El día de Pascua, 20.04, me entrevistaron en directo por radio, en muchas ciudades de Europa y del hemisferio occidental. On Easter Sunday, April 20, 2025, I was interviewed live in several cities of Europe and the Western Hemisphere.The interview was in Spanish. An English Google translation is below (RHS column). The topic was the negotiations of the Trump USA administration between Russia and Ukraine to end the war. Tom OD.)
Mi agradecimiento por la invitación de María Eugenia Plano, productora del programa radial Corresponsales en Línea, realizado por las corresponsales de los diarios Clarín y La Nación en París y Londres (María Laura Avignolo), París (Danielle Raymond), Madrid (Silvia Pisani), Berlin (Araceli Viceconte), Washington ( Paula Lugones) y San Pablo (Cristina Veiga) con la conducción de Silvia Naishtat (Editora de Economía de Clarín). en vivo y en directo para Radio Ciudad en Buenos Aires, los días domingos de 10 a 12 AM Hora Argentina. My thanks for the invitation from María Eugenia Plano, producer of the radio program Corresponsales en Línea, made by the correspondents of the newspapers Clarín and La Nación in Paris and London (María Laura Avignolo), Paris (Danielle Raymond), Madrid (Silvia Pisani), Berlin (Araceli Viceconte), Washington (Paula Lugones) and Sao Paulo (Cristina Veiga) hosted by Silvia Naishtat (Economics Editor of Clarín). live and direct for Radio Ciudad in Buenos Aires, Sundays from 10 to 12 AM Argentine time.
TRT asked me to be ready to comment, live, on the Oval Office meeting just before it blew up. I said Vance acted “infantile”. What I should have stressed, however, is that understanding Vance’s decision to blow up the meeting is key to understanding Trump’s strategy towards Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. (So, in this post the written analysis is the main thing, not the video.)
My TRT quick take, 28 Feb. See my later analysis, in the blog post.
There is plenty of facile analyses of this clash. Many say the blowup reflected “chaos” in Trump’s policy on Ukraine and Russia, or that Trump has an “impulsive” strategy, that he “dislikes Ukraine”, he’s “pro-Russian,” or that the blowup was a “prearranged ambush” to “humiliate” Zelensky, or similar.
Too few consider the possibility that the rebuke is consistent with a well-defined USA strategy. What quickly becomes clear from listening, at face value, to multiple statements by Trump himself and his team is that they have a consistent strategy. This is clearly not the first Trump administration. This second administration is different in its unity and consistency on its Ukraine, Russia, and Europe policies.
What was the purpose of the “minerals” deal that Zelensky came to sign?
The weeks-long USA-Ukrainian clash over this deal has reflected their geostrategic differences on a peace deal with Russia. After heated exchanges and compromises, clearly the Ukrainian side was not pleased with the issues it had had to give up in the minerals deal. Nevertheless, Zelensky’s Council of Ministers voted to endorse the deal, and Zelensky went to DC explicitly to sign it.
Interestingly, just before he went to the White House, President Zelensky met with a group of Republican and Democratic senators, who had “… all told him sign the deal and don’t get into an argument.” (War on the Rocks, timestamp 7:58-8:19, 06.03.25). Alas, if one watches Zelensky’s public argumentation, from the start of the press conference, and his telling Trump that a deal without a US security guarantee won’t work, all of which is in contradiction to the deal he is about to sign, it is clear that he precipitated the breakdown. In my reading of the event, he seemed to not be able to restrain himself, seemingly out of an understandable deep anguish at being about to sign an accord contrary to his better judgment.
What did each side want in the “minerals” deal, and who got what?
Everything I found to have been said by the actors on the USA and Ukrainian sides as to what each wanted in the document is quite consistent.
On the Ukrainian side, the big one was a USA security guarantee for any deal Trump makes with Putin. The Ukrainians certainly welcome the willingness of European allies to extend security guarantees for any deal, especially the public commitments made by both the UK and France to contribute troops, but they were clear that they did not think this can substitute for a USA guarantee standing behind theirs. Related to this, the Ukrainians opposed taking NATO membership for them off the table. Another was a seat at the table for Ukraine and the Europeans during negotiations with Russia (Trump wants something more like a shuttle diplomacy between the two.) Related to this, is that the USA should not negotiate a cease fire deal without them. Still another was refusing to agree beforehand to give up any Ukrainian territory that has been occupied by Russia.
Obviously the USA disagreed and de facto or openly refused all these conditions. However, the disagreement over the security guarantee seemed to be the most hot-button issue between them. Trump flatly refused. His reasoning, as explained to the press was interesting, revealing a lot about his philosophy or method for negotiating a peace deal. He said that the two sides obviously hated one another and he had to go between the two to negotiate anything. (Read Trump’s own words, in the transcript below.)
The Trump concept of economic interests and security interests
He also said that they had to trust him, saying that it just would not work if he first gave a security guarantee, taking Ukraine’s side so clearly beforehand. He also said that the ultimate security guarantee “is the easy part” and getting the deal “is the hard part.” He said the guarantees can “come later.” It became clear that, in his approach, this minerals deal was to be the signal to Putin that the USA would have long-term economic interests in Ukraine and would, of course, in Trump’s view of how the world works, defend against any threats to those economic interests.
This approach is clearly seen as highly risky by Ukraine, which has been abandoned once before under what was an explicit security guarantee, the Bucharest Memorandum, extended in return for giving up its nuclear weapons in the 1990’s. As Zelensky recounted for Trump, no signatories of the Minsk Accords extended security guarantees after Russia’s 2014 aggression, and Putin broke them constantly
The text of the final document, the one the Ukrainian ministers approved, is known; it was published in Kyiv two days before the Oval Office meeting. (The full text of the Ukraine-US Minerals Agreement, European Pravda, Kyiv, 26.02.25). So, it is easy to see that Kyiv didn’t get its main demands, although the USA did compromise, in a sense, on one of them, agreeing to an explicit mention of a “security guarantee.” However, the USA did not extend one as a quid-pro-quo for the minerals deal, rather in Section 10. the wording is:
The Government of the United States of America supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace. Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments, as defined in the Fund Agreement.
So, the USA vision of security, to “protect mutual investments,” is asserted in association..
10-12 February, I was invited to contribute to the NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) on critical European infrastructure, organized in Podgorica by the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, a NATO member, and The International Society for Risk Management (ISRM), Serbia, a non-NATO member. This partnership plus experts from neighboring states made the workshop on risks to regional and West Balkan infrastructure very informative. I felt quite honored, as a regional outsider, an American working on EU energy and geosecurity (based in Berlin), to be invited. Conference FB link
I planned to discuss drivers of EU deindustrialization, but decided to focus on one sharp example: how tech failures in the EU’s energy-infrastructure model, the Green Deal, is causing the unexpected 2025 EU natural gas crisis. This comes while gas prices were still high and supply still problematic from the 2022-23 Energy War – caused by Russia maliciously stopping Nord Stream pipeline flows. This new hit to European competitiveness and security was, however, an eminently avoidable “own goal.” (The workshop discussion is off the record, but I may post my own talk.)
How has the Green Deal model caused another gas crisis?
The EU Green Deal model requires installation of high percentages of wind and solar renewables. However, to supply energy reliably, installation of wind and solar renewable (RE) technology must be paired with installation of sufficient universal, long-term, grid-scale storage (ULTGSS) technology. The idea is excess electricity generated on very sunny, windy and mild days should be stored to compensate supply on dark, calm and cold days. (Let’s put aside, for now, expert debunking of this RE-plus-storage model using weather and tech data.) Over-installation of solar and wind beyond what can be backed up by some other source, is a critical vulnerability to energy infrastructure reliability during periods of cloudy, calm and cold weather. This is called “Dunkelflaute” in German.
However, the reality is that, after some four decades of storage-tech R&D, such a technology still does not exist. There is no lack of studies and data on this. However, EU members remain mandated by the Green Deal and ancillary EU and/or national laws to continue installing ever higher percentages of renewable generation.
As a result, Dunkelflaute conditions in late-November and early December 2024, and again in February 2025 across northern Europe led to prolonged periods of plunging RE generation. Without the aforementioned ULTGSS backup (my acronym), the “de facto ULTGSS” has primarily been natural-gas-fueled generation, plus importing of nuclear, hydro and coal generation from neighboring countries having excess capacity in these.
My talk was an analysis the root cause for another EU natural gas crisis this winter. I explained that the EU’s initial win in the energy war imposed on it by Putin, overcoming the initial, acute crisis of 2022, is nevertheless evolving dangerously into a Pyrrhic victory – into a defeat. This is because EU energy policy, the Green Deal, has critical technological failings, and the present EU Commission leadership refuses to reform it, rejects any serious criticism of the model, and is instead doubling down on an all-renewables system ASAP. In fact, it is assumed that Van der Leyen will announce, late in February, adoption of a new, more “ambitious” target of 90% net-zero emissions by 2040 relative to 1990. (GlobalBarrel.com readers might recall I termed this as “fantasy” in Op-Eds last year in the Polish daily press and elsewhere.)
A Green Deal reform, based on science, is not inherently “right”, “center” or “left”
I explained why a radical reform of this Green Deal model should not be a matter of political philosophy, rather ait requires only an honest recognition that the tech simply does not exist for this scale of installations. Refusal to reform is no longer only anti-science Green populism. After ca. 15 years of this Green Model’s hegemony in various member states, then in Brussels, ALL PARTIES are beset with ideological-scientific confusion and need a certain fresh start, a reeducation or green-energy deprogramming. In particular, center-right parties, such as the CDU in Germany, are typically confused in that they tend to see the entire problem as one of the methods of financing the Green Deal (and the German Energiewende, which provided the model the Green Deal is based on). They focus on having less government mandates, less subsidies, more public financing, and a more liberal, interconnected electricity market in Europe. All well and fine. However, if one is talking about alchemy, funding the transmutation of lead into gold, then it matters little how efficiently it is financed, and how liberal is the market model. In this case, the problem is that a highly RE based model (much less the German, Spanish, Austrian, etc. model of 100% renewables), lacking any universally applicable, long-term, grid-scale storage, is simply energy-infrastructure “alchemy”. It is simply impossible without an entire parallel natural gas system on standby awaiting any instance of Dunkelfloute. This is a disaster, an impossibly complex and expensive model that guarantees ever deeper EU deindustrialization.
Even the farthest right and left parties are hesitant to embrace a fundamentally different model of massive large-scale nuclear as the basis, with also extensive electricity-fueled mass transit build-outs as a clearly already-proven model. The alternative is further high energy prices, deindustrialization and undercutting of European security.
This is in English, after Eugene Romer of Układ Sił media introduces me in Polish. This was at the “3 Seas -1 Opportunity Forum” in Gdansk, last June 4-5, 2024. I have been wanting to post it ever since, as the questions remain relevant. My thanks to Eugene and his team, and to his Opportunity Think Tank colleagues.
My panel at the forum was on problems of relying on energy security that arrives via the sea. So, think Poland and Lithuania’s LNG terminals, of the many sub-sea pipelines, power and communications cables between Baltic and Nordic states. And, since June, all the incidents where ships leaving Russian ports “accidentally” dragged their anchors, cutting such vital links. So, this conference was rather prescient. My sincere thanks to our hosts The Opportunity Institute for Foreign Affairs.
26.01.2022. Experts Wahid Machram, market analyst in Dubai; Samuel Ramadi at Oxford University, UK. and TRT Roundtable host David Foster in London made important points. Here’s a key assessment I made.:
There is a new and growing asymmetry between the European Union and Russia in energy supplies – one increasingly favoring Moscow.
Europe has opened itself to energy blackmail. The present winter 2021-22 gas shortage and skyrocketing prices are only one part. There is also the real possibility of Putin cutting off the pipeline gas he is still supplying in the event that Europe, esp. Germany, opposes any Russian invasion of Ukraine.
About the new EU-Russia growing energy asymmetry:
On the demand side, Germany and Europe generally increasingly need natural gas, and are growing more dependent on Russian supplies, contrary to the promises of rapid progress to a carbon-free future of the German Green Party and others. The EU, and especially Berlin, have adopted ideologically-determind, technologically unrealistic and expensive energy-transition policies, with little concern for energy-supply security. This has made Europe increasingly dependent on Russian gas imports – 40% at present of total gas imports,
Meanwhile, on the supply side, Russia, the major European supplier, is increasingly finding ways to diversify its gas customer base away from Europe, to the Far East, especially to China, and to Eurasia generally. It also has new outlets for its vast Arctic gas resources by converting it to LNG that can go by ship to anywhere in the world.
My Op-Ed on German motives for Nord Stream 2 appeared in the Dziennik Gazeta Pravwna 4 Aug. 2021 (no. 149 dziennik.pl, forsal.pl), derived from an English interview (below here) with Artur Ciechanowiicz (PAP, Brussels). [Polish Op-Ed link]
Read the Polish Op-Ed (PDF) “Germany is not afraid of Russia. It fears risks coming from Ukraine”
Here is my full English interview, expanded for clarity:
1) [AC] What are the consequences of the Nord Stream 2 deal between Washington and Berlin?
[T O’D] Stepping back a bit: this deal marks a victory by Berlin in its long and intensifying contest with its ally, the USA, over which of these two biggest transatlantic powers will decide the alliance’s strategy with respect to Russia and China. The two allies deeply disagree on this matter.
In the USA, both Democrats and Republicans have agreed since the Obama administration that “Great Power Competition” must be the strategy for the alliance versus Russia and China. The Americans strongly feel it is necessary to “decouple” from globalism’s deep trade and tech integration with China and Russia, that these states must either change their disrespect for global trade rules and moderate their increasingly aggressive geopolitical activities, or be isolated and forcibly contained.
Germany, with almost 50% of its GDP from global trade, deeply disagrees with this US strategy [i.e., German exports provide 46.9% of GDP, the USA’s only 11.7%]. Berlin likes global rules; but its unbalanced economy cannot afford trade decoupling and it broadly opposes forceful military containment of China and Russia. Instead, it wants only negotiations and occasional sanctions.
So, Nord Stream 2 is an iconic example of this clash, this “leadership fight” between the USA and Germany over the transatlantic alliance’s strategy towards Russia. Berlin wants to maintain energy ties at all costs, while the USA has long advocated maximum European energy independence from Russia, and to constrain Russia (and defend Ukraine) by forcing Putin to continue having to send gas across Ukraine to reach his European customers.
Russia, for its part, wants to re-incorporate former-Soviet Ukraine [plus Belarus, Moldova and Georgia, and minimally keep them outside of the EU and NATO], and has wanted to avoid having to send its gas to Europe via Ukraine. Moscow’s transit dependence on Ukraine not only provided income for Ukraine, this constrained Russian subversion and military aggression there, for fear that the transit pipelines could be interrupted by either Ukrainian state or non-state actors.
For Germany, the “insecurity” of having to import Russian gas through Ukraine deeply alarmed Berlin. And so it made a strategic decision over 20 years ago to partner with Russia, to build new pipelines to bring gas directly from Russia to Germany [via Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2] and on to European customers long supplied with the same Russian gas but via Ukraine. The aim was to make Germany the new hub for distribution of Russian gas in Europe.
Given Berlin’s logic, the 2014 Russian war on Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea only made it more sure than ever of the dangers of relying on Russian gas imports that have to transit Ukraine, and it redoubled its efforts to complete NS2, notwithstanding this would undermine German relations with three consecutive US administrations and with many of its EU allies, esp. Poland and East-Central Europe – a region where its much-prized soft power has been sacrificed.
Biden reminds Erdogan of how contingent his geostrategic gains are on the US & NATO with recognition of Armenian Genocide. (See “Turkey” section of the report). Aside from obvious historical and justice reasons for Biden’s recognition, the Turkish role in the Azerbaijan-Armenia war is relevant here. From the report:
On the political and diplomatic side, the genocide recognition’s impact is mainly via engendering consternation vs the US and Nato, especially in inflicting a loss of face on Erdogan. However, the geopolitical impacts are still more concrete. Erdogan won a significant success for Turkish influence in the Caucuses with the Turkish demonstration of its military capacities via Azerbaijan’s agile use of Turkish drones, in particular the impressive swarming tactics learned from the Turks (in turn clearly derived by Turkey from NATO allies via joint exercises, etc. ). So, NATO was de facto valuable to Ankara in achieving this new influence. Further, now Biden, with the genocide recognition, has moved to strengthen the US hand in presently politically chaotic Armenia, while retaining its long-time links to Azerbaijan (especially in energy matters such as the new Southern Corridor Pipeline v. Russian gas-supply dominance of Europe). So, Biden et al have given Erdogan a rather humiliating reminder of how contingent his power projections are, ultimately, on the US superpower and NATO.
Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, Wikistrat key trends in Middle East, May 2021
Also, I speak to Erdogan’s recent ambitious projections of power throughout Mideast & Caucuses are being hindered by Turkish economic disfunction at home.
Soldiers deployed in Poland are a kind of warning to the Kremlin. – Source: GazetaPrawna.pl
My interview on Trump’s announced US troop draw downs from Germany and partial reassignment to Poland appeared in the Polish economic press Gazeta Prawna on 25 June 2020 by the Polish journalist Artur Ciechanowicz. You can read it (a) in ENGLISH below (via Google Translate, with minor fixes) or (b) in the POLISH original at this link.
O’Donnell: Soldiers at the borders of Russia are a signal to the Kremlin [INTERVIEW]
From a military point of view, deploying too many troops too close to the border with a potential enemy is dangerous because there is a risk that they can be overrun rapidly – says Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, energy and international affairs analyst, and adjunct faculty at Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.
Question: US President Donald Trump has decided to increase the US military presence in Poland, while also reducing the contingent in Germany. Where do these decisions come from?
On the one hand, they logically result from the American National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 2017. Work on it began during Barack Obama’s term of office and was completed by the Donald Trump administration. According to the NSS, the US priority is no longer the war on terror and the situation in the Middle East, but competition with China and Russia. It is therefore quite natural that the United States moves its troops and increases its military presence in countries closer to Russia – the Baltic States, Poland and Romania. The second factor that led to these decisions was the personal involvement of Donald Trump, who is running his election campaign.
Poland’s security will increase?
As a rule, increasing the US military presence in Poland is of course good news. The Pentagon’s activities have been moving in this direction for some time, although the US military is of the opinion that this should be done a little slower and not at the expense of Germany. From a military point of view, deploying too much of the army too close to the border with a potential enemy is dangerous because there is a risk that it will be overrun too soon. There is therefore a tactical reason to keep some of the army a little further from the Russian border. Therefore, the rapid relocation of a significant number of soldiers to Poland is viewed skeptically by some American commanders. Remember, soldiers deployed in Poland are a kind of warning against the Kremlin. There are enough of them for Vladimir Putin to think twice before doing anything. However, not enough – even after increasing the quota – to stop the first strike. The rule is simple here: if Russia decided to attack Poland and American soldiers would die, it would mean a war with all the power of the US. Neither any president nor Congress would hesitate a single moment.
Some American commanders are opposed to the permanent presence of US troops in Poland. Why? Continue reading →
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