I was interviewed by David Karalvanov at bTV (Bulgaria) on the US-Venezuela confrontation under Trump and Maduro (01Dec). David used excerpts for a documentary and kindly gave me the full video here. An outline of the five questions and answers is below here.
Three Asides: (i) In a recent CNN interview I spoke about other Trump geo-economic/geostrategic rationales. and mentioned this Venezuelan opposition’s long unwillingness to organize or allow a domestic popular movements to forcibly restore democracy from below. See: “Why Trump wants a Venezuelan oil boom …“). (ii) I recall vividly how Trump and co., in his first term, easily misled a naively dependent Venezuelan opposition, which in turn misled the country’s suffering population into believing the USA was preparing to forcibly liberate them. This was deeply corrosive to advancing any self-reliant domestic anti-Maduro movement. In the end, with Bolton, the Trump administration revealed its self-interest and incompetence as a petty putsch Bolton et al attempted to execute was embarrassingly gamed by the Venezuelan regime’s intelligence police. (iii) I’ve written for 20 years on Venezuela, Chavismo and oil, including two years as visiting professor, Universidad Central de Venezuela’s UCV/CENDES, Caracas. (I’m happy to speak to any audience in detail on Ven.-US-China-Russia-Iran-Colombian-EU-… and/or Ven. domestic matters.- TO’D)
David’s five questions and some of my answers:
1. What is the situation with Venezuelan oil reserves? I explained that Venezuela’s oil reserves, are the largest in the world and mostly extra heavy oil along the Orinoco River.
2. Why is Venezuelan oil production so low when it has the world’s largest reserves? I explained some history of both corruption and incompetence since the 2002 paro or national oil company strike.
3. What do drugs have to do with the US-Venezuelan confrontation? I discussed three issues the USA is raising:
(i) drugs (fentanyl and cocaine) and Trump’s apparent beliefs about these issues,
(ii) the Venezuelan emigration crisis, with 7.9 million people having left under Maduro due to severe inflation, lack of food and etc., which in turn dovetails with Trump’s focus on the USA immigration crisis, and
(iii) a new, several-years’-evolving USA view towards Venezuela’s huge oil reserves (especially under Trump) and on the USA position within the Western Hemisphere.
On the latter point, I make clear that there was never any reason for the USA to care deeply about Venezuela’s oil since when Chavez came to power, despite Chavez’s (especially) and Maduro’s constant warnings to the Venezuelan public that the USA was supposedly always on the verge of invading to take its oil riches. This disinterest was because of the gas and oil production explosion in the USA since esp. 2005 and 2007, with then-new fracking technology applied to the USA’s huge shale oil resources.
However, I explain my analysis that there are now two NEW reasons the USA, and esp. Trump might be interested in getting Venezuelan oil back online rather rapidly. One is that it may be necessary to remove Russian oil almost entirely from the market to force Putin to make peace. The other (not sufficient in itself) is that USA shale oil is very light oil and the USA and Caribbean refineries were built for heavier So. American and older-traditional Texas crude oils. It would be very beneficial to mix some upgraded Venezuelan extra-heavy crude with the USE’s presently very light shale oils to optimize use of these refineries and make the USA and W. Hemisphere more self-sufficient …. an important issue in Trump’s geo-economic and geopolitical world views.
4. So, the USA thinks that Venezuelan oil would give it an edge to take the Russian petrostate offline? I explain the prospects for “huge” USA and European oil-firm investments in Venezuela if Maduro is forced out. Although there is a glut of oil today in the world market allowing the USA, Ukraine and a Gulf allies, etc. to take Russia offline if needs be, longer term I see that the Trump administration is interested in getting Venezuelan oil online longer term to change the international balance of power in oil and stop the Russian petrostate from committing aggression vs. Ukraine and many other states.
5. Issues of a possible “deal” between Trump and Maduro to get Maduro to leave? This is a long story. I explain first that Trump tried with Richard Grenell & a USA oil-investment firm to make deals with Maduro (like he tried with Putin too to end the Ukraine war). But, Maduro never carried through on past negotiated deals. Then, Trump adapted the view of Rubio-Machado to force Maduro out. I outline three possible scenarios: (i) Maduro agrees to leave, (ii) some form of indigenous or seemingly indigenous military coup forcing him out, and (iii) Maduro’s forcible removal, in some manner, by the USA. In each case, I compare the likelihood of resistance form armed, pro-Chavista groups and various bandito-former-guerillas active in illegal mining and other elicit activities (often with Colombian origins) within Venezuela. In any case, as the USA (should have) learned in Iraq, sufficient forces must be committed to insure the security of the state and civil society or it is irrelevant if the USA has “secured” the oil fields and ministry. Although the vast majority of Venezuelans have little care HOW the dictator Maduro is removed, the willingness of pro-Chavista armed groups or groupings form the present armed forces, etc. to engage in terrorism, armed resistance, and sabotage, could have a very big effect on retarding the economic – and oil – recovery of Venezuela, and destabilize and sabotage energy infrastructure in neighboring states for many years. This has to be handled carefully. It is clear the present US administration, more than others, lacks realism and competence in these matters.
The Global Barrel 