In the last two weeks, I was in Warsaw twice. First, for the Three Seas One Opportunity conference (3S1O) on 27 April, organized by the Opportunity Think Tank, where I co-chaired a session. This was an official side event of the Three Seas Summit (a ministerial conference). Second, for the Warsaw Security Forum’s Public Dialogue. (WSF) 7 May. I will soon post here about both these very interesting events.
However, I was asked by TVP, the Polish national broadcaster, to come to their Warsaw studios on 8 May, the day after the WSF, for a live-on-air commentary on the recent drama in the German Bundestag (parliament) where the new Chancellor, Fredrich Merz, embarrassingly failed to get the necessary votes on the first ballot. He finally succeeded on second ballot, after intense politicking and consultations within his party, the center-right CDU, in its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, and in his coalition-partner party, the center-left SPD.
So, first; I was asked to explain this surprising electoral fiasco for the new chancellor, Merz, and his party, and how it may have weakened his new government.
Secondly, Merz immediately, after being sworn in, undertook a one-day whirlwind trip to Paris and then Warsaw, to visit his prospective main partners in the European Union, President Macron of France and Prime Minister Tusk of Poland. (Continued ….)
My interview above addressed several longtime Polish-German differences predating the present two leaders’ tenures, issues which again generated frictions during Mertz’s visit.
To illustrate my point, listen to Tusk’s rather strident tone in their press conference (video here) when Merz arrived. Note too Merz’s points – unfortunately the German to English translation in this Indian news service video is poor.
In contrast, Merz’s meeting with Macron had gone much better than the later one with Tusk. In fact, Merz had endorsed much closer security cooperation with France (EuroNews), but not with Poland.
The two areas of most difficulty were, first, European security and the war in Ukraine, and second immigration and border controls.
(Importantly, at least to me, they did agree on a new Berlin-to-Warsaw fast train line. Just what I need! A very pleasant trip today, it nevertheless takes six hours for ca. 600 Km. If the new train averages over 200 km/h, it could cut 2.5 hours, and perhaps only 3.0 running as an express).
In the interview, I brought up what seemed to me the two “elephants in the room”:
— First, the present industrial decline of Germany, increasingly understood in Germany as a process of forced “deindustrialization”. I began warning of this almost three years ago, seeing uncompetitiveness that grew during the Merkel-era morphing under Scholz’s tenure into outright deindustrialization. This transition has been especially driven by the fiasco of Germany’s populist, techno-optimist all-renewables energy-transition policy. This policy had already long caused uncompetitively high energy prices, which were subsequently exacerbated by Putin’s weaponization and cutoff of what had been relatively cheap and massive Russian gas supplies to Germany before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
— Secondly, the other elephant in the room as Merz and Tusk met was the challenge posed by Trump’s tariffs and his looming economic and financial demands on Europe, demands which will only exacerbate — and consciously exploit — the aforementioned German deindustrialization.
Unfortunately, as I will discuss here in coming weeks, Merz’s choice for his minister for energy and economy has only reaffirmed my suspicions during the recent German election campaign that Merz and his CDU lack an understanding of the 40-plus-year failures to develop the technology and system-integration (synergetic) elements required for any “all renewables” or heavily renewables-based national electric grid, such as that Germany is striving for. This analytical and policy failing of the Merz government will undermine his stated high-priority plans to reduce the country’s energy costs so as to staunch deindustrialization, just as it undermined the previous government’s efforts.
This all has deep implications for Poland. In fact, at the Warsaw Security Forum, I asked Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski to elaborate the differences in German vs Polish energy policies which lead each to such different attitudes towards the resumption of reliance on Russian gas imports. Sikorski’s answer, understandably, avoided any direct answer to this question, especially given that the new German chancellor was about to arrive in town.
In my TVP interview, I stressed the looming negative economic impacts for Poland and other Central and Eastern European (CEE) states if-and-when Merz fails to halt German deindustrialization, considering Germany is the CEE’s main trading partner.
Meanwhile, on a very positive note, and unbeknownst to the public at the time of the interview, two things were underway:
After their meeting in Warsaw, Merz and Poland’s Tusk, were joined by the UK’s PM Starmer, and set off on a train journey to visit Kyiv and met with President Zelensky. A very positive initiative by the three.
Lastly, you will note that I put forward an explanation, in my interview, of the difference in the national perspectives and strategic postures of the now-to-be-strengthened Weimar Triangle countries of France, Germany and Poland, to the ongoing war in Ukraine and to the ultimate issue of guaranteeing the peace that may come, especially in so far as committing any troops within Ukraine to guarantee the peace. Readers’ take on my analysis of this is of interest to me, any thoughts are appreciated, as always.
Best, Tom O’D (back in Berlin)
The Global Barrel 