My gratitude to LRT.lt journalist Vaida Kalinkaitė-Matuliauskienė for this in-depth print interview. We spoke just after Baltic states had disconnected from the Russian-Belarus electrical grid, BRELL, and had connected with the European grid. This was a complex and costly project, executed rapidly and flawlessly. [My comment continue below, after the English (first link) and Lithuanian (second link) versions:]
If you had stayed in BRELL, it would have been much easier for Russia
[a Google translation PDF]12 Mar 2025 — Of course, this zone is not only yours, it is connected to the European Union (EU). Thomas O’Donnell | Warsaw Conference “Energy Security in the Middle and… || LRThttps://www.lrt.lt › Verslas ||
jeigu būtumėte likę BRELL, Rusijai būtų daug lengviau
12 Mar 2025 — Žinoma, ši zona ne tik jūsų, ji sujungta su Europos Sąjunga (ES). Thomas O’Donnell | Varšuvos konferencijos „Energetinis saugumas Vidurio ir… || LRThttps://www.lrt.lt › Verslas || Translate this
The Baltic states’ impetus was obvious: a deep mistrust of Russia after its 2022 cutoff of half of all European gas imports intended to pressure EU states to abandon solidarity with Ukraine as Russia invaded it. So, switching to the European grid is a great relief. However, the dangers haven’t ended.
There have been several mysterious cuts to communications cables and gas pipelines running under the Baltic Sea, raising new alarms (see references below: Baltic Sea Cable Cuts). The Baltic States’ new connections with Europe now include undersea cables to the Nordic states. LRT.lt, the Lithuanian public broadcaster, was very interested to ask me what might Russia’s motives and aims be with the recent spate of apparent state-sanctioned sabotage and what to expect next.
[FYI: Here is an earlier interview from June 2024 in Gdansk, that includes a discussion of Baltic Sea energy risks, and here is an earlier, long interview from January 2025 with Aleksandra Ketlerienė, LRT.lt deputy editor-in-chief, on Baltic and EU energy security issues vis-a-vis Russia, and Trump’s policies.]
Our interview then turned to concerns over what would be optimal Lithuanian energy policies, especially what energy transition model should the Baltic states, as small states, embrace.
As always, I advocated putting security of supply and cost as most important. In particular, I stressed that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia must be pragmatic, avoiding:
- Populist and unscientific overreliance on “renewable” (RE), “green”, weather-variable wind and solar generation, most especially as there has, unfortunately not been any universally applicable, long-term, grid-scale storage tech developed, and also because high-percentage renewables generation requires massive rebuilding and expansions of the entire distribution and transmission grids, as well as interconnections to neighboring countries, and it requires the addition of “smart” features to handle matching the complex, independent variabilities of both demand and RE generation levels.
- Avoid populist, anti-scientific nuclear phobias (which, by the way, do not require any of the above-mentioned very expensive and very complex additional tech or grid infrastructure required by RE generation).
The European “Green Deal” unfortunately promotes a sort of “renewables-fundamentalism,” as I have termed it, a very high or de facto complete dependence on weather-variable RE generation, a plan like that which long ago gripped Germany, Austria, Denmark, Spain, the UK and some other EU states.
Now that the EU has lost its cheap Russian pipeline gas as an energy backup, these states committed to unsustainable levels of RE generation are facing severe distortions and insecurity in their electrical supplies. This is principally because there simply is no large-scale grid-storage technology to back up renewables when they generate minimal energy on calm and overcast days and so, natural gas generation which can be easily ramped up and down in counter-sync with weather-variable renewables, has become the de fact long-term grid-scale “storage” tech. Thus, natural gas supplies to the gas-resource-poor EU has been chronically geo-politicized – which made the Russian gas cutoff all the more devastating, and its impact so long lasting.
Any illusions that Baltic or any EU states can rely on 100% weather-dependent renewable energy should by now be shattered by looking at the complex energy mess these countries all now face, with volatile and often-high natural gas and/or electricity prices.
The failure of this utopic all-renewables policy is now causing huge hits to industrial competitiveness across Europe, most especially in Germany, beset with deindustrialization. This in turn is a major contribution to the present deindustrialization of Germany, and a big hit to EU competitiveness.
So, the warning I respectfully offered for Lithuania and the small Baltic states was that they are much more vulnerable than these larger Member states to Green Deal policies plunging them into chronic energy crisis. Simply put, small states have much less margin for error in their energy policies, and especially so if they are on a hostile Russia’s doorstep.
In particular I advocate, for the Baltic states (but really any others too) that they:
- Strictly limit installations of weather-dependent renewables. That is to say, limit wind and solar generation installations to below the threshold where it is necessary to begin the extremely expensive and complex rebuilding of entire electrical grids and where one also needs to install technologies for long-term, grid-scale storage — in particular, as I said above, because the latter technologies simply do not exist, after some 45 years of dedicated R&D. Depending on the state of their present grids, national wealth, system governance capacities and etc. this might be a maximum of 20 to perhaps 30% weather-dependent RE generation.
- Therefore, serious consideration should be given to installing small modular reactors (SMRs), as various new models of these are built and demonstrated to be economical over the coming decade (i.e., this will occur mostly in the USA, UK, Canada and So. Korea), and/or to installing regionally shared large-scale Generation 3+ reactors. In either the SMR or Gen 2+ cases, this should provide a reliable, uninterrupted, and thus secure, carbon-free grid.
- In the interim, one must secure what piped natural gas and/or LNG one can, with generally longer-term contracts to insulate for price volatility and for energy-supply security. This is the best, most flexible interim fossil-fuel electrical and heat generation source until high-percentage decarbonization can be pragmatically, securely and affordably achieved.
Appendix 1. RELATED CONFERENCE:_
I’ll be moderating a panel (see Agenda). The session is called: The Baltic as an Innovation Hub) at the “Three Seas, One Opportunity” Conference in Warsaw on 27 April, where many of these same questions will be examined by Polish, Baltic, 3 Seas regional and other experts. See the website here or watch the promo video, and out the attendance form there, if you want to attend. Organized by the Opportunity Institute (Gdansk).
Appendix 2. References on Baltic Sea Cable Cuts:
2024 Baltic Sea submarine cable disruptions – Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Baltic_Sea_submarine_cable_disruptions
Our Gdansk chat: Baltic energy risks | USA ousting China from post-war order | “Transition” will be simple: nuclear & mass-transit. “Critical” minerals overblown | EU’s failing model: all-renewables, new grids, grid-storage & EVs | Poland’s risk: China uses Russia | The Global Barrel
https://globalbarrel.com/2025/02/07/our-gdansk-chat-baltic-energy-risks-usa-ousting-china-from-post-war-order-transition-will-be-simple-nuclear-mass-transit-critical-minerals-overblown-eus-failing-model-all-ren/
Cut connections: the growing concern over Baltic Sea cable incidents
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/cut-connections-the-growing-concern-over-baltic-sea-cable-incidents/ss-AA1zKPcJ?ocid=finance-verthp-feeds
EU To Enhance Security Of Undersea Cables After Sabotage – Barron’s
https://www.barrons.com/news/eu-to-enhance-security-of-undersea-cables-after-sabotage-94800e9e
A timeline of suspected underwater sabotage incidents in the Baltic Sea | World News – Hindustan Times
https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/a-timeline-of-suspected-underwater-sabotage-incidents-in-the-baltic-sea-101740155236855.html
Sweden launches probe after yet another Baltic Sea cable is damaged
https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20250221-sweden-launches-probe-after-yet-another-baltic-sea-cable-is-damaged
Chinese ship suspected of cutting undersea cables connecting Finland and Sweden to Central Europe
https://myind.net/Home/viewArticle/chinese-ship-suspected-of-cutting-undersea-cables-connecting-finland-and-sweden-to-central-europe
Norway Seizes Russian-Crewed Ship Suspected of Cutting an Undersea Cable – The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/31/world/europe/norway-russia-ship-baltic-undersea-cable.html
China ‘ringing alarm bells’ as it unveils deep-sea cable cutting device – NewsBreak
https://www.newsbreak.com/express-u-s–316349130/3868052693573-china-ringing-alarm-bells-as-it-unveils-deep-sea-cable-cutting-device
Baltic Sea Cable Incidents Pile Up—Who Is To Blame?
https://www.forbes.com/sites/katharinabuchholz/2025/01/31/baltic-sea-cable-incidents-pile-upwho-is-to-blame/
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3 Seas 1 Opportunity Conference. My panel description:
The Baltic as an Innovation Hub: Advancements in AI, cloud and quantum technologies, and digital solutions for business and administration. The Baltic as a hub for innovation in the Three Seas region, from smart infrastructure to new digital economy models.
Moderators: Tomoyuki Hashimoto, Vilnius University/SGH, & Dr. Thomas O’Donnell, Wilson Center
