraine will accept, for example, to open this project or to reopen these pipelines to resupply gas? Don’t you think the other European nations that were impacted neglecting or abandoning this Russian gas?
Doctor, don’t you think that there has been a change in US policies, economic and political policies towards Russia after the reelection of Trump? Do you think we may see a change?
Here is a transcript of the Q&A (AI generated)
1 00:00:00,052 –> 00:00:02,772 are joined by Doctor Thomas Odoner. From
2 00:00:02,932 –> 00:00:05,052 Berlin. Welcome back, Doctor. Happy to
3 00:00:05,052 –> 00:00:07,972 have you with us tonight. So the EU
I appeared alongside Dr. Hashem Aqel, Oil and Energy Expert, Associate Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, who contributed several insights. Asharq News is the Mideast Bloomberg partner. My further analysis follows:
Arabic, original broadcast version.
The recent rise in EU gas prices and the rapid depletion of what had been a significant surplus in EU storage, is principally a two-sided story.
One side is indeed about the impending cutoff of Russian gas, still flowing across Ukraine. This has been expected for months, and so is already largely priced in. Expectations of new transit across Ukraine of Russian-origin gas re-labelled as Azerbaijani was being negotiated. However, this deal fell apart, with the final nail in its coffin being when Ukraine’s President Zelensky asserted that Ukraine would not transit any further Russian-origin gas after 31 December unless payments to Russia are withheld until after the war ends. This seems a very reasonable demand for a country fighting for its survival against a Russian invasion. [See “Ukraine will not allow transit of Russian gas with Azeri label, Zelenskyy says, dashing Slovak hopes,” EuroNews, Jorge Liboreir 19 Dec. 2024.] This marks the end of the five-year contract, which was only agreed to at the last moment before New Year 2020, when the US Senate finally forced then-President Trump to agree to sanctions on Nord Stream 2 construction (I was in Kyiv, for Naftogaz, and on Ukrainian television, analyzing Washington sanctions, Kyiv-Moscow negotiations, and the pro-Nord Stream position of Berlin.)
The other side is a story of yet another European energy own-goal, a consequence of its over-reliance on weather-dependent renewable energy generation. This overreliance has made its electricity supply increasingly volatile, in sync with the weather. In November and early December, especially north and western Europe experienced what the Germans call “Dunkelflaute“, a protracted wind and solar drought. Batteries can only substitute for perhaps 40 minutes, or at best an hour. So, the de facto long-term, grid-scale “storage” backing up Europe’s plethora of wind and sun generation is really just natural-gas turbine electrical generation plants. The reality of increased generation (and hence, electricity market) volatility and dependence on gas backup generation was analyzed this week in a data-driven manner by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. [See: “Dunkelflaute: Driving Europe Gas Demand Volatility” Energy Insight: 161, by Anouk Honoré and Jack Sharples, Senior Research Fellows, OIES, 2024/12.]
Is this even a real proposal? Nowadays, after becoming so unreliable a supplier of gas to Europe, in fact having weaponized Russian gas deliveries, it is difficult for anyone to take this proposal seriously. Erdogan may have many significant problems; however he and Turkey are not so naieve as to do what Germany and Austria forced the European Union to do, i.e., become overdependent on Russian gas, especially given the deep energy crisis Europe is currently going through.
But, also consider this (as I explained towards the end): This proposal of sending Nord Stream gas, originating in Northern Urengoy province, above the Artic Circle, would also require a big, new pipeline laying project, running at least from perhaps near the Ukrainian border south towards the Black Sea and then onto Turkey. This would have a significant cost. And, by the time this could be finished – in perhaps five or more years – the world will have moved on. By that time, new LNG and natural gas production potential in the USA, Qatar, Australia, Algeria, Norway, Israel (sent to Egypt for liquification) and likely many others’, will have been developed and be on the global market. On this time horizon, there would be plenty of diverse sources of gas fully able to replace Russian export capacities.
I also explained the history of the South Stream Pipeline …
My thanks to Al Jazeera’s Katya Bohdan, producer, and the digital team in Doha (English) for this well done “documentary” featuring my point of view on: “What does Russia’s gaas cur mean for Europe?” I think it is self-explanatory (and its short). Watch it below or directly at the AJ link here. Tom OD.
Dear readers: I have so many interviews on the present energy-and-war crisis that I cannot post them all here. Here are two recent ones.
My interview with Deutsche Welle (Berlin) host Daniel Winters on i) OPEC+ decision to only up production 100k barrels. & Could an EU price cap on Russian natural gas & other gas help with supplies, with costs to citizens and businesses? Here is the English Audio for Al Jazeera video BELOW.
On Sunday night, (Al Jazeera) I refuted a Moscow expert who said Russia’s leadership (i.e., Putin) is planning to divide EU over natural gas, saying the EU was never united. The English response audio is above the YouTube video, which is in Arabic.
Some comments on the DW interveiw above:
I spoke with DW.de Business show host Daniel Winter about the OPEC decision today, which some decried, and the EU plans to put a price cap on natural gaas – Russian and otherwise. You might find my take on the OPEC decision surprising?
Jun 17, 2022 Today, Gazprom announced a further cut in exports of gas via Nord Stream 1 to Germany and on into Europe. Earlier this week, they had cut 40%, now it is 60% of the 55 billion cubic meters per year (bcm) that normally flows in this pipe.
I explained that the Gazprom excuse – -that it could not re-import some compressor parts it had sent to Siemens to repair in Canada due to sanctions — appears as a convenient, manufactured excuse.
I pointed out that a one-off sanctions waiver from the USA, EU and/or Canada for the reimportation of these very specific parts could likely be easily arranged – and if the gas did not again flow fully, Gazprom’s ruse would be clearly exposed.
However, as I said, this is more accurately understood as simply another step in the weaponization of the over-dependence of the European Union (and esp. of Germany, Austria and Italy) on Russian gas imports, a game which Mr. Putin began in earnest in August of 2021.
Kostaka.Media (Kyiv) independent journalists continue informing the Ukranian people on energy affairs. I was interviewed from afar by YAROSLAV MARKIN, TETIANA HUZENKO. We focused on gas issues – would Putin cut Europe’s gas? What have the Americans been organizing, now with the Europeans? How would this affect Europe, Ukraine and Putin’s income?
Below are links to the article in Kostaka’s three languages (EN, RU, UA). I pasted in the English one below, in case you have access problems. This interview had to be written, not audio/video, due to wartime difficulties. [Also, here’s my previous (in-person Kyiv) interview with Kostaka.Media.]
Biden’s Gas Air Lift and the impact on Kremlin revenue: Thomas W. O’Donnell on the russian gas embargo 28 April 2022 — Author YAROSLAV MARKIN, TETIANA HUZENKO Europe is going to cut the consumption of gas by a ⅔ in 2022, that is obviously will affect the Kremlin’s revenue. However, an embargo is highly possible as well. Both the Kremlin and the EU, in response to Russia’s new war crimes in Ukraine, could stop the gas flows. In such a case, LNG supplies are to help weather the crisis of 2022-2023 via Biden Air Lift. The last mentioned is being set up by the US and EU diplomats and is patterned on the Berlin Air Lift of 1949. Berlin Air Lift was a system of food and coal supply during the times when the USSR had been blocking land routes. This would be the end of Russian gas supplies to Europe forever, an international expert and senior energy and geopolitics analyst at GlobalBarrel.com, Dr Thomas W. O’Donnell believes. He told Kosatka.Media how quickly Europe would be able to abandon Russian gas, what alternative supply routes could be used, and whether Hungary and Austria, obsessed with Russian gas, could prevent this.
The analogue of Putin’s army in the energy sector • How much gas does Europe import from Russia per year? Who are the major consumers?
There are two different market processes whereby Russian gas is purchased by Europe. If we speak about only gas delivered by pipeline, these are: І. Via long-term contracts, agreements which are for natural gas to be delivered for several years, perhaps from five to as much as 20 years.
ІІ. Via the “spot” market. These are short-term contracts for gas to be delivered the following month. It is also possible to buy gas day-by-day, where traders agree to a price for gas delivered the next day. Here, gas traders consult the future’s market, which has set the price for gas delivered the next day, or the next month, or some number of months in the future.
The English version is below here | Mein Op-Ed-Artikel wurde am 6. April 2021 im Tagesspiegel Background in Berlin gedruckt.
Die Ukraine als „Zentralbank“ für europäische Energie
Thomas O’Donnell, Hertie School of Governance
Wie kann die Gasdominanz Russlands strategisch eingehegt werden? Der Wissenschaftler Thomas O’Donnell von der Hertie School of Governance prüft in seinem Standpunkt die Möglichkeit, die Ukraine mit ihren großen Gasspeichern zu einer Art „Zentralbank“ für europäische Energie zu machen und sie als Puffer zu nutzen. Zusammen mit weiteren Alternativen zu den Nord-Stream-Pipelines verbessere das die Versorgungssicherheit stark.
Der Chef des ukrainischen Gastransportsystems, Sergiy Makogon, hat vorgeschlagen, dass Europa die Ukraine als flexiblen und strategischen Energieknotenpunkt akzeptiert und dabei die Vorteile ihrer einzigartigen Gastransport- und -speicherinfrastruktur nutzt.
Was dieses Konzept glaubwürdig macht, ist, dass die Ukraine seit 2014, kurz nachdem die Maidan-Revolution und die russische Aggression begannen, ihren Gassektor erfolgreich in diese Richtung umgestaltet hat. Mit Hilfe der EU rüstete die Ukraine rasch die Exportpipelines in die Slowakei, nach Polen, Ungarn und Rumänien um, um Rückflüsse (Reverse-Flow) zu ermöglichen. Das befreite Kiew schnell von der Notwendigkeit, russisches Gas zu kaufen, und stellte sicher, dass ein solcher „Handel“ in Zukunft nicht dazu genutzt werden kann, Moskau zugeneigte Oligarchen zu fördern.
Op-Ed: Ukraine as “Central Bank” of European energy
Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, Hertie School of Governance | Published in: Tagesspiegel Background, Berlin. 6 April 2021
How can Russia’s gas dominance be strategically contained? Dr. Thomas O’Donnell of the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, examines the possibility of turning Ukraine with its large gas storage facilities into a kind of “central bank” for European energy and using it as a buffer. Together with other alternatives to the Nord Stream pipelines, this will greatly improve European security of supply.
The CEO of Ukrainian’s gas transmission pipeline system, Mr. Sergiy Makogon, has proposed that Europe embrace Ukraine as a flexible and strategic energy hub, taking advantage of its unique gas-transport and -storage infrastructure.
What makes this concept credible is that Ukraine has been successfully re-shaping its gas sector in this direction since 2014, shortly after its Maidan Revolution and Russia’s aggression began. With EU assistance, Ukraine rapidly retooled export pipelines to Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to permit reverse flows. This rapidly freed Kyiv from buying Russian gas and assured this “trade” could not be used in future to cultivate pro-Moscow oligarchs.
My 3rd EuroNews Nord Stream 2 sanctions interview, 6 January 2021 (After 30-seconds intro)
[This post is a dey late due to the violent attack on the US Capitol orchestrated by the outgoing-president and his followers. This assault has been defeated and the election is being certified by Congress. Trump will soon leave and Biden will take office in accordance with the Constitution and laws. T. O’D.]
The EuroNews Morning Show asked me [yesterday 6 January,] again about the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Two key points made in the earlier interviews were:
That the plans of Nord Stream 2 AG (NS2 AG) to restart pipelaying before the holidays in German waters was a propaganda exercise (viz, “a disinformation campaign”) orchestrated by Moscow and Gazprom to create the impression the pipeline can be finished.
Despite this new pipelaying “bravado”, the pipeline was effectively “dead” because of the US sanctions.
These points were an assessment of the impact of the new sanctions law, which was about to be enacted by the US Congress. This is the “Clarifications” of the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act, or PEESCA, which was enacted December 2021, despite a veto by President Trump. These PEESCA sanctions have been added to the previous PEESCA (December 2002) sanctions and the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, initially 2017) sanctions against NS2.
My EuroNews live Morning Show interview today (9 Dec 20) with Rosie Wright:
I explains why the German far-right AfD party, which went to Moscow yesterday to show Lavrov their party’s support for Nord Stream 2, supports the project. The AfD supports it along with all other German parties, from “far-right to far-left, and those in the middle, except the Greens.”
Also, I explain how Europe’s dependence on Russian gas will require decades to escape.
However, what are the strategic objectives of Moscow in building Nord Stream 2? I explain Putin wants to build Nord Steam 2 through the Baltic Sea to Germany as well as to complete the Turk Stream (formerly South Stream) pipeline across the Black Sea and Turkey and on into the Balkans and then into Central Europe, and also west to Italy. The reason for this is so that Gazprom does not have to send Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine and Belarus, countries that are in rebellion against Russian dominance.
My analysis of the US-German crisis over Nord Stream 2 and policy towards Russia, published in Washington by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS), 8 October 2020. Read it at AICGS website\. Or, continue here. Comments & Critiques welcomed (below or via email)
Nord Stream 2: Allies’ Crisis
Two decades of Washington-Berlin collisions over the Nord Stream 1 and now the Nord Stream 2 pipelines have come to crisis.
The U.S. Congress stopped Nord Stream 2 construction in December 2019 by enacting sanctions under the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act (PEESA), and is poised to enact a much harsher “Clarification” of PEESA, sanctioning any entity that resumes or aids in resuming construction in the Baltic Sea. German officials insist the project will, nonetheless, be completed, denouncing U.S. sanctions as “extraterritorial” interference in “European sovereignty.”
In reality, the project appears dead. Statements by businesses interests, as opposed to political actors, support this.[1] To resume construction, companies, ports, officials, and insurers would require guarantees against ruin, including being personally sanctioned, which is difficult to imagine the German state providing. And there is no evidence of preparations to do so. Nevertheless, Russia’s Gazprom continues preparations to resume work.[2]
Complicating matters, the U.S. Congress, having mandated sanctions against the pipeline, would have to approve any compromise. On the other side, the German Bundestag roundly “savaged” a motion by the Green Party to abandon Nord Stream 2 in response to Navalny’s poisoning, unprecedentedly uniting the CDU/CSU of Chancellor Merkel and her SPD coalition partners with both the far-left Die Linke and far-right Alternative for Deutschland.[3]
What are US experts’ and officials’ views on the increasingly conflictive energy and geostrategic relations between Russia, Germany, Poland and Ukraine?
Greetings. I’m in Washington as a “Title VIII” fellow of the Kennan Institute in the Woodrow Wilson Center, interviewing people in think tanks and government (legislative and executive) on these topics. I’ll also give a public talk on this at Wilson on 12 June, at 2 PM (more info soon).
I’m interested to hear anything readers think should be asked and of whom. Don’t hesitate to write me at twod(at)umich.edu or my (temp) Wilson email: thomas.odonnell(at) wilsoncenter.org.
A central issue: why is Germany so adamantly for Nordstream 2 despite the negative security consequences for Ukraine and despite the tremendous hit this project is causing to German soft-power not only with Poland, but with most Central and Eastern European (CEE) and Nordic states? (Here’s my own analysis.) How do US experts see this? Continue reading →
The US Senate’s decision to expand sanctions against Russia triggered indignation in Berlin, throwing Germany’s geopolitical ambitions over the Nord Stream 2 project into sharp relief. Read below or get the App. My other articles at Berlin Policy Journal
“Neue Neue Ostpolitik”
Berlin – July 21, 2017 By: Thomas O’Donnell — On June 15, the US Senate approved an act to sharply expand sanctions imposed on Russia in retaliation for its intervention in eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014. The broadly bi-partisan move that enshrined Barack Obama’s earlier executive orders – intended as a response to Moscow’s alleged cyber interference in US elections – was a stunning rebuke to US President Donald Trump’s Russia policy, essentially taking a broad swath of foreign policy out of his hands. Continue reading →
What are US experts’ and officials’ views on the increasingly conflictive energy and geostrategic relations between Russia, Germany, Poland and Ukraine? 
The Global Barrel 
